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Abstract			This	 thesis	 investigates	 the	 proliferation	 of	 alternative	 political	 imaginaries	 in	 the	Web-based	 art	 produced	 during	 the	 global	 financial	 crisis	 of	 2008	 and	 its	 aftermath	 (2008-2015),	with	a	particular	focus	on	the	influence	of	communist	utopianism.	The	thesis	begins	by	 exploring	 the	 continuous	 relevance	 of	 utopianism	 to	 Western	 political	 thought,	including	 the	 historical	 context	 within	 which	 the	 financial	 crisis	 of	 2008	 occurred.	 This	context	has	been	defined	by	the	new	political,	social	and	cultural	milieu	produced	by	the	development	 of	 Data	 Capitalism	 –	 the	 dominant	 economic	 paradigm	 of	 the	 last	 two	decades.	In	parallel,	the	thesis	identifies	the	“organic”	connections	between	leftist	utopian	thought	and	networked	technologies,	in	order	to	claim	that	the	events	of	2008	functioned	as	a	catalyst	for	their	reactivation	and	expansion.	Following	this	analysis,	the	thesis	focuses	on	how	politically	engaged	artists	have	reacted	to	the	global	financial	crisis	through	the	use	of	the	World	Wide	Web.	More	specifically,	the	thesis	categorises	a	wide	range	of	artworks,	institutional	 and	non-institutional	 initiatives,	 as	well	 as	 theoretical	 texts	 that	have	either	been	written	by	artists,	or	have	inspired	them.	The	result	of	this	exercise	is	a	mapping	of	the	post-crisis	Web-based	art,	which	is	grounded	on	the	technocultural	tools	employed	by	artists	 as	well	 as	 on	 the	main	 concepts	 and	 ideals	 that	 they	 have	 aimed	 at	materialising	through	 the	 use	 of	 such	 tools.	 Furthermore,	 the	 thesis	 examines	 the	 interests	 of	 Data	Capitalists	in	art	and	the	Internet,	and	the	kinds	of	restrictions	and	obstacles	that	they	have	imposed	 on	 the	 political	 use	 of	 the	Web	 in	 order	 to	 safeguard	 them.	 Finally,	 the	 thesis	produces	an	overall	evaluation	of	the	previously	analysed	cultural	products	by	taking	into	account	both	the	objectives	of	their	creators	and	the	external	and	internal	limitations	that	ultimately	shape	their	character.	Accordingly,	the	thesis	locates	the	examined	works	within	the	ideological	spectrum	of	Marxist	and	post-Marxist	thought	in	order	to	formulate	a	series	of	 proposals	 about	 the	 future	 of	 politically	 engaged	 Web-based	 art	 and	 the	 ideological	potentialities	of	networked	communication	at	large.					
	
		 iii	
Contents	
		
Acknowledgements	.............................................................................................................................	ix	
Introduction	...........................................................................................................................................	1	Mapping	Utopian	Art:	Alternative	Political	Imaginaries	in	New	Media	Art	(2008-2015)	10	
Chapter	1	|	Creating	(in)	Data	Capitalism:	New	Art	for	a	New	Economy?	.......................	16	Towards	a	New	Economic	Paradigm	........................................................................................................	16	The	Rise	and	Fall	(?)	of	Data	Capitalism	..................................................................................................	19	Art	of	the	Revolution	and	the	Revolution	of	Art	..................................................................................	26	Crisis	2.0:	Art	Alert!	..........................................................................................................................................	30	
Chapter	2	|	Utopia	Distributed:	The	Organic	Connections	of	the	Internet	with	
Communist	Thought	.........................................................................................................................	40	In	and	Out	of	Communism:	Theorising	New	Worlds	.........................................................................	40	From	the	“End	of	History”	to	the	End	of	Utopia	...................................................................................	45	From	the	End	of	Utopia	to	Another	“End	of	History”	........................................................................	47	Searching	for	the	Nature	of	Revolution	...................................................................................................	51	Kantian	Justice	and	the	Repudiation	of	Possession	............................................................................	54	Benjamin’s	Revolutionary	Art	Object	.......................................................................................................	57	Deconstructing	the	Aura:	Deconstructing	Time	..................................................................................	60	The	Fluid	Temporality	of	Contemporaneity	..........................................................................................	65	Grand	Narratives:	Joining	the	Pieces	........................................................................................................	69	Art	in	the	Age	of	Online	Reproduction	.....................................................................................................	72	
Chapter	3	|	Diagnosing	the	Crisis:	Deconstruction	and	Protest	.........................................	78	Formulating	the	“Telekommunist”	Agenda	...........................................................................................	78	The	Systems	of	the	System:	Making	Sense	of	Data	Capitalism	......................................................	85	Deconstructing	the	flow	.............................................................................................................................................	87	Labour	as	domination	.................................................................................................................................................	95	The	rediscovery	of	the	proletariat	......................................................................................................................	104	Cutting	culture	in	a	culture	of	cuts	.....................................................................................................................	108	From	Occupying	the	Square	to	Reclaiming	the	Commons	...........................................................	117	The	hackers	of	the	streets	......................................................................................................................................	124	
Chapter	4	|	The	Rise	of	Radical	Institutions:	Towards	Alternative	Modes	of	
Socioeconomic	Being	......................................................................................................................	128	From	Public	Space	to	Hackerspace	.........................................................................................................	128	The	Currency	of	Capitalism	and	the	Death	of	Currencies	.............................................................	134	
		 iv	
“Liberating”	speculation	.........................................................................................................................................	137	Bitcoin	and	its	legacies	............................................................................................................................................	143	Exchange	beyond	money	........................................................................................................................................	148	Between	the	“Community”	and	the	“Commune”:	Reimagining	the	State	..............................	152	From	the	Web	to	the	ground	(and	back)	.........................................................................................................	156	
Chapter	5	|	Between	Myth	and	Reality:	The	Limits	of	the	Political	Web	.......................	169	“It’s	the	Economy,	Stupid”	..........................................................................................................................	169	Post-Internet	Art	and	the	Fable	of	the	Apolitical	Web	...................................................................	172	Expanding	Online:	The	Web	as	a	Marketplace	..................................................................................	179	Art	as	Data	as	Profit	.......................................................................................................................................	188	From	Globalisation	to	Googlization:	The	Rise	of	New	Monopolies	..........................................	195	Institutional	Control,	Legal	Constraints	and	the	Limits	of	Online	Freedom	.........................	203	
Chapter	6	|	Changing	a	Changing	World:	Art	Within	Endless	Crisis	...............................	214	The	Manifesto	Criterion	...............................................................................................................................	214	Exploring	the	Shades	of	“Red”	..................................................................................................................	218	From	the	Ideology	of	Networks	to	the	Ideology	of	the	Multitude	.............................................	225	Procedural	Sublimity	and	the	“Society	of	Non-Spectacle”	............................................................	232	From	Abstraction	to	the	“Unstable	Equilibrium	of	Compromise”	............................................	240	Systemic	Instability	and	the	Rise	of	“Cybertopos”	...........................................................................	243	Post-net	Participation:	Towards	a	“Value-driven	Demos”?	.........................................................	253	
Conclusion	..........................................................................................................................................	261	
Glossary	..............................................................................................................................................	271	
Bibliography	......................................................................................................................................	277													
		 v	
	 List	of	Figures	 				Figure	1:	Agitprop	train	(1919)	.......................................................................................................................	27	Figure	2:	Krzysztof	Wodiczko,	Projection	onto	South	Africa	House	(1985)	..................................	33	Figure	3:	Natalie	Bookchin,	Metapet	(2003)	..............................................................................................	35	Figure	4:	Electronic	Disturbance	Theater,	Zapatista	Tactical	Floodnet	(1998)	.........................	37	Figure	5:	WikiLeaks	..............................................................................................................................................	38	Figure	6:	The	re-enactment	of	the	storming	of	the	Winter	Palace	(1920)	...................................	41	Figure	7:	The	Fall	of	the	Berlin	Wall	(1989)	..............................................................................................	43	Figure	8:	View	from	the	speaker’s	platform	at	the	ancient	agora	in	Athens	(Pnyx)	................	50	Figure	9:	The	photograph	of	Kafka	referenced	by	Walter	Benjamin	..............................................	59	Figure	10:	The	front	cover	of	the	television	programme	for	the	1936	Olympic	Games	.........	62	Figure	11:	The	Deadswap	stand	at	the	Transmediale	festival	in	Berlin	(2012)	.........................	81	Figure	12:	Octo	installed	at	Haus	der	Kulturen	der	Welt,	in	Berlin	(2013)	..................................	83	Figure	13:	Burak	Arikan,	Networks	of	Dispossession	(2013)	...............................................................	88	Figure	14:	Burak	Arikan,	Islam,	Republic,	Neoliberalism	(2012)	.......................................................	89	Figure	15:	Burak	Arikan,	Higher	Education	Industrial	Complex	(2013)	.........................................	90	Figure	16:	Paolo	Cirio,	Loophole4All	(2013)	..............................................................................................	93	Figure	17:	Paolo	Cirio,	Loophole4All	Certificates	of	Incorporation	(2013)	..................................	94	Figure	18:	Paolo	Cirio,	Loophole4All	corporate	diagram	(2013)	......................................................	94	Figure	19:	Stephanie	Rothenberg,	Invisible	Threads	(2008)	...............................................................	96	Figure	20:	Stephanie	Rothenberg’s	Invisible	Threads	installed	at	LABORAL	Centro	de	Arte,	Gijon,	Spain	(2010)	...............................................................................................................................................	97	Figure	21:	Stephanie	Rothenberg,	Jeffrey	Crouse	and	Michael	Schieben,	Laborers	of	Love	(2011)	.........................................................................................................................................................................	99	Figure	22:	Karin	Hansson,	The	Affect	Machine	(2012)	.......................................................................	102	Figure	23:	Liens	Invisibles,	Seppukoo	(2009-2011)	............................................................................	103	Figure	24:	Natalie	Bookchin,	Laid	Off	(2009)	.........................................................................................	106	Figure	25:	Natalie	Bookchin,	Long	Story	Short	(2014-2016)	..........................................................	108	Figure	26:	Museum	of	Contemporary	Cuts	(MoCC)	.............................................................................	110	Figure	27:	Olga	Kisseleva,	Money	is	Time	(2014)	..................................................................................	111	Figure	28:	Tom	Corby,	No	Detectable	Level	(2013)	.............................................................................	112	Figure	29:	W.A.G.E.	artist’s	fees	calculator	..............................................................................................	114	Figure	30:	W.A.G.E.,	pOWER	(100):	A	Screenplay	(2012)	...................................................................	115	Figure	31:	Maurice	Benayoun,	Emotion	Forecast	(2010)	..................................................................	117	Figure	32:	Maurice	Benayoun,	Occupy	Wall	Screens	(2011)	............................................................	119	Figure	33:	EMST,	Esse,	Nosse,	Posse:	Common	Wealth	for	Common	People	(2010)	................	121	Figure	34:	EMST,	Mapping	the	Commons	(2010)	..................................................................................	122	Figure	35:	Julian	Oliver,	Damian	Stewart	and	Arturo	Castro,	The	Artvetiser	(2010)	............	125	Figure	36:	Liam	Young,	Electronic	Countermeasures	(2011)	...........................................................	126	Figure	37:	Centre	of	Contemporary	Culture	(CCCB)	LAB..................................................................	130	Figure	38:	Furtherfield,	Zero	Dollar	Laptop	workshop	(2010)	.......................................................	134	Figure	39:	Stefanos	Tsivopoulos,	History	Zero	central	room	(2013)	...........................................	135	Figure	40:	Christian	Nold,	Bijlmer	Euro	(2010)	.....................................................................................	139	Figure	41:	Christian	Nold,	Bijlmer	Euro	transaction	flows	(2010)	................................................	140	Figure	42:	Paolo	Cirio,	P2P	Gift	Credit	Card	(2010)	.............................................................................	142	Figure	43:	Paolo	Cirio,	P2P	Gift	Credit	Card	basic	credit	diagram	(2010)	..................................	143	
		 vi	
Figure	44:	Caleb	Larsen,	A	tool	to	deceive	and	slaughter	eBay	auction	page	(2009,	ongoing).....................................................................................................................................................................................	147	Figure	45:	e-flux,	Time/Bank	listings	page	(2010,	ongoing)	............................................................	149	Figure	46:	Neighbourhood	Time	Exchange	(2014,	ongoing)	............................................................	151	Figure	47:	Neighbourhood	Time	Exchange	gallery	event	(2015)	...................................................	152	Figure	48:	Natalie	Bookchin,	agoraXchange	(2004-2008)	...............................................................	154	Figure	49:	Eugenio	Tisselli,	Sauti	ya	wakulima	(2011,	ongoing)	...................................................	157	Figure	50:	Eugenio	Tisselli	,Los	ojos	de	la	milpa	(2012)	....................................................................	158	Figure	51:	r0g_,	#OSJUBA	(2012)	.................................................................................................................	162	Figure	52:	Paolo	Cirio,	Global	Direct	personal	decision	diagram	(2014)	...................................	164	Figure	53:	Paolo	Cirio,	Global	Direct	participatory	legislative	diagram	(2014)	......................	165	Figure	54:	Artie	Vierkant,	Image	Object	Thursday	4	June	2015	12:53PM	(2015)	....................	172	Figure	55:	Katja	Novitskova,	Mars	Potential	(Cat)	(2015)	................................................................	173	Figure	56:	Alex	Ruthner,	(B)	RUSH	(2015)	..............................................................................................	174	Figure	57:	Artsy	...................................................................................................................................................	181	Figure	58:	The	Andy	Warhol	Foundation	at	Christie’s	.......................................................................	184	Figure	59:	Fach	&	Asendorf	Gallery’s	GIF	Market	................................................................................	185	Figure	60:	Daata	Editions	................................................................................................................................	186	Figure	61:	Google	Cultural	Institute	...........................................................................................................	190	Figure	62:	Google	Cultural	Institute’s	“Art	Project”	.............................................................................	192	Figure	63:	Google’s	DevArt	.............................................................................................................................	194	Figure	64:	Internet.org	.....................................................................................................................................	205	Figure	65:	The	quadrants	of	the	political	spectrum	of	Internet	governance	............................	226	Figure	66:	Farmville	..........................................................................................................................................	235	Figure	67:	Ian	Bogost,	Cow	Clicker	(2010)	..............................................................................................	237	Figure	68:	Conor	McGarrigle,	NAMAland	(2010)	.................................................................................	251	Figure	69:	Conor	McGarrigle,	NAMAland	participatory	event/walk	(2010)	............................	252								 	
		 vii	
													During	the	period	of	registered	study	in	which	this	thesis	was	prepared	the	author	has	not	been	registered	for	any	other	academic	award	or	qualification.	The	material	included	in	this	thesis	has	not	been	submitted	wholly	or	in	part	for	any	academic	award	or	qualification	other	than	that	for	which	it	is	now	submitted.			Signature:	 	Date:	11th	April	2016														
		 viii	
														
To	my	parents	
	
To	my	teachers																		
		 ix	
Acknowledgements			I	would	not	have	been	able	to	complete	this	research	project	without	the	generous	help	of	many	 people.	 Foremost,	 I	 wish	 to	 express	 my	 sincerest	 gratitude	 to	 my	 supervisors	Professor	David	Crowley	and	Monika	Parrinder	for	their	excellent	guidance	throughout	my	study.	This	thesis	only	represents	a	small	fraction	of	the	support	that	I	have	received	from	them	over	 the	 last	 five	 years.	 In	particular,	 I	would	 like	 to	 acknowledge	my	 supervisors’	constructive	advice	in	my	effort	to	balance	my	engagements	as	an	artist	against	my	work	as	an	 academic	 tutor	 and	 researcher,	 which	 has	 been	 a	 challenging	 task	 at	 times.	Furthermore,	 I	am	particularly	grateful	to	Professor	Lanfranco	Aceti	at	Boston	University	and	the	Leonardo	Electronic	Almanac	(The	MIT	Press)	for	his	insightful	comments	and	our	fruitful	collaboration	in	the	context	of	LEA	since	2012.	I	would	especially	like	to	thank	him	for	giving	me	 the	opportunity	 to	publish	a	volume	of	LEA	 in	2014,	which	 focused	on	 the	area	of	 interest	 that	 this	 thesis	 is	also	 investigating.	 In	addition,	 I	gratefully	acknowledge	the	contribution	of	Professor	Julian	Stallabrass	at	The	Courtauld	Institute	of	Art	and	Berlin-based	new	media	curator	Susanne	Jaschko,	who	worked	as	senior	editors	in	the	volume.	In	this	context,	I	wish	to	also	thank	all	the	theorists	and	artists	who	participated	in	the	volume	and,	in	particular,	Professor	Emeritus	Dan	Schiller,	Natalie	Bookchin,	Dr	Cornelia	Sollfrank	and	 Dr	 Daphne	 Dragona	 for	 our	 productive	 debates	 during	 the	 preparation	 of	 the	publication.	 Conducting	 research	 at	 the	 Royal	 College	 of	 Art	 has	 been	 a	 thoroughly	stimulating	 experience,	 ever	 since	 I	 first	 arrived	 at	 the	 college	 in	 order	 to	 study	 for	 a	Masters	degree	 in	2008.	 I	would	 like	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 contribution	of	 all	members	of	staff,	both	academic	and	non-academic,	who	have	been	 joyful,	helpful,	and	supportive.	 In	particular,	 I	 wish	 to	 thank	 the	 college’s	 Research	 Office	 and	 its	 Senior	 Research	 Tutor	Martina	Margetts,	as	well	as	the	School	of	Humanities	and	its	Dean	Professor	Jane	Pavitt	for	generously	supporting	the	research	events	that	I	organised	since	2011.	In	addition,	I	would	like	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 International	 Committee	 of	 Art	History	 (Comité	 International	 d'	Histoire	de	l'	Art	–	CIHA),	the	European	Cultural	Foundation	and	the	Open	Society	Institute	for	sponsoring	my	research	trips	during	the	early	stages	of	my	doctoral	study.	Also,	I	wish	to	express	my	sincere	thanks	to	my	line	managers	at	the	University	for	the	Creative	Arts,	Rosie	 Gunn,	 Steve	 Brown	 and	 Andrew	 Bossom,	 for	 their	 support,	 and	 I	 would	 like	 to	acknowledge	the	contribution	of	the	UCA	Research	Office	to	the	research	events	that	I	have	
		 x	
participated	in	or	organised	in	the	last	three	years	of	my	study.	In	addition,	I	would	like	to	thank	my	 colleague	 at	 UCA	 Joseph	 Taylor	McRae	 for	 our	 fruitful	 discussions	 around	 the	relationship	of	computer	games	with	contemporary	notions	of	spectacle	and	gamification.	Furthermore,	I	wish	to	pay	special	thanks	to	my	dear	friend	Dr	Venediktos	Kapetanakis	for	his	encouragement	and	advice	over	the	period	of	my	research.	Last,	but	certainly	not	least,	I	 wish	 to	 thank	my	 family	 for	 their	 constant	 and	 unconditional	 support	 throughout	 the	completion	of	this	thesis	and	all	that	went	before.	
1		
Introduction	
	
	In	 retrospect,	 the	 first	 stages	 of	 the	 research	 that	 supports	 this	 doctoral	 thesis	 can	 be	traced	 fifteen	 years	 back,	 to	 my	 studies	 at	 the	 Faculty	 of	 Law,	 Economic	 and	 Political	Sciences	 of	 Aristotle	 University	 of	 Thessaloniki,	 in	 Greece.	 In	 2001,	 I	was	 a	 second-year	student	at	the	University’s	BSc	programme	in	Economics,	and	I	was	about	to	specialise	for	another	 two	 years	 in	 Business	 Administration.	 Although	 I	 had	 already	 decided	 that	 I	wanted	to	become	an	artist,	I	felt	that	in	order	to	be	able	to	meaningfully	approach	social,	political	 and	 economic	 issues	 through	 my	 artworks,	 I	 first	 needed	 to	 understand	 to	 a	minimum	extent	 the	complexities	 that	define	 the	modes	of	production	of	an	 increasingly	globalised	economy.	Thanks	to	the	programme’s	various	modules	and,	in	particular,	those	focusing	on	marketing	and	consumer	behaviour,	I	quickly	came	to	realise	the	multifaceted	connections	 between	 the	 architecture	 of	 our	 economic	 systems	 and	 the	 means	 of	communication	that	we	use	on	an	everyday	basis.	This	realisation	encompassed	not	only	the	content	of	such	means,	but	also	their	own	distinct	architecture	and	the	modus	operandi	through	which	information	is	produced	and	reproduced.	Most	importantly,	perhaps,	I	came	to	realise	the	profound	ways	in	which	our	 instruments	of	communication	may	determine	our	individual	and	collective	economic	practices	and,	through	this	process,	the	values	that	imbue	a	social	body’s	behaviour	beyond	the	economy.			 However,	in	many	ways,	the	economic	theories,	principles	and	formulas	that	I	was	taught	 during	 my	 first	 four	 years	 in	 Higher	 Education	 were	 put	 under	 question	 as	 we	entered	 the	 historical	 period	 that	 started	 with	 the	 outbreak	 of	 the	 subprime	 mortgage	crisis	in	the	US,	in	2007.	The	burst	of	the	“bubble”	of	the	American	housing	market	was	an	early	 indication	 that	 there	might	be	 limits	 to	 the	 financialization	of	 the	economy	and	 the	economic	paradigm	that	until	2007	seemed	to	be	unchallengeable.1	Interestingly,	what	this	first	 crisis	 provided	 us	 with	 was	 a	 glimpse	 into	 the	 widespread	 failures	 of	 the	 global	financial	system,	as	too	many	banks	and	other	financial	firms	had	been	cultivating	a	culture	
																																																								1	US	house	prices	started	declining	in	2006,	following	a	period	of	sharp	increase,	particularly	after	2001.	By	2003	the	US	Federal	Reserve	had	lowered	its	Federal	funds	rate	from	6.5%	to	just	1%	–	the	lowest	rate	in	45	years.	By	2004,	the	American	homeownership	rate	had	peaked	at	an	all-time	high	 of	 69.2%.	 Following	 the	 decline	 in	 prices,	 adjustable-rate	 mortgages	 were	 reset	 at	 higher	interest	 rates.	 However,	 higher	 monthly	 payments	 meant	 that	 it	 suddenly	 became	 much	 more	difficult	 for	 borrowers	 to	 refinance	 their	 loans.	 As	mortgage	 delinquencies	 increased	 rapidly,	 all	securities	backed	with	mortgages	lost	their	value.		
			 2	
of	 excessive	 borrowing	 in	 order	 to	 sustain	 their	 own	 excesses.2	This	 context	 was	emphatically	confirmed	with	the	events	of	2008,	which	had	an	impact	of	a	truly	global	scale	this	time.	As	Lehman	Brothers,	the	fourth	largest	investment	bank	in	the	US,	went	bankrupt	in	 September	 2008	 due	 to	 negligence	 and	 malfeasance	 connected	 with	 the	 period	 that	preceded	the	subprime	mortgage	crisis,	it	started	becoming	obvious	not	only	that	we	had	moved	 from	 the	 phase	 of	 “owner’s	 capitalism”	 to	 “managers’	 capitalism”,	 but	 –	 most	importantly	 –	 that	 the	 “principal-agent	 problem”	 (i.e.	 the	 fact	 that	 managers	 have	 been	running	 companies	 for	 their	 own	personal	 benefit,	 instead	of	 the	 shareholders’	 benefit)3	had	 become	 an	 organic	 part	 of	 our	 economic	 paradigm.	 Several	 other	 banks	 also	 went	bankrupt	 across	 the	 globe	 in	 the	 years	 that	 followed,	 and	 in	 a	 largely	 “unimaginable”	development	that	defied	the	spirit	of	“laissez-faire”	capitalism,	sovereign	states	bailed-out	many	 of	 them.4	At	 the	 same	 time,	 governments	 and	 Central	 Banks	 alike	 responded	with	unprecedented	fiscal	stimulus	packages	and	monetary	policy	expansion	measures,	which,	however,	had	a	much	smaller	effect	than	the	one	envisioned	by	policymakers.	As	a	result,	such	moves	 have	 been	 repeated	 several	 times	 since	 the	 outbreak	 of	 the	 crisis.5	In	 2009,	despite	 the	 aforementioned	 responses	 and	 the	 impetus	 of	 emerging	 markets	 and	developing	economies,	the	global	GDP	contracted.6	The	period	of	the	Great	Recession	saw	even	the	most	powerful	economies	in	the	world	shrunk,	like	for	instance	in	the	case	of	the	US	(18	consecutive	months	in	recession,	between	December	2007	and	June	2009)7	and	the	
																																																								2	Carl	Levin	and	Tom	Coburn,	‘Wall	Street	and	the	Financial	Crisis:	Anatomy	of	a	Financial	Collapse’	(Hsgac.senate.gov,	 2011)	<http://www.hsgac.senate.gov//imo/media/doc/Financial_Crisis/FinancialCrisisReport.pdf?attempt=2>	accessed	20	March	2016.	3	See:	Michael	C	Jensen	and	William	H	Meckling,	‘Theory	of	the	Firm:	Managerial	Behavior,	Agency	Costs	 and	 Ownership	 Structure’	 (1976)	 Journal	 of	 Financial	 Economics	 vol.	 3,	 p.	 305;	 and	 Jean-Jacques	 Laffont	 and	 David	 Martimort,	The	 Theory	 of	 Incentives:	 The	 Principal-Agent	 Model:	 Vol.	
1	(2nd	edn,	Princeton	University	Press	2002).	4	In	the	US	alone,	bailed-out	banks	have	included	giants	such	as	Citigroup,	Bank	of	America	and	JP	Morgan.	 In	 the	UK,	bailed-out	banks	have	 included	Lloyds,	 the	Royal	Bank	of	Scotland	and	–	 in	a	prominent	“bank-run”	case	–	Northern	Rock.	5	The	 most	 prominent	 case	 in	 this	 context	 is	 Greece,	 and	 the	 three	 “rescue	 packages”	 that	 the	country	has	 received	 in	order	 to	 fund	 its	 sovereign	debt,	 as	well	 as	 the	debts	of	 its	banks	 (2010,	2012	and	2015).			6	International	 Monetary	 Fund,	 ‘Report	 for	 Selected	 Country	 Groups	 and	 Subjects’	 (IMF.org,	 14	September	 2006)	<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=21&pr.y=15&sy=2006&ey=2016&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=001%2C110%2C163%2C200&s=NGDP_RPCH&grp=1&a=1#download>	accessed	20	March	2016.	7	The	 National	 Bureau	 of	 Economic	 Research,	 ‘US	 Business	 Cycle	 Expansions	 and	 Contractions’	(Nber.org,	 20	 September	 2010)	 <http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html>	 accessed	 20	March	2016.	
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UK	 (27	 months	 in	 recession	 in	 total,	 between	 mid	 2008	 and	 mid	 2012).8	Finally,	 the	ongoing	crisis	in	the	Eurozone	has	seen	several	countries	(Greece,	Portugal,	Ireland,	Spain	and	Cyprus)	require	“rescue	packages”,	either	in	order	to	refinance	their	government	debt,	or	in	order	to	bail	out	some	of	their	over-indebted	banks.	According	to	official	statistics,	my	home	 country	Greece	 experienced	a	 staggering	 sixty-four	 consecutive	 terms	 in	 recession	between	 2008	 and	 2014	 –	 many	 more	 than	 what	 the	 country	 had	 experienced	 during	World	War	II.9	Most	importantly,	in	2015,	Greece	went	once	again	into	recession10	and,	the	current	 prediction	 is	 that	 Greece	 has	 also	 been	 in	 recession	 during	 2016.11	Finally,	 in	another	 notable	 event,	 the	 most	 important	 developing	 economy	 in	 the	 world,	 China,	announced	 that	 its	 economic	 growth	 for	 2015	 had	 been	 the	 slowest	 in	 a	 quarter	 of	 a	century,12	and	an	even	gloomier	prediction	has	been	made	for	2016.13	This	 PhD	 thesis	 adopts	 as	 its	 starting	 point	 the	 chain	 of	 events	 described	 above,	whose	consequences	can	still	be	felt	across	the	globe.	Its	area	of	investigation	encompasses	not	 only	 the	 causes	 of	 a	 prolonged	 and	 severe	 crisis,	 but	 also	 the	 alternative	 modes	 of	socioeconomic	being	that	may	be	proposed	as	“antidotes”	to	the	deep	“systemic	breaches	in	 accountability	 and	 ethics	 at	 all	 levels”14	that	 have	 been	 emphatically	 defining	 our	globalized	 economic	 paradigm	 over	 the	 last	 three	 decades.	 In	 order	 to	 explore	 such	alternatives,	the	thesis	will	turn	to	the	potentialities	opened	by	the	traditionally	powerful	association	between	a	society’s	communication	technologies	and	 its	 ideological	direction,																																																									8 	Grahame	 Allen,	 ‘Key	 Issues	 for	 the	 New	 Parliament	 2010’	 (Parliament.uk,	 2010)	<http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/key_issues/Key-Issues-Recession-and-recovery.pdf>	accessed	20	March	2016;	and	Simon	Rogers	and	Amy	Sedghi,	‘UK	GDP	since	 1955’	The	 Guardian	(25	 October	 2013)	<http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2009/nov/25/gdp-uk-1948-growth-economy>	accessed	20	March	2016.	9	‘Eurostat	 -	 Tables,	 Graphs	 and	Maps	 Interface	 (TGM)	Table’	 (Ec.europa.eu,	 28	 September	 2015)	<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tec00115>	accessed	20	March	2016.	10	ibid.		11	'ΤΡΙΜΗΝΙΑΙΑ	ΕΚΘΕΣΗ	ΙΟΥΛΙΟΣ	-	ΣΕΠΤΕΜΒΡΙΟΣ	2016'	(Γραφείο	Προϋπολογισμού	του	Κράτους	
στη	Βουλή,	2016)	<http://www.pbo.gr/Reports/TabId/1085/ArtMID/5206/ArticleID/11368/QUARTERLY-REPORT-JULY-SEPTEMBER-2016.aspx>	accessed	29	November	2016.	12	Mark	 Magnier,	 ‘China’s	 Economic	 Growth	 in	 2015	 Is	 Slowest	 in	 25	 Years’	The	 Wall	 Street	
Journal	(19	 January	 2016)	 <http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-economic-growth-slows-to-6-9-on-year-in-2015-1453169398>	accessed	20	March	2016.	13	'China	GDP	Annual	Growth	Rate	|	1989-2016	|	Data	|	Chart	|	Calendar'	(Tradingeconomics.com,	2016)	<http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/gdp-growth-annual>	accessed	29	November	2016.	14 	‘Financial	 Crisis	 Inquiry	 Commission’	 (Fcic.law.stanford.edu,	 2	 October	 2011)	<http://fcic.law.stanford.edu/>	accessed	20	March	2016.		
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which	 by	 the	 time	 of	 my	 first	 university	 degree	 had	 already	 been	 widely	 theorised.	 In	addition	to	this	context,	the	subject	matter	of	the	thesis	will	be	defined	by	the	new	sets	of	relationships	 that	 have	 emerged	 in	 the	 meantime,	 as	 technologies	 like	 Web	 2.0	 have	gradually	 transformed	 our	 everyday	 lives	 and	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 world	 as	 an	interconnected	milieu.	Most	 importantly,	 the	 thesis	will	 embark	on	 this	exploration	 from	the	distinct	perspective	of	contemporary	cultural	production,	and	art’s	own	use	of	the	new	means	of	communication.	Accordingly,	 the	 aim	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 to	 investigate	 the	 relationship	 between	alternative	political	imaginaries	and	post-crisis	New	Media	Art.	More	specifically,	the	thesis	examines	 the	 influence	 of	 communist	 utopianism	 and	 its	 multiple	 legacies	 on	 the	ideological	dispositions	of	 the	politically	engaged	Web-based	art	 that	has	been	produced	during	the	global	financial	crisis	of	2008	and	its	aftermath	(2008-2015).	The	thesis	uses	the	term	“Web-based	art”	in	order	to	denote	two	types	of	projects:	Firstly,	the	category	refers	to	 artworks	 that	 exist	 exclusively	 online	 and	 largely	 adhere	 to	 the	 already	 established	practices	and	traditions	of	net	art	–	namely,	projects	that	use	the	diverse	tools	provided	by	the	 Internet	 and,	 predominantly,	 the	 World	 Wide	 Web.	 And,	 secondly,	 the	 term	incorporates	artworks	that	might	exist	 in	physical	spaces,	but	also	have	important	online	components,	which	 are	necessary	 for	 the	 communication	of	 their	 creators’	 aesthetic	 and	ideological	 objectives.15	Apart	 from	 such	 artworks,	 the	 thesis	 also	 examines	 relevant	institutional	 and	non-institutional	 initiatives,	 as	well	 as	 theoretical	 texts	 that	have	either	been	written	by	artists,	or	have	inspired	them.	The	thesis	poses	four	principal	research	questions.	Firstly,	what	is	the	relevance	of	alternative	political	imaginaries	–	and	in	particular	those	inspired	by	communist	thought	–	to	the	historical	and	technocultural	context	within	which	the	global	financial	crisis	of	2008	occurred?	 Secondly,	 what	 are	 the	 main	 formal	 and	 conceptual	 characteristics	 of	 the	political	Web-based	art	that	has	been	produced	between	2008	and	2015?	Thirdly,	what	are	the	interests	of	global	capitalist	elites	in	art	and	the	Internet,	and	what	kind	of	restrictions	have	they	imposed	on	the	political	use	of	the	Web	in	order	to	safeguard	them?	And,	finally,	to	what	extent	the	political	Web-based	art	of	the	post-crisis	era	has	been	the	result	of	the	paradoxical	 combination	 of	 capitalism’s	 products	 (in	 the	 form	 of	 networked	media)	 and	
																																																								15	The	thesis	regards	Web-based	art	as	a	subset	of	New	Media	Art,	which	can	be	defined	as	a	group	of	artworks	that	combine	traditional	media-based	practices	(e.g.	video,	animation	and	experimental	film)	 with	 practices	 based	 on	 new	 technologies,	 which	 do	 not	 necessarily	 have	 a	 media-related	component	(e.g.	electronic	art,	robotic	art	and	bio	art).	
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communism’s	 visions	 (in	 the	 form	 of	 alternative	 anti-capitalist	 modes	 of	 political	organisation,	social	being	and	cultural	production)?		In	order	to	answer	those	research	questions,	the	thesis	employs	elements	stemming	from	 four	 main	 bodies	 of	 knowledge:	 Marxist	 theory,	 contemporary	 art	 practice,	information	and	 communication	 technologies	 (ICTs),	 and	economics.	The	 combination	of	those	fields	is	necessary	not	only	because	of	the	complexity	of	the	questions	posed,	but	also	because	of	the	transient	nature	of	the	subject	matter	of	this	investigation.	The	main	part	of	the	analysis	conducted	in	this	thesis	 is	based	on	a	particular	historical	conjuncture	in	the	development	of	contemporary	art.	This	conjuncture	refers,	firstly,	to	a	specific	set	of	events	(the	 global	 financial	 crisis	 of	 2008	and	 its	 aftermath)	 and,	 secondly,	 to	 the	 adoption	 and	adaption	of	a	specific	medium-tool	(the	World	Wide	Web).	With	a	view	to	addressing	the	challenges	produced	by	this	context	of	contemporaneity	and	hybridity,	the	thesis	proposes	a	 set	 of	 new	 concepts,	 which	 I	 shall	 outline	 in	 the	 next	 few	 pages.	 Those	 concepts	collectively	constitute	a	prominent	contribution	of	this	thesis	to	knowledge,	in	addition	to	its	 main	 –	 and	 more	 easily	 identifiable	 –	 contribution:	 the	 covering	 of	 an	 important	thematic	gap	in	the	existing	scholarship,	which	relates	to	the	investigation	of	the	impact	of	the	global	financial	crisis	on	contemporary	art.		The	new	terminology	associated	with	the	development	of	the	proposed	concepts	is	mainly	introduced	in	the	final	chapter,	and	it	includes	the	terms	“pro-cybernetic	localism”,	“post-net	participation”	and	“Internet	of	Praxis”.	This	vocabulary	 is	employed	 in	order	 to	describe	 a	 new	 kind	 of	 public	 engagement	 with	 online	 and	 physical	 spaces,	 one	 which	combines	their	unique	characteristics	in	order	to	produce	ideologically	subversive	artistic	objects	 and	 cultural	 initiatives.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	 final	 chapter	 also	 reintroduces	 and	refines	the	concept	of	“cybertopos”	–	a	term	that	first	appeared	in	scholarship	in	2001,	in	an	 article	 by	 information	 and	 communication	 technologies	 theorist	 Jonathan	 Marshall	titled	 “Cyberspace	 or	 Cybertopos:	 The	 creation	 of	 online	 space”.16	Although	 Marshall	investigates	 in	 the	 article	 the	 relationship	 between	 cyberspace	 and	 physical	 spaces,	 the	term	 “cybertopos”	 only	 appears	 in	 the	 title	 of	 his	 paper,	 thus	 completely	 lacking	 a	definition.	 In	the	 last	chapter	of	this	thesis,	 I	provide	a	specific	theoretical	 framework	for	“cybertopos”,	which	becomes	essential	in	my	evaluation	of	the	dual/hybrid	spatial	nature	of	Web-based	art	and	its	socio-political	potentialities.	To	those	terms,	I	would	like	to	add	the	“distributed	art	object”	of	online	reproduction,	which	 is	 theorised	as	 the	successor	of																																																									16	Jonathan	Marshall,	 ‘Cyberspace	 or	 Cybertopos:	 The	 creation	 of	 online	 space’	 in	 Social	Analysis	(vol	45,	no	1,	Berghahn,	New	York	2001)	pp.	81	–	102.	
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the	 mechanically	 reproduced	 and	 digital	 art	 objects,	 and	 contrasted	 with	 the	 singular-unique	 object	 that	 still	 dominates	 the	 mainstream	 art	 world.	 Finally,	 of	 particular	importance	 is	 the	 proposition	 of	 “Data	 Capitalism”	 –	 a	 term	 that	 first	 appeared	 in	scholarship	 in	 2012,	 through	 the	 call	 for	 papers	 that	 was	 published	 by	 the	 Leonardo	Electronic	Almanac	for	its	special	issue	titled	“Red	Art:	New	Utopias	in	Data	Capitalism”.17	The	 issue	was	 edited	by	Lanfranco	Aceti,	 Susanne	 Jaschko,	 Julian	 Stallabrass	 and	myself,	and	 it	 was	 based	 on	 a	 session	 that	 I	 organised	 and	 convened	 at	 the	 17th	 International	Symposium	on	Electronic	Art	(ISEA),	 in	2011	(Istanbul,	Turkey).18	Furthermore,	 the	term	has	 been	 referenced	 by	 Julian	 Stallabrass	 in	 his	 2013	 essay	 “Elite	 Art	 in	 an	 Age	 of	Populism”.19	Despite	those	early	attempts	to	define	its	main	characteristics,	in	recent	years,	“Data	 Capitalism”	 has	 been	 increasingly	 associated	 with	 a	 range	 of	 diverse	 concepts,	including	 “Big	Data”,20	the	 temporal	experience	of	networks,21	surveillance,22	and	 the	role	of	privacy	regulations.23	Those	approaches	have	–	at	least	partly	–	deprived	the	term	from	the	 economic	 context	 that	 it	 originally	 aimed	 to	 describe.	 The	 perspective	 that	 I	 adopt	throughout	this	thesis	aims	to	restore	and	enrich	this	context.	All	of	the	terms	listed	above,	as	well	 as	 other	 key	 terms	 and	 concepts	 that	 are	 crucial	 to	my	 investigation	 have	 been	included	in	the	Glossary,	which	can	be	found	at	the	end	of	the	thesis.		 The	 introduction	 and/or	 elucidation	 of	 those	 terms	 and	 concepts	 functions	 as	 an	important	tool	for	the	fulfilment	of	a	prominent	gap	in	the	existing	scholarship.	As	I	have	already	stated,	 this	contribution	refers	 to	 the	study	of	 the	politically	engaged	Web-based	art	produced	between	2008	and	2015,	 and,	 in	particular,	 to	 its	 strong	 affinities	with	 the	various	strands	and	legacies	of	Marxist	thought.	Notably,	the	previously	described	gap	was	only	 partly	 covered	with	 the	 2014	publication	 of	 the	 volume	 of	 the	 Leonardo	Electronic	Almanac	 that	 I	 initiated	 and	 co-edited.	 More	 specifically,	 because	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 the																																																									17 	‘Leonardo	 Electronic	 Almanac	 –	 Red	 Art	 LEA	 Call	 For	 Papers’	 (Leoalmanac.org,	 2012)	<http://www.leoalmanac.org/red-art-lea-call-for-papers/>	accessed	10	April	2016.		18	‘From	New	Media	to	Old	Utopias’	(isea2011.sabanciuniv.edu,	2011)	<https://isea2011.sabanciuniv.edu/panel/new-media-old-utopias>	accessed	10	April	2016.	19	Julian	Stallabrass,	‘Elite	Art	in	an	Age	of	Populism’,	loc.	cit.	20	Steve	Lohr,	Data-Ism	(Oneworld	Publications	2015).		21	Mark	B.	N.	Hansen,	‘The	Operational	Present	of	Sensibility’	in	The	Nordic	Journal	of	Aesthetics,	No.	47	(Aarhus	2014)	pp.	38	–	53.		22	Ulrik	Ekman	and	others	(eds),	Ubiquitous	Computing,	Complexity,	And	Culture	(Routledge,	London	2015).	23	‘13th	 ETUC	 Congress	 –	 Speech	 by	 Martin	 Schulz,	 President	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament’	(Europarl.europa.eu,	 2015)	 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/the-president/en/press/press_release_speeches/speeches/speeches-2015/speeches-2015-september/pdf/13th-etuc-congress-speech-by-martin-schulz-president-of-the-european-parliament>	accessed	10	April	2016.	
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publication	as	 a	 selection	of	 articles,	 reviews	and	visual	 essays	 from	authors	of	different	backgrounds	 and	 specialisations,	 it	was	not	 possible	 to	provide	 a	 systematic	mapping	of	the	Web-based	practices	that	have	emerged	since	2008.	In	addition,	the	realization	of	this	intellectual	exercise	was	not	facilitated	by	the	fact	that	the	volume	did	not	focus	exclusively	on	online	and	Web-based	art,	but	rather	on	a	wide	range	of	new	media	artworks,	practices	and	cultural	schemes.		The	 absence	 of	 those	 analytical	 elements	 characterizes	 the	 entire	 body	 of	publications	that	have	hitherto	aimed	at	exploring	the	association	of	 the	global	economic	crisis	 with	 contemporary	 artistic	 practices.	 This	 becomes	 readily	 identifiable	 when	 we	examine	the	scope	of	the	most	prominent	of	these	publications,	as	well	as	the	case	studies	that	 support	 their	 analyses.	 In	 late	 2010,	 American	 artist,	 activist	 and	 writer	 Gregory	Sholette	published	Dark	Matter:	Art	and	Politics	in	the	Age	of	Enterprise	Culture.24	His	book	focuses	on	the	subversive	art	practices	that	have	emerged	in	the	last	three	decades	thanks	to	 the	 development	 of	 inexpensive	 new	 media	 technologies.	 Sholette	 describes	 those	practices	 as	 contemporary	 culture’s	 “creative	 dark	 matter”	 –	 a	 set	 of	 anti-capitalist	artworks	 and	 artistic	 initiatives	 that	 lie	 at	 the	 margins	 of	 the	 mainstream	 art	 world.25	Although	Sholette	successfully	identifies	the	important	role	of	the	Internet	in	the	fruition	of	this	 ideological	 and	 artistic	 milieu,	 his	 book	 provides	 a	 more	 general	 overview	 of	oppositional	practices	and	their	theorisation.	As	a	result,	 it	only	tangentially	explores	the	influence	of	the	global	financial	crisis	of	2008	on	New	Media	Art	(including	Web-based	art),	drawing	more	attention,	instead,	to	the	mapping	of	key	events	in	the	historical	evolution	of	global	 capital’s	 structural	 crisis	 (e.g.	 by	 exploring	 the	 fiscal	 crisis	 of	 the	 1970s,	 or	contextualising	the	Argentinean	economic	collapse	of	1999-2002).	A	very	similar	approach	can	be	 found	Global	Activism:	Art	and	Conflict	in	the	21st	Century	 (2015),	which	was	edited	by	artist,	curator	and	theorist	Peter	Weibel.26	The	book	accompanied	the	exhibition	global	
aCtIVISm,	 which	 was	 organised	 by	 the	 ZKM	 Centre	 for	 Art	 and	 Media,	 in	 Karlsruhe,	between	 December	 2013	 and	 March	 2014.27	Just	 like	 the	 artists	 in	 the	 exhibition,	 the	authors	 that	 were	 selected	 by	 Weibel	 for	 the	 book	 investigate	 a	 very	 wide	 range	 of	connections	between	contemporary	art	and	activism	in	the	publication’s	700	pages.	More	specifically,	 they	 explore	 ecological	 issues,	 gentrification,	women’s	 rights,	 legal	 issues	 as																																																									24	Gregory	 Sholette,	 Dark	 Matter:	 Art	 And	 Politics	 In	 The	 Age	 Of	 Enterprise	 Culture	 (Pluto	 Press,	London	2010).	25	ibid.,	p.	1.	26	Peter	Weibel	(ed),	Global	Activism:	Art	and	Conflict	in	the	21st	Century	(MIT	Press,	London	2015).	27	The	 exhibition’s	 website:	 'Global	 Activism'	 (Global-activism.de,	 2016)	 <http://www.global-activism.de>	accessed	6	December	2016.	
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well	as	the	events	that	occurred	in	the	context	of	the	“Arab	Spring”.	As	a	consequence,	only	a	 small	 part	 of	 the	 book	 relates	 to	 economic	 issues	 and	 the	 financial	 crisis	 of	 2008;	 and	even	 in	 that	part,	 there	 is	 a	 limited	 focus	on	Web-based	practices.	Thus,	 although	Global	
Activism	 successfully	 demonstrates	 the	 perceptivity	 of	 a	 significant	 part	 of	 the	 art	world	towards	political	struggles,	economic	inequalities	and	social	divisions,	at	the	same	time,	it	underplays	the	role	of	the	most	powerful	medium	of	the	21st	century:	the	Internet.		Three	 years	 after	 the	 publication	 of	 Dark	 Matter,	 Gregory	 Sholette	 edited	 in	collaboration	with	Austrian	artist	Oliver	Ressler	a	book	that	addresses	much	more	directly	the	context	produced	by	the	global	financial	crisis.	 Just	 like	with	Weibel’s	Global	Activism,	Sholette	 and	 Ressler’s	 It’s	 the	Political	Economy,	Stupid:	The	Global	Financial	Crisis	 in	Art	
and	Theory	(2013)28	accompanied	an	exhibition	under	the	same	title,	which	was	curated	by	the	 two	editors	and	has	 travelled	 to	various	 countries	 since	2011.29	Sholette	and	Ressler	included	 in	 the	 book	 contributions	 from	 various	 politically	 engaged	 artists	 and	 cultural	producers,	 as	well	 as	 essays	of	different	 lengths	 and	 formats	by	 renowned	 theorists	 and	philosophers,	 such	 as	 Slavoj	 Žižek,	 Judith	 Butler	 and	 David	 Graeber.	 The	 participating	authors	 call	 for	 the	 proliferation	 of	 radical	 new	 art	 forms	 that	 are	 able	 to	 break	 the	traditional	boundaries	between	the	production,	dissemination	and	reception	of	art.	This	is	particularly	applicable	to	collaborative	and	communal	works,	which	can	employ	a	different	artistic	language	in	order	to	ultimately	catalyse	a	different	(art)	world.	Quite	surprisingly,	however,	there	are	very	limited	references	in	the	book	to	the	contribution	of	the	Internet	to	this	 “regenerative”	 process,	 and	 very	 few	 case	 studies	 to	 support	 the	 authors’	 stated	aspirations	 in	 the	 context	 of	 networked	 societies.	 Therefore,	 the	 essays	 could	 be	characterised	as	being	much	more	speculative	than	analytical	when	it	comes	to	the	new	art	that	has	been	produced	since	2008.		In	contrast	to	the	predominantly	contextual	approach	adopted	by	Sholette,	Ressler	and	Weibel,	new	media	theorists	Tatiana	Bazzichelli	and	Geoff	Cox	decided	in	2013	to	focus	on	 the	 examination	 of	 specific	 anti-capitalist	methodologies	 that	 have	 been	 espoused	 by	artists	in	the	aftermath	of	the	global	financial	crisis.	 In	their	book	Disrupting	Business:	Art	
																																																								28	Gregory	Sholette	and	Oliver	Ressler	(eds),	It's	The	Political	Economy,	Stupid:	The	Global	Financial	
Crisis	in	Art	and	Theory	(Pluto	Press,	London	2013).	29	The	venues	where	the	exhibition	has	been	staged	are:	Open	Space,	Open	Systems,	Vienna,	Austria	(2011);	Austrian	Cultural	Forum,	New	York,	USA	(2012);	Centre	of	Contemporary	Art,	Thessaloniki,	Greece	 (2012);	 Pori	 Art	 Museum,	 Pori,	 Finland	 (2013);	 Center	 for	 Cultural	 Decontamination,	Belgrade,	 Serbia	 (2013);	Gallery	400/University	of	 Illinois	 at	Chicago,	USA	 (2013);	Galerija	Nova,	Zagreb,	Croatia	(2014);	NeMe	Arts	Centre,	Limassol,	Cyprus	(2014);	DAAP	Galleries,	University	of	Cincinnati,	Cincinnati,	USA	(2016).	
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and	Activism	in	Times	of	Financial	Crisis,30	the	two	editors	and	their	contributors	(amongst	whom	we	find	Oliver	Ressler)	explore	how	artists	can	appropriate	capitalist	business	tools	and	strategies	in	order	to	develop	alternative	modes	of	cultural	production.	In	this	case,	the	speculation	 that	 is	 championed	 by	 It’s	 the	 Political	 Economy,	 Stupid	 materialises	 as	 a	practical	 agent	 that	 may	 subvert	 the	 political	 economy	 of	 the	 market,	 with	 a	 view	 to	achieving	 much	 wider	 autonomy	 within	 new	 and/or	 parallel	 economic	 models.	Nevertheless,	the	works-case	studies	employed	in	Disrupting	Business	use	a	wide	variety	of	media;	and	even	when	artworks	in	online	media	are	examined,	the	main	perspective	of	the	analysis	 is	 that	 of	 subverting	 the	 mechanics	 of	 corporate	 operations.	 This	 means	 that	although	several	of	Bazzichelli	and	Cox’s	contributors	theorise	the	Internet	as	an	influential	anti-systemic	platform	or	tool	(e.g.	Paolo	Cirio;	Geert	Lovink	and	Nathaniel	Tkacz;	Dmytri	Kleiner	 and	 Baruch	 Gottlieb;	 Heath	 Bunting),	 in	 the	 end,	 the	 book	 produces	 a	 rather	fragmented	and	partial	image	when	it	comes	to	the	exact	nature	and	role	of	Web-based	art	in	 the	 post-crisis	 world.	 Finally,	 a	 similar	 position	 of	 disregard	 can	 be	 identified	 in	 the	investigation	conducted	by	art	critic	Yates	McKee	in	his	book	Strike	Art:	Contemporary	Art	
and	the	Post-Occupy	Condition	 (2016).31	As	 a	 collaborator	 of	 various	 post-Occupy	 groups,	McKee’s	main	objective	is	to	highlight	the	relation	of	art	to	the	radical	politics	promoted	by	Occupy.	 Starting	 from	 the	 active	 role	 of	 artists	 in	 the	 movement	 and	 the	 artistic/visual	language	produced	in	the	context	of	its	activities,	McKee	traces	Occupy’s	(artistic)	legacy	in	several	activist	groups	(e.g.	MTL,	Not	an	Alternative,	the	Illuminator,	the	Rolling	Jubilee	and	G.U.L.F.),	 in	 order	 to	 reach	 more	 recent	 initiatives,	 like	 Black	 Lives	 Matter.	 Once	 again,	however,	 and	despite	 the	pivotal	 role	 of	 social	media	 in	 the	development	 of	Occupy,	 the	Internet	is	largely	absent	from	McKee’s	analysis.	Finally,	it	is	worth	noting	that	because	of	the	 subject	matter	 of	Strike	Art	 and	 all	 of	 the	 books	 listed	 above,	 very	 few	of	 the	 artists	whose	projects	are	examined	in	this	thesis	are	referenced	in	them.32	Quite	naturally,	then,	the	process	of	covering	the	previously	described	scholarly	gap	constitutes	an	ambitious	and,	perhaps,	risky	intellectual	exercise:	as	the	reverberations	of																																																									30	Tatiana	Bazzichelli	 and	Geoff	 Cox	 (eds),	Disrupting	Business:	Art	&	Activism	in	Times	of	Financial	
Crisis	(Autonomedia,	New	York	2013)	31	Yates	McKee,	Strike	Art:	Contemporary	Art	and	the	Post-Occupy	Condition	(Verso,	London	2016).	32	The	most	notable	exception	is	Paolo	Cirio,	whose	practice	is	included	in	Global	Activism:	Art	and	
Conflict	in	the	21st	Century	 and	Disrupting	Business:	Art	and	Activism	in	Times	of	Financial	Crisis,	 in	which	 he	 is	 a	 contributor.	 Also,	 there	 are	 short	 references	 to	 post-2008	works	 an	 initiatives	 by	W.A.G.E.	 (in	 Dark	 Matter:	 Art	 and	 Politics	 in	 the	 Age	 of	 Enterprise	 Culture,	 and	 in	 Strike	 Art:	
Contemporary	Art	and	 the	Post-Occupy	Condition)	 and	 Burak	 Arikan	 (in	 It’s	 the	Political	Economy	
Stupid:	The	Global	Financial	Crisis	in	Art	and	Theory),	while	Dmytri	Kleiner	is	one	of	the	contributors	of	Disrupting	Business.		
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the	 crisis	 are	 still	 spreading	 or	 –	 even	 –	 evolving,	 and	 as	 networked	 technologies	 are	continuously	advancing,	the	analytical	focus	of	the	investigation	undertaken	by	this	thesis	may	 have	 to	 shift.	 Nevertheless,	 I	 believe	 that	 in	 spite	 of	 those	 challenges,	 this	 thesis	constitutes	a	timely	and	necessary	exercise.	Firstly,	it	is	necessary	in	order	to	identify	and	categorise	 for	 the	 first	 time	 the	 diverse	 Web-based	 political	 artworks	 and	 cultural	initiatives	that	have	emerged	since	the	outbreak	of	the	crisis.	Then,	it	is	necessary	in	order	to	explore	 the	 limitations	and	obstacles	 that	 those	sets	of	practices	have	encountered,	or	may	 encounter	 in	 the	 future.	 And,	 finally,	 it	 is	 necessary	 in	 order	 to	 locate	 the	aforementioned	 cultural	 products	 and	 methodologies	 within	 an	 increasingly	 fluid	ideological	spectrum,	which	itself	requires	–	at	least	partly	–	redefinition.	The	latter	stage	of	this	study	will	allow	us	to	not	only	explore	the	future	of	politically	engaged	Web-based	art,	 but	 also	 to	 systematise	 the	 ideological	potentialities	of	networked	 communication	at	large.	 	
Mapping	 Utopian	 Art:	 Alternative	 Political	 Imaginaries	 in	 New	 Media	 Art	 (2008-
2015)		The	 first	 chapter	 of	 this	 thesis,	 titled	 “Creating	 (in)	 Data	 Capitalism:	New	Art	 for	 a	New	Economy?”,	 embarks	 on	 the	 previously	 described	 investigation	 by	 elaborating	 on	 the	methodological	basis	on	which	its	main	hypotheses	and	assertions	will	be	grounded.	More	specifically,	 the	 chapter	 identifies	 the	 subject	 matter	 of	 the	 thesis	 as	 an	 “intersection”	between	the	evolutionary	paths	of	Late	Capitalism	and	contemporary	art.	Accordingly,	the	analysis	of	the	methodology	begins	with	the	theorisation	of	Data	Capitalism	as	an	economic	system	 whose	 main	 raw	 material	 and	 output	 is	 programmable	 information	 (data).	 The	main	 catalyst	 for	 the	 rise	 of	 this	 new	phase	 in	 the	 evolution	 of	 our	 globalised	 economic	system	 has	 been	 the	 development	 of	 the	World	Wide	Web,	 which	 gradually	 altered	 the	balance	 in	 the	 principal	 agent	 of	 economic	 expansion	 from	 consumption	 to	 production	(user-generated	 data	 and	 content).	 However,	 the	 system’s	 overdependence	 on	 data,	 as	expressed	through	the	algorithmic	control	of	the	economy,	has	been	a	prominent	cause	of	the	 global	 financial	 crisis	 (e.g.	 through	 high-frequency	 trading).	 Notably,	 alongside	 the	quantification	of	everyday	life	due	to	widespread	processes	of	datatization,	they	constitute	two	of	the	main	elements	against	which	Web-based	cultural	producers	reacted	after	2008.	Yet,	this	reaction	did	not	occur	within	a	cultural	“void”.	By	the	outbreak	of	the	crisis	there	was	 already	 an	 important	 tradition	 of	 New	Media	 Art	 practices	 on	whose	 basis	 cultural	
			 11	
producers	 could	 create	 new	 politically	 engaged	 artworks	 and	 projects.	 As	 the	 chapter	explains,	this	tradition	begins	with	tactical	media	artists	and	their	diverse	interventions	in	public	 spaces,	 which	 expressed	 a	 strong	 critique	 of	 the	 political,	 economic	 and	 cultural	order	 through	 temporary	 disruptions	 to	 urban	 life.	 The	 second	 and	 most	 important	tradition	 stems	 from	 net	 art,	 which	 emerged	 in	 the	 mid	 1990s,	 as	 Internet	 access	 and	applications	 were	 rapidly	 spreading.	 Post-crisis	 cultural	 producers	 have	 had	 the	opportunity	 to	 build	 on	 the	 rich	 legacy	 of	 artists	 who	 have	 worked	 on	 the	 Internet	 by	exploring	 its	 radical	 political	 potentialities.	 Finally,	 it	 is	 worth	 noting	 the	 significant	contribution	 of	 online	 activist	 platforms	 that	 have	 taken	 advantage	 of	 the	 new	potentialities	 opened	 by	Web	 2.0	 in	 order	 to	 influence	 public	 opinion	 on	 a	 truly	 global	scale.	 Thanks	 to	 the	 focused	 “issue-based”	 approach	 of	 those	 artistic	 practices	 and	alternative	 channels	of	public	 advocacy,	 a	 fertile	online	ground	 for	 the	 revitalisation	and	promotion	of	anti-capitalist	ideas	was	already	in	place	by	2008.	The	second	chapter	of	 the	 thesis	explores	 the	 theoretical	 framework	under	which	we	could	bring	 together	Web-based	art	 and	 the	 re-activation	of	political	utopianism	 that	followed	 the	 crisis	 (“Utopia	 Distributed:	 The	 Organic	 Connections	 of	 the	 Internet	 with	Communist	Thought”).	More	specifically,	the	chapter	identifies	communist	thought	and	its	multiple	 traditions	 as	 the	 unifying	 agent	 for	 the	 evolutionary	 paths	 of	 the	 economy	 and	culture	 that	 have	 been	 described	 above.	 This	 agency	 is	 delineated	 by	 revealing	 the	Internet’s	 “organic”	 connections	with	 communist	 utopianism,	 through	 an	 examination	 of	the	work	and	legacy	of	Walter	Benjamin.	The	chapter	begins	with	an	analysis	of	the	role	of	utopianism	 in	 Western	 political	 philosophy	 during	 the	 two	 decades	 that	 preceded	 the	global	 financial	 crisis	 and	 followed	 the	 Fall	 of	 the	 Berlin	Wall	 (1989).	 Despite	 the	 anti-utopian	spirit	defining	this	period,	utopia	managed	to	survive	in	the	Western	public	sphere,	ultimately	 finding	an	 ideal	catalyst	 for	 its	proliferation	 in	 the	events	of	2008.	As	a	result,	the	ideological	annulment	of	the	anti-utopian	rhetoric	exemplified	by	thinkers	like	Francis	Fukuyama	and	John	Gray	has	been	accompanied	by	the	re-emergence	of	questions	around	the	role	of	grand	narratives	in	the	post-crisis	world,	including	the	potential	of	communism.	The	thesis	employs	Walter	Benjamin’s	study	of	Immanuel	Kant	in	order	to	approach	such	questions.	More	specifically,	the	chapter	draws	connections	between	Kant	and	Benjamin’s	shared	interest	in	the	notion	of	“justice”	and	Benjamin’s	work	in	the	field	of	art	under	the	influence	of	Marx.	The	thesis	claims	that	the	main	element	that	links	those	two	aspects	of	Benjamin’s	work	is	“possession”	–	a	capacity	that	is	negated	in	the	case	of	art	through	the	art	 object’s	mechanical	 reproduction.	 In	 today’s	 context,	 digital	 and	 online	 reproduction	
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constitute	 capacities	 that	 defy	 to	 an	 even	 greater	 extent	 the	 power	 of	 aura	 and	historicization.	 The	passage	 from	 the	 singular-unique	 to	 the	 “distributed”	 art	 object,	 and	from	an	“auratic”	to	a	more	democratic	mode	of	cultural	production	becomes,	as	a	result,	a	natural	means	for	the	formulation	of	new	revolutionary	demands	that	focus	on	the	power	of	 “here-and-now”	 (“jetztzeit”	 in	 Benjamin’s	 work).	 Those	 potentialities	 are	 further	highlighted	 in	 the	 final	 part	 of	 the	 chapter,	 through	 the	 examination	 of	 two	 significant	reinterpretations	of	Benjamin’s	work	in	the	context	of	the	Internet	Age:	The	Work	of	Art	in	
the	Age	of	Digital	Reproduction	(1995)	by	Douglas	Davis,	 and	Engineering	Culture:	On	‘The	
Author	as	(Digital)	Producer’	(2005)	by	Geoff	Cox	and	Joasia	Krysa.	The	comparison	of	the	two	texts	reveals	not	only	the	continuous	relevance	of	Benjamin’s	revolutionary	assertions	to	 the	development	of	 the	 Internet	as	a	cultural	milieu,	but	also	 its	 transformation	 into	a	much	more	personal	and,	thus,	political	tool	of	expression,	which	requires	a	deeper	sense	of	social	agency	and	responsibility	from	its	users.		The	 third	and	 fourth	chapters	constitute	 the	 “core”	of	 this	 thesis,	 as	 they	examine	the	responses	of	artists,	 collectives	and	cultural	 institutions	 to	 the	global	economic	crisis	(“Diagnosing	the	Crisis:	Deconstruction	and	Protest”	and	“The	Rise	of	Radical	Institutions:	Towards	Alternative	Modes	of	 Socioeconomic	Being”,	 respectively).	 They	 jointly	 propose	an	inclusive	“navigation	map”	whose	aim	is	to	systematise	the	anti-capitalist	Web-based	art	that	has	been	produced	between	2008	and	2015.	For	the	construction	of	this	“map”,	both	chapters	 adopt	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 the	 artists,	 as	 this	 has	 been	 expressed	 in	 the	descriptions	 of	 their	 artworks,	 their	 practice	 statements,	 manifestos,	 articles,	 academic	papers,	public	talks	and	interviews.	Through	the	combination	of	such	sources,	the	thesis	is	able	to	highlight	the	artists’	utopian	language	and	theorisation,	with	a	view	to	identifying,	connecting	 and,	 finally,	 categorising	 their	 common	 goals,	 aspirations	 and	 dreams.	 The	latter	 may	 be	 expressed	 through	 the	 adoption	 of	 practices	 that	 denounce	 capitalism,	practices	 that	 dismantle	 its	 economic	 and	 ideological	 functions,	 and	 –	 finally	 –	 practices	that	propose	alternatives.33	As	it	will	be	indicated,	those	modes	of	anti-capitalist	resistance	often	 co-exist	 within	 the	 same	 artworks,	 which	 explicitly	 or	 implicitly	 reference	 the	legacies	 of	 Marxist	 thought.	 In	 order	 to	 materialise	 their	 resistance,	 the	 works	 that	 are	analysed	 employ	 a	 variety	 of	 tools,	 including	 the	 use	 of	 hacktivist	 methodologies,	 the	adoption	or	inception	of	digital	currencies,	the	establishment	of	hackerspaces,	and	the	re-appropriation	 and	 activation	 of	 public	 spaces	 as	manifestations	 of	 the	 commons.	 At	 the																																																									33	Valentina	Montero	Peña	and	Pedro	Donoso,	‘Dissent	and	Utopia:	Rethinking	Art	and	Technology	in	 Latin	 America’	 in	 Lanfranco	 Aceti	 and	 others	 (eds),	 Red	Art:	New	Utopias	 in	Data	Capitalism,	
Leonardo	Electronic	Almanac	vol.	20,	no	1	(Leonardo/ISAST,	San	Francisco	2014)	p.	137.	
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same	 time,	 other	 artworks	 and	 artistic	 initiatives	 share	 a	 predominantly	 conceptual	 and	issue-based	 approach.	 Accordingly,	 such	 projects	 focus	 on	 ideas	 and	 phenomena	 like	immaterial	 labour,	 the	 formation	 of	 an	 online	 proletariat,	 the	 devalorization	 and	 the	underfunding	 of	 the	 arts	 and	 culture	 in	 the	period	 that	 has	 followed	 the	 global	 financial	crisis,	 and	 the	 development	 of	 strategies	 for	 reimagining	 and	 reconstructing	 the	 state.	Through	 the	 synthesis	 of	 those	 tools	 and	 concepts,	 new	media	 artists	have	 attempted	 to	catalyse	 the	 re-emergence	 of	 revolutionary	 political	 thought	 and	 action	 as	 an	 attainable	and	realistic	objective	that	could	lead	to	social	transformation.		The	element	 that	distinguishes	 the	 two	chapters	 is	 the	extent	 to	which	artists	are	willing	to	not	only	dismantle	and	denounce	Data	Capitalism,	but	also	to	move	towards	its	replacement	 through	 the	 articulation	 of	 a	 new	 economic,	 social	 and	 political	 system.	Accordingly,	in	the	third	chapter,	my	investigation	will	produce	a	mapping	of	artworks	and	projects	that	have	a	considerably	“diagnostic”	approach.	This	is	expressed	through	works	that	systematically	deconstruct	the	modus	operandi	of	Data	Capitalism	and	protest	against	its	 multiple	 social	 ramifications.	 The	 overall	 goal	 of	 those	 practices	 is	 to	 activate	 the	political	consciousness	of	citizens	and	help	them	to	develop	a	much	deeper	understanding	of	 their	 class	 position.	 The	 aforementioned	 artworks	 and	 cultural	 initiatives	 will	 be	followed,	 in	 the	 fourth	 chapter,	 by	 a	 larger	 body	 of	 projects,	 whose	 focus	 becomes	 the	gradual	 formulation	 of	much	more	 practical	 propositions.	 Such	 proposals	 constitute	 the	core	 preoccupation	 of	 the	 practices	 of	 cultural	 producers	 who	 aspire	 to	 establish	 new	modes	of	socioeconomic	being.	The	latter	are	actively	promoted	by	their	initiators	as	viable	alternatives	 to	 the	 capitalist	 economic	 model	 and	 the	 social,	 political	 and	 cultural	conditions	that	it	produces.	The	fifth	chapter	of	the	thesis	attempts	to	locate	the	main	obstacles	that	may	hinder	the	 ability	 of	 the	 previously	 analysed	 artistic	 projects	 to	materialise	 their	 socio-political	ambitions	(“Between	Myth	and	Reality:	The	Limits	of	the	Political	Web”).	More	specifically,	the	chapter	considers	the	multiple	ways	in	which	some	of	the	main	economic,	political	and	cultural	 agents	 related	 to	Data	 Capitalism	have	 been	 in	 a	 position	 to	 exert	 pressure	 and	restrict	the	utopian	impulse	that	was	born	in	the	Internet	following	the	crisis.	Those	agents	include	 the	 various	 institutions	 and	 instruments	 associated	 with	 the	 contemporary	 art	market,	 such	 as	 commercial	 galleries,	 auction	 houses,	 art	 fairs,	 biennials,	 collectors	 and	museums,	and	their	expanding	relationship	with	the	Web;	social	media	platforms	and	their	corporate	networks;	online	mega-corporations,	such	as	Web	portals,	search	engines,	cloud	computing	 companies	 and	 electronic	 retailers;	 financial	 institutions	 and	 fiscal	 policy	
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bodies,	 including	 commercial	 banks	 and	 Central	 Banks;	 and,	 finally,	 governments	 and	transnational	 institutions	 with	 regulatory	 powers	 over	 the	 Internet.	 Accordingly,	 the	chapter	will	 suggest	 that	 the	all	 those	 agents	have	been	able	 to	 exert	 strong	practical	 as	well	 as	 ideological	 “pressure”	on	 the	 Internet	by	appropriating	and/or	manipulating	 to	a	considerable	 extent	 the	 very	 tools	 that	 are	 employed	 by	 politically	 engaged	 artists	 and	cultural	 producers.	 This	 capacity	 has	 been	 evident	 in	 phenomena	 such	 as	 the	commercialisation	of	the	Web	and	online	art;	the	rise	of	online	corporate	monopolies;	the	development	of	modes	of	online	disinformation	and	censorship;	and	the	fierce	institutional	control	of	 the	 Internet’s	 architecture	on	a	national	 as	well	 as	a	 transnational	 level.	All	of	those	 obstacles	 have	 the	 capacity	 to	 radically	 delimit	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 online	 anti-capitalist	 initiatives,	 including	 the	 capacities	 of	 Web-based	 art	 across	 its	 various	methodologies	and	concepts	as	set	out	in	chapters	three	and	four.		The	sixth	and	final	chapter	of	this	thesis	attempts	to	produce	a	holistic	evaluation	of	the	projects	analysed	or	referenced	in	chapters	two	and	three,	on	the	basis	of	Marxist	and	post-Marxist	thought	(“Changing	a	Changing	World:	Art	Within	Endless	Crisis”).	Firstly,	the	chapter	 adopts	 as	 its	 assessment	 criterion	 Marx’s	 writings,	 and	 more	 specifically	 The	
Communist	Manifesto,	before	embarking	on	a	consideration	of	the	writings	of	post-Marxist	thinkers	whose	work	has	focused	on	the	ideological	nature	of	new	media	technologies.	The	thesis	 identifies	 the	 incapacity	of	 those	diverse	 ideological	 traditions	 to	 fully	 capture	 the	scope	 of	 Web-based	 post-crisis	 art,	 proposing,	 in	 addition,	 an	 investigation	 into	 the	ideological	 space	 between	 denationalised	 liberalism	 and	 global	 governmentality.	Furthermore,	 the	 chapter	 elaborates	 on	 the	 systemic	 ideological	 impasses	 produced	 by	Data	 Capitalism,	 which	 are	 directed	 against	 the	 sustainability	 of	 revolutionary	 political	thought	in	all	of	its	expressions.	More	specifically,	the	thesis	makes	the	proposition	that	we	live	 in	 a	 “Society	 of	 Non-Spectacle”	 in	 which	 the	 procedural	 sublimity	 generated	 by	networked	 media	 has	 led	 to	 the	 cultivation	 of	 a	 “gamified”	 and,	 thus,	 highly	 uncritical	public	 sphere.	 The	 latter	 is	 increasingly	 determined	 by	 an	 abstract	 perspective	 on	 the	social	 body’s	 function	 and	 potentialities,	which	 is	 exemplified	 by	 the	 counter-productive	intellectual	devices	like	the	multitude.	Finally,	the	chapter	identifies	the	opportunities	for	socioeconomic	change	engendered	by	the	political	Web-based	art	of	the	crisis,	which	may	help	 us	 to	 develop	 a	 new	 understanding	 of	 networked	 communication	 at	 large.	 In	 this	context,	the	thesis	recognizes	the	need	for	the	cultivation	of	a	new,	more	strategic	approach	to	 the	 relationship	 between	 cyberspace	 and	 physical	 space,	 which	 is	 synopsised	 in	 the	notion	of	 “cybertopos”.	The	materialization	of	 this	 relationship	 requires	 the	activation	of	
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physical	 space’s	 distinct	 traits	 through	 and	 in	 parallel	 to	 the	 use	 of	 networked	 media.	Accordingly,	the	development	of	a	culture	of	“pro-cybernetic	localism”	could	function	as	an	antidote	 to	 the	 depoliticised	 conception	 of	 networked	media	 that	 characterises	many	 of	today’s	 technology-driven	 discourses	 (e.g.	 “Internet	 of	 Things”	 and	 “Internet	 of	 Places”).	Such	approaches	should	be	replaced	by	the	proposition	for	an	“Internet	of	Praxis”,	within	which	the	ethos	of	“post-net	participation”	that	emerged	from	the	crisis’	social	and	artivist	movements	 could	 flourish.	 The	 subject	 of	 “post-net	 participation”	 is	 a	 “value-driven	demos”,	 whose	 scope	 lies	 beyond	 the	 largely	 “theological”	 theorisation	 of	 the	multitude	that	still	dominates	leftist	thought.	In	contrast	to	this	view,	the	praxes	of	the	new	“demos”	should	 be	 directed	 against	 the	 Web’s	 powerless	 socialisation	 (e.g.	 in	 the	 form	 of	 social	media),	which	ultimately	functions	in	favour	of	Data	Capitalism’s	process	of	accumulation.	The	Web-based	art	of	the	future	could	capitalise	on	the	lessons	learnt	from	the	crisis	and	embrace	 a	 new	 context	 of	 socialisation,	 which	 could	 provide	 a	 fertile	 ground	 for	 the	alternative	political	imaginaries	stemming	from	the	Marxist	tradition.	
16		
Chapter	1	
	
Creating	(in)	Data	Capitalism:	New	Art	for	a	New	
Economy?			
Towards	a	New	Economic	Paradigm		In	 the	Manifesto	of	the	Communist	Party	(1848),	Karl	Marx	and	Friedrich	Engels	 famously	describe,	 with	 remarkable	 precision,	 the	 complex	 technological,	 economic,	 political	 and	social	 conditions,	 which	 150	 years	 after	 the	 publication	 of	 their	 work,	 we	 came	 to	 call	“globalisation”.	The	two	thinkers	begin	their	analysis	by	specifying	the	basic	elements	on	which	the	production	model	of	a	globalised	economy	would	be	based:		 All	 old-established	 national	 industries	 have	 been	 destroyed	 or	 are	 daily	 being	destroyed.	They	are	dislodged	by	new	 industries,	 […]	by	 industries	 that	no	 longer	work	up	indigenous	raw	material,	but	raw	material	drawn	from	the	remotest	zones;	industries	whose	products	are	consumed,	not	only	at	home,	but	in	every	quarter	of	the	globe.	 In	place	of	 the	old	wants,	satisfied	by	the	production	of	 the	country,	we	find	 new	wants,	 requiring	 for	 their	 satisfaction	 the	 products	 of	 distant	 lands	 and	climes.34		Marx	 and	 Engels	 go	 on	 to	 elucidate	 the	 consequences	 of	 globalisation,	 underlining	 the	interdependence	of	 all	 nations	–	 a	 condition	 that	 incorporates	both	 the	material	 and	 the	immaterial	 or	 intellectual	 mode	 of	 production.	 Within	 this	 environment	 of	interconnectivity,	 it	 becomes	 practically	 impossible	 to	 adopt	 a	 one-sided	 perspective	 on	transnational	 issues,	 since	 what	 happens	 at	 one	 part	 of	 the	 world	 can	 influence	significantly	 and	at	 a	 great	 speed	what	happens	 at	 other	places.	The	 improved	means	of	communication	are	the	key	agent	that	facilitates	this	process	both	on	a	practical	as	well	as	on	an	 ideological	 level.	Notably,	 those	means	of	 communication	allow	 the	bourgeoisie	 to	promote	on	a	global	scale	not	only	a	specific	economic	model,	but	also	a	cultural	model	–	a	particular	interpretation	of	what	constitutes	human	civilisation.																																																										34	Karl	Marx	and	Friedrich	Engels,	The	Communist	Manifesto	(Pluto	Press,	London	2008)	pp.	38-39.	
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	 In	 today’s	 world,	 Marx	 and	 Engels’	 19th-century	 vision	 of	 interdependence	 and	interconnectivity	might	have	been	realised	to	a	considerable	extent;	however,	the	means	of	communication	 that	 have	 been	 developed	 in	 the	 meantime	 constitute	 much	 more	 than	propaganda	 tools.	 More	 precisely,	 contemporary	 communication	 technologies	 lie	 at	 the	“hard	core”	of	an	unprecedentedly	globalised	economic	system,	whose	vision	of	constant	growth	depends	almost	entirely	on	 the	production	and	reproduction	of	 communication’s	very	 content:	 information.	 In	 the	 global	 economy	 of	 the	 21st	 century,	 some	 of	 the	most	financially	 powerful	 corporations	 sell	 information	 rather	 than	 material	 goods,	 whilst	basing	 their	 activities	 exclusively	 in	 the	 immaterial	 realm	of	 cyberspace	 (e.g.	 Google).	At	the	 same	 time,	 user-generated	 information	 produced	 online	 drives	 the	 expansion	 of	 the	most	 socially	 and	 culturally	 influential	 corporations	 that	 the	 world	 has	 ever	 seen	 (e.g.	Facebook,	 YouTube	 and	 Twitter).	 And,	 finally,	 global	 financial	markets	 rise	 and	 fall	 as	 a	result	 of	 the	 spread	 of	 information	 on	 real-time	 networked	 mass	 media.	 Notably,	 this	financial	modus	operandi	 is	combined	with	 the	adoption	of	speculative	 trading	practices,	which	 are	 defined	 by	 the	 new	 nature	 of	 information	 as	 a	 quantifiable	 commodity	(datatization).	 Of	 course,	 this	 is	 not	 the	 first	 instance	 in	 human	 history	 in	 which	information	has	been	recognised	as	having	the	capacity	to	give	birth	to	other	information,	which,	in	turn,	may	generate	wealth	–	private,	or	public.35	However,	as	art	writer	and	critic	Julian	Stallabrass	notes,	it	is	the	first	time	that	we	see	a	dialectical	synthesis	of	the	notions	of	production	and	reproduction,	as	new	technologies	bind	them	together	irrevocably.36	As	I	will	 indicate,	 over	 the	 last	 three	 decades,	 the	 global	 domination	 of	 capitalism	 and	 the	advent	of	networked	technologies	have	together	nurtured	the	conditions	 for	the	rise	of	a	new	kind	of	economic	paradigm,	in	which	the	production	and	reproduction	of	data	appear	to	be	by	themselves	capable	of	sustaining	the	system.	The	rise	of	Data	Capitalism	could	be	understood	 as	 the	 global	 establishment	 of	 this	 mode	 of	 production,	 whose	 main	 raw	material	and	output	is	programmable	information	(data).		Within	 this	system,	 the	 Internet	constitutes	 the	most	 important	streamline	 for	 the	practically	 incommensurable	 flows	 of	 information,	 which	 engulf	 all	 aspects	 of	 our	 lived	experiences:	 from	 work	 to	 leisure,	 from	 one	 continent	 to	 another,	 from	 one	 device	 to	another,	and	–	most	importantly	–	across	most	social	groups	and	classes.	Nevertheless,	in																																																									35	On	a	basic	microeconomic	 level,	we	 could	 claim	 that	private	education	 constitutes	 such	a	 case.	This	can	be	traced	back	to	Classical	and	Hellenistic	Greece,	and	the	tuition	fees	paid	by	aspiring	civil	servants,	 political	 leaders	 and	public	 orators	 to	 prominent	 philosophers,	 like	 Protagoras	 and	 the	Sophists.	36	Julian	Stallabrass,	‘Elite	Art	in	an	Age	of	Populism’	in	Alexander	Dumbadze	and	Suzanne	Hudson	(eds),	Contemporary	Art:	1989	to	the	Present	(John	Wiley	&	Sons,	Oxford	2013)	p.	9.	
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spite	 of	 the	 immaterial	 streamline’s	 impressive	 volume	 and	 reach,	 its	 actual	 complexity	does	not	reside	primarily	in	those	two	quantifiable	traits,	but,	rather,	in	the	hybrid	nature	of	 its	 “source”.	 The	 latter	 can	 be	 traced	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 we	 are	 not	 merely	 users	 of	information	 anymore	–	we	are	 also	producers.	As	prosumers	of	 new	media	 technologies	and	products	(producers	and	consumers	at	once),37	we	have	developed	a	radically	different	relationship	with	the	means	of	communication,	as	our	immersion	in	them	becomes	much	more	multifaceted	in	terms	of	our	emotional	involvement	and	our	role	as	economic	agents.	Both	of	these	aspects	are	dependent	on	a	new	mode	of	economic	instrumentation	that	sees	Internet	users	“engage	in	permanent	creative	activity,	communication,	community	building	and	content-production”.38		As	a	consequence	of	this	context,	we	proactively	seek	for	information-data	that	will	enable	 us	 to	 produce	 new	 data,	 whose	 quality	 should	 be	 deemed	 “satisfactory”.	 This	satisfaction	 is	not	merely	 the	goal	of	a	demanding	consumer,	but	also	 the	objective	of	an	individual	who	might	wish	to	sell	–	directly,	or	indirectly	–	the	product	of	his	activity,	thus	
actively	 lending	to	 it	an	economic	function.	For	 instance,	a	user	might	decide	to	sell	 in	an	online	store	an	e-card	that	he	designed	by	manipulating	one	of	his	holiday	photos	with	the	help	of	a	piece	of	software	like	Photoshop.	And,	the	owner	of	a	 local	store	may	develop	a	stronger	presence	on	social	media	platforms	in	order	to	attract	more	friends	and	followers,	who	might,	then,	become	customers	of	his	business.	Nevertheless,	the	most	important	part	of	 capital	 accumulation	 under	 Data	 Capitalism	 can	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	 role	 of	 Internet	users	 as	 passive	 producers	 of	 data.	 Given	 that	 we	 individually	 and	 collectively	 create	patterns	 through	 our	 online	 behaviours,	 the	 data	 gathered	 and	 analysed	 from	 those	behaviours	become	financially	exploitable	products	for	online	corporations	–	for	instance,	through	 the	 utilization	 of	 personalised	marketing	 tools.	 Therefore,	 given	 that	 almost	 the	totality	 of	 our	 activities	 is	 in	 a	 position	 to	 leave	 a	 “trace”	 on	 networked	media,	 it	 is	 the	totality	of	our	lives	that	becomes	exploitable	in	the	context	of	Data	Capitalism’s	“productive	consumption”.39	In	 other	 words,	 within	 the	 “prosumer	 merger”	 that	 we	 have	 described	above,	the	most	important	economic	agent	is	the	producer,	not	the	consumer.	This	context	constitutes	 a	 radical	 shift	 from	 all	 previous	 phases	 of	 the	 capitalist	 paradigm,	 which																																																									37	The	term	“prosumer”	was	coined	by	futurologist	Alvin	Toffler,	and	first	appeared	in	his	book	The	
Third	Wave	(1980).	More	recently,	“prosumer”	has	also	been	employed	in	the	context	of	describing	the	buyers	of	high-end	electronic	products	(e.g.	digital	cameras),	which	approximate	the	capacities	of	professional	equipment.	In	this	case,	“prosumer”	is	the	combination	of	the	terms	“professional”	and	 “consumer”.	 For	 an	 early	 study	 of	 the	 latter	 interpretation	 of	 the	 term,	 see:	 Philip	 Kotler,	‘Prosumers:	A	New	Type	of	Customer’	(1986)	Futurist	September	-	October	pp.	24-28.		38	Christian	Fuchs,	Digital	Labour	and	Karl	Marx	(Routledge	2013)	p.	100.	39	Harry	Cleaver,	Reading	Capital	Politically	(Anti/Theses,	Leeds	2000)	p.	123.	
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focused	 on	 the	 proliferation	 of	 consumption	 as	 the	main	means	 for	 achieving	 economic	expansion.			
The	Rise	and	Fall	(?)	of	Data	Capitalism		However,	 as	 Marx	 and	 Engels	 have	 also	 predicted	 in	 The	 Communist	 Manifesto,	 the	capitalist	world	of	interdependence	and	interconnectivity	is	doomed	to	ultimately	fall	into	a	deadly	spiral	of	crises.	As	the	two	authors	argue,	bourgeois	society	conjures	up	gigantic	means	of	production	and	exchange,	which	–	at	some	point	–	become	impossible	to	control.	More	specifically,	the	perpetuation	of	the	relations	of	production,	exchange	and	property,	on	 which	 the	 established	 class	 structures	 are	 based,	 necessitates	 a	 greater	 and	 quicker	consumption	of	the	economy’s	production	forces.	Nevertheless,	such	a	function	cannot	be	supported	 by	 the	 socioeconomic	 system,	 which	 struggles	 to	 keep	 up	 with	 the	 required	intensity	 of	 the	 consumption.	 Accordingly,	 the	 capitalist	 society	 ends	 up	 resembling	 a	“sorcerer	who	 is	no	 longer	able	 to	 control	 the	powers	of	 the	nether	world	whom	he	has	called	 up	 by	 his	 spells”.40	As	 a	 result	 of	 this	 incapacity,	 an	 epidemic	 of	 over-production	occurs,	to	which	the	bourgeoisie	responds	in	two	distinct,	yet	interconnected	ways:	“On	the	one	hand	by	enforced	destruction	of	a	mass	of	productive	forces;	on	the	other,	by	conquest	of	 new	markets,	 and	 by	 the	more	 thorough	 exploitation	 of	 the	 old	 ones”.41	However,	 in	reality,	this	reaction	only	paves	the	way	for	new	crises,	which	are	more	extensive	and	even	more	catastrophic.	This	deterioration	can	be	readily	explained	if	we	take	into	account	the	fact	that	the	means	through	which	the	crises	can	be	prevented,	or	“resolved”,	decline	every	time	 that	 a	 further	 destruction	 of	 productive	 forces,	 a	 further	 market	 expansion,	 or	 a	further	measure	of	exploitation	of	an	existing	market	is	applied.	Consequently,	according	to	the	manifesto,	 the	gradual	 collapse	of	 the	 system	appears	 inevitable.	Today,	 the	mode	of	production	 might	 be	 considerably	 different	 from	 the	 one	 that	 Marx	 and	 Engels	 had	experienced	during	their	time,	and	on	which	they	based	their	prediction.	Nevertheless,	the	two	thinkers	have	been	able	to	successfully	identify	that	it	is	not	the	implementation	of	the	capitalist	 model	 that	 has	 the	 capacity	 to	 ultimately	 bring	 the	 system	 to	 a	 collapse,	 but	rather,	its	very	architecture.		The	“epidemic	of	over-production”	that	Marx	and	Engels	describe	in	their	manifesto	is,	 in	 today’s	 economic	 environment,	 an	 epidemic	 of	 data	 over-production.	 However,	 in																																																									40	Marx	and	Engels,	The	Communist	Manifesto,	op.	cit.,	p.	41.	41	ibid.,	p.	42.	
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contrast	 to	 the	 case	 of	 physical	 products	 that	 remain	 unconsumed,	 the	 data	 that	we	 are	producing	 today	 can	 be	 stored,	 preserved	 and	 used	 at	 any	 given	 time.	 Therefore,	 their	over-production	does	not	mainly	refer	to	their	quantity,	but	rather	to	the	amassing	of	the	“wrong”	 kind	 of	 data.	 The	 adjective	 “wrong”	 denotes	 data	 that	 cannot	 be	 “productive”,	because	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 bear	 no	 connection	with	 the	 real	 traits	 of	 the	 economy.	 In	order	 to	 comprehend	 this	 complex	 quantitative	 and	 qualitative	 condition,	 we	 need	 to	consider	the	fact	that	within	a	thoroughly	immaterial	production	system,	value	is	not	based	on	 physical	 reality	 anymore;	 rather,	 it	 is	 based	 on	 projections,	 expectations	 and	assumptions,	which	are	epitomised	in	the	function	of	 the	financial	markets.	This	mode	of	speculation	 is	 inherent	 in	 today’s	 financialized	economic	model.	For	 instance,	Facebook’s	financial	 value	 in	 the	 summer	of	2014	was	192	billion	US	dollars	 –	namely,	 a	 staggering	128	 times	 higher	 than	 its	 reported	 annual	 profits.42	Such	 a	 valuation	 completely	 defies	traditional	 economic	 logic,	 which	 entails	 that	 the	 actual	 value	 of	 a	 company	 should	 be	calculated	as	a	relatively	modest	multiple	of	its	annual	profits	–	usually	no	more	than	7	to	8	times	 this	 profit.	 The	 question	 that	 naturally	 arises	 here	 is	 on	 the	 basis	 of	what	 kind	 of	information-data	 do	 we	 project	 that	 Facebook	 will	 have	 in	 the	 future	 such	 strong	profitability	that	it	would	be	in	a	position	to	justify	its	current	valuation?	Quite	evidently,	the	 real	 economy	 is	 incapable	 of	 informing	 this	 kind	 of	 long-term	 hypothesis	 and,	 thus,	feeding	 evaluative	models	with	 “real”	 data	becomes	 a	 challenge.	 In	other	words,	 the	 gap	between	what	the	model	requires	and	what	the	real	economy	is	in	a	position	to	generate	in	the	 form	of	 data	produces	 a	 “natural”	 environment	 of	 speculation.	Therefore,	 the	under-consumption	disparity	in	Data	Capitalism	is	a	qualitative	rather	than	a	quantitative	matter,	as	data	that	should	have	originated	from	the	real	economy	are	replaced	in	financial	models	by	data	that	have	been	projected	by	other	models.	Data	Capitalism	is	thoroughly	delineated	by	this	self-referential	architecture.	Thus,	 in	 order	 to	 analyse	 in	more	 depth	 this	multifaceted	 economic	 context,	 it	 is	necessary	 to,	 first	 of	 all,	 define	 the	 epidemic	 of	 Data	 Capitalism	more	 accurately;	 for,	 it	constitutes	not	only	a	problem	of	data	over-production,	but	also	a	symptom	of	data	over-dependence.	 On	 an	 elemental	 level,	 this	 set	 of	 conditions	 can	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	procedural	 nature	 of	 wealth	 accumulation	 under	 Data	 Capitalism,	 which	 is	 inextricably	connected	to	the	fact	that	computational	processes	are	now	the	rule	in	all	types	of	human	activities	(either	directly,	or	indirectly	–	explicitly,	or	implicitly).	As	a	result,	our	economic																																																									42	James	Ball,	‘Facebook	Worth	128	Times	Its	Profits?	That’s	beyond	Optimistic	–	It's	Euphoric’	The	
Guardian	(25	 August	 2014)	 <http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jul/25/facebook-valuation-billions-market-buy-sell-profit>	accessed	21	March	2016.	
			 21	
practices	 have	 also	 developed	 strong	 computational	 characteristics.43	More	 specifically,	algorithms	 and	 bots44	determine	 the	 decisions	 made	 within	 financial	 markets,	 and	 the	same	 decision-making	 context	 applies	 increasingly	 to	 the	 actions	 through	 which	 other	economic	agents	(e.g.	states,	companies,	individual	investors,	etc.)	may	respond	to	market-related	developments	and	their	consequences.	One	might	assume	that	this	is	a	process	of	optimisation,	 in	which	 the	 insufficiencies	and	bias	of	 the	human	 factor	are	minimised,	or	overcome	altogether.	However,	as	sociologist	Donald	Mackenzie	notes,	 in	reality,	“market	design	 is	 a	 political	 matter”,45	and	 this	 entails	 that	 the	 computational	 tools	 that	 are	employed	 by	 the	 markets	 also	 display	 political	 characteristics.	 Those	 political	 elements	become	salient	if	we	consider	that	financial	modelling	is	a	thoroughly	inscriptive	process,	in	which	the	computer	models	that	are	developed	“act	on	economic	situations	as	much	as	describe	 them”.46	In	 other	 words,	 although	 individual	 aspects	 of	 the	 decision-making	process	 might	 follow	 the	 principles	 of	 statistical	 modelling,	 which	 is	 based	 on	 the	formulation	of	clear	assumptions	and	randomness	(e.g.	gathering	data	on	the	factors	that	may	 influence	 currency	 exchange	 rates),	 the	 overall	 system	 can	 be	 characterised	 as	deterministic	in	terms	of	its	objective	(e.g.	the	manipulation	of	currency	rates’	fluctuations	in	 order	 to	 generate	 profit	 by	 instantly	 exchanging	 large	 amounts	 of	 money	 from	 one	currency	to	another).		The	 deterministic	 nature	 of	 this	 process	 is	 accentuated	 further	 if	 we	 additionally	consider	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 “clear	 assumptions”	 on	which	 financial	models	 are	 based	 also	display	ideological	rather	than	mathematical,	or	scientific	characteristics.	For	instance,	the	assumption	that	we	will	be	in	a	position	to	maintain,	or	–	even	–	increase,	the	current	level	of	exploitation	of	a	particular	natural	resource	may	completely	 ignore	 the	environmental	and,	 accordingly,	 socio-political	 ramifications	 of	 the	 hypothesis.	 Most	 importantly,	however,	such	an	assumptive	context	applies	not	only	to	financial	modelling,	but	also	to	the	models	 that	 may	 determine	 public	 economic	 policies.	 Over	 the	 last	 three	 decades,	 such	policies	have	been	increasingly	dependent	on	financial	markets	and	their	fluctuations	–	for	instance,	through	the	financial	assets	included	in	the	portfolios	of	pension	funds,	or	as	an	“antidote”	 to	 crises,	 like	 the	2008	bail-out	of	 several	 “too	big	 to	 fail”	 banks	by	 sovereign																																																									43	Geert	 Lovink	 and	 Nathaniel	 Tkacz,	 ‘Friends	 with	 Money’	 in	 Tatiana	 Bazzichelli	 and	 Geoff	 Cox	(eds),	Disrupting	Business:	Art	&	Activism	in	Times	of	Financial	Crisis	(Autonomedia,	New	York	2013)	p.	179.	44	Bots	 are	 software	 applications	 that	 run	 automated	 scripts	 online	 in	 order	 to	 perform	 specific	tasks.	45	Donald	A	MacKenzie,	Material	Markets:	How	Economic	Agents	Are	Constructed	(Oxford	University	Press	2008)	p.	32.	46	Lovink	and	Tkacz,	op.	cit.,	p.	180.	
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states.	Interestingly,	this	context	of	public	policy-making	can	have	direct	connections	with	the	 formation	 and/or	 the	 perpetuation	 of	 socioeconomic	 classes.	 For	 example,	 the	hypothesis	about	what	is	the	minimum	cost	of	life	in	a	specific	country	impacts	the	way	in	which	economic	models	determine	what	might	constitute	an	“appropriate”	national	living	wage.	Based	on	 this	assumption,	a	redistribution	of	wealth	can	 take	place,	which	may	be	directed	 either	 towards	 the	 most	 vulnerable	 strata	 of	 society,	 or	 towards	 the	 most	privileged	 classes.	 In	 conclusion,	 we	 could	 synopsise	 the	 nature	 of	 Data	 Capitalism’s	financial	models	by	highlighting	three	major	characteristics:	Firstly,	the	decisions	made	by	a	 given	 model	 always	 follow	 the	 same	 direction,	 with	 a	 view	 to	 achieving	 a	 specific	objective.	The	latter	cannot	be	“neutral”,	as	there	are	always	ideological	characteristics	that	define	both	its	logic	and	its	social	impact.	Secondly,	the	models	are	fully	automated	through	the	 computerisation	 of	 their	 function.	 And,	 finally,	 the	 models	 execute	 all	 decisions	 in	fractions	 of	 a	 second	 (“high-frequency	 trading”).47	Consequently,	 the	 human	 agent	 is	 not	only	 excluded	 from	 this	 process,	 but,	 also,	 appears	 incapable	 of	 intervening	 in	 any	meaningful	way,	as	its	exclusion	is	thoroughly	structural	–	not	incidental.		Unsurprisingly,	 the	 social	 implications	 of	 the	 previously	 described	 financial	conditions	 can	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 the	 elemental	 fact	 that	 financial	 “traders’	 primary	relationship	 is	 with	 screens	 and	 other	 telecommunication	 devices”48	–	 not	 with	 the	instruments	and	situations	that	express	the	real	economy.	As	it	has	already	been	indicated,	this	means	that	the	“post-human”	character	of	financial	markets	becomes	“post-social”,	for	there	 is	 a	 gap	 between	 model-based	 assumptions	 and	 projections,	 and	 physical	 reality.	Nevertheless,	 the	 deterministic	 and	 “post-social”	 nature	 of	 the	modelling	 process	 is	 in	 a	position	 to	 cause	 serious	problems,	 even	before	 having	 any	 impact	 on	 the	 real	 economy.	This	danger	 is	exemplified	by	the	category	of	market	events	called	“flash	crashes”,	which	may	occur	in	the	context	of	high-frequency	trading.	Flash	crashes	can	be	described	as	the	
																																																								47	The	goal	of	high-frequency	trading	computer	models	is	to	capture	very	small	amounts	of	money	on	 every	 trade	 that	 they	 execute	 –	practically,	 a	 fraction	of	 a	 penny.	Traders	move	 in	 and	out	 of	short-term	positions	in	equities,	futures,	options,	currencies,	etc.	several	times	during	the	same	day.	As	 a	 result,	 their	 small	 gains	 per	 trade	 accumulate	 quickly	 and	 by	 the	 end	 of	 the	 day	 they	may	report	 large	 profits.	 Notably,	 even	 three	 years	 after	 the	 outbreak	 of	 the	 crisis	 (2011),	 high-frequency	trading	accounted	 for	more	than	60%	of	all	stock	trading	and	30%-40%	of	 the	 futures	market.	 Most	 importantly,	 high-frequency	 trading	 firms	 have	 proved	 very	 active	 in	 the	 area	 of	lobbying	through	political	contributions,	with	a	view	to	securing	their	modus	operandi	and	overall	market	influence.		See:	 ‘High-Frequency	 Lobbying’	The	 New	 York	 Times	 (18	 July	 2011)	<http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2011/07/18/business/18fasttrade_g.html>	 accessed	 21	March	2016.	48	Lovink	and	Tkacz,	op.	cit.,	p.	180.	
			 23	
result	of	algorithms	working	exactly	as	programmed,	but	in	financial	conditions	that	have	not	been	predicted	by	 their	creators.	Two	of	 the	most	notable	cases	of	 such	events	were	reported	 at	 the	 New	 York	 Stock	 Exchange	 in	 2010,	 and	 at	 the	 Singapore	 Exchange	 in	2013.49	In	the	case	of	the	American	Stock	Exchange,	1	trillion	US	dollars	were	“lost”	in	the	value	 of	 US	 equities	 within	 just	 36	 minutes	 on	 6	 May	 2010.50	The	 fluctuation	 was	 so	significant	that	the	“Dow	Jones	Industrial	Average	(DJIA)	experienced	the	biggest	intraday	point	 decline	 in	 its	 entire	 history”.51	And,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Singapore,	 the	 flash	 crash	“deadlock”	 continued	 for	 three	days	 in	October	2013,	 resulting	 in	a	 loss	of	6.9	billion	US	dollars	in	the	Exchange’s	capitalization.52	Despite	the	fact	that	there	is	still	no	clear	image	regarding	 the	exact	sequence	of	 the	events	 that	unfolded	during	 those	 two	 flash	crashes,	there	is	a	general	consensus	in	the	relevant	scholarship	that	high-frequency	trading	played	a	 crucial,	 if	 not	 the	most	 important	 role.53	At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 role	 of	 high-frequency	trading	was	combined	with	important	weaknesses	in	the	trade-reporting	infrastructure	of	Exchange	 markets,	 which	 high-frequency	 traders	 have	 exploited.54 	This	 framework	suggests	that	in	the	case	of	flash	crashes	we	are	not	are	faced	with	a	computational	failure,	but	rather	with	a	logical	failure,	which	occurs	due	to	our	incapacity	to	project	all	possible	financial	situations	through	the	models	that	we	construct.		The	previously	described	departure	from	logic	is,	in	fact,	a	systemic	feature	of	Data	Capitalism,	 which	 defies	 the	 rationality	 of	 “homo	 economicus”	 –	 a	 key	 principle	 of	neoclassical	economics.55	However,	this	particularity	of	Data	Capitalism	can	be	thoroughly	
																																																								49	On	 Tuesday	 25	 November	 2014,	 two	 smaller	 flash	 crashes	 were	 reported	 at	 the	 NYSE.	 Other	types	of	technical	glitches	have	also	been	accused	for	the	extreme	fluctuations	of	individual	stocks,	or	for	problems	in	the	function	of	Exchange	markets,	like	–	for	instance	–	in	the	case	of	the	closure	of	the	Chicago	Board	Options	Exchange	on	25	April	2013.		50	Andrei	 Kirilenko	 and	 others,	 ‘The	 Flash	 Crash:	 The	 Impact	 of	 High	 Frequency	 Trading	 on	 an	Electronic	 Market’	 (Cftc.gov,	 2014)	<http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@economicanalysis/documents/file/oce_flashcrash0314.pdf>	accessed	21	March	2016;	and	Stephen	Grocer,	‘Senators	Seek	Regulators’	Report	on	Causes	of	Market	Volatility’	Wall	Street	Journal	(7	May	2010).		51	ibid.		52	‘Singapore	Exchange	Regulators	Change	Rules	Following	Crash’	Singapore	News	(3	August	2014)	<http://www.singaporenews.net/index.php/sid/224382417/scat/a677a0718b69db72/ht/Singapore-Exchange-regulators-change-rules-following-crash>	accessed	21	March	2016.	53	Kirilenko	and	others,	loc.	cit.	54	Eric	M	Aldrich,	 Indra	Heckenbach	and	Gregory	Laughlin,	 ‘The	Random	Walk	of	High	Frequency	Trading’	 [2015]	 Social	 Science	 Research	 Network	<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2481201>	accessed	21	March	2016.	55	According	 to	 the	 traditional	 economic	 paradigm,	 “homo	 economicus”	 (“economic	man”)	 is	 the	figurative	 human	 being	 characterized	 by	 the	 infinite	 ability	 to	 make	 rational	 decisions.	 Those	decisions	 are	 based	 on	 his	 ability	 to	 choose	 the	 optimum	 out	 of	 all	 possible	 alternatives	 by	gathering	and	constantly	updating	all	available	information.	Homo	economicus	is	able	to	consider	
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explained	if	we	theorise	the	system	and	its	crisis	through	the	lens	of	Behavioral	Finance	–	namely,	 by	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 influence	 of	 psychological,	 social,	 cognitive,	 and	emotional	factors	on	the	decisions	of	financial	agents.	In	the	case	of	financial	markets,	this	is	synopsised	in	the	notion	of	“what	the	market	thinks”	–	the	herd	behaviour	of	the	mass	of	investors.	 As	 political	 economist	 Christian	 Marazzi	 asserts,	 “In	 financial	 markets,	speculative	 behaviour	 is	 rational	 because	 the	markets	 are	 self-referential.	 Prices	 are	 the	expression	of	the	action	of	collective	opinion,	so	the	 individual	 investor	does	not	react	to	information	but	to	what	he	believes	will	be	the	reaction	of	the	other	investors	in	the	face	of	that	 information”.56	Notably,	 Marazzi’s	 analysis	 is	 supported	 by	 empirical	 evidence	provided	 by	 the	 financial	 markets’	 impressive	 “back-and-forth	 swings”	 in	 August	 2008.	However,	 the	 most	 important,	 perhaps,	 element	 that	 links	 this	 behaviour	 to	 Data	Capitalism	as	a	new	economic	paradigm	is	the	role	of	 information.	The	French	economist	André	Orléan,	a	pioneer	of	the	theory	of	self-referential	finance,	has	underlined	that	once	investors	adopt	a	herd	behaviour,	communication	becomes	a	key	ingredient	in	the	function	of	 the	market	 and,	 thus,	 of	 today’s	 economy	 as	 a	whole.57	Investors	 and	 other	 economic	agents	need	information	(data)	in	order	to	be	able	to	speculate	on	what	might	happen	next.	Yet,	given	 that	 the	distinction	between	the	 financial	sphere	and	 the	real	economy	sphere	has	collapsed,	and	the	inscriptive	character	of	algorithmic	models,	speculation	can	readily	lead	to	speculative	bubbles.	Marazzi	synopsizes	this	context	by	noting	that	“For	companies	listed	on	the	stock	exchange,	the	centrality	of	communication	certainly	leads	to	economic	distortions,	 in	 that	 the	 self-referentiality	 of	 the	 markets	 exposes	 them	 to	 the	 risks	 of	volatility	in	the	markets,	originating	from	factors	which	have	nothing	to	do	with	productive	rationality”.58			 This	systemically	embedded	lack	of	control	has	been	one	of	the	main	features	of	the	global	 financial	 crisis	of	2008	and	 the	period	 that	has	 followed	 it.	The	ongoing	economic	turmoil	 in	 the	Eurozone	 and	 in	 other	parts	 of	 the	world,	 and	 the	 asthenic	 growth	of	 the	global	economy	in	comparison	with	the	pre-crisis	era	may	be	seen	as	the	results	of	a	set	of	
																																																																																																																																																																																		all	the	consequences	of	his	actions	and	only	makes	decisions	that	maximise	his	self-interest,	beyond	emotions	or	any	external	system	of	beliefs.	Finally,	homo	economicus	dislikes	risk.		56	For	a	thorough	analysis	of	Orléan’s	approach	to	the	crisis,	see:	André	Orléan,	The	Empire	Of	Value	(The	MIT	Press,	Cambridge	MA	2014).	57	Christian	 Marazzi,	 ‘Conventions	 and	 disruptions’	 in	 Riccardo	 Bellofiore	 and	 Giovanna	 Vertova	(eds),	 The	 Great	 Recession	 And	 The	 Contradictions	 Of	 Contemporary	 Capitalism	 (Edward	 Elgar,	Cheltenham	2014),	p.	89.	58	ibid.	
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systemic	 failures	 that	 still	 remain	 out	 of	 control.59	Notably,	 this	 context	 of	 prolonged	uncertainty	 has	 catalysed	 strong	 socio-political	 reactions	 around	 the	 globe,	 which	 have	been	expressed	by	different	electorates	and	social	groups	as	a	demand	for	radical	change.	For	instance,	in	the	Eurozone	area,	all	governments	that	signed	loan	agreements	and	“bail-out”	memoranda	with	 the	 International	Monetary	 Fund	 (IMF)	 and	 the	 European	 Central	Bank	(ECB)	did	not	survive	for	long	the	pressures	of	austerity	and	lost	their	majorities	in	national	elections.	At	the	same	time,	politicians	with	socialist	agendas	have	gained	ground	not	only	in	the	crisis-hit	countries	of	the	Eurozone,	which	have	displayed	a	high	degree	of	political	 volatility	 since	 the	 outbreak	 of	 the	 crisis,	 but	 also	 in	 countries	 that	 have	 had	traditionally	 strong	 political	 establishments,	 with	 considerably	 conservative	 ideological	characteristics.	 In	 the	 last	 few	 years,	 relevant	 cases	 have	 included	 the	 rise	 of	 Senator	Bernie	Sanders	as	the	runner-up	for	the	Presidential	nomination	of	the	Democratic	Party	in	the	US,	and	the	double	election	of	 Jeremy	Corbyn	as	 the	 leader	of	 the	UK’s	Labour	Party,	though	an	open	voting	process.	Most	 importantly,	 perhaps,	 the	 impressive	 emergence	of	new	social	movements	 in	 the	aftermath	of	 the	crisis,	such	as	“Occupy	Wall	Street”	(USA),	“Indignados”	(Spain)	and	“Aganaktismeni”	(Greece),	has	reflected	the	need	of	large	parts	of	our	 societies	 to	 find	 alternative	 modes	 of	 socioeconomic	 being,	 which	 would	 be	 in	 a	position	 to	 successfully	 control	 the	 financial	 system	 and	 prioritise	 social	 over	 economic	demands.		Those	aspirations	and	the	left-wing	political	agendas	within	which	they	are	located	have	displayed	important	“pre-revolutionary”	characteristics,	as	they	have	been	regularly	directed	against	structural	elements	of	Data	Capitalism.	Those	include	components	such	as	the	 algorithmic	 control	 of	 the	 economy	and	 the	quantification	of	 everyday	 life	 through	a	process	 of	 constant	 datatization.	 The	 latter	 entails	 that	 all	 types	 of	 information	 are	“translated”	 into	 readable,	 sharable	 and	 comparable	 data,	 which	 can,	 then,	 be	 used	 in	financial	modelling.	 Reacting	 to	 such	 practices,	 and	 alongside	 the	 various	 phenomena	 of	social	 unrest	 and	 political	 disobedience	 that	 the	 world	 has	 experienced	 since	 2008,	 the	aforementioned	 political	 developments	 have	 been	 able	 to	 produce	 a	 context	 of	 class	polarisation	with	 explicitly	 subversive	 potentiality	 at	 times.	 In	 the	 following	 chapters	 of	this	thesis	we	will	explore	the	influence	of	this	political	climate	on	culture,	 in	the	form	of																																																									59	International	Monetary	Fund,	‘Report	for	Selected	Country	Groups	and	Subjects’	(Imf.org,	1	April	2015)	<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=21&pr.y=15&sy=2006&ey=2016&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=001%2C110%2C163%2C200&s=NGDP_RPCH&grp=1&a=1#download>	accessed	21	March	2016.	
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Web-based	 art.	 However,	 the	 economy	 is	 only	 the	 first	 of	 the	 two	 principal	 factors	 that	have	 determined	 the	 character	 of	 Web-based	 art	 produced	 after	 the	 crisis.	 The	 second	factor	has	been	art	 itself	and,	more	specifically,	 the	rich	tradition	of	artistic	practices	and	movements	that	have	been	inspired	by	alternative	political	imaginaries.	In	all	probability,	the	most	prominent	of	those	traditions	during	the	last	century	has	been	the	amalgamation	of	 revolutionary	 political	 thought	 and	 cultural	 production	 that	 was	 catalysed	 by	 the	seminal	 events	 of	 October	 1917	 in	 Russia	 –	 the	 Bolshevik	 Revolution.	 By	 using	 this	historical	synthesis	as	a	starting	point,	we	will	use	the	second	part	of	this	chapter	in	order	to	develop	a	more	solid	understanding	of	the	cultural	and	ideological	basis	that	has	shaped	the	 political	 Web-based	 works	 of	 the	 post-crisis	 era.	 Finally,	 this	 investigation	 will	 be	further	 developed	 and	 expanded	 in	 the	 next	 chapter,	 in	 which	 we	 will	 explore	 a	 third,	“underlying”	 factor:	 the	 philosophical	 framework	 that	 organically	 brings	 together	 Web-based	art	and	communist	utopianism.			
Art	of	the	Revolution	and	the	Revolution	of	Art		The	aftermath	of	the	Great	October	Socialist	Revolution60	was	an	unprecedentedly	dynamic	period	for	all	artists,	designers,	architects,	theorists	and	writers	who	aimed	to	build	a	new	relationship	 between	 art	 and	 everyday	 life	 through	 the	 integration	 of	 the	 one	 into	 the	other.61	The	 People’s	 Commissariat	 of	 Enlightenment	 –	 the	 Soviet	Ministry	 of	 Culture62	–	encouraged	artists	to	celebrate	the	Revolution	and	reinvent	art	by	bringing	their	work	out	of	their	studios	and	into	public	space:	 in	the	central	squares,	 the	parks	and	the	streets	of	towns	and	cities,	 and	on	 the	 facades	of	prominent	public	buildings.63	Interestingly,	Lenin	insisted	 that	 post-revolution	 monuments	 should	 not	 reflect	 merely	 the	 Russian	 history;	rather,	 they	 should	 adopt	 an	 overtly	 internationalist	 approach,	 which	 would	 evoke	 the	universal	 character	 of	 socialism	 and	 its	 founding	 principles.	 Accordingly,	 the	 list	 of	 the	historical	 figures	 that	 artists	memorialized	 in	 their	 newly	built	monuments	 started	 from	antiquity	and	heroes	who	had	fought	tyranny,	like	Spartacus,	Gracchus	and	Brutus;	and	it																																																									60	The	 “Great	 October	 Socialist	 Revolution”	 has	 been	 the	 official	 name	 used	 by	 the	 Soviets.	 See:	Vladimir	Ilʹich	Lenin,	On	The	Great	October	Socialist	Revolution	(Progress	Publishers	1967).	61	For	a	more	extensive	study	of	the	Russian	avant-garde	art,	see:	Catherine	Cooke,	Russian	Avant-
Garde	(Academy	Editions	1995).	62	See:	 Sheila	 Fitzpatrick,	The	Commissariat	of	Enlightenment:	Soviet	Organization	of	Education	and	
the	Arts	under	Luncharsky,	October	1917-1921,	(Cambridge	University	Press	1970).	63	Syrago	Tsiara,	‘Utopia	and	Reality	in	the	Art	of	the	October	Revolution’	(2008)	Historein	vol.	7	pp.	87	–	88.	
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reached	 much	 more	 recent	 revolutionaries,	 like	 German	 communist	 martyrs	 Karl	Liebknecht	 and	 Rosa	 Luxemburg.	 In	 between,	 one	 could	 spot	 the	 Italian	 national	 hero	Garibaldi,	the	English	utopian	socialist	Robert	Owen,	the	French	utopian	theorists	Charles	Fourier	 and	Saint-Simon,	 as	well	 as	 cultural	 figures	 such	 as	Heinrich	Heine	 and	Frédéric	Chopin.64		At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 windows	 of	 the	 offices	 of	 the	 Russian	 Telegraph	 Agency	(ROSTA)	 became	 innovative	 information	 channels,	 as	 they	 featured	 regularly	 changing	illustrations	of	the	latest	social	and	political	events.	Furthermore,	art	was	travelling	around	the	country	through	propaganda	trains	and	lorries,	which	were	painted	with	revolutionary	slogans	 and	 images.	 In	 addition,	 those	means	of	 transport	were	distributing	posters	 and	books,	as	well	as	playing	selected	speeches	by	Lenin	on	their	loudspeakers.65	However,		
	Figure	1:	Agitprop	train	(1919)		
																																																								64	Richard	 Stites,	Revolutionary	 Dreams:	 Utopian	 Vision	 and	 Experimental	 Life	 in	 the	 Russian	
Revolution	(Oxford	University	Press,	USA	1988)	pp.	89-90.	65	Tsiara,	loc.	cit.	
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lorries	 and	 trains	were	not	 the	 sole	 products	 of	 industrialisation	 that	were	perceived	 as	both	literal	and	metaphorical	vehicles	for	the	dissemination	of	socialist	art.	Technological	advances,	 like	 the	 improved	means	 of	 transportation,	 and	 the	 new	modes	 of	 centralised	production	were	widely	 considered	 to	be	 the	 catalysts	 that	would	allow	artists	 to	 create	original	forms	of	art.	In	a	process	of	gradual	consolidation,	the	Soviet	avant-garde	“forged	connections	 rather	 than	 posed	 analogies	 between	 artistic	 and	 industrial	 production,	cultural	and	political	revolution”.66	New	industrial	 technologies	and	scientific	 innovations	propelled	 social	 utopian	 expression	 in	 all	 forms	 of	 literature,	 the	 visual	 arts	 and	music,	even	 during	 the	 period	 that	 had	 led	 up	 to	 the	 October	 Revolution.67	As	 artists	 Mikhail	Larionov	and	Natalya	Goncharova	proclaimed	in	their	Rayonists	and	Futurists	manifesto	of	1913,	 “the	 whole	 brilliant	 style	 of	modern	 times	 –	 our	 trousers,	 jackets,	 shoes,	 trolleys,	cars,	airplanes,	railways,	grandiose	steamships	–	is	fascinating”.	According	to	the	artists	of	the	Revolution,	this	unprecedented	epoch	of	change	was	opening	up	not	just	for	their	own	country,	but	also	for	humanity	as	a	whole.68	Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 path	 towards	 communism	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Russia	 did	 not	open	as	a	result	of	capitalism’s	crises	(as	Marx	and	Engels	had	predicted	in	The	Communist	
Manifesto),	 it	 still	 aimed	 at	 realising	 the	 context	 for	 the	 arts	 that	 the	 two	 authors	 had	already	delineated	in	some	of	their	earlier	writings.	More	specifically,	The	German	Ideology	(1846)	 describes	 thoroughly	 the	 effect	 that	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 post-revolutionary	communist	society	would	have	on	cultural	production.	Notably,	Marx	and	Engels	not	only	locate	 the	 origins	 of	 creativity	 within	 the	 mode	 of	 labour,	 but	 they	 also	 specify	 how	 a	different	(i.e.	communist)	mode	of	 labour	shall	 transform	the	cultivation	of	artistic	 talent	and	its	span:		
																																																								66	Hal	Foster,	‘Some	Uses	and	Abuses	of	Russian	Constructivism’,	Art	into	life:	Russian	Constructivism	
1914-1932	(Rizzoli	International	Publications,	New	York	1990)	p.	244.	67	There	are	numerous	cases	of	artists	and	works	that	exemplify	this	trend.	In	visual	arts,	relevant	artworks	 vary	 from	 Vladimir	 Tatlin’s	 “counter	 reliefs”	 (three-dimensional	 constructions	 using	wood	 and	 metal,	 which	 were	 either	 displayed	 in	 corners	 or	 more	 conventionally	 similar	 to	paintings)	 to	 Kazimir	 Malevich’s	 Suprematist	 paintings.	 In	 literature,	 Alexander	 Bogdanov's	 Red	
Star	 (1908)	and	Engineer	Menni	 (1913),	mixed	technological	and	political	revolution	with	science	fiction,	 by	 imagining	 a	 communist	 society	 on	 planet	Mars.	 The	 futurist	 poems	 of	 Aleksei	 Gastev	describe	 passionately	machines	 as	 an	 extension	 of	 human	 nature,	while	 Vasilii	 Kamenskii	wrote	“ferro-concrete	poems”	that	were	composed	by	words	suspended	like	airplanes.	The	Futurist	opera	
Victory	Over	the	Sun	was	first	performed	in	Saint	Petersburg	in	1913,	with	a	libretto	by	poet	Aleksei	Kruchenykh	 and	music	 by	 Mikhail	 Matiushin.	 Kazimir	 Malevich	 designed	 the	 opera’s	 stage	 sets,	costumes	and	lighting.	68	Mary	Ann	Caws	(ed),	Manifesto:	A	Century	of	Isms	(University	of	Nebraska	Press	2000)	p.	242.	
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The	 exclusive	 concentration	 of	 artistic	 talent	 in	 particular	 individuals,	 and	 its	suppression	 in	 the	 broad	mass	which	 is	 bound	 up	with	 this,	 is	 a	 consequence	 of	division	of	 labour.	 If,	even	 in	certain	social	conditions,	everyone	were	an	excellent	painter,	 that	would	not	at	all	exclude	 the	possibility	of	each	of	 them	being	also	an	original	painter,	so	that	here	too	the	difference	between	‘human’	and	‘unique’	labour	amounts	to	sheer	nonsense.	In	any	case,	with	a	communist	organization	of	society,	there	disappears	 the	 subordination	of	 the	 artist	 to	 local	 and	national	narrowness,	which	arises	entirely	from	division	of	labour,	and	also	the	subordination	of	the	artist	to	 some	definite	art,	 thanks	 to	which	he	 is	exclusively	a	painter,	 sculptor,	 etc.,	 the	very	name	of	his	activity	adequately	expressing	the	narrowness	of	his	professional	development	 and	 his	 dependence	 on	 division	 of	 labour.	 In	 a	 communist	 society	there	 are	 no	 painters	 but	 at	 most	 people	 who	 engage	 in	 painting	 among	 other	activities.69		Marx	and	Engels	go	on	 to	underline	 the	 importance	of	 “original	and	 free	development	of	individuals”	within	a	communist	society	and	the	fact	that	establishing	connections	between	people	will	contribute	towards	this	outcome.70	If	 we	 tried,	 then,	 to	 synopsize	 this	 prospective	 context	 for	 artistic	 creation,	 and	combine	it	with	the	goals	of	nascent	Soviet	culture,	we	could	claim	that	they	are	both	based	on	a	new	understanding	about	the	social	function	of	art.	The	latter	is	expressed	through	a	series	 of	 interconnected	principles	 and	 objectives.	 First	 of	 all,	 socialist	 art	 should	 aim	 at	achieving	an	unprecedented	geographical	reach,	in	order	to	embrace	the	whole	of	society	and,	in	particular,	those	of	its	members	who	have	had	more	limited	access	to	culture	due	to	their	unprivileged	social	position.	Unsurprisingly,	such	a	position	is	very	often	associated	with	 living	 in	 an	 equally	 unprivileged	 geographical	 position,	 be	 it	 the	 working-class	
																																																								69	Karl	 Marx	 and	 Friedrich	 Engels,	 ‘The	 German	 Ideology’	 in	 David	 McLellan	 (ed),	Karl	 Marx:	
Selected	Writings	(Oxford	University	Press	2000)	p.	206.	70	ibid.,	p.	207.	Furthermore,	in	the	introduction	of	his	Dialectics	of	Nature	(1898),	Engels	provides	some	 noteworthy	 examples	 of	 cultural	 figures	 who	 exemplified	 the	 expanded	 perspective	 on	artistic	 talent	 that	 is	 analysed	 in	The	German	Ideology:	 “Leonardo	 da	 Vinci	 was	 not	 only	 a	 great	painter	 but	 also	 a	 great	 mathematician,	 mechanician,	 and	 engineer,	 to	 whom	 the	 most	 diverse	branches	of	physics	are	indebted	for	important	discoveries.	Albrecht	Durer	was	painter,	engraver,	sculptor,	and	architect,	 and	 in	addition	 invented	a	 system	of	 fortification	embodying	many	of	 the	ideas	 that	much	 later	were	 again	 taken	 up	 by	Montalembert	 and	 the	modern	German	 science	 of	fortification”.	See:	Friedrich	Engels,	‘The	German	Ideology’	in	William	Dugger	and	Howard	Sherman	(eds),	Evolutionary	Theory	in	the	Social	Sciences	vol.	3	(Routledge,	New	York	2003)	pp.	10	–	11.	
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suburbs	of	a	metropolis,	or	the	remote	villages	of	the	countryside.71	Furthermore,	the	new	context	for	artistic	creativity	should	not	be	looking	merely	inwards	–	namely,	towards	the	society	of	a	single	country	–	but,	rather,	 it	should	attempt	to	accentuate	the	international	and	 universal	 elements	 that	 it	 aspires	 to	 communicate,	 both	 formally	 and	 conceptually.	This	dual	 “expansion”	would	be	made	possible	 thanks	 to	 the	products	of	 technology	and	their	employment	as	channels	of	dissemination.	No	artificial	exclusions	apply	to	the	forms	of	art	that	can	be	disseminated;	on	the	contrary,	there	should	be	a	strong	interdisciplinary	or	 cross-disciplinary	 element	 in	 the	 character	 that	 cultural	 initiatives	 and	 events	 may	adopt.	 Accordingly,	 new	 forms	 of	 engagement	 can	materialise,	 as	 people	 are	 offered	 the	opportunity	to	re-evaluate	and	rediscover	the	relevance	and	the	role	of	art	in	its	different	forms	 for	 their	 everyday	 lives.	 Artists	 shall	 actively	 engage	 with	 society	 and	 aim	 to	transform	 the	 members	 of	 the	 audience	 into	 co-communicators	 of	 their	 ideas.	 Most	importantly,	 this	 perspective	 would	 emerge	 through	 a	 particular	 socioeconomic	 prism,	which	 associates	 directly	 art	 with	 the	 dominant	 production	model	 and	 the	 tools	 that	 it	employs	–	for	instance,	though	the	division	of	labour,	which	Marx	and	Engels	identify	as	the	source	 of	 conceptual	 “narrowness”.	 Therefore,	 communism’s	 orientation	 towards	 the	disappearance	of	class	culture	does	not	in	any	way	entail	the	disappearance	of	all	culture.72	The	aim	of	 the	political	 and	cultural	 transformation	 is	 clear:	 to	 replace	an	old	 system,	 in	which	 the	 formation	 and	 augmentation	of	 capital	 happens	 only	 in	 benefit	 of	 some	 social	classes	 (the	 bourgeoisie),	 with	 a	 new	 system	 of	 equality,	 in	 which	 capital,	 including	
intellectual	and	cultural	capital,	shall	become	common	wealth.		 			
Crisis	2.0:	Art	Alert!		Several	of	the	artists	that	have	been	active	during	the	historical	period	that	started	with	the	global	 financial	 crisis	 of	 2008	have	 found	 inspiration	 in	 those	 very	 objectives	 of	 nascent	Soviet	 art.	 Their	 artworks,	 projects	 and	 interventions	 have	 been	 based	 on	 the	 ideals	 of	openness,	 inclusivity	 and	 collaboration	 within	 a	 context	 of	 strong	 political	 engagement,	which	their	Soviet	counterparts	enthusiastically	espoused	almost	a	century	ago.	However,	in	the	case	of	contemporary	artists	aiming	for	political	change,	the	trains	and	the	lorries	of	the	 People’s	 Commissariat	 of	 Enlightenment	were	 replaced	 by	 a	 range	 of	 very	 different																																																									71	In	the	case	of	nascent	Soviet	culture,	those	conditions	were	–	at	least	partly	–	addressed	through	the	 public	 interventions-artworks	 of	 artists,	 as	well	 as	 though	 the	 propaganda	 lorries	 and	 trains	that	traveled	across	Russia.			72	Marx	and	Engels,	The	Communist	Manifesto,	op.	cit.,	p.	58.	
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means:	smartphones,	desktops,	laptops	and	tablets.	In	addition,	in	the	squares	around	the	world	 where	 large	 crowds	 gathered	 to	 protest	 against	 the	 dominance	 of	 the	 financial	markets	over	politics,	their	slogans,	their	songs,	their	banners,	their	discussions	and	their	emotions	were	not	mediated	merely	through	traditional	media	outlets,	like	television,	the	radio	and	the	printed	and	electronic	press,	but	primarily	through	the	means	that	they	were	literally	holding	in	their	own	hands.	Thanks	to	those	networked	gadgets,	protestors	were	able	 to	 document	 their	 activities	 and	 the	 reactions	 of	 the	 security	 forces,	 express	 their	opinions	 and	 inform	 the	 people	who	were	 absent	 about	 the	 reality	 on	 the	 ground.	 This	information	 was	 instantly	 transmitted	 and	 shared	 with	 audiences	 around	 the	 world,	through	still	 images,	videos	and	texts.	Therefore,	we	could	easily	 identify	 two	major	new	attributes	that	define	the	nature	of	the	means	of	communication	in	the	early	21st	century:	firstly,	all	of	the	previously	listed	devices	are	interconnected	thanks	to	the	Internet	and	the	use	of	networked	applications;	and,	secondly,	all	of	them	have	a	strong	personal	character,	not	only	as	objects	of	personal	use,	but	also	–	 if	not	mainly	–	as	 items	 integrated	 into	all	aspects	of	their	users’	everyday	lives.			 In	their	influential	manifesto	The	ABC	of	Tactical	Media	(1997),	new	media	cultural	theorists	 and	 practitioners	 David	 Garcia	 and	 Geert	 Lovink	 associate	 the	 notion	 of	 the	everyday	life	with	the	political	use	of	new	media	technologies,	by	referencing	the	work	of	French	philosopher	Michel	de	Certeau.73	In	his	book	The	Practice	of	Every	Day	Life	 (1984),	De	Certeau	proposes	 the	 transformation	of	consumers	 into	active	producers,	 through	the	imaginative	 use	 of	 elements	 and	 tools	 that	 are	 already	 available	within	 their	 immediate	surroundings	 and	 social	 environments.	 In	 order	 to	 elucidate	 this	 approach,	 De	 Certeau	draws	 a	 distinction	 between	 “strategies”	 and	 “tactics”.	 He	 associates	 the	 latter	 with	 the	ability	 of	 the	 weaker	 in	 society	 to	 disrupt	 the	 dominant	 order	 as	 established	 by	 more	powerful	through	the	deployment	of	different	strategies.	In	contrast,	tactics	are	related	to		 clever	tricks,	knowing	how	to	get	away	with	things,	‘hunter’s	cunning,’	manoeuvres,	polymorphic	simulations,	joyful	discoveries	poetic	as	well	as	warlike	they	go	back	to	the	immemorial	[...]	intelligence	displayed	in	the	tricks	and	imitations	of	plants	and	
																																																								73	David	 Garcia	 and	 Geert	 Lovink,	 ‘The	 ABC	 of	 Tactical	 Media’	 (Nettime.org,	 16	 May	 1997)	<http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9705/msg00096.html>	 accessed	 21	 March	2016.	
			 32	
fishes.	 From	 the	 depths	 of	 the	 ocean	 to	 the	 streets	 of	 the	modern	megalopolises,	there	is	a	continuity	and	permanence	of	these	tactics.74		Those	 subversive	 capacities	 started	 becoming	 more	 widely	 visible	 in	 the	 early	 1990s,	thanks	to	the	much	cheaper	and	easy-to-use	media	products	that	were	entering	the	lives	of	more	 and	 more	 people.	 Those	 products	 included	 camcorders,	 video	 projectors,	 sound	systems	 and	 video	 reproduction	 devices.	 Accordingly,	 technological	 innovations	 became	the	main	agent	that	contributed	to	the	rise	to	tactical	media,	which	are	defined	by	Garcia	and	Lovink	as	 “what	happens	when	the	cheap	 ‘do	 it	yourself’	media	 […]	are	exploited	by	groups	and	individuals	who	feel	aggrieved	by	or	excluded	from	the	wider	culture”.75		The	 two	 authors	 identify	 the	 “heroes”	 of	 tactical	 media	 in	 the	 form	 of	 activists,	hackers,	 street	 rappers,	 pranksters,	 nomadic	media	 warriors	 and	 camcorder	 kamikazes,	before	 referencing	 the	 practice	 of	 Polish	 artist	 Krzysztof	 Wodiczko	 as	 “an	 exemplary	example	 of	 the	 tactical”.76	Since	 the	 1980s,	Wodiczko	 has	 been	 creating	 large-scale	 slide	and	video	projections	of	politically	and	socially	charged	images,	which	“occupy”	the	façades	of	 important	 buildings	 and	 monuments	 around	 the	 world.	 Some	 of	 his	 most	 influential	projects	 include	 the	 projection	 of	 the	 image	 of	 Ronald	 Reagan’s	 hand	 in	 the	 pledge	 of	allegiance	pose,	on	the	AT&T	Long	Lines	Building,	which	is	situated	in	the	financial	district	of	 New	 York.	 This	 public	 intervention	 took	 place	 just	 four	 days	 before	 the	 1984	 US	Presidential	 Elections	 and	 it	 aimed	 at	 criticising	 the	 subordination	 of	 political	 power	 to	financial	power.	And,	 in	1985,	Wodiczko	projected	a	 swastika	on	 the	 façade	of	 the	South	Africa	House	 in	Trafalgar	Square	of	London,	as	a	protest	 for	 the	continuous	 financial	and	political	 support	 of	 the	 British	 government	 for	 the	 Apartheid	 regime.	 Garcia	 and	 Lovink	characterise	 such	historical	 practices	 as	 “temporary	 reversals	 in	 the	 flow	of	power”,	 and	they	 associate	 them	with	 the	 inherent	 objective	 of	 tactical	 media	 to	 oppose	 the	 rule	 of	money	 over	 people.	 Quite	 evidently,	 this	 definition	 gives	 room	 for	 rather	 diverse																																																									74	Michel	de	Certeau,	The	Practice	of	Everyday	Life	(University	of	California	Press,	Berkeley	1984)	p.	xii.	De	 Certeau	 provides	 an	 example	 of	 tactics	 by	 referring	 to	 the	 history	 of	 Latin	 America:	 “For	instance,	 the	 ambiguity	 that	 subverted	 from	within	 the	 Spanish	 colonizers’	 ‘success’	 in	 imposing	their	 own	 culture	 on	 the	 indigenous	 Indians	 is	 well	 known.	 Submissive,	 and	 even	 consenting	 to	their	 subjection,	 the	 Indians	 nevertheless	 often	 made	 of	 the	 rituals,	 representations,	 and	 laws	imposed	 on	 them	 something	 quite	 different	 from	 what	 their	 conquerors	 had	 in	 mind;	 they	subverted	 them	 not	 by	 rejecting	 or	 altering	 them,	 but	 by	 using	 them	 with	 respect	 to	 ends	 and	references	 foreign	 to	 the	 system	 they	 had	no	 choice	 but	 to	 accept	 […]	 their	 use	 of	 the	 dominant	social	order	deflected	its	power,	which	they	lacked	the	means	to	challenge;	they	escaped	it	without	leaving	it.	The	strength	of	their	difference	lay	in	procedures	of	‘consumption’”	(ibid.,	p.	xiii).	75	Garcia	and	Lovink,	loc.	cit.	76	ibid.		
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interpretations	and	practices	that	could	be	identified	as	being	“tactical”.	Therefore,	it	would	be	 more	 useful	 –	 and	 more	 accurate,	 perhaps	 –	 to	 conceptualise	 the	 embracement	 of	tactical	media	as	the	exploitation	of	a	pool	of	potentialities	associated	with	the	seizure	of	communication	means	that	either	become	temporarily	available,	or	that	are	appropriated	after	having	been	left	“unclaimed”	over	a	considerable	period	of	time.		This	approach	to	communication	resources	nurtures	what	we	could	call	a	 “media-conscious	 environment”77	in	 which	 art,	 politics,	 media	 and	 technology	 are	 much	 more	likely	to	be	combined	through	the	identification	of	their	overlaps	and	mutual	influences.	As	the	members	of	the	tactical	media	collective	Critical	Art	Ensemble	(CAE)78	wrote	in	2001,	“the	 tactical	 media	 practitioner	 uses	 any	 media	 necessary	 to	 meet	 the	 demands	 of	 the	situation”.	In	consequence,	“specialisation	does	not	predetermine	action.	This	is	partly	why	tactical	media	lends	itself	to	collective	efforts,	as	there	is	always	a	need	for	a	differentiated	
	Figure	2:	Krzysztof	Wodiczko,	Projection	onto	South	Africa	House	(1985)		
																																																								77	John	Baldock,	Nick	Manning	and	Sarah	Vickerstaff	(eds),	Social	Policy	(3rd	edn,	Oxford	University	Press	2007)	p.	97.		78	The	collective’s	website:	 ‘Critical	Art	Ensemble’	 (Critical-art.net)	<http://www.critical-art.net/>	accessed	28	March	2016.		
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skill	base”.79	Interestingly,	Michel	de	Certeau	describes	this	hybridization	in	rather	artistic	terms:	as	a	form	of	hidden	“poesis”	that	 is	“dispersed,	but	 it	 insinuates	itself	everywhere,	silently	and	almost	invisibly,	because	it	does	not	manifest	itself	through	its	own	products,	but	 rather	 through	 its	 ways	 of	 using	 the	 products	 imposed	 by	 a	 dominant	 economic	order”.80	This	 attitude	 has	 been	 particularly	 evident	 in	 the	 projects	 of	 the	 Critical	 Art	Ensemble,	which	include	–	amongst	others	–	the	creation	of	networked	bikes	designed	for	nomadic	 broadcasts,	 which	 constituted	 detournements	 of	mainstream	media	 broadcasts	(Radio	Bikes,	Graz,	Austria,	2000);	a	simulation	of	a	dirty	bomb’s	explosion	in	public	space	(Radiation	 Burn,	 Halle,	 Germany,	 2010);	 and	 A	 Public	 Misery	 Message:	 A	 Temporary	
Monument	to	Global	Inequality	 (Kassel,	Germany,	2012),	 in	which	participants	were	 lifted	by	a	helicopter	to	hover	at	a	height	that	allowed	them	to	visualize	the	economic	separation	of	the	top	1%	of	wealthiest	people	from	the	bottom	99%.81		 Most	importantly,	however,	the	spirit	exemplified	by	the	projects	the	writings	of	the	Critical	Art	Ensemble	can	be	found	throughout	the	1990s	and	the	early	2000s	in	the	works	of	 various	 net	 artists,	 who	 can	 be	 considered	 as	 precursors	 of	 the	 Web-based	 artistic	practices	 developed	 after	 2008.	 For	 instance,	 the	 artivist	 group	 ®TMmark	 (art	 mark)	adopted	a	pseudo-corporate	brand	identity	in	order	to	accentuate	the	protections	enjoyed	by	 corporations,	 in	 contradistinction	 with	 the	 legal	 provisions	 for	 artists	 and	 cultural	producers	 at	 large.82	In	 one	of	 their	most	prominent	projects,	 the	members	of	 the	 group	created	 in	 1999	 a	 spoof	 website	 for	 the	 Presidential	 campaign	 of	 George	 W.	 Bush	(GWBush.com),	 in	 order	 to	 criticise	 his	 conservative	 views.	 The	 outrage	 by	 the	 then	Republican	candidate’s	campaign,	led	Bush	to	the	controversial	assertion	that	“there	ought	to	 be	 limits	 to	 freedom”.83	Natalie	 Bookchin,	 a	 former	 member	 of	 ®TMmark,	 has	 been	exploring	 through	 her	 personal	 work	 various	 subjects	 associated	 with	 the	 economy,	corporate	 culture,	 equality	 and	 democracy.	 One	 of	 Bookchin’s	 most	 acclaimed	 net	 art	projects,	 which	 provides	 a	 fierce	 critique	 of	 the	 capitalist	 mode	 of	 labour,	 is	 Metapet																																																									79	Critical	Art	Ensemble,	Digital	Resistance:	Explorations	in	Tactical	Media	(Autonomedia,	New	York	2001)	p.	8.	80	De	Certeau,	op.	cit.,	p.	xii.	81	By	early	2016,	the	collective	had	also	published	seven	books:	The	Electronic	Disturbance	(1994),	
Electronic	 Civil	 Disobedience	 &	 Other	 Unpopular	 Ideas	 (1996),	 Flesh	 Machine:	 Cyborgs,	 Designer	
Babies,	 &	 New	 Eugenic	 Consciousness	 (1998),	 Digital	 Resistance:	 Explorations	 in	 Tactical	 Media	(2001),	Molecular	Invasion	(2002),	Marching	Plague	(2006),	and	Disturbances	(2012).	82	The	 group’s	 website,	 ‘RTMark’	 (Rtmark.com,	 2000)	 <http://www.rtmark.com/>,	 was	 under	construction	as	of	October	2016.		83	Terry	M	Neal,	 ‘Satirical	Web	Site	Poses	Political	Test’	The	Washington	Post	(29	November	1999)	<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPcap/1999-11/29/002r-112999-idx.html>	 accessed	21	March	2016.	
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(2003).	The	work	is	an	online	game	in	which	players	adopt	the	role	of	corporate	managers	who	 control	 genetically	 modified	 human	 employees,	 or	 “transgenic	 virtual	 pets”.	 In	 an	overt	critique	of	the	uncritical	character	of	our	networked	capitalist	society,	all	“Metapets”	have	been	bioengineered	in	order	to	include	in	their	DNA	a	fictional	obedience	gene,	which	is	normally	found	in	dogs.84		Bookchin	 and	 the	 rest	 of	 ®TMmark’s	 members,	 supported	 passionately	 another	online	artistic	collective,	Etoy,	in	its	legal	battle	with	the	owners	of	www.etaoys.com,	who	wanted	to	buy	the	collective’s	website.	Etoy,	which	describes	itself	in	its	mission	statement	
	Figure	3:	Natalie	Bookchin,	Metapet	(2003)		as	a	“corporate	sculpture”,85	launched	in	1999	a	multifaceted	net	art	project	called	Toywar,	in	response	to	the	aforementioned	legal	case.	The	work	was	an	online	game,	through	which																																																									84	As	 Bookchin	 notes,	 “Playing	 according	 to	 the	 rules	 will	 lead	 to	 the	 most	 boring	 of	 outcomes.	Players	will	 earn	money,	 but	who	 cares?	Money	makes	 you	 a	 ‘winner’	 but	 you	 can’t	 do	 anything	with	the	money,	and	the	game	will	soon	become	pretty	dull.	On	the	other	hand,	playing	poorly	will	lead	to	some	of	the	more	interesting	game	elements.	Your	Metapet	will	become	a	lot	more	colourful	and	 rebellious,	 artists’	mini	 games	 (in	which	 I	 had	other	 artists	 design	 simple	 little	 games	 about	biotechnology)	 will	 show	 up,	 and	 your	 pet	 starts	 sending	 messages	 back	 and	 forth	 to	 other	Metapets”.	 See:	 ‘Metapet’	 (Metapet.net)	 <http://metapet.net/>	 accessed	 21	 March	 2016;	 and	Natalie	Bookchin,	 ‘Metapet’	 (Bookchin.net)	 <http://bookchin.net/projects/metapet/>	 accessed	21	March	2016.		85	The	collective’s	members	go	on	to	note	that	“etoy	twists	artistic	production	and	appearance	in	a	world	dominated	by	ambivalent	parameters:	mass	production	and	consumption	of	information	and	goods,	global	transportation,	branding,	maximization	of	profits,	growing	complexity,	technological	penetration	 of	 life	 and	 virtualization”.	 See:	 ‘Fundamentals’	 (Etoy.com)	<http://etoy.com/fundamentals/>	accessed	21	March	2016.	
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players	could	support	Etoy	by	engaging	in	various	online	activities	(e.g.	by	criticising	Etoys	in	online	forums),	whilst	driving	the	stock	price	of	Etoys.com	down.	The	legal	battle	ended	in	 January	 2000,	 with	 Etoys’	 announcement	 that	 they	 were	 dropping	 their	 original	lawsuit.86	In	the	same	spirit	of	anti-capitalist	critique,	net	art	duo	Jennifer	and	Kevin	McCoy	launched	in	1999	Airworld,	a	website	that	constituted	the	online	presence	of	a	spoof	airline	company.	 The	marketing	 slogans	 that	 were	 featured	 in	 the	website	were	 collected	 by	 a	specially	 designed	 piece	 of	 software	 that	 searched	 the	 Web	 and	 selected	 stereotypical	marketing	 jargon	 and,	 then,	 used	 them	 in	 audio	Web	 casts,	 thus	 producing	 a	 corporate	parody.87	Finally,	 by	 the	 late	 1990s,	 collectives	 such	 as	 Electronic	 Disturbance	 Theater	(EDT)	 had	 managed	 to	 introduce	 hacking	 practices	 to	 the	 repertoire	 of	 online	 tools	available	 to	 politically	 engaged	 artists.	 One	 of	 the	 group’s	most	 famous	works	 has	 been	
Zapatista	Tactical	Floodnet	(1998),	which	invited	Internet	users	to	participate	in	collective	electronic	 civil	 disobedience,	 in	 solidarity	 with	 the	 Zapatistas	 –	 the	 revolutionary	movement	of	indigenous	people	in	Chiapas	of	Mexico.	The	first	online	action	took	place	on	10	April	1998,	in	the	form	of	a	virtual	“sit-in”	that	facilitated	the	malfunction/hacking	of	the	websites	 of	 individuals	 and	 organizations	 considered	 to	 be	 agents	 of	 Mexican	 neo-liberalism	and	to	have	played	a	negative	role	in	the	suppression	of	the	rights	of	the	people	of	 Chiapas.88	The	 attacks	were	 directed	 (amongst	 others)	 against	 the	websites	 of	 former	Mexican	 President	 Ernesto	 Zedillo,	 former	 US	 President	 Bill	 Clinton,	 the	 Mexican	 Stock	Exchange	 and	 Chase	 Manhattan	 Bank.89	EDT	 artist	 and	 programmer	 Brett	 Stalbaum	characterized	 the	 project	 as	 “an	 example	 of	 conceptual	 net.art	 that	 empowers	 people	through	activist/artistic	expression”.90			
																																																								86	‘Projects:	 Toywar	 1999/2000’	 (Etoy.com)	 <http://etoy.com/projects/toywar/>	 accessed	 21	March	2016	87	Jennifer	McCoy	and	Kevin	McCoy,	 ‘Mccoyspace:	Airworld	Series	 (1999-2000)’	 (Mccoyspace.com,	2012)	<http://www.mccoyspace.com/project/57/>	accessed	21	March	2016.	88	The	Zapatista	Tactical	FloodNet’	 (Thing.net)	<http://www.thing.net/~rdom/ecd/ZapTact.html>	accessed	21	March	2016.	89	Mark	Tribe	and	Reena	Jana,	New	Media	Art	(Taschen,	Cologne	2007)	p.	40.	90	The	Zapatista	Tactical	FloodNet’,	loc.	cit.	
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	Figure	4:	Electronic	Disturbance	Theater,	Zapatista	Tactical	Floodnet	(1998)		In	parallel	with	the	work	of	this	first	generation	of	online	cultural	producers,	several	online	 activist	 initiatives	 managed	 to	 transcend	 the	 ephemerality	 of	 traditional	 tactical	media	practices	and	influence	public	opinion	on	a	truly	global	scale.	This	has	been	possible	thanks	 to	 the	 engagement	 of	 their	 audience	 through	 a	 more	 focused	 “issue-based”	approach,	 with	 stated	 long-term	 ambitions,	 as	 well	 as	 through	 the	 development	 of	 a	networked	“platform”	model	that	offers	far	greater	logistical	possibilities.	This	combination	can	 be	 found	 in	 the	modus	 operandi	 of	 online	 non-profit	 public	 policy	 advocacy	 groups,	whose	 aim	has	been	 to	 address	both	 international	 and	domestic	 issues.	The	 earliest	 and	most	prominent	example	of	such	an	organisation	is	MoveOn.org,	which	started	in	1998	as	an	 e-mail	 group	 that	 circulated	 petitions.	 By	 early	 2016,	 the	 platform	 had	more	 than	 8	million	 registered	 members	 and	 it	 had	 become	 the	 “blueprint”	 for	 most	 online	 civic	organisations.	 By	 regularly	 using	 online	 petitions	 and	 promoting	 fundraising	 schemes	 in	support	 of	 specific	 causes,	 platforms	 such	 as	Avaaz,	 Change.org,	 SumOfUs.org,	 GetUp,	 38	Degrees,	Campact,	and	350.org,	have	been	able	to	secure	millions	of	signatures-participants	in	 their	 petitions	 and,	 accordingly,	 exert	 sustained	 pressure	 on	 policymakers	 and	corporations	through	their	campaigns.	In	addition,	the	rise	of	open-publishing	networks	of	
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journalist	collectives,	such	as	Indymedia,	which	was	founded	during	the	1999	Seattle	WTO	protests,91	indicated	 the	 power	 of	 bottom-up	 information,	 especially	 in	 times	 of	 social	upheaval.92	Finally,	 the	 most	 prominent	 example	 of	 online	 activism	 in	 recent	 years	 has	been	 the	WikiLeaks	 platform,	whose	 publication	 of	 news	 leaks	 and	 classified	media	 has	managed	to	attract	worldwide	attention.	Since	2006,	WikiLeaks	has	published	classified	or	top-secret	 information,	 including	diplomatic	 cables,	which	were	provided	by	 anonymous	whistle-blowers.	Over	the	years,	those	leaks	have	concerned	war	conflicts	(e.g.	the	Iraq	and	Afghanistan	wars,	including	the	high-profile	leak	of	a	Bagdad	airstrike	video	in	2007	by	US	Army	 intelligence	analyst	Chelsea	Manning);	human	right	violations	(e.g.	 the	suppression	of	 Tibetan	 dissent	 in	 China,	 and	 the	 Guantanamo	 Bay	 detention	 centre	 procedures);	financial	scandals	(e.g.	Barclays	bank	tax	avoidance	case);	environmental	scandals	(e.g.	the	toxic	waste	dumping	in	the	Ivory	coast	by	the	Dutch	corporation	Trafigura);	and,	 last	but	not	 least,	 the	 mass	 surveillance	 operations	 of	 various	 governments	 (e.g.	 the	 MYSTIC	surveillance	programme	
	Figure	5:	WikiLeaks																																																									91	The	 protests	 in	 Seattle	 occupy	 an	 important	 place	 in	 the	 history	 of	 the	 anti-globalisation	movement,	which	was	initiated	in	the	late	1980s.	The	Seattle	protests	took	place	on	30	November	1999	and	were	directed	against	the	World	Trade	Organisation’s	Ministerial	Conference,	which	was	convening	in	order	to	launch	a	new	round	of	multilateral	trade	negotiations.			92	This	 fact	was	emphatically	 confirmed	 later	by	 the	 crucial	 role	 that	Web	2.0	media	applications	played	 in	 the	 formation	 and/or	 coordination	 of	 new	 revolutionary	 political	movements,	with	 its	first	manifestations	found	during	the	main	events	of	the	“Arab	Spring”	(2010-2011).		
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	of	NSA,	which	was	originally	revealed	by	former	CIA	employee	Edward	Snowden).93	Consequently,	 by	 the	 outbreak	 of	 the	 global	 financial	 crisis,	 there	was	 already	 an	important	 tradition	 of	 online	 artistic	 and	 activist	 practices	 that	 appeared	 capable	 of	supporting	 “the	 impulse	 behind	 successive	 generations	 of	 avant-garde	 utopian	 art	movements	in	which	the	role	of	artists	was	envisioned	as	being	to	liberate	a	potential	for	art	making	 (or	 the	 creative	 principal)	 in	 everyone”.94	Following	 the	 events	 of	 2008,	 this	liberating	function	has	been	understood	and	materialised	by	cultural	producers	not	simply	as	the	result	of	the	passage	from	the	net	art	practices	of	Web	1.0	to	the	new	potentialities	opened	 by	Web	 2.0;	 rather,	 artists	 have	 embraced	 this	 context	 as	 an	 invitation	 to	move	from	 the	 passive	 prosumption	 favoured	 by	 Data	 Capitalism	 to	 a	 context	 of	 active	participation	 in	 the	 processes	 of	 creating	 and	 disseminating	 socially	 engaged	 creative	content.	This	recuperation	of	the	utopian	moment,95	as	David	Garcia	calls	 it,	has	been	the	ultimate	outcome	of	the	intersection	–	or,	rather,	the	clash	–	between	the	economy	and	art.	The	 reaction	against	 the	 crisis	of	Data	Capitalism	and	 its	main	 components	 (datatization	and	 the	 algorithmic	 control	 of	 the	 economy)	 managed	 to	 gradually	 give	 birth	 to	 more	“unashamedly”	political	approaches,	expressed	by	artists	who	have	systematically	aimed	at	revitalising	 alternative	 political	 imaginaries	 through	 the	 advanced	 tools	 offered	 by	networked	media.	The	next	chapter	of	this	thesis	will	explore	the	critical	framework	under	which	we	could	therorise	Web-based	art	and	the	re-activation	of	political	utopianism	that	followed	 the	 crisis.	 As	 it	 will	 be	 demonstrated	 through	 the	 work	 and	 legacy	 of	 Walter	Benjamin,	communist	thought	and	its	multiple	traditions	functioned	as	a	powerful	unifying	agent	for	the	evolutionary	paths	of	the	economy	and	culture	that	we	have	described	above.				
	 	
																																																								93	Notably,	in	2013,	WikiLeaks	assisted	Edward	Snowden	to	leave	Hong	Kong	and	fly	to	Russia,	en	route	 to	 the	 Republic	 of	 Ecuador,	where	 he	 could	 seek	 political	 asylum.	However,	 Snowden	was	unable	to	continue	his	journey	after	arriving	in	Moscow,	and	he	was	granted	a	temporary	asylum	by	the	Russian	Federation.		94	David	Garcia,	 ‘From	Tactical	Media	 to	 the	Neo-Pragmatists	 of	 the	Web’	 in	 Lanfranco	Aceti	 and	others	 (eds),	Red	Art:	New	Utopias	 in	Data	Capitalism,	Leonardo	Electronic	Almanac,	 vol	 20,	 no	 1	(Leonardo/ISAST,	San	Francisco	2014)	p.	128.	95	ibid.	
			 40	
Chapter	2	
	
Utopia	Distributed:	The	Organic	Connections	of	the	
Internet	with	Communist	Thought				
In	and	Out	of	Communism:	Theorising	New	Worlds		On	25	October	1917,	 the	Winter	Palace	 in	St	Petersburg	was	stormed	by	numerous	 fully	equipped	tanks	and	other	armoured	vehicles.	They	were	engaged	in	a	fierce	battle	in	order	to	enter	the	official	residence	of	all	Russian	monarchs	since	1732,	and	were	courageously	supported	 by	 125	 ballet	 dancers,	 100	 circus	 artists,	 260	 secondary	 actors,	 1,750	supernumeraries,	500	musicians,	200	women	(mainly	students)	and	150	assistants.	Their	every	move	was	meticulously	planned	by	theatre	director	Nikolai	Evreinov	and	their	heroic	actions	 were	 watched	 by	 more	 than	 100,000	 people,	 who	 were	 gathered	 in	 the	 Palace	Square	in	order	to	witness	a	decisive	moment	of	change	in	world	History.	As	the	Bolshevik	Red	Guards	 finally	managed	 to	occupy	 the	Palace,	 red	 lights	were	 lit,	 a	 cannon	was	 fired	from	 battleship	 Aurora	 and	 fireworks	 marked	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 celebrations	 for	 the	successful	initiation	of	the	Great	October	Socialist	Revolution	in	Russia.96	Of	course,	this	short	account	of	the	Uprising	of	the	25th	(as	Lenin	himself	used	to	call	the	storming	of	the	Tsar’s	residency)	is	merely	a	description	of	the	re-enactment	that	took	place	exactly	three	years	after	the	events	that	 led	to	the	rise	of	communism	in	the	global	political	stage.	Like	most	propaganda	re-enactments,	it	was	all	but	an	accurate	portrayal	of	the	day’s	events.	More	specifically,	 the	actual	storming	did	not	take	place	during	the	day,	but,	rather,	in	the	middle	of	the	night.	There	was	no	fierce	fighting	involved	and	the	palace	fell	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 Bolsheviks	 after	 an	 almost	 bloodless	 siege:	 the	 soldiers	 merely	crossed	 the	 square	 and	 entered	 the	 palace	 by	 a	 side	 entrance	 at	 around	 2	 am.	 In	 the	malachite	 hall,	 the	 ministers	 of	 the	 Kerensky	 government	 surrendered	 without	 much	hesitation	and	 the	whole	operation	was	over	by	3:10	am.	Finally,	no	more	 than	300-400	soldiers	 participated	 in	 the	 storming,	 without	 the	 need	 of	 any	 support	 from	 tanks	 and	
																																																								96	Nancy	 Van	 Norman	 Baer,	Theatre	 in	 Revolution:	 Russian	 Avant-Garde	 Stage	 Design	 1913-
1935	(Thames	and	Hudson	1991)	pp.	72-73.	
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armoured	vehicles	 in	order	 to	occupy	 the	 square	and	 conquer	 the	palace.97	Yet,	 all	 these	facts	 did	 not	 matter	 much	 when	 it	 came	 to	 the	 re-enactment	 itself,	 whose	 rather	illuminating	subtitle	was	“a	mass	action”.98	For,	the	most	important	aspect	of	it	was	not	all	the	major,	or	minor	inconsistencies	that	one	could	potentially	remark,	but,	rather,	the	very	fact	 that,	 at	 last,	 the	 storming	 of	 the	 Winter	 Palace	 could	 be	 documented	 through	photographs	and	films.	The	Revolution	now	had	an	image.		
	Figure	6:	The	re-enactment	of	the	storming	of	the	Winter	Palace	(1920)		 Seven	decades	later,	the	events	that	signalled	communism’s	“withdrawal”	from	the	global	political	stage	did	not	require	any	re-enactment	in	order	for	them	to	be	documented.	The	 fall	 of	 the	 Berlin	Wall	 (9	 November	 1989)	was	 broadcast	 live	 on	 television	 screens	around	 the	 world,	 while	 hundreds	 of	 photojournalists	 were	 also	 present	 in	 order	 to	
																																																								97	Orlando	 Figes,	A	 People’s	 Tragedy:	 The	 Russian	 Revolution,	 1891-1924	(Jonathan	 Cape,	 London	1997)	pp.	491-492.	98	Lars	 Kleberg,	Theatre	 as	 Action:	 Soviet	 Russian	 Avant-Garde	 Aesthetics	(Charles	 Rougle	 tr,	Macmillan,	London	1993)	pp.	44-64.		
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capture	 the	 image	 of	History	 in	 (mass)	 action.	 Yet,	 there	was	 another	 kind	 of	 difference	between	 the	 two	historical	 events	 that	 signalled	 on	 a	 symbolic,	 as	well	 as	 on	 a	 practical	level,	the	rise	and	the	fall	of	communism.	Whereas	the	establishment	of	a	communist	state	had	 been	 anticipated	 and	 theorised	 at	 least	 since	 the	 publication	 of	 Marx	 and	 Engel’s	
Manifesto	 of	 the	Communist	Party	 in	 1848,	 the	 (immanent)	 collapse	 of	 communism	 had	been	a	much	less	anticipated	and	theorised	event.	In	other	words,	although	the	status	quo	of	 a	world	with	 communism	had	been	 largely	 envisioned	 (even	 if	 such	 an	 image	proved	“erroneous”	with	regard	to	the	way	in	which	socialism	was	ultimately	put	into	practice	as	a	step	 towards	 communism),	 a	 world	 seemingly	 without	 communism	 emerged	 almost	immediately	as	an	open-ended	question.99	This	thesis	will	attempt	to	continue	regarding	it	as	such.	Nevertheless,	since	History	is,	almost	exclusively,	written	by	the	“winners”	of	each	struggle,	 it	was	not	 long	before	a	“conclusive”	 theory	about	a	world	without	communism	was	 conceived.	 The	 Friedliche	Revolution	 (Peaceful	 Revolution)	 of	 1989	 was	 in	 genuine	need	 of	 a	 text	 that	 would	 outline	 a	 framework	 of	 certitude	 within	 a	 rapidly	 changing	world.100	And	just	like	it	took	three	years	for	the	Bolsheviks	to	produce	a	matching	image	for	their	Great	Revolution,	it	took	the	theorists	of	neoliberal	capitalism	three	years	in	order	to	 formulate	 what	 felt	 like,	 for	 quite	 a	 long	 time,	 as	 the	 most	 solid	 and	 thorough	interpretation	 of	 the	world	 that	 appeared	 to	 emerge	 from	 the	 debris	 of	 the	 Berlin	Wall.	Interestingly,	the	work	that	finally	undertook	this	challenging	role	did	not	merely	provide	an	explanation	for	the	reshaping	of	History	as	witnessed	in	the	events	of	1989-1991,	but,	rather,	it	triumphantly	proclaimed	the	very	End	of	it.	In	his	 famous	book	The	End	of	History	and	the	Last	Man	 (1992),	American	political	economist	Francis	Fukuyama	declared	that	 the	 fall	of	communism	designated	that	 liberal	democracy	–	as	defined	through	the	prism	of	the	“free	market”	–	was	the	optimum	form	of	social	organization	and,	in	that	sense,	History	had	reached	by	1992	its	final	goal	or	stage.	
																																																								99	In	 his	 book	 Everything	Was	 Forever,	 Until	 It	Was	No	More:	 The	 Last	 Soviet	 Generation	 (2005),	Russian	 anthropologist	Alexei	 Yurchak	describes	how	 in	 the	 late	 1980s	 the	 “perestroika”	 started	generating	 doubts	 to	 Soviet	 citizens	 as	 regards	 the	 “eternal	 state”	 of	 their	 socialist	 political	organisation.	However,	the	proximity	and	the	rapidity	of	the	system’s	collapse	remained	something	that	almost	no	one	could	have	 foreseen.	See:	Alexei	Yurchak,	Everything	Was	Forever,	Until	It	Was	
No	More	(Princeton	University	Press	2006).		100	The	 Romanian	 Revolution	 of	 December	 1989	 has	 not	 been	 equally	 peaceful,	 as	 the	 Nicolae	Ceaușescu	 regime	 and,	 then,	 the	 National	 Salvation	 Front	 (FSN),	 which	 succeeded	 it,	 are	responsible	 for	 the	 deaths	 of	more	 than	 3,000	 people.	 In	 addition,	 the	 transition	 of	 Lithuania	 to	independence	and	to	a	free	market	economy	has	been	marked	by	various	tensions,	which	involved	interventions	by	the	Soviet	Army	as	well	as	incidents	with	Soviet	paramilitary	groups.		
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	Figure	7:	The	Fall	of	the	Berlin	Wall	(1989)		Despite	 adopting	 an	 overtly	 Hegelian	 schema, 101 	Fukuyama	 denounced	 Marx’s	interpretation	 of	 Hegel	 as	 being	 completely	 delimiting.102	The	 only	 accurate	 exegesis	 of	Hegel’s	 Universal	 History	 is,	 according	 to	 Fukuyama,	 the	 one	 that	 identifies	 the	“achievement	of	absolute	self-consciousness”	with	 life	 in	a	 liberal	democratic	state	 in	 the	post-communist	 era.103	Fukuyama	 went	 on	 from	 this	 position	 to	 become	 a	 guru	 of	 the	neoconservatives	in	USA	during	the	1990s	and,	notably,	on	3	June	1997,	he	co-signed	with	other	 prominent	members	 of	 the	 “movement”	 (including	Dick	Cheney,	Donald	Rumsfeld,	Paul	 Wolfowitz,	 Jeb	 Bush,	 Norman	 Podhoretz	 and	 Elliott	 Abrams)	 the	 Statement	 of	Principles	of	 the	Project	for	the	New	American	Century,	which	called	 for	 the	adoption	of	a	“Reaganite	policy	of	military	 strength	 and	moral	 clarity”.104	Nevertheless,	History	proved																																																									101	Fukuyama	 examines	 Hegel	 by	 using	 the	 interpretation	 of	 his	 work	 by	 philosopher	 Alexandre	Kojève.		102	Francis	 Fukuyama,	The	 End	 of	 History	 and	 the	 Last	 Man	(1st	 edn,	 Hamish	 Hamilton,	 London	1992)	pp.	64-65.		103	ibid.	p.	64.	104	Project	for	the	New	American	Century,	 ‘Statement	of	Principles’	(Web.archive.org,	3	June	1997)	<http://web.archive.org/web/20070810113753/www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm>	accessed	23	March	2016.	See	more	at:	Institute	for	Policy	Studies,	‘Project	for	the	New	American	 Century’	 (Rightweb.irc-online.org,	 21	 March	 2013)	 <http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/project_for_the_new_american_century/#_edn1>	accessed	23	March	2016.	
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more	 unpredictable	 than	 what	 Fukuyama	 expected	 when	 he	 published	 his	 “conclusive”	version	 of	 human	 evolution,	 just	 three	 years	 after	 the	 demise	 of	 the	 Soviet	Union.	 Thus,	following	the	invasion	of	Iraq	(2003)105	and	the	economic	crisis	that	began	with	the	burst	of	the	housing	market	bubble	in	the	US	(2007),	Fukuyama	became	a	fierce	critic	of	the	Bush	Administration.	 In	 addition,	 he	 re-positioned	himself	with	 regard	 to	 the	 responsibility	 of	the	state	 in	a	globalized	economy,	 turning	 in	 favour	of	a	much	more	proactive	regulating	role,	 and	he	voted	 for	Barack	Obama	 in	 the	Presidential	Elections	of	 2008.106	Even	more	impressive,	in	an	interview	in	early	2012,	Fukuyama	asked	for	the	formation	of	a	Tea	Party	on	the	Left	in	order	to	counterbalance	the	influence	of	Wall	Street	in	global	politics,	and	he	accused	President	Obama	for	not	nationalising	the	banking	sector	when	he	took	over	from	President	George	W.	Bush	in	2009.107	The	 trajectory	of	Fukuyama’s	political	 choices	might	produce	an	 interesting	story;	yet,	it	does	not	reveal	much	by	itself	about	the	ideological	framework	vindicated	in	The	End	
of	History	 and	 its	actual	 influence.	Notably,	 in	 the	same	 interview	cited	above,	Fukuyama	appeared	to	be	in	the	confident	position	to	claim	that	there	is	still	no	alternative	system	to	capitalism.	In	other	words,	Fukuyama	seems	to	suggest	that	even	amid	the	worst	crisis	of	capitalism,	the	failures	of	the	system	do	not	mean	that	it	is	not	the	best	system	available.	It	would	 be,	 therefore,	 too	 “convenient”	 and,	 perhaps,	 naïve	 to	 dismiss	 Fukuyama’s	theorisation	 of	 the	 human	 condition	 merely	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 previously	 described	“evidence”.	Of	course,	the	full	investigation	of	Fukuyama’s	claims	and	their	reverberations	is	beyond	this	study’s	purposes	and	possibilities.	Nevertheless,	their	impact	on	one	of	the	main	 concepts	 examined	 in	 this	 thesis	 is	 of	particular	 interest,	 since	 it	 provides	 a	 rather	solid	 explanation	 for	 Fukuyama’s	 unwavering	 faith	 in	 capitalism.	 The	 concept	 that	 I	 am	referring	 to	 is	utopia.	 In	order	 to	 illuminate	utopia’s	 relation	with	 this	particular	kind	of	faith,	I	would	like	to	briefly	focus	on	two	central	elements	of	the	narrative	developed	in	The	
End	of	History.	More	 specifically,	 I	would	 like	 to	 examine	 how	 Fukuyama’s	monosemous	theorisation	of	history	ultimately	becomes	a	monosemous	ethical	paradigm;	and,	then,	how	his	 analysis	 of	 the	 Hegelian	 “struggle	 for	 recognition”	 completely	 ignores	 the	 idea	 of	revolution	as	 an	 integral	part	of	human	nature.	The	 former	 characteristic	of	 Fukuyama’s																																																									105 	'Why	 I	 Won’t	 Vote	 For	 George	 Bush'	 (The	 Times,	 2004)	<http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/life/article1720828.ece>	accessed	6	April	2016.		106	The	 Dish,	 'Fukuyama	 For	 Obama'	 (The	 Atlantic,	 2008)	 <http://www.theatlantic.com/daily-dish/archive/2008/05/fukuyama-for-obama/216126/>	accessed	6	April	2016.	107	‘Spiegel	 Interview	 with	 Francis	 Fukuyama:	 “Where	 Is	 the	 Uprising	 from	 the	 Left?”’	Spiegel	
Online	(1	 February	 2012)	 <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,812208,00.html>	accessed	23	March	2016.	
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premise	deprives	utopia	of	its	ability	to	formulate	ethical	claims,	while	the	latter	denies	the	means	for	the	realisation	of	such	claims	in	practical	terms.			
From	the	“End	of	History”	to	the	End	of	Utopia		By	 proclaiming	 the	 End	 of	 History,	 Fukuyama	 inevitably	 invites	 his	 readers	 to	 define	 a	breaking	 point	 between	 what	 one	 could	 name	 a	 “historicist”	 condition	 and	 a	 “meta-historicist”	one.	However,	he	does	not	provide	us	with	a	clear	set	of	criteria	and	tools	on	the	basis	of	which	we	could	potentially	identify	such	a	breaking	point.	Instead,	according	to	French	 philosopher	 Jacques	 Derrida,	 “Fukuyama	 defines	 liberal	 democracy	 here	 as	 an	actual	reality	and	there	as	a	simple	ideal”.108	In	other	words,	he	oscillates	between	the	past	(if	we	are	to	accept	that	liberal	democracy	has	already	been	accomplished)	and	the	future	(by	theorising	liberal	democracy	as	an	objective	still	waiting	to	be	realised).	The	outcome	of	 this	 dichotomy	 is	 a	 hybrid	 version	 of	 the	 present.	 The	 latter	 is	 transformed	 into	 a	schizophrenic	 temporal	 form	 that	 strives	 to	 combine	 the	 qualities	 of	 something	 that	 can	already	 be	 experienced	 (and	 which	 is,	 thus,	 ethically	 robust	 according	 to	 Fukuyama’s	judgment),	with	the	qualities	of	something	that	has	yet	to	arrive	(a	fact	which	would,	then,	entail	that	the	present	is	experiencing	an	ethical	lack	of	some	form).	This	peculiar	situation	can	only	lead	us	towards	the	conclusion	that	the	breaking	point	I	referred	to	earlier	is,	 in	fact,	 now.	 Fukuyama	 appears	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	 break	 that	 was	 incised	 on	 History	 by	liberal	democracy	only	began	 in	1989	and	 is	 still	 an	operation	 in	progress.	Nevertheless,	the	 adoption	of	 this	 theorisation	would	 refute	 the	 very	 idea	of	 the	 “point”	 and,	 thus,	 the	existence	of	a	true	break	or	change	in	historical	time,	which	could,	then,	be	“transcended”.	In	order	to	defend	his	position,	Fukuyama	introduces	the	argument	that	his	trans-historical	approach	is,	in	reality,	an	investigation	of	the	timeless	human	nature.109	Instead,	however,	 of	 making	 things	 clearer,	 this	 choice	 renders	 his	 perspective	 even	 more	convoluted:	if	there	is,	indeed,	a	single	human	nature	(that	can,	notably,	be	translated	into	a	specific	 political	 system),	 then,	 what	 is	 the	 single	 set	 of	 ethics	 that	 characterises	 this	nature?	The	 ideas	of	both	democracy	and	 liberalism	appear	 to	be	discredited	at	once	by	Fukuyama’s	 determinism.	 Nonetheless,	 there	 is	 an	 explanation	 about	 his	 postulation.	 As	Derrida	notes	in	Spectres	of	Marx	(1993),	Fukuyama’s	work	is,	in	effect,	a	gospel	stemming	
																																																								108	Jacques	 Derrida,	Specters	 of	 Marx:	 The	 State	 of	 the	 Debt,	 the	Work	 of	 Mourning,	 and	 the	 New	
International	(Routledge,	London	2006)	p.	78.	109	Fukuyama,	op.	cit.,	p.	138.	
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from	 the	 Christian	 tradition.	 Fukuyama	 becomes	 an	 evangelistic	 figure	 that	 spreads	 the	“good	 news”	 of	 the	 alliance	 between	 liberal	 democracy	 and	 the	 “free	 market”,	 which	 is	realised	 through	 the	 death	 of	 Marxism.110	The	 concept	 of	 time	 emerging	 in	 The	 End	 of	
History	and	the	Last	Man	lies	in	harmonious	agreement	with	this	new	“gospel”:	if	glimpses	of	afterlife	can	already	be	experienced	in	this	life	thanks	to	Jesus’	sacrifice	and	resurrection,	then,	we	live,	indeed,	in	a	hybrid	present.	The	death	of	Marxism	and	the	reign	of	the	liberal	democratic	state	do	not	adopt	merely	the	form	of	this	dogma,	but,	also,	part	of	its	content.	This	 religious	 perspective	 is,	 perhaps,	 even	 more	 evident	 in	 the	 second	 element	 of	Fukuyama’s	 theorization	 that	 I	 would	 like	 to	 underline	 in	 this	 context;	 namely,	 the	“struggle	for	recognition”.	On	20	 July	1997,	 less	 than	 two	months	after	 the	publication	of	 the	Project	 for	 the	New	American	Century,	 in	 an	article	 entitled	 “The	World	Resurrects	Che”,	 the	New	York	Times	proclaimed	that	if	Che	Guevara	had	been	alive,	“he	would	be	firmly	in	the	capitalist	camp”.111	In	 the	 spirit	 of	 a	 neoliberal	 capitalist	 triumph	 against	 any	 potential	 alternative	system	(ideally	exemplified	by	the	ghost	of	revolutionary	socialism),	the	idea	of	revolution	itself	was	“overtaken”	by	 the	new	dominant	global	 ideology.	Quite	simply,	 it	 seemed	that	what	was	happening	at	that	time	around	the	world	thanks	to	neoliberal	capitalism	was	so	revolutionary,	 that	 any	 other	 notion	 of	 revolution	 was	 condemned	 to	 evaporate:	 an	“Apocalypse”	of	 some	kind	had	already	 taken	place.	This	 redemptive	principle	 lies	at	 the	epicentre	 of	 Fukuyama’s	 anti-utopian	 and	 anti-revolutionary	 thought.	 Fukuyama	synopsizes	this	principle	by	adopting	Alexandre	Kojeve’s	exegesis	of	Hegel’s	“struggle	 for	recognition”.	According	to	this	interpretation	of	Hegel’s	concept,	any	historical	process	can	be	understood	as	a	continuous	struggle	of	humans	to	be	recognized	by	other	humans.	This	is	critical	for	the	fulfilment	of	self-recognition,	since	in	order	to	become	aware	of	himself	as	a	 separate	 entity,	 an	 individual	 has	 to	 be	 recognized	 first	 by	 other	 human	 beings	 as	 a	man.112	Fukuyama	believes	that	this	non-materialist	historical	dialectic	“is	much	richer	 in	its	understanding	of	human	motivation	 than	 the	Marxist	version,	or	 than	 the	sociological	tradition	stemming	from	Marx”.113	In	agreement	with	this	suggestion,	neoliberal	capitalist	democracy	 is	 credited	 with	 providing	 a	 solid	 framework	 of	 freedoms	 for	 individuals	 in	order	 for	 them	 to	 be	 able	 to	 successfully	 seek	 the	 recognition	 of	 their	 fellow-citizens.																																																									110	Derrida,	op.	cit.,	p.	72.	111 	Tina	 Rosenberg,	 ‘The	 World	 Resurrects	 Che’	The	 New	 York	 Times	(20	 July	 1997)	<http://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/20/opinion/the-world-resurrects-che.html>	 accessed	 23	March	2016.	112	Fukuyama,	op.	cit.,	p.	147.	113	Fukuyama,	op.	cit.,	p.	144.	
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Thanks	to	this	capacity,	the	individual	does	not	have	to	go	to	the	extreme	point	of	risking	his	 own	 life	 in	 order	 to	be	 recognized	by	others	 anymore114	and,	 therefore,	 any	mode	of	revolutionary	 thought	 or	 action	 can	 be	 permanently	 banished.	 If	 “the	 French	Revolution	was	the	event	that	took	the	Christian	vision	of	a	free	and	equal	society,	and	implemented	it	here	 on	 earth”,115	then,	 the	 “Promised	 Land	 of	 liberal	 democracy”116	has	 made	 even	 the	idea	of	revolution	impertinent	to	human	consciousness.	Thus,	 if	we	accept	Fukuyama’s	premise	as	formulated	in	The	End	of	History	and	the	
Last	Man,	the	ethical	core	of	political	utopianism	can	no	longer	remain	relevant	to	today’s	world:	utopia	has	already	been	achieved	 in	 the	 form	of	 the	post-1989	 liberal	democratic	state.	For	Fukuyama,	utopia	and	the	idea	of	revolution	died	along	with	communism,	even	if	the	 demise	 of	 the	 latter	 did	 not	 automatically	 lead	 western	 liberal	 democracy	 to	 the	development	of	 its	 full	 capacities.	Nevertheless,	 one	would	expect	 that	 since	Fukuyama’s	political	and	ideological	choices	have	been	largely	contested	by	the	course	of	a	History	still	at	work,	the	road	for	utopianism,	including	a	socialist	one,	would	have	opened	once	more.	In	reality,	however,	Fukuyama’s	“roadblock”	is	positioned	only	on	one	side	of	utopia’s	path.	There	 is	 another	 “roadblock”	 positioned	 on	 the	 opposite	 side,	 which	 stems	 from	 a	considerably	different,	yet	equally	hostile	standpoint.	The	work	that	probably	synopsises	this	 perspective	 more	 eloquently	 than	 any	 other,	 is	 the	 book	 of	 English	 political	philosopher	John	Gray,	Black	Mass:	Apocalyptic	Religion	and	the	Death	of	Utopia	(2007).		
From	the	End	of	Utopia	to	Another	“End	of	History”		Interestingly,	 in	 Black	 Mass,	 Gray	 offers	 an	 overt	 condemnation	 of	 Fukuyama’s	 main	doctrines.	More	specifically,	he	asserts	that	the	idea	of	a	history	moving	towards	an	End	is	a	fiction	that	exceeds	any	possibility	for	a	rational	assessment	and,	at	the	same	time,	liberal	democracy’s	 legitimacy	 as	 the	 unique	 mode	 of	 global	 governance	 is	 an	 argument	 not	supported	by	reality.117	Nevertheless,	when	it	comes	to	his	evaluation	of	utopianism,	Gray	adopts	a	deterministic	approach	very	similar	to	the	one	deployed	by	Fukuyama	in	The	End	
of	History	and	the	Last	Man.	His	view	on	utopia	is	lucidly	synopsised	in	the	beginning	of	his	book’s	 final	chapter,	appropriately	 titled	“Post-Apocalypse”.	 In	 this,	Gray	argues	 that	“the																																																									114	Fukuyama,	op.	cit.,	p.	147.	115	Fukuyama,	op.	cit.,	p.	199.	116	Fukuyama,	op.	cit.,	p.	134.	117	John	 Gray,	Black	 Mass:	 Apocalyptic	 Religion	 and	 the	 Death	 of	 Utopia	(Penguin	 Books,	 London	2008)	p.	175.		
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faith	 in	Utopia,	which	killed	so	many	 in	 the	centuries	 following	 the	French	Revolution,	 is	dead.	Like	other	faiths	it	may	be	resurrected	in	circumstances	that	cannot	be	foreseen;	but	it	 is	unlikely	 to	 trouble	us	much	 further	 in	 the	next	 few	decades”.118	Given,	however,	 the	author’s	 earlier	 assertion	 that	 utopian	 movements	 are	 usually	 developed	 following	 a	disaster,119	his	claim	that	faith	in	utopia	is	dead	appears	to	suggest	that	no	such	disastrous	historical	 events	 should	 be	 anticipated	 in	 the	 near	 future.	 This	 prediction	 would	 entail,	however,	 the	possession	of	 some	kind	of	prophetic	qualities	evidently	 located	within	 the	field	 of	metaphysics,	 which	 Gray	 so	 vehemently	 rejects	 in	 his	 book.	 Once	more,	 History	appears	 to	have	 reached	a	 “pause”,	 if	not	an	 “End”	of	 some	 form.	This	 “pause”,	however,	does	not	 come	without	 important	 implications	 in	 the	 sphere	of	 ideology;	 for,	 it	 is	not	 an	empirical	observation,	but,	rather,	a	construction	aiming	at	producing	a	very	particular,	or	–	even	–	“manipulable”	understanding	of	History.		Gray	provides	two	distinct	sets	of	criticisms	against	utopia	in	order	to	construct	his	anti-utopian	argument.	The	first	criticism	that	he	develops	in	this	context	regards	utopia	as	a	counter-productive	intellectual	device,	given	that	it	can	lead	to	modes	of	social	being	that	are	naïve,	non-executable	and	thoroughly	inefficient.	 In	order	to	support	this	postulation,	Gray	 goes	 back	 to	 the	 “origins”	 of	 utopia	 in	 the	 form	of	 Plato’s	Republic,	 Thomas	More’s	
Utopia	 and	 some	19th	 century	 intentional	 communities.120	These	 traditions	of	utopianism	should	be	collectively	understood	as	“a	movement	of	withdrawal	from	the	world”,121	rather	than	 as	 an	 attempt	 to	 change	 it.	 This	 “tolerant”	 theorisation	of	 utopia	 is,	 also,	 evident	 in	Gray’s	 general	 view	 on	 the	Western	 pre-Christian	world,	which	 is	 often	 contrasted	with	Christianity’s	 decisive	 influence	 on	 the	 development	 of	 the	 modern,	 apocalyptic	utopianism.	 Yet,	 what	 is	 more	 revealing	 about	 Gray’s	 view	 on	 the	 pre-Christian	 ancient	world	is	not	what	he	writes	about	it,	but,	rather,	what	he	does	not	write.	Despite	the	fact	that	in	his	earlier	book,	Straw	Dogs:	Thoughts	on	Humans	and	Other	Animals	(2002),	Gray	is	much	more	willing	to	locate	the	roots	of	modern	utopianism	in	Plato	(in	accordance	with	thinkers	 like	Karl	 Popper),122	in	Black	Mass	 he	 suggests	 that	 it	was	 only	 after	 its	 contact	
																																																								118	ibid.,	p.	260.	119	ibid.,	p.	8.	120	The	Welsh	 social	 reformer	 Robert	 Owen	 (1771-1858)	 established	 intentional	 communities	 in	the	UK	and	the	US,	while	communities	based	on	the	ideas	of	the	French	philosopher	Charles	Fourier	(1772-1837)	and	the	French	political	theorist	Henri	de	Saint-Simon	(1760-1825)	were	established	not	only	in	their	home	country,	but	also	in	the	US	(ibid.,	p.36).	121	ibid.,	p.21	122	Karl	 Popper,	The	Open	Society	and	Its	Enemies:	Volume	1:	The	Spell	of	Plato	(Routledge,	 London	1945).	
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with	 Christianity	 that	 Platonism	 became	 part	 of	modern	 utopianism.123	Nevertheless,	 by	avoiding	to	further	engage	with	the	legacy	of	ancient	Greek	philosophy,	what	he	avoids	is,	in	reality,	to	examine	the	historical	context	within	which	philosophers	like	Plato	developed	their	(utopian)	political	works	and,	accordingly,	the	extent	to	which	such	a	context	could	be	relevant	to	today’s	political	debates	around	democracy	and	its	demise.	A	 crucial	 characteristic	 that	 Gray	 fails	 to	 identify	 about	 Plato’s	 work	 is	 that	 his	utopian	thought	stems	from	a	remarkably	solid	reality:	the	Greek	polis	within	which	Plato	was	born,	brought	up	and	taught.	Any	ancient	polis	consisted	of	two	“entities”:	ecclesia	and	
oikos.	Oikos	was	the	private	household	and	it	stood	symbolically	for	each	citizen’s	personal	interests,	whereas	ecclesia	represented	the	body	of	people	designated	to	take	care	of	 the	polis’	 common	affairs.	 In	between	 those	 two	“entities”	one	can	 locate	agora,	 the	physical	space	where	 all	 the	 citizens	were	 gathered	 in	order	 to	 “reconcile”	 their	private	 interests	with	the	shared	interests	of	the	polis.	Agora	is	exactly	the	physical	as	well	as	the	conceptual	space	within	which	any	philosopher	was	called	to	perform	his	role.	In	his	treatment	of	the	Greeks,	however,	Gray	appears	 to	completely	 ignore	the	physical	aspect	of	 the	agora	and	the	way	in	which	it	informs	every	aspect	of	Plato’s,	and	any	other	Athenian	philosopher’s,	work.	 There	 is	 no	 other	 way	 to	 explain	 his	 assertion	 that	 the	 arguments	 of	 someone	operating	 within	 a	 real	 physical	 space,	 like	 Plato,	 can	 acquire	 such	 an	 explicitly	 naïve,	unrealistic	and,	in	effect,	fictional	character.	In	other	words,	the	germs	of	real	and	feasible	change	should	be	present	 in	 the	proposals	of	 the	philosopher	 to	 the	polis,	 even	when	he	uses	 a	 description	 that	 employs	 fictional	 or	 symbolic	 elements,	 with	 a	 view	 to	communicating	 his	 premises	 more	 easily	 to	 a	 diverse	 audience.	 The	 adoption	 of	 the	aforementioned	realistic	or	pragmatist	elements	would	make	at	least	a	small	proportion	of	the	 citizens	 to	 be	 convinced	 and	 envisage	 as	 realisable	 a	 project	 that,	 for	 most	 people,	might	initially	appear	like	pure	fantasy.	Plato	is	fully	conscious	of	this	process,	which	aims	at	producing	a	political	“sensus	communis”	for	the	city-state,	as	he	clearly	indicates	in	the	
Republic.124	Yet,	Gray’s	consideration	of	the	Greek	classical	philosophers	(or,	rather,	the	lack	of	any	 substantial	 consideration)	 also	 hints,	 in	 my	 opinion,	 at	 another	 fact;	 namely,	 at	 his	unwillingness	 to	articulate	any	genuine	criticism	against	 the	western	 liberal	 state	and	 its	version	of	democracy.	Notably,	Gray	chooses	not	to	make	any	references	to	the	function	of	the	polis	on	the	level	of	everyday	citizenship.	This	approach	is	associated	with	an	implicitly																																																									123	Gray,	op.	cit.,	p.	11.	124	Plato,	Republic	(Oxford	University	Press	1993)	500d10-501e6	
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	Figure	8:	View	from	the	speaker’s	platform	at	the	ancient	agora	in	Athens	(Pnyx)		utopian	 theorization	of	Athenian	democracy	and,	 thus,	with	 the	dismissal	of	 its	potential	value	 for	 today’s	 democracies,	 which,	 arguably,	 operate	 under	 very	 different	socioeconomic	conditions.	Such	criticism	has	been,	at	 least	partly,	based	on	the	assertion	made	in	popular	literature	that	Athens	was	a	small	city-state	and,	thus,	the	openness	and	directness	 of	 its	 democratic	 procedures	 was	 only	 possible	 thanks	 to	 its	 size. 125	Nevertheless,	the	truth	is	that	ancient	Athens	was	not	such	a	small	city	in	terms	of	the	part	of	its	population	that	enjoyed	full	political	rights:	an	estimation	of	the	number	of	Athenian	citizens	 (adult	males	 owning	 land)	 in	 the	 5th	 century	 B.C.	 brings	 them	 to	 a	minimum	 of	30,000	and	a	maximum	of	50,000.126	This	 fact	 inevitably	 raises	questions	not	only	 about	the	way	we	envision	the	systems	of	representation	adopted	by	our	democracies,	but,	also,	about	 the	 administrative	 structures	 that	 we	 privilege	 for	 the	 accomplishment	 of	 our	everyday	public	activities	and	social	endeavours.	One	could,	perhaps,	claim	that	there	are	no	real	lessons	to	be	learnt	from	a	city-state	whose	economic	system	was	based	on	slavery	
																																																								125	Lyman	Tower	Sargent,	Utopianism:	A	Very	Short	Introduction	(Oxford	University	Press	2010)	p.	18.	126	John	Thorley,	Athenian	Democracy	(2nd	edn,	Routledge	2004)	p.	74.	
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and	 whose	 political	 rights	 were	 reserved	 only	 for	 a	 portion	 of	 its	 population.127	Nevertheless,	realism	(which	Gray	identifies	as	the	antidote	to	utopianism)	would	compel	us	 to	 accept	 that	 even	 if	 the	 accusations	made	 against	 Athenian	 democracy	 are	 entirely	accurate,	still,	ideas	like	seisachtheia,128	the	draw	for	participating	in	certain	public	bodies,	the	open	law-making	process,	the	scrutiny	in	front	of	a	“popular	tribunal”	after	the	end	of	all	civil	and	military	magistrates’	terms	(most	of	whom	could	not	exercise	the	same	office	twice)	could	form	a	potentially	fruitful	basis	of	dialogue	about	the	quality	of	western	liberal	democracy.	 In	 his	 effort	 to	 produce	 an	 all-encompassing	 theory	 serving	 the	 rejection	 of	utopia,	 Gray	 ignores	 any	 achievement	 of	 systems	 that	 could	 be	 characterised	 as	“unrealistic”	from	the	perspective	our	current	model	of	the	liberal	democratic	state.	Thus,	what	 we	 could	 diagnose	 in	 Gray’s	 work	 is	 a	 latent	 post-historicist	 negation	 of	 change,	which	 refutes	 the	 possibility	 of	 formulating	 credible	 claims	 for	 a	 deeper	 and	 wider	democratic	function	within	our	existing	political	and	economic	systems.129		
Searching	for	the	Nature	of	Revolution		The	 second	 criticism	 that	 Gray	 develops	 in	 Black	Mass	 against	 utopia	 is	 a	 much	 more	predictable	one:	according	to	it,	utopia	belongs	to	a	violent,	catastrophic	and,	thus,	highly	dangerous	 strand	 of	 human	 thought.	 In	 support	 of	 this	 view,	 Gray	 refers	 to	 a	 variety	 of	cases	 as	 diverse	 as	 Nazism,	 the	 American	 neo-conservatives,	 the	 Bolsheviks	 and	 the	different	terrorist	groups	nurtured	by	Islamist	fundamentalism.130	In	spite	of	their	explicit																																																									127	One	 of	 the	most	 prominent	 set	 of	 criticisms	 against	 the	 paradigm	of	Greek	democracy	 can	be	found	in	Martin	Bernal’s	seminal	book	Black	Athena:	Afro-Asiatic	Roots	of	Classical	Civilization	(Free	Association	Books	1991).		128		Seisachtheia	(σεισάχθεια,	from	σείειν	seiein,	to	shake,	and	ἄχθος	achthos,	burden)	was	a	set	of	laws	 introduced	 by	 the	 Athenian	 lawmaker	 Solon	 (c.	 638	 BC–558	 BC)	 when	 he	 became	 chief	magistrate	(archon)	in	c.	594	BC.	Through	seisachtheia,	Solon	cancelled	all	debts	in	order	to	restore	land	 to	 its	 constitutional	 holders	 and	 forbade	 the	 use	 of	 personal	 freedom	 as	 a	 collateral	 in	 all	future	debts	dealings.	See:	Matthew	Dillon	and	Lynda	Garland,	Ancient	Greece:	Social	and	Historical	
Documents	from	Archaic	Times	to	the	Death	of	Alexander	(Routledge,	London	2010)	pp.	305	–	308.	129	The	disregard	for	democratic	investment	in	late	capitalist	societies,	along	with	the	connection	of	any	 historical	 process	 with	 almost	 exclusively	 economic	 criteria	 is	 salient	 in	 the	 work	 of	 many	neoliberal	 thinkers.	 In	 his	 highly	 influential	 work	Exit,	Voice,	and	Loyalty:	Responses	to	Decline	 in	
Firms,	Organizations,	and	States	(Harvard	University	Press	1970),	Albert	Hirshman	makes	 it	 clear	from	the	very	title	of	his	book	that	similar	qualitative	criteria	should	be	applied	to	the	evaluation	of	both	 private	 economic	 organizations	 and	 democratic	 states.	 And	 two	 decades	 later,	 Francis	Fukuyama	states	in	The	End	of	History	and	the	Last	Man:	“Just	as	a	modern	economist	does	not	try	to	define	a	product’s	‘utility’	or	‘value’	in	itself,	but	rather	accepts	the	marketplace’s	valuation	of	it	as	expressed	 in	a	price,	 so	one	would	accept	 the	 judgment	of	 the	 ‘marketplace’	of	world	history.”	(Fukuyama,	op.	cit.,	p.	136)	130	Gray,	op.	cit.,	p.	35.	
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differences,	Gray	claims	 that	all	 those	historical	examples	are	 the	violent	products	of	 the	Christian	 Western	 world’s	 cultural	 paradigm	 and	 that,	 in	 fact,	 they	 all	 stem	 from	 the	tradition	of	Enlightenment	and	 its	philosophers.131	The	 case	 that	 I	would	 like	 to	make	 in	order	 to	 contradict	 this	 second	 major	 anti-utopian	 argument	 is	 provided	 by	 Immanuel	Kant,	who	is	identified	in	Black	Mass	as	“the	supreme	Enlightenment	figure”	after	Voltaire,	and	 as	 a	 “great	philosopher”.132	Despite	 this	 fact,	 however,	 his	 name	 is	mentioned	 in	 the	whole	book	only	 twice	and	when	Gray	 refers	 to	Kant’s	work	he	only	does	 so	 in	order	 to	underline	his	 racist	 attitude	 towards	non-Europeans,	 as	expressed	 in	Observations	on	the	
Feeling	of	the	Beautiful	and	the	Sublime	(1764).	Therefore,	Gray	chooses	to	present	the	past	in	 a	 rather	 selective	 way,	 in	 order	 to	 justify	 his	 argument	 against	 utopianism.	 Quite	naturally,	the	question	that	arises	at	this	point	is	“why?”			 In	 order	 to	 provide	 an	 answer	 to	 the	 previous	 question	 and	 demonstrate	 the	
critically	 non-violent	 legacy	 of	 Kant,	 I	 would	 like	 to	 examine	 his	 interpretation	 of	revolution;	namely,	the	potentially	most	violent	form	that	utopianism	may	adopt.	There	is	a	“seeming	contradiction”	in	the	theorisation	of	revolution	made	in	Kant’s	work,	as	Hannah	Arendt	 points	 out	 in	 her	 Lectures	 on	 Kant's	 Political	 Philosophy	 (1982). 133 	This	contradiction	 lies	 in	 the	 fact	 that	 although	 Kant	 perceives	 the	 enthusiasm	 produced	 by	revolution	as	a	positive	sign	of	humanity’s	capacity	to	evolve	towards	a	potentially	better	future,	at	the	same	time,	he	appears	to	condemn	any	kind	of	violence	associated	with	it.	He	mentions	in	The	Conflict	of	the	Faculties	(1798),	with	regard	to	the	French	Revolution:		The	 revolution	 of	 a	 gifted	 people	 which	 we	 have	 seen	 unfolding	 in	 our	 day	 may	succeed	or	miscarry;	 it	may	be	filled	with	misery	and	atrocities	to	the	point	that	a	sensible	 man,	 were	 he	 boldly	 to	 hope	 to	 execute	 it	 successfully	 the	 second	 time,	would	 never	 resolve	 to	make	 the	 experiment	 at	 such	 cost—this	 revolution,	 I	 say,	nonetheless	finds	in	the	hearts	of	all	spectators	(who	are	not	engaged	in	this	game	themselves)	 a	 wishful	 participation	 that	 borders	 closely	 on	 enthusiasm,	 the	 very	expression	of	which	 is	 fraught	with	danger;	 this	 sympathy,	 therefore,	 can	have	no	other	cause	than	a	moral	predisposition	in	the	human	race.134																																																										131	Gray,	op.	cit.,	p.	34.	132	Gray,	op.	cit.,	p.	85.	133	Hannah	Arendt,	Lectures	on	Kant’s	Political	Philosophy	(Ronald	Beiner	ed,	University	of	Chicago	Press	1982)	p.	44.	134	Immanuel	 Kant,	The	 Conflict	 of	 the	 Faculties	(Mary	 J	 Gregor	 tr,	 University	 of	 Nebraska	 Press	1992)	p.	153.		
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Kant	goes	on	to	advocate	that	“such	a	phenomenon	in	human	history	is	not	to	be	forgotten,	because	 it	 has	 revealed	 a	 tendency	 and	 faculty	 in	 human	 nature	 for	 improvement”.135	Notably,	however,	there	are	certain	conditions	to	be	fulfilled	in	order	for	this	improvement	to	 materialise:	 offensive	 war	 should	 be	 avoided	 and	 the	 end	 product	 of	 the	 revolution	should	be	a	“Republican	constitution”.136	Kant	could,	perhaps,	come	under	the	criticism	of	changing	his	views	on	revolution	as	 expressed	 in	 his	 earlier	works,	 like	The	Science	of	Right	 (or	Doctrine	of	Right)	 (1790).	However,	 the	 connection	 that	he	makes	between	 the	avoidance	of	 offensive	war	and	 the	need	 for	 a	 Republican	 constitution	 is,	 in	 fact,	 remarkably	 consistent	 with	 the	argumentation	 developed	 by	 him	 even	 before	 the	 French	 Revolution,	 and,	 in	 particular,	with	the	reasoning	that	he	provides	in	various	points	of	his	short	essay	Perpetual	Peace:	A	
Philosophical	Sketch	 (1795).	 Furthermore,	 in	The	Science	of	Right	 itself,	 Kant	 describes	 in	detail	his	concept	of	the	true	Republic:			 	Every	true	Republic	is	and	can	only	be	constituted	by	a	Representative	System	of	the	People.	 Such	 a	 Representative	 System	 is	 instituted	 in	 name	 of	 the	 People,	 and	 is	constituted	 by	 all	 the	 Citizens	 being	 united	 together,	 in	 order,	 by	means	 of	 their	Deputies,	 to	 protect	 and	 secure	 their	 Rights.	 […]	 People	 then	 does	 not	 merely	represent	the	Sovereignty,	but	they	are	themselves	sovereign.137		Kant	continues	his	analysis	by	further	delineating	the	qualitative	characteristics	of	such	a	Representative	System:		 The	 capability	 of	 Voting	 by	 possession	 of	 the	 Suffrage,	 properly	 constitutes	 the	political	 qualification	 of	 a	 Citizen	 as	 a	 Member	 of	 the	 State.	 But	 this,	 again,	presupposes	 the	 Independence	 or	 Self-sufficiency	 of	 the	 individual	 Citizen	 among	the	people,	 as	one	who	 is	not	 a	mere	 incidental	part	of	 the	Commonwealth,	 but	 a	Member	of	it	acting	of	his	own	Will	in	community	with	others.	The	last	of	the	three	qualities	 involved,	 necessarily	 constitutes	 the	 distinction	 between	 active	 and	passive	Citizenship;	although	the	latter	conception	appears	to	stand	in	contradiction	to	the	definition	of	a	Citizen	as	such.138																																																									135	ibid.,	p.	159.	136	ibid.,	p.	153.	137	Immanuel	Kant,	The	Science	of	Right	(Forgotten	Books,	Charleston	2008)	p.	142.	138	ibid.,	p.	104.	
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Therefore,	by	describing	the	indispensable	attributes	of	the	“true	Republic”	and	its	system	of	 representation,	Kant	already	circumscribes	 the	area	within	which	any	political	 change	might	 occur.	 For,	 such	 kind	 of	 action	 should	 neither	 threaten	 the	 function	 of	 public	distributive	justice,	nor	should	it	ignore	that	“legislative	power	[…]	can	only	belong	to	the	united	will	of	the	people”.139	Only	if	political	change	“is	carried	forward	by	gradual	reform	and	in	accordance	with	fixed	principles,	it	may	lead	by	a	continuous	approximation	to	the	highest	political	good,	and	to	perpetual	peace”.140		In	this	context,	Kant	appears	to	supplement	rather	than	contradict	his	earlier	views,	when	 writing	 The	Conflict	 of	 the	Faculties,	 shortly	 after	 the	 French	 Revolution.	 In	 other	words,	even	if	we	accept	his	most	“pro-revolutionary”	positions,	Kant’s	theorisation	could	hardly	be	characterised	as	one	encouraging	violent	political	and	social	behaviour,	as	Gray	appears	to	suggest.	The	appropriation	of	History	on	which	Gray	builds	his	argument	stems	from	 his	 effort	 to	 establish	 a	 largely	 “post-ideological”	 context	 for	 the	 present:	 if	 the	ideologies	of	 the	past	nurtured	violent	utopianism	and	today	we	are	through	with	utopia	(as	 Gray	 claims	 throughout	 his	 book),	 then,	 it	 could	 be	 readily	 claimed	 that	 we	 have	somehow	managed	to	overcome	ideology	itself	–	or,	at	least,	to	prevail	over	what	one	could	call	“bad”-utopian	ideology.	It	is	at	this	critical	point,	that	Gray’s	largely	“post-ideological”	conception	 of	 the	 present	 appears	 to,	 eventually,	 converge	 upon	 Fukuyama’s	 “post-historical”	 and	 “post-ethical”	 theorisation	of	human	nature.	 Interestingly,	Gray	 concludes	his	chapter	on	the	Americanization	of	Apocalyptic	utopianism	by	the	neo-conservatives	in	the	 USA,	 in	 a	 distinctly	 trans-historical	 tenor,	 which	 appears	 to	 purposefully	 ignore	 the	differences	between	ideologies	and	eras.	More	specifically,	he	turns	to	Dostoyevsky’s	novel	
The	Possessed	(1871-2)	in	order	to	draw	an	analogy	between	the	Russian	revolutionaries	of	1917	 and	 the	 ideological	 principles	 of	 the	 George	 W.	 Bush	 administration:	 “Like	Dostoyevsky’s	deluded	visionaries”,	Gray	asserts,	 “neo-conservatives	embraced	 force	as	a	means	to	Utopia”.141		
Kantian	Justice	and	the	Repudiation	of	Possession			The	 examination	 of	 Fukuyama	 and	 Gray’s	 work	 has	 demonstrated	 that	 even	 before	 the	outbreak	of	capitalism’s	worst	ever	crisis,	in	2008,	utopia	should	not	have	been	dismissed	
																																																								139	ibid.	140	ibid.,	p.	160.	141	Gray,	op.	cit.,	p.	205.	
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as	 a	 living	 entity	 within	 human	 consciousness,	 despite	 –	 in	 many	 ways	 –	 remaining	“dormant”.	 The	 catalyst	 effect	 of	 the	 crisis	 itself	 on	 the	 revitalization	 of	 our	 relationship	with	notions	 of	 utopianism	will	 be	 thoroughly	 explored	 in	 the	 following	 chapters	 of	 this	thesis,	through	the	perspective	of	politically	engaged	Web-based	art.	Yet,	 in	order	to	fully	apprehend	 the	 basis	 on	which	 the	 art	 of	 the	 post-crisis	 period	 has	 been	 produced,	 it	 is	necessary	to	connect	political	theory	to	art.	Rather	predictably,	perhaps,	this	will	happen	in	this	thesis	by	engaging	with	Kant’s	work	on	aesthetics.	Nevertheless,	it	would	be	useful	to	perform	this	transition	by	concentrating	for	a	little	bit	longer	on	Kant’s	moral	and	political	philosophy.	In	particular,	his	work	in	the	Doctrine	of	Right	is	essential	not	only	in	order	to	understand	better	 the	 foundations	 on	which	his	 relation	 to	 the	 concepts	 of	 violence	 and	revolution	is	built,	but,	also,	in	order	to	identify	his	impact	on	the	work	of	Walter	Benjamin,	whose	ideas	have	been	fundamental	in	any	theorisation	of	the	digital	art	object	during	the	last	three	decades.	In	the	field	of	Kantian	studies,	the	Doctrine	of	Right	remained	for	a	rather	long	time	a	relatively	overlooked	part	of	Kant’s	philosophical	system.142	Interestingly,	one	could	make	a	 similar	 claim	 about	 Benjamin’s	Notes	Toward	a	Work	on	the	Category	of	Justice	 (1916),	which	 constitutes	 an	 effort	 to	 re-approach	 Kant’s	Metaphysics	of	Morals	and	 replace	 his	“doctrine	of	 right”	with	what	Benjamin	 calls	 the	 “category	of	 justice”.	Kant’s	work	 in	 the	
Metaphysics	of	Morals	 investigates	 the	 legal	 rights	 that	 an	 individual	 enjoys	 or	 is	 able	 to	acquire,	 through	an	exploration	of	 the	relation	between	private	and	public	 law.	Centrally	located	 in	his	 analysis	 is	 the	 idea	of	 the	 “axiom	of	 external	 freedom”;	namely,	 the	 innate	right	that	we	have	to	objects	external	from	ourselves,	including	the	possession	of	physical	objects	as	well	as	the	regulation	of	our	relations	with	other	individuals	and	the	results	of	their	actions.	In	the	“Introduction	to	the	Doctrine	of	Right”,	Kant	delineates	the	context	of	this	original	right	to	freedom	by	defining	it	as	follows:	“Freedom	(independence	from	being	constrained	by	another's	choice),	insofar	as	it	can	coexist	with	the	freedom	of	every	other	in	 accordance	with	 a	 universal	 law,	 is	 the	 only	 original	 right	 belonging	 to	 every	man	by	virtue	 of	 his	 humanity”.143	Through	 the	 assumption	 of	 this	 original	 right	 to	 freedom,	 an	individual	can	require	from	everyone	else	to	act	towards	him	according	to	a	universal	law																																																									142	In	the	last	three	decades,	important	studies	have	re-evaluated	Kant’s	work	the	Doctrine	of	Right.	See,	 for	 example:	Wolfgang	Kersting,	 ‘Politics,	 Freedom	and	Order:	Kant’s	Political	Philosophy’	 in	Paul	 Guyer	 (ed),	The	Cambridge	Companion	to	Kant	(Cambridge	University	 Press	 1992)	 pp.	 342	 –	366;	Leslie	Arthur	Mulholland,	Kant's	System	Of	Rights	(Columbia	University	Press	1990);	and	Allen	D	Rosen,	Kant’s	Theory	of	Justice	(Cornell	University	Press,	Ithaca	1993).	143	Immanuel	Kant,	The	Metaphysics	of	Morals	(Mary	J	Gregor	ed,	Cambridge	University	Press	1991)	p.	63.	
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of	 right.144	Yet,	 in	 order	 to	 peacefully	 enjoy	 this	 universal	 right,	 an	 individual	 has	 to	withdraw	 from	 the	 natural	 state	 of	 external	 freedom	 and	 adhere	 to	 what	 Kant	 calls	 a	“juridical	state”:		 From	 private	 Right	 in	 the	 state	 of	 nature	 there	 proceeds	 the	 postulate	 of	 public	Right:	When	you	cannot	avoid	living	side	by	side	with	all	others,	you	ought	to	leave	the	 state	 of	 nature	 and	 proceed	 with	 them	 into	 a	 rightful	 condition,	 that	 is,	 a	condition	 of	 distributive	 justice.	 The	 ground	 of	 this	 postulate	 can	 be	 explicated	[entwickeln]	analytically	from	the	concept	of	Right	in	external	relations,	in	contrast	with	violence	(violentia).145		Benjamin	 attempts	 to	 construct	 a	 philosophical	 framework	 that	 would	 permit	 the	“reconciliation”	between	the	state	of	nature	and	the	juridical	state	(Rechtstaat),	which	Kant	describes	 in	 terms	 of	 two	 rather	 rigidly	 defined	 entities.	 It	 is	 exactly	 from	 the	 “lacuna”	between	the	two	states	that	Benjamin’s	contribution	emerges,	under	the	influence	of	Marx.		 In	the	Notes	Toward	a	Work	on	the	Category	of	Justice,	the	principle	of	right	does	not	automatically	 appear	 as	 a	 virtue	 for	 Benjamin.	 Instead,	 virtue	 is	 something	 profoundly	deeper,	since	 it	 is	designated	as	the	element	that	 leads	to	 justice:	“Justice	 is	 the	power	of	virtue”,	Benjamin	states,	connoting	the	association	of	the	two	concepts	with	two	distinctly	different	 systems	 of	 classification.146	In	 the	 central	 position	 that	 the	 “axiom	 of	 external	freedom”	 occupied	 in	 the	Doctrine	of	Right,	 Benjamin	 now	places	 the	 idea	 of	 possession.	The	opening	of	his	Notes	leaves	no	room	for	doubt	with	regard	to	its	significance	in	relation	to	 justice:	 “No	 order	 of	 possession,	 however	 it	 may	 be	 articulated,	 leads	 to	 justice”,	Benjamin	asserts.147	In	view	of	this	“transition”,	Kant’s	passage	from	the	state	of	nature	to	the	juridical	state	should,	also,	be	replaced;	what	Benjamin	replaces	it	with	is	the	passage	from	right	to	justice.	The	latter	should	be	understood	as	a	condition	in	which	a	good	cannot	be	a	possession	anymore.148	In	other	words,	the	attainment	of	justice	entails	that	the	idea																																																									144	Sharon	 Byrd	 and	 Joachim	 Hruschka,	Kant’s	 Doctrine	 of	 Right:	 A	 Commentary	(Cambridge	University	Press	2010)	p.	10.		145	Kant,	The	Metaphysics	of	Morals,	op.	cit.,	pp.	121-122.	146	Peter	 Fenves,	The	 Messianic	 Reduction:	 Walter	 Benjamin	 and	 the	 Shape	 of	 Time	(Stanford	University	 Press,	 Stanford	 2011)	 p.	 206.	 In	 his	 book,	 Fenves	 focuses	 on	 neglected	 aspects	 of	Benjamin’s	 work	 by	 examining,	 amongst	 others,	 his	 friendship	 with	 Gershom	 Scholem.	 It	 is	 in	Scholem’s	 Diaries	 that	 Benjamin’s	 revision	 of	 Kant’s	 Metaphysics	 of	 Morals	 first	 appears	 in	international	bibliography.	147	Benjamin	in	ibid.,	p.	189.	148	Benjamin	in	ibid.,	p.	198.	
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of	 possessing	 something	 in	 terms	 of	 merely	 enacting	 the	 rights	 emanating	 from	 Kant’s	juridical	 state	 has	 been	 permanently	 overcome.	 Thus,	 whereas	 we	 can	 seek	 a	 virtue	 by	demanding	 it,	we	 cannot	 do	 the	 same	with	 justice:	 justice	 is	 a	 state	 that	 either	 exists	 or	does	not	exist.149		According	to	Benjamin,	what	appears	to	threaten	any	attempt	at	approximating	the	category	of	justice	is	the	inherent	violence	that	can	be	ascribed	to	any	actual	possession.150	Nevertheless,	 violence	 should	 not	 been	 perceived	 monosemantically	 here,	 for,	 under	specific	 conditions,	 it	 can	 acquire	 a	 genuine	 revolutionary,	 or	 socially	 “transcendent”	character.	In	order	to	substantiate	this	disposition,	Benjamin	expands	Kant’s	interpretation	of	violence	(“violentia”)	from	a	Marxist	perspective,	and	he	identifies	“pure	Gewalt”	(“pure	violence/power”)	as	the	catalyst	element	in	his	theorization.	In	the	Doctrine	of	Right,	Kant	condemns	the	labour	theory	of	property,151	but,	at	the	same	time,	is	open	to	the	taking	over	of	 unclaimed	 spaces,	 provided	 that	 their	 aspiring	 possessors	 demonstrate	 an	 adequate	amount	of	Gewalt.	For	Benjamin,	this	principle	should	be	radically	expanded	so	that	it	can	be	 applied	 to	 situations	 in	 which	 everything	 is	 owned	 by	 a	 very	 limited	 number	 of	individuals.152	Accordingly,	the	proletariat	is	portrayed	as	the	only	rightful	recipient	of	this	kind	of	power,153	which,	nevertheless,	should	be	used	with	prudence	and	as	a	“gift”	–	as	a	kind	of	 “divine	power”.154	That	 is	why	Benjamin	underlines	 that	 “pure	Gewalt”	 should	be	understood	 as	merely	 a	 stage	 towards	 the	 realization	 of	 the	 category	 of	 justice:	 “In	 this	world	divine	Gewalt	is	higher	than	divine	lack	of	violence	[Gewaltlosigkeit];	in	the	coming	world,	divine	lack	of	violence	higher	than	divine	Gewalt”.155		
Benjamin’s	Revolutionary	Art	Object		The	 ontological	 differentiation	 of	 justice	 that	 Benjamin	 proposes	 and	 its	 revolutionary	power	are	deeply	engraved	not	only	in	his	writings	in	the	area	of	political	philosophy,	but,																																																									149	ibid.,	p.	188.	This	 fact	could,	possibly,	 illuminate	the	origin	of	Kant’s	difficulty	 in	 identifying	an	adjective	that	would	effectively	differentiate	juridical	possession	from	physical	possession.	Notably,	in	 the	Doctrine	of	Right	he	experimented	with	various	adjectives,	 including	 “intentional”,	 “virtual”	and	“potestival”.	Nevertheless,	none	of	them	proved	satisfactory	in	the	end.	150	ibid.,	p.	189.	151	Kant	 in	 ibid.,	p.195.	According	to	 the	 labour	theory	of	property,	 formulated	by	 John	Locke,	 the	exertion	 of	 labour	 upon	 natural	 resources	 gives	 a	 “natural	 right”	 to	 the	 individual	 exerting	 the	labour	to	own	such	resources	and	their	products.	152	Benjamin	in	ibid.,	p.213.	153	ibid.,	p.	220.	154	ibid.,	p.	219.	155	ibid.,	p.	225.	
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also,	in	his	work	on	art.	Just	as	in	his	Notes	he	recognizes	the	absence	of	a	single	“form”	for	right	and	morality	as	positive	in	political	terms,156	in	his	seminal	essay	The	Work	of	Art	in	
the	 Age	 of	 Mechanical	 Reproduction	 (1936)	 Benjamin	 praises	 the	 art	 object’s	 new	“unformable”	 ontology	 as	 a	 direct	 result	 of	 the	 mass	 reproducibility	 offered	 by	photographic	and	reprographic	 technology.	Benjamin	regards	 the	 latter	as	a	catalyst	 that	can	help	the	art	object	to	formulate	revolutionary	demands	and	contribute	to	the	pursuit	of	social	change.	At	the	root	of	the	political	and	revolutionary	promise	that	Benjamin	saw	in	mechanically	 reproduced	 art	 lies	 its	 ability	 to	 overcome	 the	 artwork’s	 “aura”	 and	 the	rituals	appended	on	it	through	tradition.	For	Benjamin,	the	latter	controls	our	relationship	with	the	work	of	art	through	the	imposition	of	a	specific	“reading”	on	it	and	the	creation	of	a	 monosemous	 context	 of	 “legitimisation”	 that	 excludes	 any	 other	 interpretation.157	In	other	words,	the	aura	is	not	an	“ontological	property”	of	the	object	in	itself,	but	rather	an	artificial	 construction	 that	 delimits	 the	 object’s	 qualities.	 Therefore,	 by	 physically	multiplying	the	artwork	through	copying	it	(mechanical	reproduction),	what	we	are	doing	in	effect	is	to	“free”	the	work	from	its	authoritative	and	distant	character	and,	as	a	result,	we	are	given	the	opportunity	to	democratise	it	both	quantitatively	and	qualitatively.		According	 to	Benjamin,	 this	was	not	possible	before	 the	 invention	of	photography	and	cinema	and,	most	importantly,	before	realising	the	inherent	ideological	dispositions	of	such	new	media.	 For,	 the	aura	 is	not	 a	 given	 fact	about	 the	artwork,	but,	 rather,	 a	 set	of	relations	formed	around	it,	which	act	as	a	“protective	fence”.	What	those	relations	protect	is	 quite	 easy	 to	 identify:	 the	 dominant	 (cultural)	 order	 and	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 ruling	classes.	This	political	perspective	is	vividly	reflected	even	in	works	predating	The	Work	of	
Art	in	the	Age	of	Mechanical	Reproduction.	For	 instance,	Benjamin	refers	with	precision	 to	this	 “prior”	 stage	 in	 the	 artwork’s	 ontology	 and	 to	 its	 “resistance”	 to	 the	new	conditions	generated	by	 technology,	when	he	describes	 the	nature	of	early	photographs	 in	his	Little	
History	 of	 Photography	 (1931).	 Adopting	 a	 photograph	 of	 writer	 Franz	 Kafka	 as	 a	 case	study,	he	elaborates	on	the	origin	of	its	auratic	qualities:		This	 picture,	 in	 its	 infinite	 sadness,	 forms	 a	 pendant	 to	 the	 early	 photographs	 in	which	people	 did	not	 yet	 look	out	 at	 the	world	 in	 so	 excluded	 and	 godforsaken	 a	manner	as	this	boy.	There	was	an	aura	about	them,	a	medium	that	lent	fullness	and																																																									156	ibid.,	p.197.	157	As	Benjamin	notes,	“the	uniqueness	of	a	work	of	art	 is	 inseparable	from	its	being	imbedded	in	the	 fabric	 of	 tradition”.	 See:	 Walter	 Benjamin,	The	 Work	 of	 Art	 in	 the	 Age	 of	 Mechanical	
Reproduction	(Hannah	Arendt	ed,	Schocken	1969	[1936])	p.	223.	
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security	 to	 their	 gaze	 even	 as	 it	 penetrated	 that	 medium.	 And	 once	 again	 the	technical	equivalent	is	obvious:	it	consists	in	the	absolute	continuum	from	brightest	light	to	darkest	shadow.	Here,	 too,	we	see	 in	operation	the	 law	that	new	advances	are	prefigured	in	older	techniques	[…]	So	much	for	the	technical	determinedness	of	the	auratic	appearance.158		
	Figure	9:	The	photograph	of	Kafka	referenced	by	Walter	Benjamin		Benjamin	 identifies	 as	 a	 form	 of	 “technical	 conditioning	 of	 the	 auratic	 appearance”	 the	“posturing	stance”	adopted	by	people	in	many	photographs	and,	notably,	he	connects	such	technical	choices	directly	to	the	preoccupations	of	the	members	of	the	bourgeoisie:		 After	 1880,	 though,	 photographers	 made	 it	 their	 business	 to	 simulate	 the	 aura	which	 had	 been	 banished	 from	 the	 picture	 with	 the	 suppression	 of	 darkness	through	faster	lenses,	exactly	as	it	was	being	banished	from	reality	by	the	deepening																																																									158	Walter	Benjamin,	Selected	Writings:	1927-1934,	volume	2	 (Belknap	Press	of	Harvard	University	Press	1999).	p.	515-517.		
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degeneration	of	the	imperialist	bourgeoisie.159			 It	seems	quite	reasoned,	 then,	 that	the	destruction	of	 the	aura,	which	Benjamin	so	enthusiastically	 proclaimed	 in	 The	Work	of	Art	 in	 the	Age	of	Mechanical	Reproduction,	 is	ultimately	grounded	on	its	conception	as	an	act	of	(political)	justice:	“To	pry	an	object	from	its	 shell,	 to	 destroy	 its	 aura,	 is	 the	 mark	 of	 a	 perception	 whose	 ‘sense	 of	 the	 universal	equality	 of	 things’	 has	 increased	 to	 such	 a	 degree	 that	 it	 extracts	 it	 even	 from	 a	 unique	object	by	means	of	reproduction”,	he	writes.160	If	we,	thus,	conceptualize	the	object	in	the	way	 that	 Benjamin	 is	 advocating	 –	 as	 a	 combination	 of	 a	 material	 and	 an	 immaterial	existence	 (the	 “shell”)	 –	mechanical	 reproduction	 functions	 as	 a	 destructive	 as	well	 as	 a	rescuing	gesture:	the	aura	is	destroyed	and,	at	the	same	time,	the	object	is	“saved”	as	a	new	kind	of	“value”	is	appended	on	it.	The	critical	element	that	defines	this	new	“value”	is	the	object’s	potential	 for	distribution	to	an	audience	that	 is	wider	than	ever	before	 in	human	history	–	a	fact	that,	nevertheless,	does	not	have	any	negative	effect	on	the	work’s	formal	qualities.	 Therefore,	 the	 development	 of	 technology,	 in	 the	 form	 of	 photography	 and	cinema,	marks	for	Benjamin	not	only	the	fall	of	the	aura,	but,	also,	the	rise	of	the	potential	to	 pursue	 a	 new	 order	 in	 which	 justice	 can	 be	 finally	 fulfilled.161	The	 idea	 of	 the	 “pure	
Gewalt”	 resonates	once	more	strongly	 in	Benjamin’s	work.	The	violent	and	revolutionary	reordering	 of	 perception,	 which	 accompanies	 the	 destruction	 of	 the	 aura,	 acquires	 the	characteristics	of	an	almost	“divine”	catalyst.	By	transforming	the	 individual	artwork,	 the	collapse	 of	 the	 aura	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 also	 transform	 the	 collective	 cultural	 condition	through	the	mechanical	reproducibility	of	all	cultural	objects.			
Deconstructing	the	Aura:	Deconstructing	Time		Since,	 however,	 the	 aura	 is	 part	 of	 the	 fabric	 of	 tradition,	 which	 –	 by	 its	 nature	 –	 may	encompass	many	“layers”,	its	removal	and	the	ensuing	transformation	of	the	art	object	is,	above	all,	a	process.	But,	such	a	process	does	not	come	without	contradictions,	or	obstacles.	Based	on	the	previous	analysis,	it	is	possible	to	conceptualise	the	“condensed”	time	of	the	aura	 as	 the	 time	 of	 the	 “retroactive”	 object:	 an	 object	 whose	 qualities	 have	 been	 the	product	of	an	intense	exercise	of	historicization.	Thus,	even	if	the	aura	is	indeed	removed																																																									159	ibid.,	p.	517.	160	Benjamin,	The	Work	of	Art	in	the	Age	of	Mechanical	Reproduction,	op.	cit.,	p.	222.	161	As	 Benjamin	writes:	 “For	 the	 last	 time	 the	 aura	 emanates	 from	 the	 early	 photographs”.	 Thus,	there	is	a	permanent	rupture	with	the	past	conditions	of	artistic	production.	ibid.,	p.	224.		
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“automatically”	through	reproduction,	the	illumination	of	its	“layers”	and	the	repositioning	of	the	artwork	in	time	and	space	is	a	much	more	complex	function.	Benjamin	alludes	to	this	fact	in	The	Work	of	Art	in	the	Age	of	Mechanical	Reproduction,	when	he	recognizes	from	the	very	beginning	that	space	(and,	thus,	the	object)	is	interwoven	with	time	on	an	existential	level	in	any	theorisation	of	art.162	The	aura	conceals	the	importance	of	this	relationship	by	forming	 a	 specific	 narrative-chronicle	 around	 it.	 Yet,	 since,	 in	 the	 Age	 of	 Mechanical	Reproduction	each	member	of	the	audience	can	potentially	acquire	a	copy	of	the	object,	the	uniqueness	of	 the	narrative	can	no	 longer	be	a	sustainable	claim.	 If	we	take	 into	account	this	attack	on	narrative	and	the	recognition	of	the	significance	of	time	in	the	reception	of	the	art	object,	 then,	 it	 comes	as	no	surprise	 that	The	Work	of	Art	in	the	Age	of	Mechanical	
Reproduction	 is,	 ultimately,	 a	 work	 about	 a	 time-based	medium:	 film.	 It	 is	 important	 to	notice	 that	Benjamin	 associates	 the	 shattering	 of	 tradition	 and	 the	 “aura”	with	 the	mass	movements	of	renewal	defining	his	age,	and	he	concludes:	 “Their	most	powerful	agent	 is	film”.163		Nevertheless,	Benjamin’s	 interest	 in	a	medium	that	was	not	that	new	by	1936	and	his	 shift	 of	 focus	 from	 photography	 to	 cinema	 can	 acquire	 an	 even	 more	 illuminating	character	–	especially	with	regard	to	 its	relevance	to	the	Digital	Age	–	 if	one	places	more	emphasis	 on	 the	 historical	 conjuncture	 of	 his	work.	 Benjamin	 attacked	 narrative	 and	 its	manipulation	of	 time	through	the	aura,	not	simply	because	he	was	able	to	deconstruct	 it,	but	–	most	importantly	–	because	he	already	had	a	glimpse	of	what	was	coming.	Notably,	
The	Work	 of	 Art	 in	 the	 Age	 of	 Mechanical	 Reproduction	 was	 written	 just	 a	 few	 months	before	 the	 1936	 Summer	Olympics,	which	were	 held	 in	 Berlin.	 For	 the	Nazi	 regime,	 the	Games	constituted	a	unique	opportunity	to	prove	to	the	world	not	only	the	supremacy	of	the	German	athletes	(who	ranked	first	in	the	collection	of	medals),	but	–	most	significantly	–	 the	 political	 and	 economic	 power	 of	 Germany	 and	 the	 scientific	 and	 technological	progress	that	the	country	had	attained.	For	this	purpose,	the	Nazis	offered	to	the	world	an	achievement	that	was	able	to	overshadow	the	newly	built	stadia	and	arenas	of	their	capital	city:	 the	 first,	 ever,	 live	 television	 broadcasting	 of	 a	 sports	 event.	 In	 total,	more	 than	 70	hours	of	live	sporting	action	were	transmitted	and	more	than	150,000	people	in	Germany	witnessed	 this	 historic	 occasion	 at	 special	 viewing	 booths,	 called	 “Public	 Television	Offices”.	 The	 event	 was	 widely	 discussed	 and	 publicised	 in	 Germany	 in	 the	 months	preceding	 the	 Games	 and	 given	 Benjamin’s	 vivid	 interest	 in	 technological	 innovation,	 it																																																									162	ibid.,	p.	221.	163	ibid.	
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would	be	perfectly	legitimate	to	assume	that	he	must	have	known	about	the	broadcasting	whilst	 writing	 an	 essay	 that	 investigated	 the	 cultural	 implications	 of	 technological	progress.	Interestingly,	the	printed	programme	accompanying	the	television	broadcastings	was	available	in	four	languages	and	it	ended	with	the	following	remark:	“From	these	initial	stages	 of	 television	 in	 broadcasting	 and	 telephony,	 there	 is	 a	 growing	 up	 a	 cultural	development	 that	 promises	 to	 be	 of	 unsuspected	 importance	 to	 the	 progress	 of	mankind”.164		
	Figure	10:	The	front	cover	of	the	television	programme	for	the	1936	Olympic	Games		Although	the	concept	of	progress	that	the	television	programme	of	1936	referred	to	was,	quite	naturally,	vague	and	hard	to	project	into	the	future,	its	origins	lie	very	close	not	
																																																								164 	'1936	 German	 Olympics'	 (Tvhistory.tv,	 2016)	<http://www.tvhistory.tv/1936%20German%20Olympics%20TV%20Program.htm>	 accessed	 4	April	2016.	
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only	to	Benjamin’s	theorisation,	but,	also,	in	effect,	to	our	own	“fluid”	understanding	of	time	in	contemporary	cultural	 theory.	 If	 the	passage	 from	the	old	media	 to	 television	marks	a	transition	 from	what	one	could	name	“fiction	 time”	 to	 “real	 time”,	 then,	 the	possibility	of	instantly	shifting	between	different	real-time	images	and	sounds	and	interacting	with	them	thanks	 to	 new	media	 technologies	 could	 only	 push	 the	 boundaries	 of	 our	 perception	 of	temporality	even	further.	This	“fluctuating”	conceptualization	of	time	carries	a	very	strong	political	character	and	is	crucial	not	only	for	the	fostering	of	new	social	demands	(or,	the	re-emergence	 of	 old	 ones),	 but,	 in	 essence,	 for	 the	 very	 existence	 of	 utopianism	 within	human	consciousness.	This	necessity	becomes	evident	if	we	consider	the	diverse	relations	that	utopia	has	developed	with	the	notion	of	“time”	in	the	course	of	history.	In	some	cases,	utopianism	has	been	based	on	a	mythical	and	idealised	vision	of	the	past,	whereas,	during	other	periods,	utopias	have	attempted	to	imagine	a	fundamentally	better	future.	For	instance,	the	story	of	Eden	in	the	book	of	Genesis	in	the	Bible	depicts	a	utopia	that	has	been	lost	forever,	because	of	man’s	original	sin	at	the	dawn	of	history,	for	which	he	was	exiled	far	from	God’s	garden.	Furthermore,	and	moving	outside	the	Christian	tradition,	authors	like	the	Roman	poet	Ovid	refer	to	a	“Golden	Age”	in	the	past,	when	there	was	no	need	for	laws,	punishment	and	wars,	since	 everyone	 “maintained	 good	 faith	 and	 did	 what	 was	 right”.165	Alternatively,	 and	positioned	 at	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	 temporal	 spectrum,	 Plato’s	 Republic	 –	 the	 widely	considered	 root	 of	 Western	 utopianism	 –	 aimed	 at	 approximating	 the	 ideal	 society	 by	projecting	 a	 supreme	 structure	 that	 was	 based	 on	 a	 deep	 understanding	 of	 the	 idea	 of	justice.	 Even	 philosophers	 who	 rejected	 Plato’s	 approach,	 like	 Aristotle,	 maintained	 this	orientation	towards	the	future,	presenting	their	own	version	of	the	ideal	state	and	what	it	would	offer	to	its	citizens.166	Regardless	of	the	past	or	future	orientation,	however,	the	real	basis	 for	 the	 construction	 of	 utopianism	 is,	 in	 fact,	 the	 present.	 All	 utopias	 operate	 as	comparative	devices	 through	which	a	 judgement	about	 the	current	condition	of	a	society	can	be	made.	Thus,	they	may	criticize	the	present	by	juxtaposing	it	to	a	much	better	past;	or,	they	may	perform	the	same	function	by	describing	what	would	be	the	right	choices	for	a	future	 that	would	 be	much	 better	 than	 the	 present.	 Quite	 evidently,	 both	 points	 of	 view	bear	 profound	 political	 and	 revolutionary	 promise,	 through	 their	 implicit	 questioning	 of																																																									165	Ovid,	Metamorphoses	(M	 Innes	 tr,	 Penguin	 Books,	 London	 1955)	 p.	 31.	 Ovid’s	 mythological	account	was	 the	most	 prominent	 version	 of	 the	 “Golden	 Age”,	 which	was,	 later,	 passed	 into	 the	middle	Ages	and	the	Renaissance.	166	Aristotle	 presents	 his	 views	 on	 the	 ideal	 polis	 in	 his	Politics	(Greek:	Πολιτικά).	 See:	 Aristotle,	Ernest	Barker	and	R.	F	Stalley,	The	Politics	(Oxford	University	Press	1995).	
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the	existing	order	of	things.		Yet,	this	subversive	character	becomes	even	more	salient	when	utopias	are	enacted,	in	some	form,	 in	 the	present.	Notably,	 in	such	occasions,	 the	agents	of	 the	existing	status	quo	are	keen	to	apply	specific	rules	and	limitations	to	the	enactment,	so	that	the	dominant	order	 is	 successfully	 preserved	 and	 the	 participants	 of	 the	 enactment	 do	 not	 become	“vectors”	of	a	deviant	 ideology.	Hence,	during	antiquity,	Ovid’s	“Golden	Age”	was	enacted	through	Saturnalia,	the	Roman	festival	in	honour	of	Saturn,	which	was	held	every	year	on	17	December.	The	festivities	were	characterised	by	a	thorough	overturning	of	social	norms,	which	 even	 saw	 masters	 providing	 table	 service	 for	 their	 slaves.	 Nevertheless,	 private	celebrations	would	last	for	no	more	than	a	week	(in	many	cases,	just	for	a	day).	During	the	Middle	Ages,	similar	rituals	were	expressed	through	the	story	of	Cockaigne,	or	Cockayne,	which	described	a	mythical	land	of	plenty,	in	which	all	the	difficulties	and	the	harsh	living	conditions	 of	 the	 poor	 had	 disappeared	 and	 food	 and	 sexual	 freedom	 was	 offered	 to	everyone	on	equal	terms.	This	story	is	closely	associated	with	practices	like	the	carnival,	in	its	 various	 versions,	 which	 subverts	 the	 established	 order	 in	 people’s	 everyday	 lives	 by	mixing	social	classes	and	overturning	people’s	roles;	 in	short,	by	generating	a	brief	social	revolution.	 The	medieval	 Feast	 of	 Fools	 is	 one	 of	 the	most	 interesting	 and	 characteristic	cases,	 since	 the	 “revolt”	 adopted	 a	 highly	 blasphemous	 nature.	 More	 specifically,	 it	demanded	 the	mocking	 of	 Church	 officials	 by	 their	 own	 congregations,	whose	members	would	normally	be	in	a	subordinate	position.	The	festival	was	vehemently	condemned	by	the	Church	and	was	finally	forbidden	by	the	Council	of	Basel	in	1431,	amid	the	adoption	of	severe	penalties.		This	stance	of	prohibition	has	been	a	common	characteristic	of	all	systems	of	power	in	 their	 fight	 against	 elements	 of	 utopianism	 that	 might	 raise	 social	 demands	 implying	dissatisfaction	 with	 the	 present	 condition.	 For	 instance,	 following	 World	 War	 II,	 the	Catholic	 Church	 emphatically	 opposed	 movements	 like	 Liberation	 Theology,	 a	 Christian	doctrine	 developed	 in	 Latin	 America	 that	 believes	 that	 the	 Church	 should	 actively	contribute	to	the	emancipation	of	the	poor	from	political,	social	and	economic	injustice.167	Notably,	for	the	supporters	of	the	movement,	"Jesus	became	a	social	agitator	and	the	poor,	as	 referred	 to	 in	 the	 gospels,	 came	 to	 be	 equated	 with	 the	 proletariat	 as	 defined	 by	Marx”.168	Even	today,	the	Catholic	Church	aims	at	diminishing	the	importance	of	Liberation																																																									167	Another	example	is	Black	Theology.	168	John	 Hooper	 and	 Dan	 Collyns,	 ‘Peru	 University	 in	 Vatican	 Battle	 over	 Right	 to	 Call	 Itself	Catholic’	The	Guardian	(28	October	2012)	<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/28/peru-university-vatican-catholic?fb=optOut>	accessed	23	March	2016.	
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Theology,	 by	 largely	 presenting	 it	 as	 a	 utopian	 and	 blasphemous	 strand	 that	 flourished	under	the	special	political	conditions	of	Latin	America	in	the	1970s	and	the	1980s.	In	other	words,	 according	 to	 the	 official	 Church,	 the	movement	 should	 be	 perceived	 as	 a	 limited	phenomenon,	 both	 geographically	 and	 temporally.	 But,	 what	 if	 the	 previously	 described	enactments	 continued?	 What	 if	 time	 could	 become	 “fluid”	 enough	 in	 order	 to	 foster	utopianism	 on	 a	 whole	 new	 basis?	 What	 if	 utopian	 demands	 became	 pursuable	alternatives,	 rather	 than	 deviations	 from	 “normality”,	 forbidden	 activities,	 or	institutionalised	spectacles?			
The	Fluid	Temporality	of	Contemporaneity			In	 the	 eight	 decades	 that	 have	 followed	 the	 1936	 Olympics	 that	 Walter	 Benjamin	experienced,	 the	 reconceptualisation	 of	 temporality	 thanks	 to	 technology	 became	 so	extensive,	that	it	has	been	vividly	reflected	not	only	in	the	approach	that	cultural	theorists	have	 adopted	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 present,	 but,	 also,	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 past.	 During	 the	1990s,	art	historians	 like	Georges	Didi-Huberman169	and	Mieke	Bal,170	introduced	in	their	analyses	 the	 idea	 of	 “anachronism”,	 in	 order	 to	 describe	 the	 capacity	 of	 artworks	 to	overcome	their	traditional	temporal	identity	and	belong	both	to	the	present	and	the	past.	Their	arguments	entail	that	an	artwork	could	produce	considerably	different	meanings	in	different	times	and	places	and,	thus,	art	itself	could	acquire	a	much	more	flexible	role	as	a	social	agent.	More	recent	contributions	to	this	field	have	even	applied	the	same	principle	to	periods	 in	 art	 history	 that	 bear	 very	 strong	 “canonical”	 identities.	 For	 example,	 in	 their	book	 Anachronic	 Renaissance	 (2010),171	art	 theorists	 Alexander	 Nagel	 and	 Christopher	Wood	examine	the	artistic	production	of	the	late	Middle	Ages	and	the	Renaissance	in	light	of	 this	 new	 conceptualisation	 of	 time	 and	 the	 context	 “contemporaneity”.	 Their	 work	produces	polyvalent	interpretations	of	ideas	like	the	“copy”,	the	“replica”	and	“authorship”,	which	engage	with	and	refute	at	the	same	time	the	influence	of	(historical)	distance.	One	of	the	main	 concepts	 that	 the	 two	 authors	 employ	 in	 their	work	 in	 order	 to	 synopsise	 this	“liberating”	 function	 of	 enagagement	 and	 refutation	 is	 “subsitution”.	 As	Nagel	 and	Wood																																																									169 	Georges	 Didi-Huberman,	Fra	 Angelico:	 Dissemblance	 and	 Figuration	(Jane	 Marie	 Todd	 tr,	University	 of	 Chicago	 Press,	 Chicago	 1995);	 and	 Georges	 Didi-Huberman,	Confronting	 Images:	
Questioning	 the	Ends	of	a	Certain	History	of	Art	(John	 Goodman	 tr,	 Pennsylvania	 State	 University	Press	2005).	170	Mieke	 Bal,	Quoting	 Caravaggio:	 Contemporary	 Art,	 Preposterous	 History	(University	 of	 Chicago	Press	1999).	171	Alexander	Nagel	and	Christopher	S	Wood,	Anachronic	Renaissance	(2nd	edn,	Zone	Books	2010).		
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claim,	“to	perceive	an	artifact	in	substitutional	terms	was	to	understand	it	as	belonging	to	more	 than	 one	 historical	 moment	 simultaneously.	 The	 artifact	 was	 connected	 to	 its	unknowable	point	of	origin	by	an	unreconstructible	 chain	of	 replicas”.172	Quite	evidently,	the	content	of	the	term	“replica”	here	can	acquire	a	signification	that	goes	well	beyond	the	mere	 reconstruction	 of	 a	 physical	 object.	 The	 (re-)	 definition	 of	 the	 artwork,	 which	 –	notably	 –	 alludes	 to	 a	 procedural	 origin	 (“chain	 of”),	may	 connect	 the	 artifact’s	material	nature	 with	 its	 immaterial	 existence;	 namely,	 with	 its	 philosophical,	 anthropological,	ideological	and	cultural	function	through	time.	Art	 historian	 Terry	 Smith,	 whose	 work	 principally	 examines	 contemporary	 art,	adopts	 a	 very	 similar	 position	 on	 temporality,	 which	 echoes	 vividly	 Nagel	 and	 Wood’s	concept	of	“substitution”.	According	to	Smith,	“in	contemporary	conditions	periodization	is	impossible”,	since	“contemporaneity	consists	[…]	in	the	actual	coincidence	of	asynchronous	temporalities”.173	In	this	context,	we	might	develop	a	sense	that	specific	kinds	of	time	are	“running	 out”,	 while	 others	 seem	 to	 prevail	 and	 vice-versa.	 An	 explanation	 for	 this	condition	may	be	provided	if	we	consider	that	globalisation	lies	in	a	state	of	“suspension”	from	 which	 it	 might	 never,	 actually,	 escape:	 it	 is	 a	 process	 that	 is	 not	 complete;	 yet,	 it	appears	to	constantly	seek	completion,	despite	the	fact	that	its	incapacity	to	produce	unity	makes	 this	 goal	 largely	 unattainable.174	Therefore,	 the	 inability	 to	 singularly	 define	 the	present	 experience	 of	 temporality	 engenders	 a	 radicalisation	 of	 the	 past-present-future	triad:	 time	 is	 mixed	 and	 displaced175	and,	 as	 a	 result,	 “it	 is	 becoming	 more	 and	 more	common	 to	 feel	 oneself	 as	 standing,	 in	 important	 senses,	 at	 once	within	 and	against	 the	times”.176	In	 other	 words,	 the	 term	 “contemporary”	 should	 be	 understood	 through	 its	multiplicity,	with	regard	 to	both	 temporality	and	 art	as	one	of	 its	products.	 In	particular,	when	 referring	 to	 contemporary	 art,	 we	 refer	 to	 something	 that	 is	 “hosting”	 multiple	narratives	not	only	because	it	is	happening	today	and,	thus,	it	has	not	managed	to	produce	sufficient	 “distance”	 yet,	 but,	 rather,	 because	 there	 cannot	 be	 a	 dominant	 and	 stable	narrative	 building	 such	 “distance”	 anymore.177	Interestingly,	 Smith	 identifies	 the	 new																																																									172	ibid.,	p.30	173	Terry	Smith,	Okwui	Enwezor	and	Nancy	Condee	(eds),	Antinomies	of	Art	and	Culture:	Modernity,	
Postmodernity,	Contemporaneity	(Duke	University	Press	2009)	pp.	8-9.	174	Terry	Smith,	What	Is	Contemporary	Art?	(The	University	of	Chicago	Press,	Chicago	2009)	p.	198.	175	ibid.,	p.211.	176	ibid.,	p.	198	177	This	 fact	 is,	 perhaps,	 reflected	 to	 some	 extent	 in	 the	 efforts	 of	 several	 prominent	mid-career	contemporary	 artists	 to	 historicize	 their	 achievements	 and	 “secure”	 their	 place	 in	 history.	 For	instance,	this	might	be	claimed	about	events	such	as	Damien	Hirst’s	Tate	Modern	retrospective	in	2012	 and	 his	 involvement	 in	 the	 London	 Olympic	 Games,	 or	 Tracy	 Emin's	 appointment	 as	 a	
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modes	 of	 artistic	 creation,	 like	 digital	 interactivity,	 as	 tools	 of	 “reconciliation”	 with	 the	multiple	natures	of	time.	As	he	notes,		they	mark	out	a	physical	or	virtual	space,	a	part	of	the	world,	as	a	site	pervaded	by	provisionality	and	possibility	–	a	place	in	which,	precisely	by	exempting	itself	from	all	external	rules	governing	location,	and	by	suspending	for	a	time	the	operation	of	the	world’s	increasingly	multiplicitous	temporalities,	while	yet	acknowledging	their	powers	in	these	very	deferrals,	the	work	of	making	meaning	may	be	undertaken.178		 French	art	writer	and	curator	Nicolas	Bourriaud	characterises	contemporary	artists	who	adopt	 such	practices	as	 “semionauts”.	 In	his	book	Postproduction	 (2002),	Bourriaud	argues	 that	 DJs,	 Web	 surfers	 and	 postproduction	 artists	 build	 their	 own	 original	 paths	through	 a	 universe	 of	 signs	 (“semia”),	 by	 imagining	 links	 and	 remixing	 the	 possible	relations	 between	 disparate	 sites.179	As	 a	 result,	 new	 media	 artworks	 reconfigure	knowledge	and	undermine	the	notion	of	originality	(being	at	the	origin	of),	because	of	the	constantly	 shifting	 prism	 embedded	 in	 this	 new	 cultural	 landscape.180	Bourriaud	 further	elaborates	on	those	ideas	and	connects	them	directly	to	contemporary	artistic	production	though	 his	 curatorial	 work	 for	 “Altermodern”,	 the	 4th	 Tate	 Triennial	 (2009).	 Notably,	 a	whole	section	of	the	exhibition	at	Tate	Britain,	in	London,	was	devoted	to	the	exploration	of	time	as	 a	 crucial	 component	of	what	 it	means	 to	be	an	artist	working	 in	 the	Digital	Age.	Bourriaud	names	this	condition	“heterochronia”:		 it	describes	artists’	work	which	cannot	be	easily	anchored	to	a	specific	time;	which	asks	us	to	question	what	is	contemporary.	Without	nostalgia,	artists	trace	lines	and	connections	 through	 time	 as	 well	 as	 space.	 It	 is	 not	 the	 modernist	 idea	 of	 time	advancing	 in	 a	 linear	 fashion,	 nor	 the	 postmodern	 time	 advancing	 in	 loops,	 but	 a	chaining	or	 clustering	 together	of	 signs	 from	contemporary	and	historical	periods	
																																																																																																																																																																																		Professor	at	the	Royal	Academy	in	2011.	It	would	seem	that	despite	their	phenomenal	commercial	and	publicity	successes,	such	artists	have	been	feeling	the	pressure	of	establishing	a	“narrative”	for	their	careers	at	a	much	earlier	age	than	what	one	would	have	expected	a	few	decades	ago	for	artists	of	a	similar	standing.	178	Smith,	What	is	Contemporary	Art?,	op.	cit.,	p.195.	179 	Nicolas	 Bourriaud,	Postproduction:	 Culture	 as	 Screenplay:	 How	 Art	 Reprograms	 the	
World	(Caroline	Schneider	ed,	Jeanine	Herman	tr,	Lukas	&	Sternberg	2002)	p.	18.	180	ibid.,	pp.13-19.	
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which	allows	an	exploration	of	what	is	now.181		Therefore,	 “Altermodern”	 can	 be	 perceived	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 hypertext,	 through	 the	interconnections	 of	which	 artists	 can	 translate	 and	 transcode	 information	 that	 originally	referred	 to	 times	 and	 places	 that	 were	 considered	 as	 “non-translatable”	 and	 “non-transcodable”.	 Interestingly,	 in	 the	 catalogue	 of	 the	 exhibition,	 Bourriaud	 relates	 the	newness	of	this	state	to	the	global	economic	crisis.	In	an	attempt	to	delineate	the	political	context	of	altermodernity’s	art,	Bourriaud	makes	a	direct	comparison	between	the	rise	of	the	term	“postmodern”	and	the	oil	crisis	of	1973,	and	the	appearance	of	“altermodern”	and	the	financial	crisis	of	2008.182		 This	political	potential	of	altermodernity’s	“post-medium”	condition	could,	also,	be	traced	in	the	role	that	artists	are	“organically”	called	to	perform.183	In	her	2011	book	Under	
Blue	 Cup,	 art	 critic	 and	 theorist	 Rosalind	 Krauss,	 describes	 this	 role	 by	 “baptising”	Bourriaud’s	 “semionauts”	 the	 “knights	 of	 the	 medium”.	 Through	 the	 employment	 of	memory	as	the	core	of	her	analysis,	Krauss	highlights	the	idea	of	time	and	presents	it	as	the	element	that	differentiates	the	current	cultural	condition	from	any	other	period.	Alluding	to	a	rather	polemical	approach	to	artistic	production	through	the	use	of	the	term	“knights”,	Krauss	determines	the	mission	of	contemporary	artists	as	that	of	inventing	a	new	medium.	However,	the	process	proposed	for	this	invention	might	appear	somewhat	oxymoronic:	on	the	one	hand,	artists	are	asked	to	remember	the	importance	of	the	medium	in	the	context	that	this	was	affirmed	by	Modernism;	and,	on	the	other	hand,	they	are	asked	to	forget	the	specifics	of	the	medium.	In	other	words,	and	in	a	similar	manner	to	Benjamin’s	destruction	of	 the	 “aura”,	 artists	 are	 called	 to	 overcome	 tradition:	 “Wanting	 to	 forget	 the	 traditional	medium”	should	be	their	goal,	Krauss	notes.184	For	her,	this	is	the	only	way	to	actively	re-infuse	artistic	media	with	life:	by	using	them	as	if	they	were	brand	new.	Yet,	in	reality,	the	role	of	memory	within	digital	media	can	acquire	a	more	explicit	social	character,	provided	that	 one	 also	 views	 such	 media	 as	 technical	 objects.	 In	 For	 a	 New	 Critique	 of	 Political																																																									181 	‘Tate	 Triennial	 2009:	 Altermodern	 -	 “Heterochronia”’	 (Tate.org.uk,	 3	 February	 2009)	<http://www.tate.org.uk/context-comment/video/tate-triennial-2009-altermodern-heterochronia>	accessed	23	March	2016.	182	Nicolas	 Bourriaud	 (ed),	Altermodern:	 Tate	 Triennial	 2009	(Tate	 Publishing,	 London	 2009)	 pp.	16-17.	183	For	more	on	the	“post-medium	condition”:	Rosalind	E	Krauss,	‘A	Voyage	on	the	North	Sea’:	Art	in	
the	Age	of	the	Post-Medium	Condition	(Thames	&	Hudson,	London	2000).	184	‘In	 Conversation:	 Rosalind	 Krauss	 with	 Yve-Alain	 Bois’	The	 Brooklyn	 Rail	(1	 February	 2012)	<http://www.brooklynrail.org/2012/02/art/rosalind-krauss-with-yve-alain-bois>	 accessed	 23	March	2016.	
			 69	
Economy	 (2010),	 French	 philosopher	 Bernard	 Stiegler	 attempts	 to	 “update”	 Marx’s	 A	
Contribution	 to	 the	 Critique	 of	 Political	 Economy	 in	 the	 Digital	 Age,	 asserting	 that	 “all	technical	 objects	 constitute	 an	 intergenerational	 support	 of	 memory	 which,	 as	 material	culture,	 overdetermines	 learning	 [apprentissages]	 and	 mnesic	 activities.	 […]	 A	 newborn	child	 arrives	 into	 a	 world	 in	 which	 tertiary	 retention	 both	 precedes	 and	 awaits	 it,	 and	which,	precisely	constitutes	this	world	as	world”.185	New	technologies	can	reconfigure	the	“psycho-political”	 context	 within	 which	 memory	 is	 theorized	 by	 Stiegler,	 not	 only	 by	“reinventing”	media,	 but,	 also,	 by	 revealing	 their	 relation	 to	 the	 dominant	 economic	 and	social	 order.	 Interestingly,	 Stiegler	 underlines	 in	 his	 book	Technics	and	Time	 (1998)	 that	“there	 is	 no	work	without	 technics,	 no	 economic	 theory	 that	 is	 not	 a	 theory	 of	work,	 of	surplus	profit,	of	means	of	production	and	investment”.186		
Grand	Narratives:	Joining	the	Pieces		In	view,	then,	of	this	more	open	political	perspective,	a	plausible	question	arises:	are	there	any	“windows”	 for	 the	return	of	utopianism	and	“grand	narratives”,	such	as	communism,	within	 the	 previously	 analysed	 theorisations	 of	 time?	 At	 first	 instance,	 and	 given	“contemporaneity’s”	 fluid	 nature,	 this	 goal	might	 appear	 rather	 difficult	 to	 attain.	 In	 the	exhibition	 catalogue	 of	 “Altermodern”,	 Bourriaud	 goes	 back	 to	 the	 conditions	 defining	postmodernity	and	the	end	of	“grand	narratives”	 in	order	to	allude	to	the	permanence	of	their	 disappearance.	 As	 he	 asserts,	 narratives	 like	 Marxism	 were	 succeeded	 by	globalisation,	which,	nevertheless,	“does	not	designate	a	cultural	period	properly	speaking,	but	 a	 geopolitical	 standardisation	 and	 the	 synchronisation	 of	 the	 historical	 clock”.187	Therefore,	 the	 end	 of	 actual	 “grand	 narratives”	 is	 largely	 still	 in	 place.	 And,	 at	 the	 same	time,	 even	 “alterglobalisation	 does	 not	 seek	 cumulative	 solutions	 to	 the	 steamrollering	effect	 of	 economic	 globalisation	 –	 rather	 a	 concatenation	 of	 singular	 responses	 within	models	 of	 sustainable	 development”.188	Adopting	 a	 different	 point	 of	 view,	 which,	nevertheless,	leads	to	the	same	conclusion,	Terry	Smith	underlines	that	“master	narratives”	
																																																								185	Bernard	Stiegler,	For	a	New	Critique	of	Political	Economy	(Daniel	Ross	tr,	Polity	Press	2010)	p.	9	186	Bernard	 Stiegler,	The	Technics	and	Time	1:	The	Fault	of	Epimetheus	(Richard	 Beardsworth	 and	George	Collins	trs,	Stanford	University	Press	1998)	p.	31.	187	Bourriaud,	Altermodern,	op.	cit.,	p.	20.	188	Bourriaud,	Altermodern,	op.	cit.,	p.	23.	
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might	still	nominally	persist,	yet,	they	have	become	highly	simplified.189	As	a	result	of	this	process	of	simplification,	 they	undermine	their	very	existence	and	their	 future	prospects,	thus	becoming	prone	to	fragmentation	and	to	the	creation	of	divisions	between	the	distinct	groups	 that	 may	 be	 formed	 within	 or	 around	 them.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 notice	 that	 such	groups	 and	 “anti-groups”	 could	 be	 easily	 created	 today	 through	 the	 use	 of	 new	 media	technologies	and	the	wide	variety	of	social	media	applications	and	websites	that	define	our	everyday	experiences	of	the	Internet.			 Nevertheless,	and	despite	their	undeniable	importance,	the	obstacles	that	we	have	described	 above	 may	 not	 be	 sufficient	 in	 order	 to	 dismiss	 the	 re-emergence	 of	 “grand	narratives”	 in	 new	 forms.	 If	 one	 takes	 into	 account	 the	 fact	 that,	 in	 many	 cases,	 the	previously	 analysed	 theorisations	 allude	 to,	 or	 even,	 fully	 reveal	 their	 inherent	contradictions,	then,	there	is	plenty	of	room	for	opposite	interpretations.	More	specifically,	in	 Postproduction,	 Bourriaud	 asserts	 that	 the	 new	 media	 artwork	 “functions	 as	 the	temporary	terminal	of	a	network	of	interconnected	elements,	like	a	narrative	that	extends	and	 reinterprets	 preceding	 narratives”.190	In	 other	 words,	 instead	 of	 a	 process	 of	destruction,	we	are	faced	with	a	process	of	reinterpretation	of	(grand)	narratives,	through	art.	 Furthermore,	 in	 the	Altermodern	Manifesto,	 Bourriaud	 describes	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	unifying	 “new	 universalism”,	 whose	 basis,	 through	 the	 ubiquitous	 use	 of	 media,	 is	translation,	subtitling	and	generalised	dubbing.	And,	 in	the	catalogue	of	the	exhibition,	he	goes	a	step	further,	by	naming	the	last	part	of	his	introduction	“A	Strategic	Universalism”.	What	Bourriaud	appears	 to	suggest	 in	 this	 is	 that	since	 technology	has	unified	 the	world	and	redefined	planetary	scale,	what	we	might	need	for	an	ambiguous	and	volatile	future	is	a	 new,	 more	 “strategic”	 approach	 to	 what	 is	 collectively	 possible	 in	 the	 context	 of	globalization.	Interestingly,	Terry	Smith	describes	this	very	context	by	referencing	Jacques	Derrida	 and	 his	 concept	 of	 “à	 venir”:	 a	 state	 of	 “perpetual	 advent”	 –	 something	 that	 is	always	to	come.191	Smith	argues	that	after	the	era	of	“grand	narratives”	and	their	appended	“certitudes”	what	will	come	is,	in	reality,	impossible	to	foresee	or	predict:	“aftermath	may	last	forever”,	he	asserts.192	Notably,	the	use	of	the	term	“aftermath”	here	does	not	allude	to	a	complete	extinction,	but,	rather,	to	a	process	of	constant	destruction	and	reconstruction:	master	narratives	might	have	disappeared	as	distinct	entities,	yet,	their	fragments	could	be																																																									189	Terry	Smith	refers	predominantly	to	the	George	W.	Bush	Presidency	and	the	context	of	its	“war	on	 terror”,	 which	 has	 been	 defined	 by	 the	 manipulation	 and	 oversimplification	 of	 concepts	 like	“freedom”,	“democracy”,	or	–	even	–	“jihad”	(Smith,	Antinomies	of	Art	and	Culture,	op.	cit.,	p.	10).	190	Bourriaud,	Postproduction:	Culture	as	Screenplay:	How	Art	Reprograms	the	World,	op.	cit.,	p.	19.	191	Smith,	Antinomies	of	Art	and	Culture,	op.	cit.,	p.	9.	192	Smith,	What	is	Contemporary	Art?,	op.	cit.,	p.	6.	
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found	surrounding	us	at	any	given	time.			 Accordingly,	 a	 “here-and-now”	 filled	 with	 revolutionary	 potential	 may	 come	 into	view,	 not	 only	 because	 of	 its	 possible	 radical	 content	 (which	 may	 re-emerge	 as	 a	“fragment”	past	revolutionary	narratives),	but,	predominantly,	because	of	its	very	form.	In	his	essay	On	the	Concept	of	History	(1940),	Walter	Benjamin	refers	to	this	“here-and-now”	as	“jetztzeit”	and	he	connects	it	to	“the	consciousness	of	exploding	the	continuum	of	history	[that]	 is	 peculiar	 to	 the	 revolutionary	 classes	 in	 the	 moment	 of	 their	 action”.193	Interestingly,	 in	 the	 same	 paragraph,	 Benjamin	 recounts	 an	 incident	 from	 the	 July	Revolution	 in	 Paris	 in	 1830,194	during	 the	 first	 evening	 of	 which	 “it	 turned	 out	 that	 the	clock-towers	were	shot	independently	and	simultaneously	in	several	places”.	Accordingly,	revolutionaries	 are	 called	 by	 Benjamin	 to	 take	 part	 in	 the	 class	 struggle,	 as	 delineated	within	Marxist	thought,	by	taking	control	of	time,	memory,	and,	thereby,	History.195	In	this	context,	one	should	not	fail	to	notice	the	particularly	significant	role	that	time	occupies	in	Marx’s	critique	of	political	economy	and	the	capitalist	system,	through	the	introduction	of	the	 “socially	 necessary	 labour	 time”.	 According	 to	 Marx’s	 theory,	 which	 radically	differentiates	 him	 from	 neoclassical	 economists,	 the	 value	 of	 a	 commodity	 equals	 the	quantity	of	socially	necessary	labour	time	required	for	its	production.196	This	time	can	be	defined	 as	 the	 time	 demanded	 “in	 a	 given	 state	 of	 society,	 under	 certain	 social	 average	conditions	 or	 production,	 with	 a	 given	 social	 average	 intensity,	 and	 average	 skill	 of	 the	labour	employed”.197	The	most	important	element	in	this	proposition	is	the	fact	that	Marx	focuses	not	on	the	notion	of	price,	but,	rather,	on	that	of	value.	In	other	words,	his	aim	is	to	elucidate	what	one	could	name	“the	real	price”,	which,	nevertheless,	is	manipulated	by	the	capitalists.	It	is	through	this	system	of	distortion	that	“value”	finally	becomes	“price”.	At	the	same	time,	Marx	theorizes	value	from	a	social,	rather	than	an	individual	perspective,	since	he	associates	it	with	the	average	intensity	and	the	average	skill	available	within	a	society.	What	 the	ruling	classes	attempt	to	do	 is	 to	conceal	 this	social	character	and	benefit	 from	surplus	labour,	which	produces	surplus	value	and,	thereby,	surplus	profit.	For	this	purpose,	they	 construct	 a	 dominant	 “narrative”	 that	 privileges	 a	 monosemous	 socioeconomic																																																									193	Dennis	 Redmond	 (tr),	 ‘On	 the	 Concept	 of	 History	 by	 Walter	 Benjamin’	 Paragraph	 XV	(Marxists.org)	 <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/benjamin/1940/history.htm>	accessed	31	March	2016.	194	Benjamin	 refers	 to	 the	 Revolution	 that	 took	 place	 on	 27-29	 July	 1830,	 which	 resulted	 in	 the	overthrow	of	King	Charles	X	and	the	creation	of	a	new	constitutional	monarchy	for	France.		195	‘On	the	Concept	of	History	by	Walter	Benjamin’,	op.	cit.,	Paragraphs	IV-VI.	196	This	is	explained	in	depth	in	the	first	chapter	of	Marx’s	Capital.	197 	Karl	 Marx,	 ‘Wages,	 Price	 and	 Profit’,	Selected	 Writings:	 Karl	 Marx	 and	 Friedrich	
Engels	(Collector’s	Library	2004)	pp.	99	–	100.	
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condition,	at	the	core	of	which	lies	individualism.		Returning	to	Walter	Benjamin’s	writings	about	art	and	its	social	agency,	the	object’s	mechanical	 reproduction	 may	 be	 drawn	 up	 against	 narrative	 (any	 “narrative”:	 political,	economic,	cultural,	etc.),	not	as	an	apparatus	that	does	not	allow	for	 it	 to	exist	at	all,	but,	rather,	as	a	means	to	expose	the	basis	on	which	it	has	been	built,	 its	structure	and,	in	the	end,	its	potential	forgery.198	Therefore,	we	could	synopsize	and,	at	the	same	time,	“expand”	Benjamin’s	 intellectual	 endeavour,	 by	 describing	 it	 as	 an	 attempt	 to	 illuminate	 the	 true	nature	of	the	artistic	object	and	the	conditions	of	its	production,	as	well	as	an	invitation	to	radically	modify	 those	 conditions	 in	 a	 constantly	 evolving	 process.	 Through	 the	 passage	from	mechanical	reproduction	to	digital	reproduction	and,	then,	online	reproduction,	this	invitation	becomes	even	more	open	and	inclusive	than	Benjamin	had	ever	envisioned.	For,	the	qualitative	and	formal	consistency	of	the	work	of	art	is	combined	for	the	first	time	with	a	 truly	 global	 quantitative	 character,	 which	 is	 realised	 through	 the	 agency	 of	 a	 global	network	–	the	Internet.	This	transformation	and	its	ideological	potentialities	can	be	traced	distinctly	 in	 the	 writings	 of	 contemporary	 artists	 and	 theorists	 who	 have	 been	 directly	inspired	by	Walter	Benjamin	and	his	meticulous	 investigation	of	 the	art	object’s	political	nature.	 Since	 the	 advent	 of	 digital	 and	 networked	 technologies	 such	 thinkers	 have	employed	 Benjamin’s	 work	 as	 a	 starting	 point	 in	 order	 to	 theorise	 art	 in	 the	 age	 of	 its	online	reproducibility.	The	examination	of	two	of	the	most	prominent	“re-interpretations”	of	Benjamin’s	essays	The	Work	of	Art	in	the	Age	of	Mechanical	Reproduction	(1936)	and	The	
Author	 as	 Producer	 (1934)	 will	 provide	 us	 with	 a	 clearer	 image	 as	 regards	 the	 new	technocultural	order	that	was	born	with	the	advent	of	the	Internet	and	the	growth	of	the	World	Wide	Web.	It	is	this	within	this	very	context	of	the	proliferation	of	networks	that	the	global	financial	crisis	of	2008	broke	out.			
Art	in	the	Age	of	Online	Reproduction		In	 his	 1995	 essay	 The	Work	of	Art	 in	 the	Age	of	Digital	Reproduction	 (An	evolving	 thesis,	
1991-1995),	 artist	 and	 art	 writer	 Douglas	 Davis	 attempts	 to	 update	 Walter	 Benjamin’s	legacy,	at	a	critical	moment	for	the	scope	of	both	new	media	and	contemporary	art.	Davis	asserts	 in	 his	 essay	 that	 through	 Digital	 Art	 we	 have	 managed	 to	 reach	 a	 point	 where	
																																																								198	German	literary	theorist	Eva	Geulen	notes	that	“The	perception	of	the	aura	rises	from	its	loss”.	See:	 Eva	 Geulen,	 ‘Zeit	 Zur	 Darstellung.	 Walter	 Benjamins	 Das	 Kunstwerk	 Im	 Zeitalter	 Seiner	Technischen	Reproduzierbarkeit’	(1992)	Modern	Language	Notes	vol.	107	p.	580.	
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“everyone	 finally	 talks	 to	 everyone”199	and	 this	 is	 a	moment	when	 the	 inner	 self	 can	 be	liberated.	More	specifically,	thanks	to	the	new	instruments	of	communication,	new	stimuli	may	be	born,	as	direct	modes	of	(artistic)	expression	and	interaction	become	possible.	 In	this	way,	Virtual	Reality	 can	become	a	 “Realer	Reality”,	 and	 it	 is	within	 this	new	kind	of	reality	 that	 the	 fictions	of	 the	 “master”	and	 the	 “copy”	have	no	meaning	anymore.200	It	 is	exactly	the	rise	of	this	directness	entails	the	inevitable	fall	of	the	“aura”.	Yet,	according	to	Davis,	the	fall	is	even	deeper	than	what	it	first	appears	to	be,	for	digital	media	are	capable	of	undermining	not	only	the	“aura”	of	the	original,	but	also	the	very	concept	of	originality.	As	 everything	 can	 be	 individualized,	 we	 can	 now	 produce	 a	 “post-original	 original”;201	namely,	an	original	that	is	so	subjective	and	personal,	that	any	attempt	to	claim	that	some	kind	 of	 authority	 attached	 to	 it	 becomes	 totally	 meaningless.	 Accordingly,	 the	 singular	artistic	object	of	the	past	becomes	the	distributed	artistic	object	of	the	present,	not	only	in	terms	of	its	geographical	reach,	but	also	in	terms	of	its	ontology:	“Here	is	where	the	aura	resides	–	not	in	the	thing	itself	but	in	the	originality	of	the	moment	when	we	see,	hear,	read,	repeat,	 revise”.202	In	 this	 sense,	 the	 demolition	 of	 the	 “aura”	 is	 above	 all	 a	 demolition	 of	hierarchy,	as	the	“object”	recedes	and	(personal)	“experience”	becomes	the	most	important	element	in	New	Media	Art.	This	development	is	a	way	to	fight	homogeneity,	produce	non-linear	 concepts,	 violate	 continuity	 or,	 even,	 (art)	 history	 itself	 –	 a	means	 to	question	 the	dominant	 perception	 of	 truth	 and	 “refute	 the	 conviction	 that	 the	 world	 mind	 is	 one	mind”.203	This	is	very	much	a	political	perspective,	which	suggests	that	we	might	live	in	an	interconnected	 world,	 but	 we	 can	 claim	 for	 autonomy	 as	 well.	 Therefore,	 the	 new	capacities	of	 aesthetic	 “openness”	offered	by	 the	Digital	Age	can	become	politicized:	 “Let	anarchy	thrive”	is	the	radical	invitation	made	by	Davis	in	his	essay.204		However,	 what	 Davis	 does	 not	 provide	 us	 with	 in	 The	Work	 of	 Art	 in	 the	Age	 of	
Digital	 Reproduction	 is	 a	 concrete	 ideological	 framework,	 whose	 realisation	 would	transform	individuation	into	a	tangible	political	gesture.	On	the	contrary,	in	several	parts	of	the	essay,	the	tone	used	by	the	author	is	rather	vague,	or	–	even	–	messianic,	yet	without	identifying	the	exact	role	of	the	alleged	technocultural	“Messiah”.	More	specifically,	there	is	a	 comparison	 between	 the	 global	 communication	 networks	 and	 the	 ancient	 Greek	 God																																																									199	Douglas	Davis,	 ‘The	Work	of	Art	 in	 the	Age	of	Digital	Reproduction	(an	Evolving	Thesis:	1991-1995)’	(1995)	Leonardo	vol.	28	no.	5,	Third	Annual	New	York	Digital	Salon	p.	381.	200	ibid.,	p.	381.	201	ibid.,	p.	383.	202	ibid.,	p.	386.	203	ibid.,	p.	384.	204	ibid.,	p.	385.	
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Prometheus,	who	gave	the	gift	of	fire	to	humankind,205	accompanied	by	several	references	to	God	and	to	the	prophetic	qualities	of	technology	innovators.	To	a	certain	extent,	Davis’	utopian	 language	 might	 seem	 credulous	 two	 decades	 after	 the	 publication	 of	 his	 essay.	Arguably,	many	of	his	predictions	and	hopes	about	the	capacities	of	networked	media	have	been	realized,	through	the	advent	of	technologies	such	as	tablets,	smartphones,	Wi-Fi	and	3G/4G	communication	networks.	Yet,	at	the	same	time,	none	of	those	have	led	to	a	thriving	of	 anarchy	 as	 an	 ideological	 apparatus	 that	 has	 produced	 an	 environment	 of	unquestionable	 progress	 for	 our	 societies.	 Nevertheless,	 it	 would	 be	 hard	 to	 deny	 that	through	 the	development	of	his	arguments,	Douglas	Davis	successfully	 identifies	some	of	the	paths	through	which	the	powerful	tools	offered	by	networked	technologies	may	revive	utopianism	and	make	its	expressions	part	of	our	everyday	lives.		Ten	years	 after	 the	publication	of	Davis’	 paper,	 academics	 and	 curators	Geoff	Cox	and	 Joasia	Krysa	 edited	 a	 selection	 of	 essays	under	 the	 title	Engineering	Culture:	On	‘The	
Author	as	(Digital)	Producer’	(2005).	In	their	work,	the	two	editors-authors	attempt	to	re-approach	 Benjamin’s	 legacy,	 whilst	 avoiding	 “the	 ‘naïve	 optimism’	 of	 much	 new	 media	practice”.206	The	 result	 of	 this	 endeavour	 is	 a	much	more	 “strategic”	 theorisation	 of	 new	media	art	than	the	one	proposed	by	Davis,	which	illustrates	the	rapidity	of	technocultural	change	within	a	period	of	just	a	decade.	Cox	and	Krysa	adopt	as	a	starting	point	Benjamin’s	interest	in	the	relation	between	form	and	content	in	literature	and,	correspondingly,	in	all	forms	 of	 artistic	 creation.	 The	 main	 element	 that	 defines	 the	 nature	 of	 this	 relation	 is,	according	to	Benjamin,	the	process	through	which	a	work	is	produced.	Cox,	Krysa	and	the	authors	 that	contribute	 to	 their	book	 focus	on	 identifying	different	ways	of	 revealing	 the	complex	 production	 processes	 employed	 by	 digital	 and	 networked	 media,	 and	 –	 most	importantly	 –	 on	 investigating	 the	 capacity	 to	 intervene	 in	 those	 processes.207	The	disruption	of	the	“conception	of	technology	as	value-neutral	tool	that,	by	extension	insists	technological	development	 is	an	ethically	 indifferent	activity”208	constitutes	the	necessary	first	 step	 in	 order	 to	 redefine	 the	 role	 of	 the	 digital	 author.	 Through	 their	 analyses,	 the	contributors	 of	 the	 book	 underline	 the	 pivotal	 importance	 of	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	cultural	producer	“from	a	supplier	of	the	production	apparatus,	into	an	engineer	who	sees																																																									205	ibid.,	p.	381.	206 	Geoff	 Cox	 and	 Joasia	 Krysa	 (eds),	Engineering	 Culture:	 On	 ‘the	 Author	 as	 (digital)	
Producer’	(Autonomedia,	New	York	2005)	p.	11.	207	ibid.,	p.	7.	208	The	Institute	of	Applied	Autonomy	(IAA),	 ‘Engaging	Ambivalence:	Interventions	in	Engineering	Culture’	 in	 Geoff	 Cox	 and	 Joasia	 Krysa	 (eds),	 Engineering	 culture:	 On	 ‘The	 Author	 as	 (Digital)	
Producer’	(Autonomedia,	New	York	2005)	p.	98.	
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his	task	in	adapting	that	apparatus”.209	The	latter	is	largely	determined	by	phenomena	such	as	the	proliferation	of	immaterial	labour	and	the	rise	of	new	forms	of	exploitation	in	online	media,	including	“free	labour”.	Those	processes	have	to	be	subverted	by	finding	new	forms	of	 resistance,	 whose	 strategies	 will	 put	 “emphasis	 on	 the	 production	 of	 knowledge	 and	culture,	 rather	 than	 wealth”. 210 	Open	 source	 cultural	 practices,	 “self-institutions”,	collaborative	 online	 authoring	 systems	 like	 Wikis,	 and	 free	 software	 development	 may	create	the	basis	for	anti-systemic	contexts	of	digital	production	and	the	emergence	of	new	property	relations.		The	 theoretical	 framework	 adopted	 in	 Engineering	 Culture:	 On	 ‘The	 Author	 as	
(Digital)	Producer’	 is	characterised	by	a	distinct	shift	from	the	potential	of	the	medium	to	transform	the	individual	(Douglas	Davis)	to	the	potential	of	the	individual	to	transform	the	medium;	or,	more	accurately,	to	the	duty	of	the	individual	to	transform	the	medium.	In	the	case	of	 the	cultural	producer	and	his	 strategy	 to	generate	change,	 this	 is	 combined	with	the	realisation	of	the	increasing	interconnection	between	digital	cultural	products	and	the	capitalist	 new	media	 economy.	 The	 espousal	 of	 this	 overtly	 political	 point	 of	 view	 also	contributes	 to	 the	 identification	 of	 the	 contradictions	 that	 may	 reside	 in	 today’s	 new	media	art	practices,	which	operate	within	a	pervasive	capitalist	mode	of	production.	Such	an	intellectual	exercise	reflects	the	experience	and	knowledge	acquired	in	the	decade	that	separates	 the	 two	 key	 texts	 that	we	have	 briefly	 examined	 in	 the	 context	 of	 Benjamin’s	legacy	–	both	in	terms	of	the	technological	progress	that	has	taken	place	during	this	period	of	rapid	innovation	(1995-2005),	as	well	as	in	terms	of	the	growth	of	Web-based	art	as	a	distinct	set	of	practices.211		
																																																								209	Walter	 Benjamin,	 ‘The	 Author	 as	 Producer’	 John	 Heckman	 tr.	 (July	 –	 August	 1970)	New	Left	
Review	I/62	pp.	83-96.		210	Cox	&	Krysa	op.	cit.,	p.	9.	211	An	 additional	 explanation	 for	 the	 different	 approaches	 between	 Douglas	 Davis	 and	 Cox	 and	Krysa	(apart	from	the	gap	in	time	and,	thus,	the	gap	in	technology)	could,	potentially,	be	found	in	the	 different	 geographical	 origins	 of	 the	 authors	 –	North	America	 and	Europe.	 Platonic	 and	neo-platonic	theorizations	of	art	remain	strong	in	the	American	tradition	of	art	theory	and	art	history.	Such	approaches	predominantly	focus	on	visuality,	since	the	sense	of	sight	is	regarded	as	a	“shared”	as	well	as	a	“transcendent”	quality,	through	its	“negation”	of	materiality.	In	contrast,	art	history	in	Europe	has	 been	much	more	 vividly	 concerned	with	materiality.	Notably,	 in	 his	 essay	 “Freaks	 of	Number”,	 Matthew	 Fuller	 argues	 that	 mainstream	 computing	 is	 locked	 into	 a	 form	 of	 neo-Platonism,	which	finds	“beauty	in	the	most	apparently	simple,	the	most	purely	expressed	of	formal	resolutions	 to	 a	problem”.	A	more	 “material-based”,	Marxist	perspective	on	digital	 art	may	bring	the	 art	 object	 in	 the	 forefront	 of	 our	 theoretical	 investigations	 and	 fight	 the	 image/object	dichotomy.	 The	 latter	 hinders	 considerably	 our	 capacity	 to	 recognise	 the	 economic	 and,	accordingly,	political	dimension	of	the	(digital)	art	object.	See:	Matthew	Fuller,	‘Freaks	of	Number’	in	 Geoff	 Cox	 and	 Joasia	 Krysa	 (eds),	Engineering	 culture:	 On	 ‘the	 author	 as	 (digital)	
producer’	(Autonomedia,	New	York	2005)	pp.	161	–	175.	
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In	 the	 decade	 that	 separates	 us	 from	 2005	 and	 the	 publication	 of	 Engineering	
Culture:	 On	 ‘The	 Author	 as	 (Digital)	 Producer’,	 the	 expansion	 of	 Web	 2.0	 increased	exponentially	 the	 capacities	 offered	 by	 networked	 technologies.	 The	 emphasis	 on	 user-generated	 content,	 the	 rapid	 growth	 of	 social	 media	 platforms	 and	 the	 proliferation	 of	wireless	telecommunications	have	accentuated	to	an	unprecedented	extent	the	power	of	the	author	as	producer.	However,	at	the	same	time,	those	developments	have	produced	a	much	 more	 fractured	 and	 complex	 environment	 for	 human	 communication	 and	interaction.	It	is	within	this	environment	that	the	global	financial	crisis	of	2008	occurred.	In	many	ways,	the	crisis	came	to	remind	us	what	political	theorist	Hannah	Arendt	called	“the	 right	 to	 have	 rights”;212	or,	 in	 other	 words,	 it	 has	 helped	 us	 to	 recognise	 the	continuous	relevance	of	the	process	of	recognition.	As	we	have	suggested	in	this	chapter,	the	annulation	of	Hegel’s	 “struggle	 for	recognition”	has	been	one	of	 the	key	anti-utopian	arguments	of	 the	pre-crisis	period,	 for	 it	has	been	associated	with	 the	declaration	of	 the	“End	of	History”	and	the	assertion	that	no	fight	to	gain	“recognition”	is	required	anymore	in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 neoliberal	 capitalist	 state.	 The	 events	 of	 2008	 and	 their	 severe	consequences	 have	 emphatically	 refuted	 this	 claim.	 As	 we	 have	 indicated	 through	 the	parallel	examination	of	Benjamin	and	Kant,	the	idea	of	justice,	which	is	the	ultimate	goal	of	recognition,	 is	 inextricably	 connected	 with	 the	 idea	 of	 possession.	 Accordingly,	 the	accentuation	 of	 the	 divisions	 of	 possession	 (wealth)	 following	 the	 global	 financial	 crisis	has	 brought	 to	 light	 both	 the	 necessity	 of	 the	 struggle	 and	 the	 essential	 role	 of	 utopian	political	thought	as	its	enabler.	In	the	case	of	art,	this	need	is	organically	connected	with	Benjamin’s	mechanically	reproduced	art	object,	whose	possession	moves	from	an	auratic	to	 a	 democratic	 status.	 Benjamin’s	 notion	 of	 a	 “distributed”	 cultural	 object,	 which	 was	formulated	 under	 the	 influence	 of	 Marx’s	 ideas,	 ultimately	 found	 an	 ideal	 agent	 in	 the	Internet,	both	 in	 terms	of	 reproduction	and	geographical	 reach.	As	a	 result,	 even	before	the	outbreak	of	 the	crisis,	new	media	 theorists	and	practitioners	had	 the	opportunity	 to	identify	the	inherent	political	potentialities	of	art’s	online	creation	and	distribution.			The	projects	 that	will	 be	examined	 in	 the	next	 two	chapters	will	 indicate	 that	 the	crisis	 functioned	 as	 a	 two-fold	 catalyst	 for	 politically	 engaged	 art.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 it	revived	the	overt	utopian	spirit	exemplified	by	Davis,	in	an	attempt	to	employ	new	media	to	 promote	 socialist	 ideals	 as	 alternatives	 to	 the	 dominance	 of	 capitalism.	 And,	 on	 the	other	 hand,	 artists	 and	 cultural	 workers	 have	 often	 adopted	 the	 strategic	 view	 on	 the	Internet	exemplified	by	Cox	and	Krysa,	in	order	to	give	a	more	concrete	shape	to	novel,	or																																																									212	See:	Hannah	Arendt,	The	Origins	of	Totalitarianism	(New	York,	Harcourt	Books,	1994).	
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–	even	–	radical	modes	of	social	being.	The	work	of	such	artists,	collectives	and	institutions	testify	to	the	fact	that	utopianism	has	managed	to	survive	the	rise	of	Data	Capitalism	and,	then,	thrive	as	a	framework	of	political	thought	in	the	context	of	the	most	severe	economic	crisis	of	the	last	eight	decades.	However,	the	same	claim	could	be	made	about	the	severity	of	the	obstacles	that	capitalism,	in	its	new	data-fuelled	incarnation,	has	generated	in	order	to	 delimit	 the	 scope	 of	 new	 utopian	 thinking.	 In	 order	 to	 fully	 illuminate	 the	 political	dimension	of	post-2008	Web-based	art,	we	have	to	examine	both	tendencies;	namely,	both	the	potentialities	opened	by	 the	artistic	projects	 that	have	been	 fighting	Data	Capitalism	
and	 the	challenges	that	have	undermined,	or	may	undermine	 in	the	 future	their	political	ambitions.	 The	 next	 two	 chapters	 of	 this	 thesis	 will	 be	 the	 first	 part	 of	 this	 dual	investigation.	They	will	 focus	on	the	powerful	technocultural	tools	adopted,	or	coined	by	artists	in	the	aftermath	of	the	global	financial	crisis,	as	well	as	on	the	distinct	conceptual	approaches	 that	 the	 use	 of	 those	 tools	 has	 been	 based	 on.	 As	 it	 will	 be	 indicated,	 for	several	artists,	the	crisis	of	2008	can	be	perceived	as	the	critical	moment	when	Benjamin’s	“pure	 Gewalt”	 is	 –	 finally	 –	 mediated,	 with	 a	 view	 to	 enriching	 the	 spirit	 of	 the	socioeconomic	change	that	was	gradually	emerging	across	the	globe.						 	
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Chapter	3	
	
Diagnosing	the	Crisis:	Deconstruction	and	Protest			
Formulating	the	“Telekommunist”	Agenda		At	 the	 height	 of	 the	 global	 economic	 crisis,	 in	 2010,	 software	 designer	 Dmytri	 Kleiner	published	his	influential	Telekommunist	Manifesto	–	a	revised	collection	of	texts	that	he	and	his	collaborators	at	the	Telekommunisten	network	had	been	working	on	since	2006.213	The	Telekommunisten	 network	 constitutes	 a	 collective	 of	 software	 designers,	 cultural	producers	 and	 activists	who	 collaborate	 in	 order	 to	 investigate	 the	 political	 economy	 of	communication	technologies,	with	a	particular	focus	on	the	potential	of	free	networks	and	free	culture.	In	the	manifesto,	Kleiner	theorises	class	conflict	in	the	context	of	information	economy,	arguing	for	the	voluntary	establishment	of	collaborative	and	shared	structures	of	cultural	 production	 and	 economic	 distribution.	 Three	main	 questions	 are	 at	 the	 core	 of	Kleiner’s	endeavour:	Firstly,	what	kind	of	economic	architecture	does	the	infrastructure	of	the	 Internet	 produce?	 Secondly,	 how	 is	 value	 created	within	 networks	 and,	 accordingly,	what	 are	 the	 characteristics	 of	 cognitive	 labour?	And,	 finally,	where	does	 ownership	 lie?	One	 of	 the	 most	 interesting	 and	 revealing	 parts	 of	 the	 multi-part	 manifesto	 is	 “The	Manifesto	 of	 the	 Telekommunisten	 Network”,	 in	 which	 the	 author	 “hacks”-modifies	 the	second	section	of	The	Communist	Manifesto	 in	an	attempt	 to	reinterpret	and	“update”	 the	principles	set	out	by	Marx	and	Engels.	Kleiner	begins	by	proclaiming	that	“the	first	step	in	the	revolution	by	 the	working	class	 is	 to	develop	a	network	of	enterprises	where	people	produce	for	social	value	and	share	as	equals,	and	to	build	and	expand	the	economic	size	of	these	enterprises	to	raise	the	organized	proletariat	to	the	position	of	being	the	dominant	economic	class”.214	Kleiner	goes	on	to	apply	a	number	of	key	substitutions	with	Marx	and	Engels’	 text:	 instead	of	 the	abolition	of	private	property,	he	suggests	 its	mutualisation;	 in	the	 place	 of	 a	 centralised	 state,	 he	 envisions	 a	 common	 stock	 of	 production	 assets	 that	function	on	the	basis	of	decentralisation;	he	identifies	the	producer-consumer	relationship	as	the	new	antagonism	that	has	replaced	the	distinction	between	town	and	country;	and	he																																																									213	Dmytri	Kleiner,	The	Telekommunist	Manifesto	(Institute	of	Network	Cultures,	Amsterdam	2010).		214	ibid.	p.	26.	
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proposes	a	distributed	and	global	production	model	instead	of	a	concentrated	and	national	one.	 Accordingly,	 Kleiner	 calls	 for	 a	 system	 of	 self-organisation	 through	 which	 the	members	 of	 the	 “landless”	 proletariat	 of	 Web	 2.0215	will	 expand	 their	 economic	 and	political	power,	instead	of	trying	to	directly	gain	political	supremacy	through	revolution.216		 In	 order	 to	 contribute	 towards	 this	 objective,	 Kleiner	 proposes	 two	 instruments:	“venture	communism”	and	“copyfarleft”.	Both	concepts	constitute	disruptive	“reversals”	of	two	 significant	 adversaries	 of	 leftist	 networked	 culture:	 venture	 capitalism217 	and	copyright.	According	to	Kleiner,	venture	communism	is	an	economic	paradigm	whose	main	characteristic	 is	 the	 establishment	 of	 venture	 communes.	 Those	 communes	 can	 be	understood	as	self-organised,	shared-ownership	“firms”,	through	which	peer-to-peer	(P2P)	network	technologies	can	be	funded,	developed	and	distributed.	All	independent	producers	belonging	to	the	commune	share	a	common	stock	of	productive	assets,	to	which	they	have	equal	 access.	 Production	 is	 not	 centrally	 coordinated	 in	 the	 venture	 commune;	 only	 the	stock	 is	 managed	 by	 it,	 making	 sure	 that	 goods	 are	 made	 available	 to	 the	 independent	producers	who	might	need	them	(e.g.	housing,	or	tools).218	Finally,	“ownership	in	a	venture	commune	 can	 only	 be	 acquired	 by	 contributions	 of	 labour,	 not	 property”.219	In	 terms	 of	intellectual	production,	the	main	tool	that	is	required	to	allow	such	a	peer-to-peer	system	to	 exist	 is,	 according	 to	 Kleiner,	 the	 copyfarleft.	 The	 copyfarleft	 constitutes	 a	 radical	reinterpretation	of	 the	 already	existing	 framework	of	 copyleft	 (i.e.	 a	 leftist	 substitute	 for	the	 capitalist	 framework	 imposed	 by	 copyright),	 which	 includes	 intellectual	 property	licenses	 such	 as	 the	 General	 Public	 License	 (GPL).220	The	 Telekommunist	 Manifesto	identifies	 two	 prospective	 categories	 of	 users	 of	 cultural	 products:	 the	 users	 who	 are	members	of	worker-owned	businesses	or	worker-owned	collectives,	in	which	case	they	are	granted	a	“worldwide,	royalty-free,	non-exclusive,	perpetual”	license;221	and	users	who	are	operate	 as	 private	 businesses	 that	 aim	 “to	 generate	 profit	 from	 the	 labour	 of	 employees	
																																																								215	ibid.,	p.	19.	216	ibid.,	pp.	26-27.	217	‘Venture	capitalism’	denotes	a	system	of	economic	expansion	based	on	the	funding	with	private	equity	 capital	 of	 early-stage,	 high-potential,	 growth	 companies	 (start-up	 companies).	 Quite	 often	those	companies	belong	to	the	technology	sector.		218	Kleiner,	op.	cit.,	p.	23.	219	Kleiner,	op.	cit.,	p.	24.	220	Kleiner,	 op.	 cit.,	 p.	 36.	 The	 GPL	 is	 the	most	widely	 used	 free	 software	 license.	 It	 grants	 users	(individuals,	 private	 and	public	 organizations,	 companies)	 the	 freedom	 to	use,	 study,	 share,	 copy	and	modify	the	software.	The	GPL	was	released	by	Richard	Stallman	in	1989	and	since	then	there	have	 been	 revisions	 in	 order	 to	 keep	 up	with	 both	 technological	 innovations	 and	 new	 legal	 and	regulatory	frameworks.	221	Kleiner,	op.	cit.,	p.	45.	
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paid	 by	 salary	 or	 other	 wages”,222	in	 which	 case	 no	 use	 is	 permitted.	 Those	 terms	 are	explained	and	theorized	in	more	depth	in	the	six-page	“Peer	Production	License”,223	which	is	 also	 the	 license	 under	 which	 The	 Telekommunist	 Manifesto	 has	 been	 published.	 For	Kleiner,	 copyfarleft	 is	 the	most	 effective	 legal	 framework	 in	 order	 to	 prevent	 “property	owners	 from	 turning	 our	 productivity	 into	 their	 accumulated	 wealth”224	and	 stop	 the	exploitation	 and	 limitations	 imposed	 on	 the	 author’s	 freedom	 through	 the	 intellectual	property	regime	that	is	currently	in	place.		 The	 artistic	 projects	 and	 interventions	 of	 the	 Telekommunisten	 collective	 pose	similar	 questions	 through	 interactive	 artworks	 that	 often	 adopt	 an	 experimental,	speculative,	or	–	even	–	satirical	character.	According	to	the	collective,	their	works	could	be	seen	 as	 the	 products	 of	 a	 “performative	 science	 fiction”:	 they	 often	 fail	 to	 function	 as	expected,	 or	 they	 function	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 unexpected	ways.	 By	 playing	with	 elements	 of	surprise,	bewilderment,	humour	and	parody,	they	aim	to	 introduce	the	political	economy	of	the	Internet	into	the	debates	of	media	artists,	theorists	and	the	public.	Those	objectives	become	evident	in	the	group’s	Deadswap	(2009),	which	has	been	a	social	experiment	that	explored	the	potential	for	off-line	 file-sharing	and	communication	systems,	with	a	view	to	accentuating	the	importance	of	establishing	online	decentralised	network	structures	free	of	corporate	 or	 state	 control.225	Originally,	 the	 platform	worked	 by	 having	 people	 covertly	passing	 a	 USB	memory	 stick	 from	 one	 to	 another,	 with	 the	 coordination	 of	 the	 process	being	executed	through	an	anonymous	SMS	gateway.	As	a	result,	there	was	no	need	for	an	Internet	 connection.	 In	early	2016,	 the	 collective	presented	Deadswap	2.0,	which	uses	an	Android	app	that	allows	participants	to	coordinate	the	circulation	of	the	USB	memory	stick	more	 easily.	 The	 work	 constitutes	 an	 oblique,	 humorous	 and	 tangible	 interpretation	 of	what	Kleiner	 calls	 the	antagonism	between	peer-to-peer	 communism	 (which	promotes	a	distributed	model	of	production)	and	the	client-server	capitalist	State	(whose	main	aim	is	the	commercialisation	of	all	networked	communication).226	Most	importantly,	perhaps,	it	is	worth	noting	that	Deadswap	has	“distributed”	the	responsibility	of	maintaining	the	privacy	of	 the	 system	 to	 all	 each	members,	 instead	 of	 using	 a	 centralised	 formal	 entity	 for	 this	purpose.	 As	 a	 part	 of	 Telekommunisten’s	 “Miscommunication	 Technologies”	 series,	
Deadswap	can	be	perceived	as	an	attempt	to	make	visible	the	social	relations	embedded	in																																																									222	Kleiner,	op.	cit.,	pp.	46-47.	223	Kleiner,	op.	cit.,	pp.	44-49.	224	Kleiner,	op.	cit.,	p.	20.	225	The	intervention	has	taken	place	in	Berlin	and	Aarhus.	226	Kleiner,	op.	cit.,	p.	7.	
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communication	 technologies	 by	 transferring	 them	 into	 physical	 reality	 and	 “reversing”	them.		
	Figure	11:	The	Deadswap	stand	at	the	Transmediale	festival	in	Berlin	(2012)		 The	 issue	of	decentralisation	also	 lies	at	 the	heart	of	Octo	 (2013)	–	a	rather	 literal	transcription	 of	 decentralised	 communication.227	The	 work	 has	 been	 described	 by	 the	collective	in	a	rather	ironic	and	humorous	tone,	as	“the	most	radically	disruptive	project	in	the	 history	 of	 telecommunications,	 bringing	 the	 transformative	 power	 of	 digital	communications	 to	 the	 physical	 sphere”.228	Its	 stated	 aim	 has	 been	 to	 connect	 all	households	and	business	places	around	the	world	with	pneumatic	tubes	that	provide	high-speed	 delivery	 of	 packages	 to	 and	 from	 any	 member	 of	 the	 network.	 Notably,	 the	Octo	prototype	 system	was	 installed	 for	 the	 first	 time	 throughout	 the	 Haus	 der	 Kulturen	 der	Welt	in	Berlin,	one	of	the	very	few	cities	around	the	world	that	used	to	offer	for	a	very	long	time	a	public	service	of	Pneumatic	Tube	Transport	(“Rohrpost”).229	The	service	dispatched																																																									227	The	work	was	produced	in	joint	collaboration	with	reSource	and	transmediale	2013.	228 	‘OCTO:	 A	 Global	 Pipe	 Dream	 Come	 True’	 (Transmediale.de,	 2013)	<http://www.transmediale.de/content/octo-a-global-pipe-dream-come-true>	 accessed	 25	 March	2016	229	The	service	was	available	from	1865	to	1963	in	West	Berlin	and	until	1976	in	East	Berlin.	
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small	 cylindrical	 containers	 propelled	 by	 compressed	 air	 through	 a	 network	 of	 tubes,	delivering	 messages	 around	 the	 city.	 In	 support	 of	 their	 vision,	 the	 members	 of	 the	Telekommunisten	group	also	created	a	dedicated	crowdfunding	website,	230	through	which	they	 publicised	 the	 project	 and	 invited	 people	 to	 contribute	 to	 its	 realisation,	 whilst	proclaiming	that	“the	next	generation	[of	communication]	is	physical!”231	To	a	large	extent,	
Octo	constitutes	a	parody	of	corporate	social	networks	and	a	critique	for	the	deification	of	Data	Capitalism’s	 immateriality.232	In	 addition,	 however,	 and	by	being	 installed	 in	Berlin,	where	 there	 used	 to	 be	 an	 actual	 Pneumatic	 Tube	 Transport	 system,	 Octo	 opens	 up	questions	 around	 alternative	 forms	 of	 communication	 and	 social	 organization,	 and	 their	unreserved	dismissal	through	their	characterization	as	“utopian”.	In	the	case	of	Octo,	site-specificity	 and	 historical	 precedence	 interweave	 in	 order	 to	 humorously	 expose	 the	audience	to	such	potentialities.		Remaining	 faithful	 to	 the	 spirit	 of	 The	Telekommunist	Manifesto,	 the	 focus	 of	 the	collective’s	projects	 and	 interventions	 is,	 thus,	 placed	on	 the	 importance	of	 forming	new	and	truly	open	models	of	communication.	The	often	unconventional	and	humorous	visual	language	that	the	Telekommunisten	members	have	adopted	in	order	to	express	this	need	is	particularly	 revealing,	 for	 it	 hinds	 at	 a	 historical	 moment	 of	 hybridization	 between	 art,	alternative	forms	of	social	engagement	and	activism.	As	the	members	of	the	collective	note,	the	 answer	 to	 the	 question	 of	 what	 makes	 their	 projects	 art	 is	 rather	 simple:	 “It’s	 art	because	 it	 is	 carried	 out	 in	 an	 art	 context,	 at	 events	 like	 Transmediale,	 Hack.Fem.East,	Sousevelance,	and	at	places	such	the	Piet	Zwart	Institute	and	the	Israeli	Center	for	Digital	Art.”233		The	highly	speculative	character	of	both	The	Telekommunist	Manifesto	and	the	
																																																								230	‘Seidenstrasse	 Powered	 by	OCTO-P7C-ES’	 (Octopost.me)	 <http://www.octopost.me/>	 accessed	25	March	2016.	231	The	 physicality	 of	 the	 project	 was	 further	 accentuated	 by	 two	 adjunct	 events.	 “PNEUMAtic	circus”	was	a	project	 in	which	100	international	mail	artists	contributed	pneumatic	post	capsules	containing	instructions	and	scores	to	be	used	by	transmediale	festival	visitors	for	small	actions	and	performances	 at	 the	 Haus	 der	 Kulturen	 der	Welt.	 “The	 GIZ	 Alumni	 Network	 Collaboration”	 was	developed	with	GIZ,	The	German	Agency	 for	 International	Cooperation,	and	consisted	of	capsules	containing	quotes	from	online	discussions	investigating	the	context	of	social	and	political	network-based	collaboration,	as	well	as	blank	sheets	of	paper	on	which	the	visitors	of	the	festival	could	offer	their	 own	opinions.	 For	more	 information,	 please,	 visit:	 ‘OCTO:	A	Global	Pipe	Dream	Come	True’	(Transmediale.de,	2013)	loc.	cit.	232	The	 full	 title	 of	 the	 project,	 as	 mentioned	 in	 the	 crowdfunding	 website,	 is	 revealing	 in	 this	context:	‘OCTO	P7C-1	Intertubular	Octosocial	Pneumatical	Networking’	233	'Thimbl'	 (Telekommunisten,	 2011)	 <http://telekommunisten.net/thimbl/>	 accessed	 13	 April	2016.	
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	Figure	12:	Octo	installed	at	Haus	der	Kulturen	der	Welt,	in	Berlin	(2013)		projects	 that	 have	 been	 inspired	 by	 it	 is	 indicative	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 formulation	 of	alternative	 modes	 of	 socioeconomic	 being	 may	 be	 “protected”	 and,	 accordingly,	“legitimised”	in	the	context	of	cultural	production.	In	the	case	of	the	post-2008	world,	what	has	been	effectively	protected	is	the	“window”	to	utopianism	that	opened	as	a	result	of	the	consequences	of	the	most	severe	economic	crisis	for	over	eight	decades.	By	combining	the	principles	of	networked	communication	with	the	physicality	of	their	projects,	the	members	of	the	Telekommunisten	group	have	aimed	to	confront	the	audience	with	a	new	context	of	thinking	about	the	realities	of	capitalism	and,	accordingly,	the	need	for	change.	This	spirit	imbues	–	to	different	extents	–	all	the	projects	featured	in	the	following	two	chapters,	which	constitute	the	“core”	of	this	thesis.	However,	the	artworks	and	artist-led	initiatives	that	we	will	explore	in	them	develop	a	much	more	direct	relationship	with	networked	 communication	 than	 that	 of	 the	 Telekommunisten	works,	 for	 they	make	 the	World	 Wide	 Web	 an	 essential	 element	 of	 both	 their	 conceptual	 basis	 and	 function.	Accordingly,	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 third	 and	 fourth	 chapters	 of	 this	 thesis	 will	 be	 to	systematically	 examine	 those	 responses	 of	 individual	 artists,	 collectives	 and	 cultural	institutions,	in	order	to	propose	an	inclusive	“navigation	map”	for	the	political,	Web-based	art	 that	 has	been	produced	between	2008	and	2015.	 For	 the	 construction	of	 this	 “map”,	
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both	chapters	will	adopt	the	point	of	view	of	the	artists,	as	this	has	been	expressed	in	the	descriptions	of	their	works,	their	practice	statements,	manifestos,	articles,	academic	papers	and	 interviews.	 Through	 the	 combination	 of	 such	 sources,	 the	 thesis	 will	 highlight	 the	artists’	 utopian	 language	 and	 theorisation,	 with	 a	 view	 to	 identifying,	 connecting	 and,	finally,	 categorising	 their	 common	 goals,	 aspirations	 and	 dreams.	 The	 latter	 may	 be	expressed	 through	 the	 adoption	 of	 practices	 that	 denounce	 capitalism,	 practices	 that	dismantle	 its	 economic	 and	 ideological	 functions,	 and	 –	 finally	 –	 practices	 that	 propose	alternatives.	As	it	will	be	indicated,	those	modes	of	anti-capitalist	resistance	often	co-exist	within	the	same	artworks,	which	explicitly	or	implicitly	reference	the	legacies	of	Marxism.		The	element	that	will	distinguish	the	two	chapters	is	the	extent	to	which	artists	have	been	willing	to	not	only	deconstruct	and	condemn	Data	Capitalism	in	the	aftermath	of	the	crisis,	 but	 also	 to	move	 towards	 its	 replacement	 through	 the	 creation	 of	 new	 economic,	social	and	political	institutions.	More	specifically,	 in	the	current	chapter,	my	investigation	will	 produce	 a	 mapping	 of	 artworks	 and	 projects	 that	 have	 a	 considerably	 “diagnostic”	approach.	 This	will	 be	 expressed	 through	works	 that	 take	 apart	 the	modus	 operandi	 of	Data	 Capitalism	 and	 protest	 against	 its	multiple	 social	 ramifications.	 The	 overall	 goal	 of	those	practices	has	been	to	activate	the	political	consciousness	of	citizens	and	help	them	to	develop	 a	 much	 deeper	 understanding	 of	 their	 class	 position.	 The	 aforementioned	artworks	and	cultural	initiatives	will	be	followed,	in	the	fourth	chapter,	by	a	larger	body	of	projects,	 whose	 focus	 becomes	 the	 gradual	 formulation	 of	 much	 more	 practical	 than	theoretical	propositions.	Such	proposals	aspire	 to	establish	new	modes	of	 socioeconomic	being	as	viable	alternatives	 to	 the	 capitalist	 economic	model	and	 the	 social,	political	 and	cultural	conditions	that	it	produces.	In	 terms	of	 the	methodology	adopted	 in	 the	mapping,	 the	works	and	 initiatives	of	politically	 engaged	Web-based	 artists	 are	 organised	 in	 two	 distinct	 ways:	 Either	 on	 the	basis	 of	 the	 tools	 and	 processes	 that	 they	 have	 been	 employing,	 which	 may	 include	hacktivism,	 the	 adoption	 or	 inception	 of	 digital	 currencies,	 the	 establishment	 of	hackerspaces,	and	the	re-appropriation	and	activation	of	public	spaces	as	manifestations	of	the	 commons.	 Or,	 in	 other	 cases,	 the	 categorisation	 will	 take	 place	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	projects’	common	conceptual	 focus	and	their	 “issue-based”	approach,	which	may	refer	 to	ideas	and	phenomena	such	as	immaterial	labour,	the	formation	of	an	online	proletariat,	the	devalorisation	and	underfunding	of	the	arts	in	the	period	that	has	followed	the	crisis,	and	the	development	of	strategies	for	reimagining	and	reconstructing	the	state.	In	the	cases	in	which	the	tool	or	methodology	used	can	be	deemed	to	possess	an	 inherent	anti-systemic	
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character,	then,	the	categorisation	of	the	works	on	that	basis	is	going	to	be	prioritised.	And,	in	the	cases	in	which	the	common	message	that	is	promoted	by	the	works	appears	to	be	the	artists’	priority	regardless	of	the	tools	that	they	might	be	using	for	its	communication,	then,	the	 works’	 shared	 subject	 matter	 will	 become	 the	 criterion	 of	 the	 grouping.	 As	 it	 will	become	evident,	in	some	instances,	there	are	overlaps	between	those	criteria,	which	are	by	no	means	mutually	 exclusive.	 For	 instance,	 projects	 that	 use	 a	 strong	 anti-systemic	 tool	such	as	digital	currencies	may	criticise	the	problem	of	 financial	speculation	and	currency	manipulation	 in	 the	 context	 of	 Data	 Capitalism;	 yet,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 they	 might	 also	address	 the	 lack	 of	 public	 funding	 for	 the	 arts	 and	 culture	 in	 the	 economic	 and	 political	climate	 of	 the	 post-crisis	 era.	 Finally,	 it	 should	 be	 underlined	 that	 as	 austerity	 and	economic	 uncertainty	 continue	 in	 many	 parts	 of	 the	 world,	 and	 as	 technology	 evolves	further,	additional	types	of	works	and,	thus,	groupings	may	emerge	in	the	near	future.	In	 the	 current	 chapter,	 this	 methodological	 trajectory	 will	 materialise	 in	 two	sections.	The	 first	and	 lengthier	section	will	examine	the	multiple	ways	 in	which	cultural	producers	have	built	on	the	potentialities	for	consciousness	raising	that	were	catalysed	by	the	 crisis	 through	 the	 identification	 of	 the	 invisible	 architecture	 of	 Data	 Capitalism,	 its	privileged	mode	of	labour,	the	class	divisions	that	it	accentuates	and	the	impact	of	the	crisis	on	cultural	production.	Then,	 in	 the	second	section,	 I	will	 investigate	 the	 influence	of	 the	modes	 of	 protest	 and	 civic	mobilisation	 that	 have	 occurred	 since	 2008	 on	 the	 strategies	that	 several	 artists	 have	 developed	 in	 relation	 to	 public	 space.	 As	 I	 will	 indicate,	 the	practices	 of	 such	 artists	 have	 been	 characterised	 by	 a	 strong	 focus	 on	 the	 notion	 of	 the	“commons”	 and,	 more	 specifically,	 on	 their	 appropriation	 by	 Data	 Capitalism	 and	 the	necessity	to	reclaim	them.			
The	Systems	of	the	System:	Making	Sense	of	Data	Capitalism		In	the	preface	of	A	Contribution	to	the	Critique	of	Political	Economy	 (1859),	Marx	famously	proclaimed	 that	 “it	 is	 not	 consciousness	 of	men	 that	 determines	 their	 being,	 but,	 on	 the	contrary,	their	social	being	that	determines	their	consciousness”.234	In	the	case	of	Marxist	theorisations	of	political	economy,	the	idea	of	“social	being”	is	inextricably	connected	with																																																									234	Karl	Marx,	 ‘A	 Contribution	 to	 the	 Critique	 of	 Political	 Economy’,	Marx	and	Engels	on	Literature	
and	Art	(Progress	Publishers,	Moscow	1976)	pp.	41	–	42.	Marx	has	often	been	accused	of	being	an	anti-humanist	 philosopher,	 because	 his	 assertion	 that	 relations	 of	 production	 determine	consciousness	implies	that	humans	can	be	easily	manipulated.	However,	there	are	several	thinkers	who	reject	this	delimiting	interpretation	of	Marx’s	intentions.	See:	Norman	Geras,	Marx	and	Human	
Nature:	Refutation	of	a	Legend	(Verso	Books,	New	York	1983).	
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the	established	system	of	social	organisation,	which	–	 in	turn	–	stems	from	the	dominant	system	of	production.	 Ideology	constitutes	an	 intrinsic	part	of	both	systems,	given	that	 it	may	conceal	their	direct	connection	and	create	a	“false	consciousness”.235	Marx	traces	this	function	 back	 to	 one	 the	 most	 basic	 forces	 of	 capitalism,	 in	 the	 form	 of	 commodity	fetishism.	As	he	famously	explains	in	Capital	(1867),	“a	commodity	appears	at	first	sight	an	extremely	 obvious,	 trivial	 thing”.236	However,	 this	 only	 happens	 for	 as	 long	 as	 a	 product	remains	tied	exclusively	to	its	use-value.	Once	a	specific	price/amount	of	money	is	assigned	to	a	product	(exchange-value),	people	start	perceiving	it	as	if	value	naturally	inheres	in	the	object	and,	accordingly,	in	all	objects	–	people	are	only	able	to	see	“the	relations	which	the	act	 of	 exchange	 establishes	 between	 the	 products”.237	As	 a	 result,	 the	 amount	 of	 actual	labour	 that	has	been	 spent	on	 the	 commodity,	 as	well	 as	 the	 complex	network	of	 all	 the	other	relations	through	which	it	has	been	produced	remain	invisible.	This	mystification,	or	fetishism,	effectively	erases	the	exploitation	and	domination	of	one	part	of	the	society	over	another	and,	therefore,	no	class	consciousness	can	be	born.238		Accordingly,	 raising	 consciousness	 around	 this	 process	 of	 mystification	 has	consistently	been	an	important	concern	for	politically	engaged	artists,	and	–	in	particular	–	for	artists	influenced	by	socialist	ideas.	Following	the	global	crisis	of	capitalism	that	started	in	2008,	artists	employed	the	tools	offered	by	the	World	Wide	Web	in	order	to	build	a	new	class	consciousness	through	two	distinct	routes:	firstly,	by	revealing	the	origins	of	the	crisis	and	 the	nature	of	 the	system	that	has	produced	 it;	and,	secondly,	by	exposing	 the	effects	that	the	crisis	has	had	on	specific	social	groups	and	sectors	of	human	activity.	As	it	will	be	indicated	in	this	section,	in	the	case	of	examining	the	crisis’	roots,	artworks	and	artist-led	projects	largely	focused	on	the	immateriality	–	and,	thus,	the	“invisibility”	–	of	the	flows	of	capital	 in	 Data	 Capitalism,	 which	 produce	 a	 specific	 mode	 of	 labour.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	artists	 who	 have	 been	 interested	 in	 the	 crisis’	 consequences	 have	 focused	 on	 the	impoverishment	 of	 the	 most	 vulnerable	 social	 classes,	 and	 the	 violent	 redistribution	 of	
																																																								235	See:	György	Lukács,	History	and	Class	Consciousness	(Studies	in	Marxist	Dialectics)	(7th	edn,	MIT	Press,	Cambridge,	MA	1971).	236	Karl	 Marx,	Capital:	 A	 Critique	 of	 Political	 Economy:	 V.	 1	(Ben	 Fowkes	 tr,	 Penguin	 Books	 in	association	with	New	Left	Review	1990)	p.	163.	237	ibid.,	p.	165.	238	Notably,	 Karl	 Mannheim	 associates	 directly	 knowledge	 with	 class,	 claiming	 that	 different	systems	of	knowledge	emerge	 from	different	 sets	of	 social	 conditions.	The	social	positions	of	 the	bourgeoisie	 and	 the	proletariat	define	 the	 forms	of	 knowledge	 that	 those	 two	groups	are	 able	 to	assimilate,	 and,	 thus,	 they	 distort	 social	 reality.	 See:	 Karl	 Mannheim,	Ideology	 and	 Utopia:	 An	
Introduction	to	the	Sociology	of	Knowledge	(Harcourt,	Brace,	New	York	1959).	
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wealth,	which	has	also	affected	many	culture-related	sectors	as	well	as	the	humanities	as	a	whole.		
Deconstructing	the	flow		In	 his	 works,	 Turkish-born,	 New-York-based	 artist	 Burak	 Arikan	 generates	 elaborate	network	maps	that	use	social,	political	and	economic	issues	as	inputs,	in	order	to	make	the	exchange/power	 relations	 that	 Marx	 refers	 to	 visible.	 His	 aspiration	 is	 to	 share	 this	“network	intelligence”	with	everyone	and	illuminate	how	societies	work	in	the	context	of	globalised	 Data	 capitalism.239	Quite	 interestingly,	 many	 of	 Arikan’s	 works	 start	 from	 a	seemingly	paradoxical	position	as	they	investigate	the	socio-economic	networks	in	Turkey;	namely,	 a	 country	 that	 is	widely	 considered	as	one	of	 the	 strongest	emerging	economies	and	markets	 in	 the	world.240	Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 global	 economic	 crisis	 affected	his	home	country	to	a	comparatively	limited	extent,	Arikan	developed	an	increasing	interest	in	documenting	and	critiquing	the	pervasiveness	of	neoliberal	capitalist	principles	in	Turkey.	Accordingly,	in	Networks	of	Dispossession	(2013),	Arikan	creates	a	mapping	of	the	relations	of	capital	that	have	fuelled	the	urban	transformation	of	Turkish	cities	over	the	past	couple	of	 decades.241	His	 network	 visualisations	 expose	 the	 connections	 between	 the	 state	 and	large	 corporations	 that	 have	 been	 involved	 in	 and	 have	 benefited	 from	 urban	development.242	The	idea	of	“dispossession”	is	particularly	evident	in	the	expropriation	of	the	commons,	as	public	spaces	have	been	subject	to	rapid	privatisation	across	the	country	over	 the	 last	 three	 decades	 in	 particular.	 A	 range	 of	 online	 interactive	 maps	 reveal	 the	influence	of	specific	corporations,	as	well	as	the	dispossessed	minorities	who	have	been		
																																																								239	Arikan’s	map-based	projects	have	been	widely	exhibited	internationally,	including	presentations	at	 the	 Museum	 of	 Modern	 Art	 (New	 York),	 Venice	 Architecture	 Biennale,	 São	 Paulo	 Biennial,	Istanbul	 Biennial,	 Berlin	Biennial,	 Sharjah	Biennial,	Marrakech	Biennial,	 Ars	 Electronica,	 and	KW	Institute	for	Contemporary	Art.	240	Turkey	is	present	in	all	performance	lists	for	international	emerging	markets	(IMF,	EMGP,	FTSE,	MSCI,	Standard	&	Poors	and	the	Dow	Jones	list,	amongst	others),	a	member	of	the	G-20	group,	and	Bloomberg	positioned	the	country	at	number	7	in	its	“Top	20	Emerging	Markets”	chart	for	2013	(its	highest	position	in	recent	years).	See:	‘The	Top	20	Emerging	Markets’	(Bloomberg.com,	30	January	2013)	 <http://www.bloomberg.com/slideshow/2013-01-30/the-top-20-emerging-markets.html>	accessed	25	March	2016.	241 	The	 project’s	 website:	 ‘Mülksüzleştirme	 Ağları’	 (Mulksuzlestirme.org)	<http://mulksuzlestirme.org/>	accessed	25	March	2016.	242	The	work	has	been	presented,	amongst	other	venues,	at	the	New	Museum,	in	New	York.		
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	Figure	13:	Burak	Arikan,	Networks	of	Dispossession	(2013)		affected	 by	 the	 Turkish	 government’s	 confiscations	 of	 privately-owned	 land.243	The	ideological	 background	 of	 urban	 transformation	 is	 further	 explored	 in	 Islam,	 Republic,	
Neoliberalism	 (2012).244	The	 work	 is	 comprised	 of	 three	 maps,	 in	 which	 the	 mosques,	republican	monuments,	or	museums,	and	shopping	malls	of	Istanbul	appear	to	“compete”	with	each	other	in	order	to	gain	domination	over	the	city’s	public	spaces.245	As	the	different	types	of	buildings	are	connected,	new	symbolic	spaces	are	formed,	which	are	indicative	of	the	 increasing	 competition	 between	 the	 three	 major	 ideologies	 defining	 Turkey	 today:	Islam,	Republic	and	Neoliberalism.	The	work	approaches	the	value	of	urban	space	through	an	 original	 perspective	 that	 goes	 beyond	 the	 limitations	 of	 the	 geographical	map.	 Islam,	
Republic,	Neoliberalism,	 thus,	 invites	 the	 inhabitants	 of	 Istanbul	 to	 rethink	 how	 ideology	
																																																								243	Ever	 since	 the	 post-coup	 Third	 Republic	 (1983),	 the	 newly	 opened	 Turkish	 economy	 became	heavily	 focused	 of	 construction,	 with	 several	 cities	 multiplying	 their	 populations.	 This	 has	 been	particularly	 evident	 in	 Istanbul,	whose	mayor	 in	 the	 1980s	Bedrettin	Dalan	 proudly	 pronounced	the	economic	capital	of	the	country	as	a	“city	of	yuppies.”	See:	Jenny	White,	Muslim	Nationalism	and	
the	New	Turks	(Princeton	University	Press,	Woodstock	2012)	p.	36.	244	The	work	is	both	available	online	and	in	a	printed	version	in	the	exhibitions	in	which	it	has	been	presented	(e.g.	2012	Istanbul	Design	Biennial).	245 	Burak	 Arikan,	 ‘Islam,	 Republic,	 Neoliberalism’	 (Burak-arikan.com,	 2012)	 <http://burak-arikan.com/islam-republic-neoliberalism>	accessed	25	March	2016.		
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can	materialize	and	become	a	visible	and	tangible	part	of	their	everyday	lives	through	the	urban	landscape	that	is	surrounding	them.246		
	Figure	14:	Burak	Arikan,	Islam,	Republic,	Neoliberalism	(2012)		 Another	group	of	Arikan’s	works	investigates	the	main	agents	through	which	urban	and	 economic	 development	 at	 large	 have	 been	 achieved;	 namely,	 the	 privileged	 taxation	regime	 for	 large	 corporations	 that	 remains	 concealed,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 widespread	connections	 of	 educational	 institutions	 with	 companies.	 Corporate	 wealth	 comes	 under	severe	 scrutiny	 in	 the	 Network	 for	 Foundations	 and	 Corporations	 through	 Shared	 Board	
Members	 (2011),	which	exposes	the	 links	between	tax-exemption	and	corporations	 listed	in	the	Istanbul	Stock	Exchange.247	As	Arikan	explains	in	his	personal	website,	“the	network	map	organizes	itself	by	running	as	a	software	simulation,	where	the	names	naturally	find	their	 position	 on	 the	 canvas	 through	 connecting	 forces,	 revealing	 the	 central	 actors,	
																																																								246	As	Jenny	White	notes,	in	the	case	of	Turkey	Islamic	norms	and	neoliberal	norms	merged	in	order	to	 support	 the	 country’s	 newly	 conceived	 identity.	 In	 the	 idealised	 version	 of	 the	 Islamic	community,	 “capitalist	 relations	 and	 patron-client	 systems	 […]	 are	 represented	 as	 economies	 of	affection	based	on	family,	neighborly	and	Islamic	‘love’	(sevgi)	and	service	(hizmet).”	See:	White,	op.	cit.,	pp.	173-174.	247	The	work	is	both	available	online	and	in	a	printed	version	in	the	exhibitions	in	which	it	has	been	presented	(e.g.	Kunstmuseum	Wolfsburg).	
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indirect	links,	organic	clusters,	structural	holes,	and	outliers”.248	The	database	on	which	the	work	was	 based	 included	350	 corporations,	 234	 tax-exempt	 foundations	 and	 their	 3310	board	 members,	 through	 whom	 the	 connections	 are	 being	 made.	 In	 Higher	 Education	
Industrial	Complex	 (2013),	 the	 tax-exempt	 foundations	have	been	 replaced	by	68	private	universities	 and	 their	 boards	 of	 trustees.249	The	 network	 map	 allows	 users	 to	 navigate	from	one	node	to	another	in	order	to	reveal	the	relations	of	power	developed	between	the	various	 central	 and	 peripheral	 actors	 in	 Higher	 Education.250	Notably,	 apart	 from	corporations,	 the	 organisations	 of	 the	 map	 also	 include	 privately-owned	 foundations,	associations,	political	parties	and	state	universities.	As	a	result,	the	user	is	able	to	explore	through	 the	 interactive	 maps	 the	 Turkish	 educational	 ecosystem	 in	 political,	 social	 and	economic	 terms,	 developing	 an	 awareness	 of	 the	 different	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 nature	 of	education	can	be	influenced.251		
	Figure	15:	Burak	Arikan,	Higher	Education	Industrial	Complex	(2013)																																																										248	Burak	 Arikan,	 ‘Network	 of	 Foundations	 and	 Corporations	 through	 Shared	 Board	 Members:	Turkey	 Edition’	 (Burak-arikan.com,	 2010)	 <http://burak-arikan.com/network-of-foundations-through-shared-board-members-turkey-edition>	accessed	25	March	2016.	249	Burak	Arikan,	 ‘Higher	Education	 Industrial	 Complex’	 (Burak-arikan.com,	 2013)	<http://burak-arikan.com/ozeluniversiteler/index_en.html>	accessed	25	March	2016.	250	The	interactive	map	can	be	accessed	here:	Burak	Arikan,	‘Higher	Education	Industrial	Complex’	(Graphcommons.com)	 <https://graphcommons.com/graphs/b4f91671-c778-4b01-85ba-205625e26b4e>	accessed	25	March	2016.	251	The	work	was	exhibited	at	Koç	University.	
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	 Notably,	 Arikan’s	 works	 function	 without	 harming	 or	 affecting	 directly	 the	organisations	 whose	 networks	 of	 affiliations	 they	 are	 critiquing.	 Other	 artists,	 however,	have	 adopted	 a	 considerably	more	 aggressive	 line	 of	 action	 in	 order	 to	 refocus	 people’s	attention	on	the	operational	structure	of	Data	Capitalism	as	one	of	 the	primary	causes	of	the	 crisis.	 Building	 on	 the	 tradition	 of	 hacking	 and	 hacktivism,	 the	 practice	 of	 Italian	conceptual	artist	Paolo	Cirio	constitutes	a	prominent	case,	with	his	works	often	resulting	in	controversies	 and	 legal	 actions.252	Cirio	 exemplifies	 what	 new	 media	 theorist	 McKenzie	Wark	describes	 in	A	Hacker	Manifesto	 (2004)	as	the	effort	of	digital	cultural	workers	and	hackers	 to	 extract	 new	 ideas	 out	 of	 an	 old	 arrangement	 of	 things	 –	 an	 endeavour	 that	ascribes	to	them	the	status	of	a	new	class	of	workers.	The	new	ruling	class	that	they	have	to	confront	 are	 the	 “vectoralists”;	 namely,	 the	 large	 corporations	 that	 control	 vectors	 –	 the	various	paths	and	networks	through	which	information	flows.253	Accordingly,	within	Data	Capitalism,	 it	 is	 not	 capital	 by	 itself	 that	 ascribes	 power,	 but,	 rather,	 the	 capacity	 to	manipulate	capital’s	immaterial	movement	through	networks.		This	 is	 particularly	 true	 in	 the	 case	 of	 large-scale	 tax	 evasion	 that	 takes	 place	through	 banks	 located	 in	 tax	 havens	 –	 namely,	 a	 practice	 usually	 reserved	 for	 the	 “rich	few”,	 which	 Cirio	 aims	 to	 democratise	 in	 his	 contentious	 work	 Loophole4All	 (2013).	 In	order	 to	 materialise	 this	 aspiration,	 the	 artist	 hacked	 the	 governmental	 servers	 of	 the	Cayman	 Islands,	 one	 of	 the	main	 offshore	 centres	 for	 high	 finance	 around	 the	world.	An	additional	reason	 for	Cirio’s	choice	of	 the	Cayman	Islands	has	been	the	 fact	 that	 they	are	consistently	 in	 the	 top	positions	of	 the	global	Financial	Secrecy	 Index.254	This	entails	 that	apart	from	functioning	as	a	tax	haven,	the	islands	also	avoid	any	transparency	in	the	way	that	 their	 financial	 authorities	 deal	 with	 international	 tax	 crime	 investigations.	 Cirio	managed	to	steal	the	identities	of	more	than	200,000	anonymous	companies	registered	in	the	 Caymans	 and	 he,	 then,	 moved	 their	 addresses	 to	 his	 own	 Caymans	 mailbox.	
																																																								252	Hannah	 Feiler,	 ‘Künstler	 Und	 Die	 NSA:	 Die	 Kunst	 Überwacht	 Zurück’	Frankfurter	 Allgemaine	
Zeitung	(22	 May	 2015)	 <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/kunst/ueberwachung-overexposed-von-paolo-cirio-13607673.html>	accessed	25	March	2016.	253	McKenzie	Wark,	A	Hacker	Manifesto	(Harvard	University	Press,	Cambridge,	MA	2004)	p.	1.			Wark	further	elaborates	on	this	new	context:	“That	the	vectoralist	class	has	replaced	capital	as	the	dominant	exploiting	class	can	be	seen	in	the	form	that	the	 leading	corporations	take.	These	firms	divest	themselves	of	their	productive	capacity,	as	this	is	no	longer	a	source	of	power.	They	rely	on	a	competing	mass	of	capitalist	contractors	for	the	manufacture	of	their	products.	Their	power	lies	in	monopolizing	 intellectual	 property	 –	 patents,	 copyrights	 and	 trademarks	 –	 and	 the	 means	 of	reproducing	their	value	–	the	vectors	of	communication.	The	privatization	of	information	becomes	the	dominant,	rather	than	a	subsidiary,	aspect	of	commodified	life.”	ibid.	254 	See:	 Tax	 Justice	 Network	 (Financialsecrecyindex.com,	 2	 November	 2015)	<http://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/>	accessed	25	March	2016.	
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Accordingly,	 people	 from	 around	 the	 world	 were	 invited	 to	 visit	 the	 project’s	 website,	www.Loophole4All.com,	 and	 buy	 a	 counterfeited	 certificate	 of	 incorporation	 of	 a	 real	Caymans	company	for	as	little	as	99¢	USD.	In	this	way	“small	businesses	and	middle	class	people	 can	 invoice	 from	 the	 major	 offshore	 centres	 and	 avoid	 unfair	 taxes,	 legal	responsibility	and	economic	disruption	in	their	own	indebted	home	countries,	in	a	form	of	global	 civil	 disobedience”.255	At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	artist	 set	up	a	 company	 in	 the	City	of	London	 as	 a	 legal	 “shield”	 for	 his	 actions,	 thus	 appropriating	 (and	 exposing)	 a	 standard	offshore	business	strategy.	Finally,	as	part	of	his	research	on	 the	subject,	Cirio	posted	on	www.Loophole4All.com	 a	 series	 of	 video	 interviews	 with	 experts,	 who	 provide	 viewers	with	insights	into	the	complex	networks	of	corporate	tax	avoidance	and	offshore	finance.256	
Loophole4All	received	a	strong	condemnation	from	the	authorities	of	the	Cayman	Islands,	who	 reassured	 the	 public	 about	 the	 continuation	 of	 the	 special	 financial	 status	 of	 the	islands	 through	 their	 press	 announcements.	 In	 addition,	 Cirio	 received	 cease	 and	 desist	letters,	other	legal	threats,	had	his	two	PayPal	accounts	suspended	and	a	complete	ban	on	trading.	However,	in	the	end,	his	project	managed	to	gain	wide	international	exposure,	and	it	won	the	Golden	Nica	Award,	the	most	important	prize	of	the	prestigious	Ars	Electronica	Festival,	in	2014.257	Notably,	 in	both	 the	project’s	website	and	 the	different	gallery	spaces	where	Cirio	regularly	exhibits	Loophole4All,	he	accompanies	documentation	material	 from	the	project	with	 a	diagram	 that	depicts	 the	different	 flows	 involved	 in	 the	work’s	business	 strategy:	flows	of	liability,	incorporation,	tax,	cash,	data	and	operation.	The	diagram	does	not	merely	shed	 light	on	 the	 interconnected	corporate	practices	 that	are	protected	 through	offshore	finance;	most	importantly,	it	illuminates	the	flux	of	Data	Capitalism’s	structure,	or	what	
																																																								255	From	the	project’s	 first	Press	Release:	Paolo	Cirio,	 ‘Loophole	 for	All	 -	Press	Release.	NYC,	15th	February	 2013’	 (Paolocirio.net,	 2013)	<http://www.paolocirio.net/press/PDF/Loophole4All_PR_15_02_2013.pdf>	 accessed	 25	 March	2016.	256	Those	 practices	 include:	 hiding	 toxic	 financial	 products	 and	 debts,	 hiding	 capital,	 price	 and	assets	 manipulation,	 avoidance	 of	 bankruptcy	 and	 insolvency	 obligations,	 insurance	 for	 risking	operations,	 e-commerce	 selling	 exemptions,	 tax	 avoidance	 for	 patents’	 registration,	 and	 money	laundering,	 amongst	 others.	 See:	 ‘Documenting	 and	 Investigating	 Offshore	 Centers’	(Loophole4all.com)	<http://loophole4all.com/doc.php>	accessed	25	March	2016.	257	Further	information	can	be	found	in	the	project’s	fourth	Press	Release:	Paolo	Cirio,	‘Loophole	for	All	 Press	 Release	 -	 June	 2nd	 2014,	 NYC.’	 (Paolocirio.net,	 2014)	<http://www.paolocirio.net/press/PDF/Loophole4All_PR_02_06_2014.pdf>	 accessed	 25	 March	2016.	
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	Figure	16:	Paolo	Cirio,	Loophole4All	(2013)		curator	 and	 academic	 Lanfranco	 Aceti	 terms	 as	 an	 elimination	 of	 fixed	 meaning.258	In	theorising	 Cirio’s	 work,	 Aceti	 connects	 the	 artist’s	 practice	 with	 Deleuze	 and	 Guattari’s	definition	of	“decoding”	as	given	in	A	Thousand	Plateaus:	Capitalism	and	Schizophrenia:	“Let	us	 recall	 that	 ‘decoding’	 does	 not	 signify	 the	 state	 of	 a	 flow	 whose	 code	 is	 understood	(compris)	(deciphered,	translatable,	assimilable),	but,	in	a	more	radical	sense,	the	state	of	a	flow	 that	 is	 no	 longer	 contained	 in	 (compris	 dans)	 its	 own	 code,	 that	 escapes	 its	 own	code”.259	In	 Loophole4All,	 Cirio	 attempts	 to	 do	 the	 exact	 opposite;	 namely,	 to	 produce	meaning	by	indicating	that	power	has	been	transferred	from	the	nodes	into	the	flows	of	his	diagram	and,	 thus,	 it	 has	 become	a	 highly	manipulable	 entity.	 Inevitably,	 then,	whatever	might	inhabit	the	nodes	–	most	notably,	the	concepts	of	the	state,	authority	and	citizenship	–	appears	to	have	been	completely	neutralised	in	terms	of	its	meaning:	it	does	not	“mean”	anything	until	 it	 has	 become	 fluid.	 For	 instance,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	Cayman	 Islands,	 their	state	authority	does	not	“mean”	anything	until	it	is	exerted	as	the	“fluid”	regulatory	context	of	a	tax	haven.																																																										258	Lanfranco	 Aceti,	 ‘When	 Aesthetic	 Is	 Not	 Just	 a	 Pretty	 Image’	 in	 Lanfranco	 Aceti	 and	 others	(eds),	Red	 Art:	 New	 Utopias	 in	 Data	 Capitalism,	 Leonardo	 Electronic	 Almanac	(vol	 20,	 no	 1,	Leonardo/ISAST,	San	Francisco	2014)	pp.	234	–	237.	259	Gilles	 Deleuze	 and	 Félix	 Guattari,	A	 Thousand	 Plateaus:	 Capitalism	 and	 Schizophrenia	(Brian	Massumi	tr,	1st	edn,	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	Minneapolis	1987)	p.	448.	
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	Figure	17:	Paolo	Cirio,	Loophole4All	Certificates	of	Incorporation	(2013)		
	Figure	18:	Paolo	Cirio,	Loophole4All	corporate	diagram	(2013)	
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Labour	as	domination		The	mode	of	labour	that	Data	Capitalism	privileges	is	defined	by	the	previously	described	“elimination	of	meaning”,	which	largely	stems	from	its	function	as	an	operational	system	of	flows.	Manuel	Castells	pointed	to	the	rise	of	this	condition	almost	two	decades	ago,	when	he	pronounced	that	“in	the	network	society,	a	fundamental	form	of	social	domination	is	[…]	the	prevalence	of	the	space	of	flows	over	the	space	of	places.	The	space	of	flows	structures	and	shapes	the	space	of	places,	as	when	the	differential	fortunes	of	capital	accumulation	in	global	financial	markets	reward	or	punish	specific	regions”.260	Notably,	in	Data	Capitalism	the	 flows	of	 economic	 activity	do	not	have	 to	be	 fixed	on	 a	particular	place	 anymore,	 as	cognitive	labour	is	delocalised.	This	development	is	accompanied	by	the	radical	change	in	the	 nature	 of	 economic	 expansion,	 which	 has	 become	 largely	 based	 on	 information	 and	knowledge,	 either	 through	 the	 activities	 of	 its	 intellectual	 workers,261	or	 through	 its	financialization	 and	 the	 dependence	 on	 information-data	 that	 we	 have	 described	 in	 the	introduction	 of	 this	 thesis.	 The	merge	 of	 cognitive	 labour	with	 venture	 capitalism	 in	 the	two	decades	that	have	followed	Castells’	original	assertion	has	led	to	the	precarisation	and	impoverishment	of	cognitive	labour,	given	that	its	cost	has	to	constantly	fall	in	order	for	a	greater	profit	to	be	generated.	Accordingly,	as	political	economist	Christian	Marazzi	notes,	in	 the	 current	 historical	 conjuncture	 there	 is	 an	 apparent	 “contradiction	 between	 the	valorisation	of	knowledge	and	the	devalorisation	of	the	workforce	that	explains	the	current	cleavage	of	the	labour	market	between	a	‘working	class	aristocracy’	on	the	one	hand	and	a	‘flexible	proletariat’	on	the	other”.262		 The	 increasingly	 immaterial	 and/or	 automatized	 nature	 of	 labour	 and	 the	 labour	market	is	addressed	in	Invisible	Threads	(2008),	a	“mixed	reality	performance	installation”	by	 Stephanie	Rothenberg.263	The	work	 is	 comprised	 of	 two	 parts,	which	 combine	 virtual	and	 physical	 spaces	 in	 order	 to	 create	 a	 successful	 jeans	 company	 bearing	 the	 (ironic)	brand	name	“Double	Happiness”.	In	the	online	space	of	the	popular	metaverse	Second	Life	
																																																								260	Manuel	 Castells,	The	 Rise	 of	 the	 Network	 Society:	 The	 Information	 Age:	 Economy,	 Society	 and	
Culture	(Blackwell,	Oxford	1996)	p.	398.	261	Yann	Moulier-Boutang,	Cognitive	Capitalism	(Polity	Press	2012)	p.	57.	262 	Christian	 Marazzi,	 ‘The	 Privatization	 of	 the	 General	 Intellect’	 (Nicolas	 Guilhot	 tr	
Destructural.files.wordpress.com,	 2010)	<https://destructural.files.wordpress.com/2010/10/christian-marazzi-the-privatization-of-the-general-intellect.pdf>	accessed	25	March	2016.	263	Video	documentation	of	the	work	can	be	found	here:	Stephanie	Rothenberg,	‘Invisible	Threads–A	 Virtual	 Sweatshop	 in	 Second	 Life’,	 video	 recording,	 (Vimeo.com,	 2014)	<https://vimeo.com/82201852>	accessed	25	March	2016.	
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(SL),264	the	artist	set	up	a	virtual	sweatshop	that	simulates	a	real	life	factory:	the	facility	is	fully	 equipped	 with	 weaving	 looms,	 dye	 vats,	 bolt	 roll	 cutters,	 laser	 cutters,	 piston	 and	thread	 spools,	 sewing	machines	and	a	quality	 control	 chain.	Through	 job	advertisements	placed	 in	 the	SL	classifieds,	SL	citizens	(avatars)	are	hired	and	are,	 then,	offered	 training	sessions	 before	 they	 are	 able	 to	 start	 working	 at	 the	 factory.	 Just	 like	 in	 real	 life,	 they	specialise	 in	 operating	 the	 various	 machines	 as	 well	 as	 in	 serving	 as	 floor	 managers,	supervisors	and	security	guards.	Workers	receive	200	Lindens	per	hour	(the	SL	currency),	which	translates	into	around	75¢	USD	per	hour	in	real	life,	depending	on	the	daily	exchange	rate.	All	employees	live	in	the	virtual	factory	village	and	everybody	is	closely	monitored	by	the	factory’s	management	and	held	accountable	for	their	efficiency	and	production	errors.	Any	shortcomings	might	result	in	working	overtime,	receiving	a	reduced	salary,	or	–	even	–	being	made	redundant.			
	Figure	19:	Stephanie	Rothenberg,	Invisible	Threads	(2008)		The	second	part	of	 the	work	can	be	 found	 in	 the	physical	 spaces	of	museums	and	galleries,	in	the	form	of	a	retail	kiosk	(fully	equipped	with	a	dressing	room)	where	jeans	are	produced	 through	 a	 cotton	 canvas	 printer.265	Using	 a	 microphone	 and	 a	 web	 cam,																																																									264	‘Second	Life’	(Secondlife.com)	<http://secondlife.com/>	accessed	25	March	2016.		265	The	work	premiered	at	 the	2008	Sundance	Film	Festival	 at	 the	New	Frontier	Theater	 in	Park	City,	Utah	and	has	also	been	exhibited	in	“FeedForward:	Angel	of	History”	at	LABoral	Center	for	Art	&	 Industry	 in	 Gijon,	 Spain;	 the	 symposium	 closing	 event	 for	 Synthetic	 Times	 Beijing	 Media	 Art	
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costumers	 who	 visit	 the	 kiosk	 in	 gallery	 spaces	 can	 directly	 connect	 with	 the	 factory’s	virtual	space	and	place	their	orders.	A	rather	Orwellian	audio	and	video	live	stream	allows	the	 workers	 to	 see	 and	 hear	 the	 customers,	 whilst	 the	 customers	 can	 observe	 the	production	 of	 their	 ordered	 pair	 of	 jeans	 in	 real	 time.	 Notably,	 digital	 workers	 have	 a	limited	amount	of	time	in	order	to	push	the	right	buttons	and	coordinate	the	production	of	the	jeans;	otherwise,	the	assembly	line	cannot	function	and,	as	a	result,	production	has	to	start	again	from	the	beginning.	Once	the	jeans	have	been	printed	at	the	kiosk,	they	can	be	easily	 assembled	 and	 are,	 then,	 ready	 to	 wear.	 They	 are	 sold	 to	 customers	 for	 prices	ranging	between	$30	and	$40	USD,	or	7,300-9,400	Lindens.266	Quite	evidently,	apart	from	experiencing	 very	 hostile	working	 conditions,	 the	 digital	workers	 of	 “Double	Happiness”	are	 also	 hugely	 underpaid.	 By	 using	 globalised	 telematic	manufacturing	 as	 a	 production	model/	example,	Rothenberg	manages	 to	highlight	 the	 convergence	of	digital	 labour	and	real	life	commodities,	in	the	context	of	a	virtual	economic	environment	whose	implications	often	remain	invisible.			
	Figure	20:	Stephanie	Rothenberg’s	Invisible	Threads	installed	at	LABORAL	Centro	de	Arte,	Gijon,	Spain	(2010)																																																																																																																																																																																			Festival	sponsored	by	MOMA	and	Parsons	The	New	School;	and	at	Eyebeam,	in	New	York,	amongst	other	venues.	The	printer	used	was	supplied	by	Hewlett	Packard	and	the	project	was	supported	by	Eyebeam	and	the	SUNY	Buffalo	2020	Scholars	Award.	266	The	estimation	was	based	on	March	2016	exchange	rates.	
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	 In	2011,	Rothenberg	collaborated	with	artists	Jeffrey	Crouse	and	Michael	Schieben	in	order	 to	 further	her	 investigation	 into	digital	 outsourcing,	 by	 focusing	on	 the	 changes	that	the	development	of	Web	2.0	has	produced	for	the	adult	entertainment	industry.267	The	outcome	 of	 this	 collaboration	was	 Laborers	of	Love/LOL,	 a	 crowdsourcing	 project	 in	 the	form	of	an	Internet	service-website	on	which	customers	can	order	personalised	videos	of	their	 sexual	 fantasies	 (www.laborersoflove.com).	 Those	 videos	 are	 characterised	 by	Rothenberg	 as	 “recombinant”,	 given	 that	 they	 look	 more	 like	 “a	 mashup,	 where	 1970’s	experimental	cinema	meets	canned	Photoshop	filters,	and	ultimately	reflects	on	how	desire	and	 pleasure	 are	 represented,	 fragmented	 and	 abstracted	 through	 the	 consumption	 of	online	digital	media”.268	The	website	works	by	outsourcing	customers’	fantasies	to	a	global	pool	of	anonymous	online	workers	(even	home-based),	who	are	not	specifically	connected	to	 the	 sex	 industry.	 In	 order	 to	 find	 this	 workforce,	 the	 Laborers	 of	 Love	 website	 uses	Mechanical	 Turk	 (www.mechanicalturk.com),	 a	 crowdsourcing	 job	 engine	 created	 by	Amazon	 for	 people	 seeking	 temporary	 online	 employment.	 Mechanical	 Turk	 works	 by	posting	requests	for	Human	Intelligence	Tasks	(HITs)	–	jobs	that	are	just	a	few	steps	away	from	 automation,	 but	 still	 require	 the	 contribution	 of	 human	 intelligence	 in	 order	 to	 be	completed.269	Workers	 are	 paid	 a	 small	 amount	 of	 money	 for	 each	 task	 that	 they	successfully	carry	out,	and	with	more	than	a	million	users	listed	around	the	world,	there	is	always	 a	willing	workforce	 to	 choose	 from.	Once	 the	 customers	of	Laborers	of	Love	 have	filled	in	the	order	form	with	their	specifications	(sources	of	material,	cut	frequency,	glitch	and	speed	versus	accuracy	option),	the	online	workers	start	assembling	images	and	videos	that	 are	 related	 to	 the	 fantasy,	 thus	 gradually	 compiling	 the	 final	 video.	 The	 higher	 the	price	 that	 the	buyer	 is	willing	 to	pay,	 the	 faster	 and	 the	higher	 is	 the	quality	of	 the	 final	result.	Most	importantly,	the	customer	is	provided	with	a	real	time	data	visualisation	map	that	reveals	the	locations	of	the	hired	workers	(from	Bangkok	to	Bogotá,	and	from	Miami	to	Mumbai,	etc.)	as	well	as	the	IP	addresses	of	the	content	that	is	being	mined.	Finally,	when																																																									267	The	 term	 “outsourcing”	 has	 been	 used	 in	 order	 to	 cover	 a	 variety	 of	 practices	 related	 to	commissioning	third	parties	to	execute	a	particular	business	process	(material	or	immaterial).	Also,	“outsourcing”	 has	 been	 increasingly	 associated	 with	 the	 privatisation	 of	 public	 services.	 In	 both	cases,	the	main	incentive	is	the	reduction	of	operational	costs	of	the	corporation	or	the	state-owned	organisation,	and	the	accumulation	of	financial	savings.	268 	Stephanie	 Rothenberg	 and	 Jeff	 Crouse,	 ‘Laborers	 of	 love/LOL:	 Behind	 the	 Scenes’	(Isea2011.sabanciuniv.edu,	 2011)	 <http://isea2011.sabanciuniv.edu/paper/laborers-lovelol-behind-scenes>	accessed	25	March	2016.	269	Mechanical	 Turk	 is	 also	 used	 by	marketing	 companies	 as	 a	 cheap,	 readily	 available	 tool	 that	collects	 psychological,	 emotional	 and	 behavioural	 information	 about	 online	 consumers.	 For	example,	 the	website’s	workers	might	 get	 paid	 in	 order	 to	 answer	 an	 online	 survey	 researching	their	feelings	about	specific	products	and	services.	
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the	video	is	ready,	a	link	and	a	password	are	emailed	to	the	customer,	who	is	also	given	the	option	of	anonymously	posting	his	video	on	the	Laborers	of	Love	website.270		
	Figure	21:	Stephanie	Rothenberg,	Jeffrey	Crouse	and	Michael	Schieben,	Laborers	of	Love	(2011)			 One	 of	 the	most	 interesting	 aspects	 of	 connecting	 immaterial	 labour	with	 today’s	adult	 entertainment	 industry	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 porn	 does	 not	 generate	 pleasure	 for	 the	viewer	 simply	 because	 of	 its	 content,	 but	 also	 because	 it	 eroticises	 the	 mediation	 of	technology.	 Through	 the	 screen,	 images	 acquire	 a	 “commodity	 texture”	 that	 relocates	vision	within	 the	 subjectivity	 of	 the	 observer.271	More	 specifically,	 as	writer	 and	 curator	Franklin	Melendez	 notes	 in	 his	 study	 of	 the	 advent	 of	 video	 in	 relation	 to	 sexuality,	 the	“performers’	 bodies	 and	 the	 […]	 screen	 start	 to	 question	 priority	 of	 content	 over	medium”,272	since	 the	 pleasure	 of	 the	 body	 blends	with	 the	 pleasure	 of	 the	 disembodied	gaze	that	is	adopted	by	the	viewer.	Notably,	the	disembodied	workers	of	Laborers	of	Love	should	not	be	perceived	merely	as	the	object	of	the	customer’s	disembodied	gaze;	they	are,	also,	 generating	 themselves	 a	 similar	 form	of	 gaze,	which	 is	 being	 addressed	 to	 the	very																																																									270	The	project	has	been	exhibited	at	“Perspectives	on	Imaginary	Futures”,	House	of	Electronic	Arts,	Basel,	 Switzerland;	 “Time	&	Motion:	Redefining	Work	Life”,	 FACT	 (Foundation	 for	Art	&	Creative	Technology),	 Liverpool,	 England;	 Transmediale	 2013,	 BWPWAP:	 Desire,	 Berlin,	 Germany;	 and	“Technolust”,	Magic	Lantern	Cinema,	Providence,	RI,	USA.	271	See:	 Jonathan	 Crary,	Techniques	 of	 the	 Observer:	 On	 Vision	 and	 Modernity	 in	 the	 Nineteenth	
Century	(The	MIT	Press,	Cambridge,	MA	1990).	272	Franklin	Melendez,	‘Video	Pornography,	Video	Pleasure	and	the	Return	of	the	Sublime’	in	Linda	Williams	(ed),	Porn	studies	(Duke	University	Press,	London	2004)	pp.	401	–	427.	
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activity	that	they	are	participating	in:	a	disembodied	conceptualisation	of	their	own	labour.	The	 sustainability	 and	 profitability	 of	 immaterial	 labour	 depends	 on	 this	 command	 over	the	workers’	 subjectivity.	 Philosopher	 and	 sociologist	Maurizio	Lazzarato	was	one	of	 the	first	to	theorise	this	process,	arguing	that	immaterial	labour	is	“even	more	totalitarian	than	the	earlier	rigid	division	between	mental	and	manual	labor	(ideas	and	execution),	because	capitalism	 seeks	 to	 involve	 even	 the	 worker's	 personality	 and	 subjectivity	 within	 the	production	 of	 value”. 273 	Through	 the	 development	 of	 a	 context	 of	 “participative	management”,	 immaterial	 labour	aims	to	foster	“communicational	relationships”	between	workers,	 which	 neutralise	 antagonism	 in	 terms	 of	 class.	 As	 all	 workers	 are	 required	 to	openly	 express	 themselves	 (“communicate”	 by	 sharing	 information	 and,	 thus,	collaborating),	 the	 antagonism	 between	 hierarchy	 and	 cooperation	 appears	 to	 be	abolished,	with	 a	 sense	 of	 shared	 responsibility	 amongst	 the	members	 of	 the	workforce	replacing	it.274	Not	surprisingly,	however,	this	responsibility	is	monosemous,	since	it	is	not	reflected	neither	in	the	actual	relations	of	power	within	the	production	system,	nor	in	the	salaries	of	 the	workers.	This	mode	of	exploitation	(which	becomes	evident	 in	Laborers	of	
Love)	 can	 reach	 an	 even	 more	 extreme	 level	 through	 the	 mediation	 of	 networked	technologies	 and	 become	 completely	 free:	 “free	 both	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 ‘not	 financially	rewarded’	and	of	‘willingly	given’”.275		In	the	milieu	of	Data	Capitalism,	the	most	widespread	model	of	 free	 labour	can	be	found	in	the	form	of	social	media	and	their	related	technologies.276	In	this	case,	the	input	of	the	users-workers	 is	supplied	on	a	completely	voluntary	basis	and	without	receiving	any	kind	 of	 remuneration,	 whereas	 the	 social	 media	 websites	 and	 applications	 are	 able	 to	generate	profit	through	advertising,	as	well	as	through	the	processing	and	selling	of	a	vast	amount	of	user-generated	data.	 In	addition,	 social	media	 “colonise”	 the	users’	 time,	 since	they	“suck	surplus-value	by	pursuing	citizen-laborers	in	every	moment	of	their	lives,	with	the	 result	 that	 the	working	day	 is	excessively	 lengthened	and	 intensified”.277	Information	technology	theorist	Tiziana	Terranova	theorises	the	rise	of	immaterial	and	affective	labour																																																									273	Maurizio	Lazzarato,	‘Immaterial	Labor’	in	Paolo	Virno	and	Michael	Hardy	(eds),	Radical	thought	
in	Italy:	A	Potential	Politics	(University	of	Minnesota	Press,	Minneapolis	1996)	p.	135.		274	ibid.		275	Tiziana	Terranova,	Network	Culture:	Politics	for	the	Information	Age	(Pluto	Press,	London	2014)	pp.	93-94.	276	The	term	“social	media”	covers	a	wide	range	of	websites	and	applications	that	perform	a	variety	of	functions:	social	networking;	video,	images,	documents	and	music	sharing;	blogs	and	discussion	platforms;	wikis;	and	virtual	worlds,	amongst	others.		277	Christian	 Marazzi,	The	 Violence	 of	 Financial	 Capitalism	(Kristina	 Lebedeva	 and	 Jason	 Francis	McGimsey	trs,	Semiotext(e),	Los	Angeles	2011)	p.	56.	
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as	 the	 result	 of	 what	 she	 calls	 the	 “hijacking”	 of	 the	 open-source	 movement	 by	 digital	capital,	 which	 impaired	 the	 “gift	 economy”	 tradition	 of	 the	 early	 Web.278	As	 she	 notes,	“especially	 since	 1994,	 the	 Internet	 has	 always	 and	 simultaneously	 been	 a	 gift	 economy	
and	 an	 advanced	 capitalist	 economy”.279	This	 hybrid,	 yet	 highly	 contradictory	 nature	 of	profit-oriented	networked	communication	 is	 exemplified	by	 social	media	and	 their	overt	exploitation	of	affective	labour.		In	 her	 work	 The	 Affect	 Machine	 (2012),	 New	 York-based	 artist	 and	 new	 media	researcher	 Karin	 Hansson	 reflects	 on	 the	 ambiguities	 that	 emerge	 from	 the	 operational	structure	 and	 the	 language	 used	 by	 social	 media	 networks,	 in	 which	 concepts	 such	 as	“friendship”,	“sharing”,	“following”,	or	“liking”	become	monetised	assets.	Hansson	attempts	to	expose	and	play	with	this	unbalanced	approach,	inspired	by	Antonio	Negri	and	Michael	Hardt’s	argument	that	“a	kind	of	spontaneous	and	elementary	communism”	could	be	born	out	 of	 affective	 labour	 and	 the	 networked	 relations	 that	 it	 is	 able	 to	 build.280	The	Affect	
Machine	merges	the	structure	of	a	social	networking	platform	with	that	of	a	marketplace	(such	 as	 a	 stock	 exchange	market),	 and	 invites	 its	 users	 to	 invest	 their	 social	 capital	 in	interesting	subjects	or	people.	Each	member’s	social	capital	is	comprised	of	a	set	amount	of	initial	 “shares”	 with	 no	 monetary	 value,	 which	 can	 be	 traded	 in	 any	 way	 that	 the	 user	wishes.	 By	 making	 an	 investment	 through	 his/	 her	 shares,	 the	 user	 undertakes	 the	responsibility	of	helping	in	the	development	and	wellbeing	of	a	specific	person	or	asset.	In	this	way,	users	are	able	to	form	a	network	of	connections	and	create	an	“Affect	family”	–	a	concept	 that	aims	 to	 subvert	 the	bourgeois	 character	of	 traditional	 family.281	As	Hansson	notes,	“You	invest	in	each	other	by	helping	out	whenever	it	is	possible.	The	more	successful	the	group,	the	more	successful	the	individual	gets”.282	The	artist	sees	this	formulation	as	a	disruption	of	the	division	between	the	private	and	the	public	sphere	–	as	part	of	a	scenario	for	a	future	system	of	social	organisation	embodying	Marx’s	definition	of	man’s	communal	
																																																								278	Terranova,	op.	cit.,	p.	93.	279	Terranova,	op.	cit.,	p.	94.	280	Michael	 Hardt	 and	 Antonio	 Negri,	Empire	(Harvard	 University	 Press,	 Cambridge,	 MA	 2001)	 p.	294.	281	In	 The	 Communist	Manifesto,	 Marx	 and	 Engels	 call	 for	 the	 abolition	 of	 the	 bourgeois	 family,	claiming	that	its	foundations	are	capital	and	private	gain.	Accordingly,	the	exploitation	of	children	and	women	should	stop	and	education	should	be	rescued	from	the	 influence	of	 the	ruling	classes	and	become	social.	Marx	and	Engels	op.	cit.,	pp.	59-60.	282	‘F.A.Q.’	 (Affectmachine.org)	 <http://affectmachine.org/wordpress/?page_id=51>	 accessed	 25	March	2016.	
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nature:	283	“Our	 products	 would	 be	 so	 many	 mirrors	 in	 which	 we	 saw	 reflected	 our	essential	nature.	This	relationship	would	moreover	be	reciprocal;	what	occurs	on	my	side	has	also	to	occur	on	yours”.284		
	Figure	22:	Karin	Hansson,	The	Affect	Machine	(2012)			 In	this	context	of	reaction	against	online	immaterial	labour,	we	could	identify	a	final	group	 of	 artists	 who	 have	 chosen	 to	 formulate	 their	 critique	 by	 intervening	 directly	 in	already	 existing	 social	 media	 platforms.	 A	 characteristic	 example	 of	 this	 strategy	 is	
Seppukoo	 (2009-2011)	by	 the	artistic	duo	of	Liens	 Invisibles.285	The	 title	of	 the	work	 is	a	reference	to	the	traditional	Japanese	ritual	suicide	Seppuku	(切腹),	which	can	be	translated	as	 “stomach-cutting”,	 or	 “abdomen-cutting”.286	Liens	 Invisibles	 invited	 Internet	 users	 to	end	 their	 virtual	 lives	 by	deleting	 their	 Facebook	 accounts,	 thus	 “liberating”	 their	 digital	bodies	 from	 any	 identity	 constriction	 and	 exploitation.	 By	 registering	 on	 the	 Seppukoo	website,	 Facebook	 account	 holders	 were	 offered	 the	 opportunity	 to	 automatically	deactivate	their	profiles	and	customize	their	memorial	pages.	The	personalized	memorial																																																									283	Karin	 Hansson,	 ‘The	 Desires	 of	 the	 Crowd’	 in	 Lanfranco	 Aceti	 and	 others	 (eds),	Red	Art:	New	
Utopias	 in	 Data	 Capitalism,	 Leonardo	 Electronic	 Almanac,	 vol.	 20,	 no.	 1	 (Leonardo/ISAST,	 San	Francisco	2014)	p.	188.	284	Karl	 Marx,	 ‘Comments	 on	 James	 Mills’	 in	 Jon	 Elster	 (ed),	Karl	 Marx:	 A	 Reader	(Cambridge	University	Press,	Cambridge	1986)	p.	34.	285	Liens	Invisibles	is	comprised	of	Italian	media	artists	Clemente	Pestelli	and	Gionatan	Quintini.	286	The	 project’s	 website:	 ‘Seppukoo’	 (Seppukoo.com)	 <http://www.seppukoo.com/>	 accessed	 25	March	2016.		
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pages	 were,	 then,	 sent	 to	 all	 the	 ex-Facebook	 users’	 contacts-friends,	 with	 the	encouragement	to	do	the	same	in	order	to	rise	up	the	“Seppukoo	Rank”.	In	this	context,	the	project	 could	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 humorous	 “parasitical”	 event-performance	 that	 takes	place	within	(or	parallel	to)	the	most	popular	social	networking	website	to	date.	Its	aim	of	subverting	the	viral	marketing	strategies	that	largely	define	profit-making	in	social	media	is	 materialized	 by	 disconnecting	 instead	 of	 connecting	 people;	 in	 other	 words,	 by	restricting	 the	 marketing	 pool	 that	 is	 available	 to	 online	 marketeers.	 However,	 above	anything	else,	Seppukoo	is	a	project	that	touches	upon	the	issue	of	free	choice	and	the	right	of	 self-determination.	 In	 contradistinction	 to	 the	 self-assertiveness	 and	 directness	 that	could	be	associated	with	suicide,	Facebook	and	other	social	media	make	it	rather	difficult	for	their	users	to	fully	delete	their	profiles	and	the	data	linked	to	them.287	In	other	words,	social	media	platforms	aspire	to	keep	us	as	immaterial	labourers	for	life.	The	opposition	to	the	 everlasting	 online	 labour	 and	 the	 commodification	 of	 that	 data	 that	 we	 produce	highlights	the	significance	of	freedom	both	in	our	virtual	and	our	real	lives,	which	are	now	inextricably	interwoven	with	what	we	post,	 like,	watch	and	share	online.	Being	conscious	of	 those	 connections	 is	 important	not	only	 for	our	 role	 as	users,	 but	 also	 for	our	 role	 as	active	agents	within	the	immaterial	and	concealed	modes	of	production	of	Data	Capitalism.			
	Figure	23:	Liens	Invisibles,	Seppukoo	(2009-2011)																																																									287	Samuel	 Gibbs,	 ‘How	 to	 Delete	 Your	 Facebook	 Account’	The	 Guardian	(4	 February	 2014)	<http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/feb/04/how-to-delete-facebook-account>	accessed	25	March	2016.	
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The	rediscovery	of	the	proletariat		For	Marx	and	Engels,	revolutionary	consciousness	can	materialise	only	if	people	are	in	the	position	to	recognise	the	common	source	of	their	hardships,	as	well	as	the	common	nature	of	the	solutions	through	which	their	problems	could	be	overcome.	This	is	the	sole	path	that	could	 lead	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 “the	 proletariat	 as	 proletariat,	 that	 spiritual	 and	 physical	misery	conscious	of	 its	misery,	 that	dehumanisation	conscious	of	 its	dehumanisation	and	thus	 transcending	 itself”.288	However,	 the	 formation	 of	 this	 consciousness	 is	 more	 of	 a	process,	 rather	 than	 an	 instantaneous	 realisation,	 or	 a	 moment	 of	 “spiritual	transcendence”.	 The	 Communist	 Manifesto	 clearly	 states	 that	 the	 proletariat	 has	 to	 go	through	 different	 stages	 of	 development	 and	 evolution	 until	 it	 is	 ready	 to	 replace	 the	bourgeoisie	and	 its	 system	of	production.289	Notably,	Marx	and	Engels	underline	 that	 the	expansion	 of	 the	 union	 amongst	 the	 workers	 will	 only	 become	 possible	 thanks	 to	 “the	improved	means	of	communication	that	are	created	by	modern	industry,	and	that	place	the	workers	of	different	localities	in	contact	with	one	another”.290	In	other	words,	the	means	of	communication	 are	 not	 simple	 tools	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 workers,	 but	 rather	 essential	instruments	for	the	proletariat’s	very	constitution.	 Interestingly,	 this	goal	of	an	expanded	union	resonates	strongly	with	the	post-2008	effort	of	political	movements	and	activists	to	establish	 connections	 between	 different	 social	 groups	 and	 to	 reveal	 the	 spiritual	 and	physical	 misery	 that	 has	 been	 caused	 by	 Data	 Capitalism.	 This	 objective	 has	 inspired	various	politically	engaged	artists,	who	have	attempted	to	express	through	their	own	work	the	need	to	build	the	consciousness	of	the	proletariat	as	proletariat.		 An	 artist	 in	whose	work	we	 can	 identify	 this	 ideological	 orientation	 is	 California-based	Natalie	Bookchin,	who,	as	noted	in	the	introduction,	has	been	a	pioneer	in	the	field	of	politically	engaged	net	art	since	 the	mid	1990s.	 In	2009,	Bookchin	was	commissioned	by	the	Los	Angeles	County	Museum	of	Art	(LACMA)	to	produce	Testament,	an	ongoing	series	of	video	works	composed	of	extracts	 found	in	online	video	diaries,	or	“vlogs”.	The	videos	chosen	by	the	artist	address	a	wide	range	of	social	issues	through	the	personal	narrations																																																									288	Karl	Marx	 and	 Friedrich	 Engels,	 ‘The	Holy	 Family’	 in	 David	McLellan	 (ed),	Karl	Marx:	Selected	
Writings	(2nd	edn,	Oxford	University	Press	2000)	p.	134.	289	More	 specifically,	 in	 the	 beginning,	 the	 struggle	 is	 undertaken	 by	 individual	 labourers	 who	gradually	 start	 uniting	 with	 other	 workers	 in	 their	 workplaces.	 More	 compact	 bodies	 are,	 then,	formed	on	a	local	level,	equipping	the	proletariat	with	the	confidence	to	organise	in	larger	numbers	and	on	a	regional	and	national	level.	As	the	workers	expand	in	numbers,	their	union	expands	too,	and	 it	 becomes	 the	 vehicle	 through	which	 their	 political	 actions	 can	 adopt	 a	 distinct	 class-based	character,	in	order	to	overthrow	their	national	bourgeoisie	and	start	establishing	connections	with	other	labourers	around	the	world.	290	Marx	and	Engels,	The	Communist	Manifesto,	op.	cit.,	pp.	46-47.	
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of	people	who	have	experienced	a	particular	set	of	circumstances	and	they,	then,	decide	to	share	 those	 experiences	 on	 YouTube.	 Bookchin	 edits	 elaborately	 hundreds	 of	 fragments	and	presents	them	both	in	gallery	spaces	as	video	installations	and	online,	both	on	video-sharing	platforms	and	on	her	personal	website.	Individual	clips	are	assembled	in	the	form	of	 streams	 in	which,	 “as	 in	 a	 Greek	 chorus,	 individuals	 echo,	 respond	 to,	 contradict,	 add	refrains,	iterations,	and	variations,	join	in,	and	complete	solo	narrations”.291	The	work	that	exemplifies	more	than	any	other	those	connections	with	the	format	as	well	as	the	content	of	Greek	tragedy	 is	Laid	Off	 (2009),	a	video	that	 features	personal	accounts	of	Americans	who	 have	 lost	 their	 jobs.292	In	 the	 video,	 small	 frames	 gradually	 light	 up	 over	 a	 black	background,	and	different	people	start	recounting	the	way	in	which	they	were	fired	on	the	same	day	that	they	shot	the	video.	In	some	cases,	it	is	only	them	who	have	been	dismissed	and,	 in	 other	 cases,	 it	 has	 been	 the	 whole	 of	 their	 department,	 or	 –	 even	 –	 the	 whole	company	 that	 is	 shutting	 down.	 The	 vloggers	 are	 voicing	 a	 very	 similar	 narrative	 even	when	 they	are	not	using	exactly	 the	 same	words.	This	 fact	 reveals	 the	 common	patterns	both	 in	 the	 processes	 through	which	 their	 dismissal	was	 announced	 to	 them	 and	 in	 the	feelings	and	reactions	that	the	incident	engendered.	As	a	result,	the	managerial	ethos	of	the	companies	 is	 revealed	and	 the	 individual	 anonymous	workers	appear	on	 the	 screen	as	a	social	body	that,	over	the	course	of	 the	video’s	 four-minute	duration,	starts	acquiring	the	distinct	 character	 of	 a	 social	 class.	 This	 becomes	 even	 more	 evident	 when	 some	 of	 the	vloggers	 contrast	 their	 personal	 situation	 with	 that	 of	 the	 companies’	 senior	 managers.	Finally,	 in	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 video,	 some	 of	 the	 dismissed	 employees	 assess	 their	redundancy	 as	 a	 liberating	 event.	 They	 express	 the	 hope	 that	 it	 will	 provide	 them	with	quality	 time	 for	 themselves	 and	 the	 opportunity	 to	 pursue	what	 they	 really	want	 in	 life,	free	from	what	they	term	as	a	“non-fulfilling”	mode	of	labour.	Discussing	 her	 remixing	 technique	 and	 its	 relation	 to	 ancient	 Greek	 theatre,	Bookchin	notes	that	“one	of	the	roles	of	the	chorus	[…]	was	to	act	as	a	bridge	between	the	audience	 and	 the	 actors,	 mediating	 the	 action	 between	 the	 two	 and	 interacting	 with	both”.293	 This	function	was	particularly	important	in	the	context	of	Athenian	democracy,	
																																																								291 	Matthew	 Newton,	 ‘The	 Art	 of	 Being	 Downsized’	Forbes	(27	 July	 2011)	<http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewnewton/2011/07/27/the-art-of-being-downsized/>	accessed	25	March	2016.	292	Other	 videos	 in	 the	 series	 address	 issues	 like	mental	 health	 and	 racism.	Racial	 discrimination	against	African	Americans	 is	 also	 the	 subject	 examined	by	Bookchin	 in	Now	he’s	out	in	public	and	
everyone	can	see	(2012).		293	Bookchin	 quoted	 in	 Natalie	 Bookchin	 and	 Blake	 Stimson,	 ‘Out	 in	 Public:	 Natalie	 Bookchin	 in	Conversation	 with	 Blake	 Stimson’	 (Rhizome.org,	 9	 March	 2011)	
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	Figure	24:	Natalie	Bookchin,	Laid	Off	(2009)		since	 it	 allowed	 citizens	 to	 realize	 their	 connections	 with	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 polis,	 whilst	educating	 them	 about	 the	 structures	 of	 power	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 which	 the	 ancient	 polis	operated.	 In	much	of	Bookchin’s	work,	 this	 realisation	 comes	as	 the	 result	 of	 the	 artist’s	faith	in	the	principle	of	collaboration.	As	she	notes,		 I	think	of	art	making	and	teaching	as	fundamentally	creative	social	practices.	I	teach	from	the	position	that	most	art	making	is	collaborative,	that	in	the	current	parlance,	artists	 edit,	 remix	 and	 sample	 ideas,	 attitudes,	 and	 images,	 working	 from	 within	culture	rather	than	outside	of	it.	I	think	some	of	the	best	work	comes	out	of	dialogue,	critical	awareness,	and	active	engagement	in	the	world.294		In	 Laid	Off,	 the	 idea	 of	 collaboration	 is	 combined	 with	 what	 artist	 and	 academic	 Karen	O’Rourke	 sees	as	 the	 influence	of	 the	Debordian	concept	of	 “détournement”;	namely,	 the	integration	of	artistic	products	that	originate	from	different	periods,	which	construct	a	new	
																																																																																																																																																																																		<https://rhizome.org/editorial/2011/mar/09/out-public-natalie-bookchin-conversation-blake-sti/>	accessed	25	March	2016.	294	ibid.		
			 107	
ensemble	bearing	an	alternative	scope	and	effect.295	This	becomes	evident	 if	we	consider	that	 Bookchin	 recombines	 found	 footage	 originating	 from	 different	 sources	 and,	accordingly,	 imbues	 the	 videos,	 as	 a	 new	 collective	 entity,	 with	 a	 political	meaning	 that	expands	their	original	 intentions;	or	–	even	–	the	original	 intentions	of	 the	dissemination	platform	that	the	artist	is	employing	for	the	exhibition	of	her	work.			 The	potentially	subversive	character	of	 this	shift	 in	scale,	which	becomes	possible	thanks	to	widened	participation	and	the	combination	of	individually	produced	material,	is	also	evident	in	Bookchin’s	most	recent	project,	Long	Story	Short	(2014-2016).296	The	artist	describes	 the	 work	 as	 a	 “composite	 group	 interview”,297	which	 concurrently	 adopts	 the	forms	of	a	feature	film,	an	interactive	web	documentary	and	an	online	story	archive.	Using	once	more	 the	 format	 of	 the	 video	 diary,	 Bookchin	 asked	 from	 over	 100	 participants	 to	reflect	 on	 poverty	 in	 post-crisis	 USA	 by	 sharing	 their	 personal	 stories	 of	 hardship.	 The	interviewees	describe	 in	detail	 their	unprivileged	 social	position	 that	often	 comes	as	 the	result	of	a	vicious	circle	of	poverty:	in	spite	of	the	“American	Dream”	rhetoric,	it	seems	that	people	are	rarely	offered	a	real	opportunity	to	climb	the	social	ladder.	As	the	participants	explain,	 they	 feel	 trapped	 in	 their	 circumstances,	which	are	defined	by	problems	such	as	the	lack	of	affordable	housing,	poor	health,	drug	addiction,	limited	education	and	virtually	non-existent	 community	 support.	 In	 addition,	 some	 deprived	 neighbourhoods	 are	 so	violent	 that	 one	 of	 the	 participants	 calls	 his	 own	 neighbourhood	 a	 “baby	 Iraq”.298	At	 the	same	time,	American	mainstream	media	under-report	the	extent	of	poverty	and	the	huge	divisions	between	the	country’s	super-rich	and	those	living	below	the	poverty	line.	This	is	particularly	 true	 in	 states	 like	 California,	where	Bookchin	 and	many	 of	 her	 interviewees	live.	Long	Story	Short	attempts	to	challenge	this	context	of	misrepresentation	by	creating	a	social	cinema	that	demonstrates	 that	most	of	poverty’s	causes	are	 fundamentally	shared.	Economic	 inequalities	produce	 a	 class	 of	 “unseen”	 –	people	whose	 stories	 are	not	worth	much	to	the	government.	The	different	dissemination	platforms	used	by	Long	Story	Short,																																																									295	Karen	O’Rourke,	 ‘Art	Work	/	Dream	Work	in	New	Media	Documentary’	 in	Lanfranco	Aceti	and	others	 (eds),	Red	Art:	New	Utopias	in	Data	Capitalism,	Leonardo	Electronic	Almanac,	 vol.	 20,	 no.	 1	(Leonardo/ISAST,	San	Francisco	2014)	p.	272.	For	the	original	definition	of	“détournement”	see	the	inaugural	volume	of	 the	 journal	of	 Internationale	Situationiste,	vol.	1	(Ubumexico.centro.org.mx)	p.	13	 <http://ubumexico.centro.org.mx/text/si/Internationale_situationniste_1.pdf>	 accessed	 25	March	2016.	296	'Long	 Story	 Short'	 (Natalie	Bookchin,	 2016)	 <http://bookchin.net/projects/long-story-short/>	accessed	6	April	2016.	297	Natalie	Bookchin,	‘Long	Story	Short’	in	Lanfranco	Aceti	and	others	(eds),	Red	Art:	New	Utopias	in	
Data	Capitalism,	Leonardo	Electronic	Almanac,	vol.	20,	no.	1	(Leonardo/ISAST,	San	Francisco	2014)	p.	175.	298	ibid.,	p.	176.	
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in	combination	with	the	range	of	personal	narratives,	propose	a	more	social	media,	through	which	 the	 class	 divisions	 accentuated	 by	 Data	 Capitalism	 become	 more	 easily	identifiable.299			
	Figure	25:	Natalie	Bookchin,	Long	Story	Short	(2014-2016)		
Cutting	culture	in	a	culture	of	cuts		One	of	the	less	widely	exposed	aspects	of	the	economic	crisis	has	been	its	profound	impact	on	the	arts	and	cultural	 institutions.	Similar	to	Bookchin’s	Long	Story	Short,	artists	can	be	identified	 as	 a	 social	 class	whose	 stories	has	 also	 remained	 largely	 concealed,	 given	 that	since	the	beginning	of	the	crisis	policymakers	around	the	world	have	repeatedly	prioritised	support	for	the	financial	sector	over	support	for	the	humanities	and	cultural	producers.300	
																																																								299	In	 its	 documentary	 film	 form,	Long	Story	Short	 received	 its	world	 premiere	 at	 the	Museum	of	Modern	Art	 (MoMA),	 in	New	York,	on	22	February	2016	and	 it	went	on	 to	win	 the	Grand	Prix	at	Centre	Pompidou’s	“Cinéma	du	Réel”	Festival,	in	Paris,	in	March	2016.	300	For	instance,	funding	for	the	arts	in	the	UK	was	cut	nationally	and	locally,	with	the	budget	of	Arts	Council	England	cut	by	32%	and	the	local	government	budget	cut	by	40%	between	2010	and	2015.	See:	 Mark	 Brown,	 ‘Arts	 and	 Culture	 Being	 “Systematically	 Removed	 from	 UK	 Education	System”’	The	 Guardian	(17	 February	 2015)	<http://www.theguardian.com/education/2015/feb/17/arts-and-culture-systematically-removed-from-uk-education-system>	accessed	25	March	2016.	In	addition,	in	the	US,	the	Museum	of	Contemporary	Art,	Los	Angeles	was	bailed	out	by	 the	billionaire	Eli	Broad,	 in	December	2008;	
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Notably,	 the	 budget	 cuts	 that	 have	 affected	 the	 arts	 should	 not	 be	 perceived	 as	 being	independent	 from	 the	 cuts	 in	 other	 sectors,	 including	 education,	 state-funded	 health	structures	 and	 general	 social	 support	 services.	 Rather,	 they	 form	 part	 of	 a	 much	 wider	culture	that	has	been	gradually	cultivated	as	the	dominant	political	narrative	of	the	crisis	by	 the	 financial	 elites.	 What	 is	 particularly	 important	 to	 note	 here	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 the	connotation	 of	 word	 “cut”	 is	 –	 most	 often	 –	 negatively	 charged:	 it	 signifies	 an	 act	 of	separation,	division,	slicing,	dissection,	axing	and,	in	the	end,	rejection	from	the	social	body.	However,	if	the	element	that	is	cut	can	be	associated	with	a	“cancerous”	entity,	then,	the	act	of	 slicing	 becomes	 something	 positive:	 a	 form	 of	 “cure”.	 Art,	 culture	 and	 the	 humanities	have	often	been	described	by	the	ruling	classes	in	similarly	unfavourable	terms;	namely,	as	elements	 of	 the	 social	 body	 that	 are	 dysfunctional	 and	 unproductive	 for	 the	 economy	 –	sectors	 that	 are	 not	 worthy	 of	 public	 support	 anymore.301	Accordingly,	 this	 climate	 has	produced	a	twofold	challenge	for	artists:	on	the	one	hand,	the	challenge	of	connecting	the	impact	of	the	crisis	on	the	arts	with	what	has	been	happening	in	the	rest	of	the	society;	and,	at	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 challenge	of	making	 clear	 its	 specific	 impact	on	 culture	 and	artists	themselves.		 The	 online	 platform	 of	 the	 Museum	 of	 Contemporary	 Cuts	 (MoCC)	 has	 combined	those	 two	 objectives	 since	 2012.302	Founded	 by	 Italian	 curator,	 artist	 and	 academic	Lanfranco	Aceti,	MoCC	explores	the	relationship	between	art	and	the	economy	at	a	time	of	financial	 crisis,	 with	 a	 view	 to	 presenting	 an	 alternative	 narrative	 about	 how	 the	 social	body	is	perceived	in	Data	Capitalism.	The	principal	output	of	this	investigation	is	a	series	of	online	 exhibitions	by	different	 artists	 and	 curators	whose	 interests	 lie	 in	 the	 field	 of	 the	economy,	social	equality	and	social	justice.	Those	exhibitions	use	extensively	social	media	for	the	dissemination	of	their	material	(with	one	image,	or	video	per	day	posted	on	MoCC’s	Facebook	and	Twitter	accounts),	and	they	are	often	related	–	loosely,	or	more	directly	–	to																																																																																																																																																																																			and,	 in	 February	 2009,	 the	Metropolitan	Museum	 of	 Art,	 in	 New	 York,	 announced	 that	 it	 would	freeze	staff	hiring,	and	that	15	out	of	its	23	satellite	stores	around	the	country	would	close.	301	In	 2015,	 the	UK’s	Warwick	 Commission	 concluded	 in	 its	 final	 report,	 titled	 ‘Enriching	Britain:	
Culture,	 Creativity	 and	 Growth’	 that	 “Policymakers	 are	 obsessed	 with	 a	 siloed	 subject-based	
curriculum	and	early	specialisation	in	arts	or	science	disciplines	that	ignores	and	obscures	discussion	
around	the	 future	need	 for	all	children	to	enjoy	an	education	that	encourages	creativity.”	 However,	what	 this	 pressure	 entails	 is	 that	 in	 the	 climate	 of	 the	 economic	 crisis,	 the	 arts	 are	 being	systematically	removed	from	the	British	education	system,	as	dramatic	falls	have	been	reported	in	the	 number	 of	 pupils	 taking	 GCSEs	 in	 design,	 drama	 and	 other	 craft-related	 subjects.	 	 	 See:	 The	Warwick	Commission	on	the	Future	of	Cultural	Value,	‘Final	Report’	(Warwick.ac.uk,	2	April	2015)	<http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/research/warwickcommission/futureculture/finalreport/>	accessed	25	March	2016.	302 	‘Museum	 of	 Contemporary	 Cuts’	 (Museumofcontemporarycuts.org,	 2014)	<http://museumofcontemporarycuts.org/>	accessed	25	March	2016.		
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physical	 exhibitions	 concurrently	 taking	place	 in	different	 gallery	 spaces,303	as	well	 as	 to	conferences,	panel	discussions	and	relevant	publications.			
	Figure	26:	Museum	of	Contemporary	Cuts	(MoCC)		In	his	online	exhibition	for	MoCC	titled	Decoding	the	Flow	(2013),	Paolo	Cirio	attempted	to	demystify	 the	 nature	 of	 global	 economic	 crisis	 by	 highlighting	 the	 “invisible”	 flows	 that	define	the	operation	of	Data	Capitalism.	In	order	to	do	that,	he	revisited	some	of	his	most	recent	 works	 and	 he	 provided	 succinct-yet-informative	 visual	 representations	 of	 the	economic	 environment	 in	 which	 we	 live	 through	 a	 series	 of	 diagrams.	 Those	 diagrams	focused	on	revealing	the	wealth	accumulation	processes	of	major	corporations,	like	Google,	as	 well	 as	 on	 formulating	 a	 variety	 of	 open	 society	 structures	 facilitated	 by	 new	media	technologies.	 The	 2014	 exhibition	 Money	 is	 Time	 by	 Russian	 new	 media	 artist	 Olga	Kisseleva	 focused	 on	 the	 severe	 “cut”	 of	 personal	 time	 as	 an	 invaluable	 possession,	 by	employing	a	variety	of	data	visualisation	techniques.	Kisseleva	used	for	her	visualisations	a	mathematical	 formula	 that	 combined	 life	 expectancies	 and	 working	 hours	 in	 various	countries	 in	 order	 to	 extract	 the	 “real	 value”	 of	 people’s	 time,	 which	 she	 names	 “time-value”.	Through	the	presentation	of	the	results	in	different	forms,	the	artist	highlights	the	monetisation	 of	 time	 by	 an	 abusive	 system	 of	 “servitude”,	which	 “slices”	 the	 employees’	time	 into	 mere	 economic	 units	 –	 a	 strategy	 that	 effectively	 appropriates	 people’s	 lives,	
																																																								303	Those	gallery	spaces	have	included	over	the	years	Kasa	Gallery	(Istanbul);	the	Royal	College	of	Art	(London);	Watermans	Centre	(London);	and	Guest	Projects/Shonibare	Studio	(London).	
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whilst	 producing	 significant	 wealth	 divisions	 between	 regions,	 countries,	 or	 –	 even	 –	genders.		
	Figure	27:	Olga	Kisseleva,	Money	is	Time	(2014)			 This	 extensive	 culture	of	monetisation	 is	 also	addressed,	 from	a	different	point	of	view,	 in	 Tom	Corby’s	 exhibition	No	Detectable	Level	 (2013).	 Corby	 adopted	 as	 a	 starting	point	 for	 his	 works	 his	 own	 medical	 condition,	 which	 requires	 the	 provision	 of	 state-funded	 medication,	 regular	 tests	 and	 consistent	 support	 by	 the	 services	 of	 the	 British	National	Health	System	(NHS).	Notably,	 state-supported	health	 systems	have	been	under	great	financial	pressure	in	several	countries	due	to	the	fiscal	policies	adopted	as	a	result	of	the	 crisis.	For	his	exhibition,	Corby	produces	an	aesthetic	 transcription	of	 the	 concept	of	the	sick	body,	underlining	the	financial	impact	of	the	services	that	are	being	offered	to	him,	but,	 also,	 the	 financial	 gain	 that	 is	 involved	 in	 the	whole	process	 for	drug	manufacturers	and	 health	 services’	 providers.	 In	 this	way,	 the	 artist	 poses	 the	 question	 of	 the	 value	 of	human	life,	and	if/how	this	can	be	defined	in	monetary	terms.	The	images	used	by	Corby	include	photos	of	his	medication,	weekly	price	 catalogues	or	 “drug	 tariffs”,	photos	of	 the	hospital	equipment,	as	well	as	the	collection	of	hats	that	the	artist-patient	wears	depending	
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on	his	mood	and	feelings.	The	juxtapositions	created	by	those	images	appear	to	connect	the	artist’s	 ill	 body	 with	 an	 “ill”	 society	 that	 struggles	 to	 identify	 its	 priorities	 and	 values.	Finally,	an	important	part	of	MoCC’s	online	presence	is	devoted	to	the	circulation	of	news	regarding	the	cuts	in	the	budgets	of	publicly	funded	museums	and	art	institutions	around	the	world.	 Those	 stories	 have	 been	 regularly	 posted	 on	 the	museum’s	website	 and	 on	 a	variety	of	social	media	networks,	accompanied	by	direct	links	to	the	news	sources	and/or	the	websites	of	the	affected	organisations.			
	Figure	28:	Tom	Corby,	No	Detectable	Level	(2013)		 	Quite	 predictably,	 perhaps,	 the	 severity	 of	 the	 crisis	 entails	 that	 the	 Museum	 of	
Contemporary	Cuts	 has	 not	 been	 the	 sole	 online	 initiative	 through	which	 artists,	 cultural	workers	 and	 educators	 have	 been	 communicating	 their	 anxieties	 about	 the	 pervasive	culture	of	cuts	that	Data	Capitalism	has	engendered.	This	context	of	institutional	critique	is	also	 vividly	 reflected	 in	 the	 activities	 of	 W.A.G.E.	 (Working	 Artists	 and	 the	 Greater	Economy),	 a	 New	 York-based	 collective	 founded	 in	 2008,	 which	 is	 advocating	 that	 all	organisations	pay	artist	fees	and	develop	a	protective	framework	for	the	labour	rights	of	all	creative	 professionals.304	In	 their	 “wo/manifesto”	 (2008),	 the	 members	 of	 the	 group	condemn	 the	exploitative	mode	of	 labour	 imposed	by	 the	 (increasingly	 financialized)	 art																																																									304	‘W.A.G.E’	(Wageforwork.com)	<http://www.wageforwork.com/>	accessed	25	March	2016.		
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market,	which	has	been	uncritically	adopted	even	by	non-profit	art	organisations.	Due	to	widely	 established	 practice	 of	 non-payment	 important	 economic	 inequalities	 have	 been	generated	 for	 cultural	 labourers.	Those	 inequalities	have	only	 intensified	amid	 the	crisis,	becoming	an	almost	 “formalised”	status	of	artistic	production.	According	 to	W.A.G.E.,	 this	trend	 should	 be	 actively	 fought,	 with	 the	 objective	 of	 achieving	 “the	 remuneration	 of	cultural	 value	 in	 capital	 value”.305	In	 September	 2010,	W.A.G.E.	 launched	 a	major	 online	survey	 in	 order	 to	 gather	 and	 share	 information	 regarding	 the	 economic	 experiences	 of	artists	who	have	been	exhibiting	in	non-profit	art	spaces	in	the	New	York	City	area,	since	2005.	 The	 survey	 covered	 a	 variety	 of	 characteristics	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 which	 the	 data	analysis	was	made,	 including	 the	 type	of	 the	exhibition,	 form	of	expenses,	amount	of	 fee,	demographics	and	type	of	institution.	On	average,	almost	60%	of	the	artists	who	responded	to	the	survey	did	not	receive	any	form	of	payment	or	reimbursement	for	their	participation	in	the	exhibitions	organised	by	New	York	galleries	and	museums.306		 	In	an	attempt	to	reverse	this	situation,	W.A.G.E.	 initiated	 in	2010	a	programme	of	Certification,	through	which	the	collective	acknowledges	the	espousal	of	a	“best-practices”	operational	 model	 by	 art	 organisations	 that	 commit	 paying	 artist	 fees.307	The	 W.A.G.E.	Certification	was	launched	as	a	blueprint	for	certifying	individual	exhibitions	and	it,	 later,	adopted	a	more	holistic	approach	in	view	of	becoming	able	to	evaluate	the	overall	activity	of	 institutions	 and	 their	 general	 microeconomic	 environment.308	The	 first	 exhibition	certified	was	“Free”	at	New	York’s	New	Museum	(2010),	which	explored	the	different	ways	in	 which	 the	 Internet	 has	 transformed	 our	 understanding	 of	 publicness,	 openness,	connectivity	and	dissemination.309	Curator	Lauren	Cornell	 invited	W.A.G.E.	 to	 take	part	 in	
																																																								305 	‘Wo/manifesto’	 (Wageforwork.com)	 <http://www.wageforwork.com/about/1/womanifesto>	accessed	25	March	2016.		306	The	 exact	 percentage	 is	 58.4%.	 See:	 ‘W.A.G.E.	 Survey	 Report	 Summary’	 (Wageforwork.com)	<http://www.wageforwork.com/resources/4/w.a.g.e.-survey-report-summary>	 accessed	 25	March	2016.	307 	‘About	 Certification’	 (Wageforwork.com)	<http://www.wageforwork.com/certification/1/about-certification>	accessed	25	March	2016.	308	This	includes	elements	like	the	institution's	relationship	to	real	estate	(does	it	rent,	own	and/or	function	as	a	real	estate	market	speculator/developer?);	its	age;	whether	it	receives	an	endowment,	or	not;	 its	 long	 and	 short-term	 investment	 and	 funding	 strategies;	 the	organization’s	mission;	 its	annual	 total	operating	budget;	 the	number	of	exhibitions	that	 it	produces;	 the	number	of	cultural	workers	participating	in	its	activities;	and	the	definition	of	“equity”	that	 it	espouses.	See:	W.A.G.E,	‘Principles	 of	 W.A.G.E.	 Certification’	The	 Brooklyn	 Rail	(5	 February	 2013)	<http://www.brooklynrail.org/2013/02/artseen/principles-of-wage-certification>	 accessed	 25	March	2016.	309 	‘Exhibition:	 Free’	 (Archive.newmuseum.org)	<http://archive.newmuseum.org/index.php/Detail/Occurrence/Show/occurrence_id/1092>	accessed	25	March	2016.	
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the	 show,	 with	 the	 group	 deciding	 that	 instead	 of	 exhibiting	 an	 artwork,	 they	 would	undertake	the	negotiation	of	the	fees	for	all	participating	artists.310	As	of	2014,	and	in	order	to	receive	 the	certification,	art	organisations	can	contact	 the	collective	online	 through	 its	website,	 and	 apply	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 requirements	 that	 have	 been	 established	 by	 The	W.A.G.E.	Summit.311		In	another	example	that	reflects	this	spirit	of	unveiling	the	harsh		
	Figure	29:	W.A.G.E.	artist’s	fees	calculator		realities	 of	 the	 cuts,	 the	London-based	Glasshouse	Collective	 launched	 in	2014	 its	 online	project	 The	Work	We	Want.	 Through	 the	 project’s	 website,	 the	 collective	 asked	 digital	workers	originating	from	around	the	world	to	share	their	experiences	of	work,	on	the	basis	of	four	simple	questions:	“What	work	do	you	do?	How	much	are	you	paid?	What	work	do	you	want?	How	much	do	you	want	to	be	paid?”312		By	assembling	the	workers’	responses,	
The	Work	We	Want	managed	 to	 expose	 the	underclass	of	 cultural	microworkers	 that	has	been	created	due	to	Data	Capitalism’s	expansion	in	“low	wage	economies”.	This	expansion	inevitably	also	puts	under	pressure	 the	wages	of	digital	workers	who	are	based	 in	more	developed	 economies,	 as	 they	 need	 to	 compete	 online	 in	 order	 to	 receive	 commissions.																																																									310 	W.A.G.E,	 ‘W.A.G.E	 Discuss	 Their	 Certification	 Projects’	Artforum	(23	 November	 2011)	<http://artforum.com/words/id=29628>	accessed	25	March	2016.	311	The	 Summit	 took	place	 on	13-14	 January	2014	and	 its	 results	were	 announced	 at	 the	 “Out	 of	Alternatives”	conference,	which	was	organized	by	Common	Practice	New	York	and	the	Center	 for	Curatorial	Studies	of	Bard	College	on	18	May	2014.	312	The	 project’s	 website:	 ‘The	 Work	 We	 Want’	 (Workwewant.com)	 <http://workwewant.com/>	accessed	25	March	2016.	
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Finally,	in	the	context	of	the	project,	the	members	of	the	Glasshouse	Collective	created	an	online	archive	of	videos	featuring	the	views	of	individual	artists,	researchers,	policymakers	and	lawyers	on	digital	labour,	as	well	as	a	case	study	of	a	commission	of	outsourced	art.	In	 order	 to	 accentuate	 the	 previously	 described	 context	 of	 exploitation,	 W.A.G.E.	presented	in	2012	one	of	its	most	assertive	protest	actions,	when	it	posted	on	YouTube	a	video	 ridiculing	 Carolyn	 Christov-Bakargiev,	 the	 artistic	 director	 of	 Documenta	 13.	 The	video	 criticised	 the	 curator’s	 decision	 not	 to	 pay	 fees	 to	 the	 artists	 participating	 in	 the	exhibition	 –	 one	 of	 the	most	 prestigious	 shows	 in	 the	world	 in	 the	 field	 of	modern	 and	contemporary	art.	Titled	pOWER	(100):	A	Screenplay,	 the	video’s	 title	constitutes	an	overt	reference	 to	 ArtReview’s	 famous	 “Power	 100”	 list,	 which	 is	 published	 annually	 by	 the	magazine	and	charts	the	100	most	powerful	figures	in	contemporary	art	world.313	In	the			
	Figure	30:	W.A.G.E.,	pOWER	(100):	A	Screenplay	(2012)		video,	the	famous	curator	(listed	at	the	first	place	of	the	“Power	100”	list	in	2012)	is	treated	like	an	artist,	 in	a	“fictionalised	melodrama”,	as	the	members	of	W.A.G.E.	characterise	the	work.314	The	 video	 begins	 by	 showing	 Christov-Bakargiev	 at	 a	 panel	 discussion	 in	 New	York,	 explaining	 the	 situation	 regarding	 artist	 fees	 at	Documenta:	 “If	 you	were	 an	 artist,																																																									313	‘2015	 Power	 100’	Art	Review	(2015)	 <http://artreview.com/power_100/>	 accessed	 25	 March	2016.		314	W.A.G.E,	 ‘POWER	 (100):	 A	 Screenplay’,	 video	 recording,	 (Youtube.com,	 4	 February	 2013)	<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A7OrU6qZkOs>	accessed	25	March	2016.		
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you	didn’t	get	any	money,	no,	because	you	were	already	invited	to	the	exhibition,	and	you	got	to	produce	your	work,	so	we	didn’t	pay	the	artists”.315	Her	comment	is	accompanied	by	some	 laughs.	W.A.G.E.’s	 screenplay,	 then,	goes	on	by	cutting	 to	an	 imaginary	 flashback	 in	which	 the	 curator	 is	 being	 asked	 by	 the	 CEO	of	Documenta,	 Bernd	 Leifeld,	 to	 curate	 the	exhibition	without	the	expectation	to	receive	any	reimbursement	for	her	work,	because	–	just	 like	 the	 artists	 –	 she	 has	 “already	 been	 invited	 to	 the	 exhibition”.	 Unsurprisingly,	Christov-Bakargiev’s	response	to	such	an	employment	prospect	was	negative.			 It	is	important	to	note	here	that	W.A.G.E.’s	hybrid	practices	of	advocacy	and	protest	have	not	 been	 independent	 of	 the	preoccupations	 and	 actions	 of	 other	 cultural	workers.	This	 is	 particularly	 relevant	 to	 the	 period	 of	 political	mobilisation	 that	 has	 followed	 the	creation	 of	Occupy	Wall	 Street	 (OWS),	 in	 September	2011.	Amongst	 the	working	 groups	formed	within	 the	movement,	 Arts	&	 Labor	 has	 been	 the	 one	dedicated	 to	 revealing	 the	precariousness	 experienced	 by	 cultural	 producers	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 crisis.	 Since	 its	inauguration,	 the	 group	 has	 been	 holding	 regular	 meetings	 that	 are	 advertised	 on	 its	website,	alongside	a	variety	of	other	news,	events	and	ways	to	get	involved	in	art-related	OWS	activities.	In	2012,	the	group	posted	online	a	letter	addressed	to	the	Whitney	Museum	of	 American	 Art,	 asking	 for	 the	 cancelation	 of	 the	 2014	Whitney	 Biennial	 given	 that	 “it	upholds	a	system	that	benefits	collectors,	trustees,	and	corporations	at	the	expense	of	art	workers”.316	As	 the	members	 of	 Arts	 &	 Labor	 claimed	 in	 their	 letter,	 art	 institutions	 are	today	completely	absorbed	by	a	corporate	ethos	of	profit,	self-interest	and	oppression,	and	the	Whitney	Biennial	is	no	exception	to	that.	In	another	of	its	actions,	the	group	managed	to	persuade	the	Frieze	New	York	art	fair	to	employ	union	workers	for	the	construction	of	its	250,000	square	 foot	 tent,	starting	 from	2015	–	a	 labour	practice	 that	Frieze	was	the	sole	New	York-based	art	fair	to	ignore	since	its	inaugural	edition	in	2012.	This	result	came	after	a	vigorous	campaign	that	lasted	for	almost	two	years,	during	which	Arts	&	Labor	built	on	their	 Occupy	 Wall	 Street	 network	 in	 order	 to	 stage	 various	 protest	 events.	 Rather	poignantly,	 the	 group’s	members	 even	 renamed	 the	 art	 fair	 into	 a	 “rat”	 fair,	 in	 order	 to	draw	wider	attention	to	its	unethical	employment	practices.317			
																																																								315	ibid.	316	Arts	 &	 Labour,	 ‘End	 the	 Whitney	 Biennial	 2014’	 (Artsandlabour.org,	 24	 February	 2012)	<http://artsandlabor.org/end-the-whitney-biennial-2014/#sthash.zfYeawGh.YI3dPxMN.dpbs>	accessed	25	March	2016.	317	Arts	 &	 Labour,	 ‘Facts	 about	 the	 Frieze	 NY	 “Rat”	 Fair’	 (Artsandlabour.org,	 6	 May	 2013)	<http://artsandlabor.org/facts-onfrieze/#sthash.QCPY2oRr.dpbs>	accessed	25	March	2016.	
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From	Occupying	the	Square	to	Reclaiming	the	Commons			Nevertheless,	 the	most	 important	contribution	of	the	Occupy	movement	to	the	exhibition	strategies	employed	by	politically	engaged	artists	has	–	probably	–	been	the	revitalisation	of	the	role	of	public	space	in	their	practices.	In	an	intervention	that	exemplifies	this	spirit,	French	multimedia	 artist	Maurice	Benayoun	exhibited	between	 January	 and	March	2012	for	 the	 first	 time	 in	 the	 US	 his	 real-time	 data-visualisation	 artworks	 Emotion	 Forecast	(2010)	and	Occupy	Wall	Screens	 (2011).	Benayoun	presented	the	 two	works	 in	 the	 large-scale	 public	 screens	 installed	 at	 the	 Big	 Screen	 Plaza	 of	 Manhattan,	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	“redeploy”	 them	within	 the	 geographical	 and	 ideological	 environment	 that	 gave	 birth	 to	them	(New	York’s	financial	centre).	Both	works	belong	to	the	ongoing	series	Mechanics	of	
Emotions,	 in	 which	 the	 artist	 interprets	 the	 Internet	 as	 the	 world’s	 “nervous	 system”,	producing	 diverse	 visualisations	 of	 data	 related	 to	 the	 emotional	 state	 of	 people.	 In	
Emotion	Forecast,	 that	 information	 originates	 from	websites	 related	 to	 current	 events	 in	3,200	 cities	 around	 the	 globe,	 through	 whose	 posts	 Benayoun	 is	 able	 to	 “measure”	 48	different	emotions.318	 By	associating	 the	emotional	 state	of	 the	 inhabitants	with	 the			
	Figure	31:	Maurice	Benayoun,	Emotion	Forecast	(2010)		
																																																								318	The	 research	 and	 the	 development	 of	 the	 platform	were	 carried	 out	 by	 Robin	 Gareus	 (CiTu-Paragraphe,	Université	Paris	8).	
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proximity	of	the	locations,	the	work	predicts	the	tendencies	for	the	next	couple	of	days.	The	forecasts	 are	 projected	 on	 a	 map	 that	 uses	 a	 hybrid	 visual	 language	 combining	 a	 stock	ticker	display	with	words-emotions	such	as	“happy”,	“confused”,	“weak”,	“afraid”,	“strong”	and	 “guilty”,	 amongst	 others.	 In	 addition,	 the	 maps	 were	 available	 in	 real	 time	 on	 the	project’s	website.319	As	Benayoun	notes,	“playing	with	words	is	sometimes	the	best	way	to	connect	different	layers	of	information,	different	territories,	different	fields”.320	In	the	case	of	 Emotion	 Forecast,	 those	 layers	 hint	 –	 once	 more	 –	 at	 the	 extensive	 culture	 of	monetisation,	 as	 the	 human	 factor	 merges	 with	 the	 idea	 of	 prediction,	 quantitative	manipulation	and,	in	the	end,	commodification.321	This	context	becomes	even	more	salient	and	directly	engaged	with	political	dissent,	in	Occupy	Wall	Screens.322	In	the	work,	real-time	stock	valuations	of	major	 financial	 institutions	 are	 juxtaposed	with	 the	 emotional	 trends	emanating	 from	 Occupy	 sites	 located	 around	 the	 world,	 whose	 emotion-related	 data	 is	collected	from	Web	search	engines.	On	the	left	hand	side	of	the	screen,	Benayoun	displays	the	emotional	currents	and	on	the	right-hand	side	the	stock	values.	In	both	cases,	he	once	more	uses	the	familiar	stock	tickers’	template	that	is	widely	employed	by	Bloomberg-style	news	 programs.	 In	 addition,	 for	 Occupy	Wall	 Screens	 Benayoun	 only	 presents	 the	 stock	values	 of	 financial	 companies,	 namely	 “only	 those	making	money	with	money”,323	which	have,	also,	been	the	main	responsible	for	the	recent	economic	crises.	By	showing	his	works	in	 a	 prominent	 public	 location	 not	 far	 from	 the	 actual	 site	 of	 the	 Occupy	 Wall	 Street	movement,	Benayoun	is	able	to	“reterritorialise”	meaning	and	use	public	space	in	order	to	provide	 a	 vivid	 visual	 depiction	 of	 the	 clash	 between	 the	 institutional	 agents	 of	 Data	Capitalism	(1%)	and	the	people	(99%).	If	we	consider	Benayoun’s	practice	of	activating	public	space	as	a	platform	for	social	protest,	then,	one	could	consider	it	only	as	the	“first	step”,	in	the	effort	to	produce	political	change.	The	natural	“next	step”	in	this	process	would	be	a	renewed	focus	on	public	space	itself,	by	redefining	it	not	merely	as	a	means	to	project	social	anxieties	and	struggles,	but	
																																																								319	‘Emotion	 Forecast’	 (Emotionforecast.com)	 <http://emotionforecast.com>	 accessed	 25	 March	2016.		320	Michael	Kurcfeld,	‘“Occupy	Wall	Screen”:	A	Renowned	French	Media	Artist	Takes	on	Wall	Street	(VIDEO)’	Huffington	 Post	(30	 January	 2012)	 <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-kurcfeld/wall-street-art_b_1239101.html>	accessed	25	March	2016.	321	Emotion	Forecast	has	also	been	exhibited,	amongst	other	locations,	in	ZERO1	San	Jose	Biennial,	California;	 MOMENTUM,	 Berlin;	 Dubai,	 UAE;	 ISEA	 Sydney	 2013;	 Federation	 Square,	 Melbourne,	Australia.	322	The	 project’s	 website:	 Maurice	 Benayoun,	 ‘Occupy	 Wall	 Screens:	 eMotion	 Stock	 Value’	(Benayoun.com)	<http://www.benayoun.com/projet.php?id=180>	accessed	25	March	2016.	323	Kurcfeld,	loc.	cit.	
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	Figure	32:	Maurice	Benayoun,	Occupy	Wall	Screens	(2011)		rather	as	an	active	producer	of	viable	economic	and	political	alternatives.	The	discourses	that	have	developed	around	this	potentiality	have	at	their	core	the	idea	of	the	“commons”	and	 its	 capacity	 to	 subvert	 the	 neoliberal	 context	 of	 privatization	 and/or	 government	regulation	 of	 what	 constitutes	 shared	 economic	 value	 in	 a	 society.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	commons	should	not	be	 conceptualised	merely	 in	 terms	of	what	we	have	 inherited	 from	the	 past,	 and	 are	 required	 to	 protect	 and	 pass	 to	 future	 generations	 (the	 natural	environment	 and	 its	 resources;	 cultural	 and	 intellectual	 products;	 public	 goods,	 like	infrastructures	 and	 public	 education	 or	 health	 systems).	 Rather,	 this	 definition	 should	expand	 in	 order	 to	 include	 everything	 that	we	 create	 and	 share,	 through	 the	production	and	 dissemination	 tools	 offered	 by	 networked	 technologies.	 This	 spirit	 of	 creativity	engendered	 by	 the	 online	 collaborations	 between	 artists,	 programmers,	 researchers	 and	hardware	 engineers	 has	 produced	 new	 forms	 of	 art	 that	 not	 only	 encourage	 a	 shift	 of	mentality	 towards	 the	 commons,	 but,	 also,	 a	 transformation	 in	 the	 way	 that	 many	 art	organisations	 perceive	 their	 social	 role	 and	 function.324	Not	 surprisingly,	 this	 has	 been	
																																																								324	Daphne	 Dragona,	 ‘Artists	 as	 the	 New	 Producers	 of	 the	 Common	 (?)’	 in	 Lanfranco	 Aceti	 and	others	 (eds),	Red	Art:	New	Utopias	in	Data	Capitalism,	Leonardo	Electronic	Almanac,	 vol.	 20,	 no.	 1	(Leonardo/ISAST,	San	Francisco	2014)	p.	165.	
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especially	true	in	the	case	of	the	countries	that	have	been	most	severely	hit	by	the	global	economic	crisis	and	the	austerity	that	it	has	brought	for	cultural	institutions.		 In	2010,	 the	National	Museum	of	Contemporary	Art,	 in	Athens	 (EMST),	presented	two	new	web-based	exhibitions	that	explored	the	role	of	the	commons	as	an	alternative	to	the	 path	 proposed	by	 the	 neoliberal	 economic	model.	Esse,	Nosse,	Posse:	Common	Wealth	
for	Common	People	 was	 the	 first	 of	 the	 two	 projects	 to	 be	 launched	 (April	 2010)	 as	 an	online	platform	that	introduced	both	the	museum’s	audience	and	Web	users	at	large	to	the	main	 principles	 of	 the	 commons,	 through	 a	 variety	 of	 artistic	 projects,	 open	 software	initiatives	 and	 texts	 of	 critical	 theory.325	With	 its	 triadic	 title	 referencing	 the	 spirit	 of	Renaissance	 humanism	 (the	 doctrine	 “I	 am,	 I	 know,	 I	 can”),	 the	 platform	 aimed	 to	demonstrate	how	knowledge	and	information	could	be	reclaimed	and,	accordingly,	used	in	order	to	produce	wealth	for	the	majority	of	people,	 instead	for	merely	those	who	already	control	capital	and	its	 flows.	Some	of	the	works	featured	in	the	exhibition’s	website	have	already	been	examined	in	this	thesis,	including	Invisible	Threads	by	Stephanie	Rothenberg	and	 Jeff	Crouse,	 and	Dmytri	Kleiner’s	Telekommunisten	projects.	 In	addition,	Esse,	Nosse,	
Posse:	Common	Wealth	for	Common	People	presented	other	relevant	projects	using	diverse	strategies	 with	 the	 purpose	 of	 demonstrating	 “the	 possibilities	 of	 re-appropriation	 of	knowledge	that	may	occur	only	through	knowledge	itself”.326	In	re_potemkin	(2008),	the	.-_-.	“entity”,	as	it	calls	itself,327	invites	online	users	to	download	for	free	re-edited	versions	of	Sergei	 Eisenstein’s	 Battleship	 Potemkin	 (1925),	 which	 is	 now	 on	 public	 domain	 (i.e.	 its	intellectual	property	rights	have	expired),	as	well	as	share	them	on	a	peer-to-peer	basis.328	A	 rather	 different,	 yet	 highly	 imaginative	 critique	 of	 intellectual	 property	 is	 provided	 in	another	 of	 the	 exhibition’s	works,	 Free	Culture	Play,	 which	was	 released	 in	 2008	 by	 the	
																																																								325	The	project’s	website:	‘Esse,	Nosse,	Posse:	Common	Wealth	for	Common	People’	(Emst.gr,	2010)	<http://www.emst.gr/commonwealth/>	accessed	25	March	2016.	326 	Daphne	 Dragona,	 ‘Esse,	 Νosse,	 Posse:	 Common	 Wealth	 for	 Common	 People’	 (Emst.gr)	<http://www.emst.gr/commonwealth/?page_id=2>	accessed	25	March	2016.	327	According	to	the	“entity’s”	website,	“.-_-.	is	a	trans-territorial	and	trans-cultural	distributed	peer	identity.	everybody	is	free	to	use	this	identity,	attribute	this	identity	to	their	works	and	appropriate	the	works	of	this	identity.	 .-_-.	are	not	attributed	as	“he”	or	“she”	or	“they”,	but	just	as	 .-_-.	 ,	 in	any	language.	.-_-.	is	trans-lingual	and	also	there	is	no	single	way	to	pronounce	.-_-.	in	any	language.	.-_-.	speak	any	language,	but	not	any	of	them	properly.	.-_-.	cannot	be	searched	on	the	internet	and	can	only	 be	 associated	 through	 the	works,	 however	 .-_-.	 is	 not	 associated	with	 any	 single	 individual.	everybody	can	appropriate	the	identity	and	host	the	works	of	all	.-_-.	.	all	works	of	.-_-.	are	works	of	free	culture.”	For	more	information,	see:	 ‘.-_-’	(Httpdot.net)	<http://httpdot.net/.-_-./>	accessed	25	March	2016.		328 	The	 project’s	 website:	 ‘.re_potemkin:’	 (Re-potemkin.httpdot.net)	 <http://re-potemkin.httpdot.net/>	accessed	25	March	2016.		
			 121	
Italian	 collective	 Molleindustria.329	The	 project	 adopts	 the	 form	 of	 an	 online	 game	 that	represents	the	battle	between	the	free	dissemination	of	knowledge	and	copyright	control.	Using	the	cursor,	the	player	is	invited	to	distribute	knowledge	to	the	people	who	move	in	a	circle	symbolising	the	commons	–	an	area	where	knowledge	is	cooperatively	created	and	shared.	 Outside	 this	 circle,	 one	 finds	 the	 area	 of	 the	 market.	 Within	 this,	 knowledge	 is	commodified	 by	 the	 “vectorialist”,	 a	 device	 that	 is	 the	 player’s	 enemy,	 as	 it	 tries	 to	copyright	 all	 ideas	 produced	 by	 the	 people.	 Those	who	 cannot	 access	 knowledge	 in	 the	common	will	stop	producing	new	ideas	and	will	turn	into	passive	consumers.	The	goal	of	the	player	is	to	protect	people	from	this	danger,	and	liberate	the	ones	who	were	captured	by	the	market	by	repositioning	them	within	the	area	of	the	commons.	Finally,	an	important	feature	of	 the	exhibition’s	website	has	been	its	open	submission	platform,	through	which	artists,	 academics	 and	media	 researchers	 have	 been	 able	 submit	 new	works	 and	 essays,	which	enrich	the	scope	of	Esse,	Nosse,	Posse	and	keep	it	up-to-date.330		
	Figure	33:	EMST,	Esse,	Nosse,	Posse:	Common	Wealth	for	Common	People	(2010)		 In	 December	 of	 2010,	 EMST	 launched	 its	 second	 web-based	 exhibition,	 titled	
Mapping	the	Commons,331	which	came	as	a	natural	evolution	of	Esse,	Nosse,	Posse:	Common																																																									329 	The	 project’s	 website:	 ‘Free	 Culture	 Game’	 (Molleindustria.org,	 2008)	<http://www.molleindustria.org/en/freeculturegame/>	accessed	25	March	2016.		330	The	submission	forms	of	the	platform	were	still	fully	accessible	in	early	March	2016.		331 	The	 project’s	 website:	 'Mapping	 The	 Commons	 Athens'	 (Emst.gr,	 2010)	<http://www.emst.gr/mappingthecommons/index.html>	accessed	10	April	2016.	
			 122	
Wealth	 for	 Common	People.	 The	 project	 was	 a	 collaborative	 cartography	 of	 Athens	 that	employed	free	participatory	software	in	order	to	produce	an	interactive	map	of	the	Greek	capital	 based	 on	 the	 commons.	 Adopting	 the	 initial	 form	 of	 a	 workshop,	 Mapping	 the	
Commons	was	co-organised	by	EMST	and	Hackitectura,	 a	Spanish	collective	of	architects,	artists,	computer	scientists	and	activists,	which	was	founded	in	1999	in	Seville.	Inspired	by	hacker	 culture,	 the	 group	 aims	 to	 subvert	 the	 established	 power	 structures	 with	 its	projects,	by	combining	 the	 transformative	effects	of	new	technologies	on	physical	 spaces	and	 the	 creation	 of	 social	 networks.	 The	 participants	 of	 the	workshop	 that	Hackitectura	devised	were	post-graduate	students	and	researchers	in	architecture,	communication	and	media	studies,	and	social	and	political	sciences	from	different	Athens-based	universities.332			
	Figure	34:	EMST,	Mapping	the	Commons	(2010)		
																																																								332	More	 specifically,	 the	 participants	 came	 from	 the	 School	 of	 Architecture	 of	 the	 National	Technical	 University	 of	 Athens,	 the	 Department	 of	 Communication	 and	 Media	 Studies	 of	 the	National	and	Kapodistrian	University	of	Athens	and	from	the	field	of	Social	and	Political	Sciences	of	Panteion	University.		
			 123	
Building	 on	 the	 diverse	 origins	 and	 research	 interests	 of	 the	 team,	 the	 mapping	 of	 the	Athenian	 commons	 aimed	 to	 be	 as	 comprehensive	 as	 possible,	 covering	 all	 types	 of	physical,	 cultural	 and	 digital	 commons.	 Accordingly,	 entries	 varied	 from	 self-managed	parks	to	free	Wi-Fi	providers,	and	from	the	languages	spoken	in	the	different	parts	of	the	city	centre	 to	 the	 locations	of	graffiti	artworks.	Those	urban	commons	were	documented	over	a	period	of	eight	days,	during	which	participants	registered	and	updated	information	on	the	online	interactive	map,	including	selected	case	studies	documented	in	short	videos.	The	project’s	website	also	featured	a	blog,	in	which	the	members	of	the	team	shared	their	experiences	and	explained	their	work	processes.	The	online	maps	as	well	as	other	sections	of	the	Mapping	the	Commons	website	still	remain	open	to	contributions,	reflecting	the	fluid	and	 dynamic	 character	 of	 urban	 landscape	 and	 the	 potential	 for	 exploring	 new	ways	 of	social	emancipation	from	the	oppressive	structures	of	neoliberal	capitalism.333		The	 two	 exhibitions	 have	 constituted	 a	 particularly	 extrovert	 gesture	 for	 EMST,	since	 they	 enabled	 it	 to	 adapt	 its	 activities	 to	 technological	 change	 and	 focus	 on	 new	audiences.	Most	importantly,	however,	they	allowed	the	museum	to	respond	to	the	political	climate	of	 the	time,	as	Greece	was	going	 into	the	deepest	recession	of	 its	modern	history	following	 the	agreement	of	 the	 first	memorandum	with	 its	main	 lenders,	 the	EU	and	 the	IMF.	Furthermore,	the	two	projects	became	an	indirect	means	of	tackling	the	severe	cuts	in	the	field	of	culture,	given	that	the	exhibitions’	web-based	nature	made	them	much	cheaper	to	 produce	 and	 promote	 than	 physical	 exhibitions.	 According	 to	 the	 curator	 of	 both	projects,	 Daphne	 Dragona,	 we	 could	 locate	 four	 main	 characteristics	 in	 Mapping	 the	
Commons	and	Esse,	Nosse,	Posse:	the	formation	of	new	online	and	physical	spaces	enabling	social	 encounter	 and	 interaction;	 the	 provision	 and	 empowerment	 of	 social	 and	 artistic	tools	 that	 are	 –	 quite	 often	 –	 already	 available;	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 new	 ethos	 of	collectiveness	 and	 communality;	 and,	 finally,	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 new	 system	 of	 values,	beyond	 exclusions	 and	 the	 profit-based	 understanding	 of	 social	 progress. 334 	In	combination,	the	two	projects	highlighted	the	creative	appropriation	of	public	spaces	as	a	prerequisite	for	the	production	of	common	wealth.	This	deeply	democratic	function	can	be	traced	back	to	the	simple	fact	that	“there	is	no	commons	without	commoning”335	–	namely,	
																																																								333	Apart	 from	 Athens,	 Hackitectura	 has	 organized	 similar	 workshops	 and	 initiated	 relevant	platforms	 in	 Istanbul,	Rio	de	 Janeiro,	Belo	Horizonte,	São	Paulo	and	Quito.	For	more	 information,	see:	 ‘Mapping	the	Commons	–	Research	Open	Lab	on	Urban	Commons’	(Mappingthecommons.net)	<http://mappingthecommons.net/en/world/>	accessed	25	March	2016.	334	Dragona,	‘Artists	as	the	New	Producers	of	the	Common	(?)’,	op.	cit.,	pp.	170-171.	335	ibid.	
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there	 is	 no	 commons	 without	 the	 human	 agency	 that	 brings	 them	 and	 their	 dormant	potentialities	to	life.			
The	hackers	of	the	streets		The	connections	established	between	political	activism	and	art,	 and	between	art	and	 the	activation	of	public	spaces	in	recent	years,	have	been	indicative	of	the	need	of	artists	and	cultural	 organisations	 to	 engage	 in	 more	 depth	 with	 practices	 that	 might	 have	 been	considered	of	marginal	interest	or	special	scope	before	the	crisis.	In	2012,	Science	Gallery	in	Dublin	presented	the	exhibition	Hack	the	City,	which	investigated	ways	of	rethinking	our	socio-political	 relationship	 with	 the	 environments	 within	 which	 we	 live	 in	 towns	 and	cities.336	Inspired	by	 the	 fact	 that	urban	areas	have	been	 rapidly	becoming	 the	dominant	habitat	 for	 the	 planet’s	 population	 and,	 thus,	 the	main	 space	 of	 civic	 life,	 the	 exhibition	invited	 the	 audience	 to	 adopt	 a	 “hacker	 mindset”	 in	 order	 to	 subvert	 Dublin’s	 existing	urban	systems.	By	 the	 time	of	 the	exhibition’s	opening	 (June	2012),	 the	 Irish	 capital	had	already	 experienced	 a	 rapidly	 rising	 rate	 of	 unemployment,	 large	 protests	 and	 the	emergence	 of	 its	 own	 Occupy	 movement	 (Occupy	 Dame	 Street),337	as	 a	 result	 of	 the	economic	 crisis	 and	 the	 measures	 that	 accompanied	 the	 Irish	 bailout	 programme.	 The	subtitle	 of	 the	 exhibition,	 Take	 Control,	 is	 indicative	 of	 the	 context	 within	 which	 the	organisers	 located	 its	 mission	 –	 an	 endeavour	 combining	 elements	 of	 connectivity,	openness,	 exchange,	 public	 good,	 autonomy	 and	 freedom,	 in	 order	 to	 produce,	 through	participation,	 alternative	 forms	 of	 social	 interaction	 and	 organisation.	 Accordingly,	 the	artworks,	 projects	 and	 interventions	hosted	by	Hack	the	City	 engaged	 a	diverse	 group	of	artists,	programmers,	researchers,	activists	and	community	leaders,	with	the	aim	to	bring	the	practice	of	hacking	into	the	streets.		This	 effort	 was	 vividly	 reflected	 in	 many	 of	 the	 presented	 works,	 including	 The	
Artvertiser	 (2010)	 by	 Julian	 Oliver,	 Damian	 Stewart	 and	 Arturo	 Castro.338	The	work	 is	 a	hardware	device	 as	well	 as	 an	Augmented	Reality	 (AR)	piece	of	 software	 through	which	actual	billboard	advertisements	are	replaced	in	real	time	by	artists’	works.	The	software	is	able	to	recognize	the	advertisements	on	buildings,	magazines,	or	vehicles	and,	then,	treat																																																									336 	The	 exhibition’s	 website:	 ‘Hack	 the	 City’	 (Dublin.sciencegallery.com,	 2012)	<https://dublin.sciencegallery.com/hackthecity/index.html>	accessed	25	March	2016.	337	Occupy	Dame	 Street	 (or	 Occupy	Dublin)	 located	 its	 camp	 outside	 the	 Central	 Bank	 of	 Ireland	plaza	on	Dame	Street,	in	Dublin.	338	The	project’s	website:	 ‘The	Artvertiser’	 (Theartvertiser.com,	2010)	<http://theartvertiser.com>	accessed	25	March	2016.		
			 125	
the	surfaces	as	a	white	“canvas”	that	can	display	different	images	or	videos.	The	members	of	 the	 audience	were	 able	 to	 see	 the	 transformed	 billboards	 by	wearing	Artvertiser’s	AR	goggles,	by	collecting	a	tablet	from	Science	Gallery,	or	by	simply	using	any	kind	of	handheld	web-connected	device,	like	a	smartphone.	The	platform	through	which	the	advertisements	are	replaced	features	a	variety	of	artworks	chosen	from	the	Web,	which	attack	consumerist	culture	 and	 the	 commercialization	 of	 most	 human	 activities.	 Accordingly,	 the	 work	transforms	 the	 read-only,	 proprietary	 imagery	 of	 our	 urban	 spaces	 into	 a	 read-write	platform	for	 the	presentation	of	non-proprietary	 images	and	videos.	Employing	elements	of	humour	and	parody,	The	Artvertiser	portrays	the	Internet	as	a	redistribution	mechanism	that	 enables	 the	 audience	 to	 subvert	 the	marketing	 narratives	 of	 commercialisation	 and	consumption.	 The	same	ethos	imbues	another	of	Julian	Oliver’s	projects,	Newstweek,	which		
	Figure	35:	Julian	Oliver,	Damian	Stewart	and	Arturo	Castro,	The	Artvetiser	(2010)		was	developed	in	collaboration	with	Danja	Vasiliev	in	2011.339	Also	being	part	of	the	Hack	
the	City	exhibition,	Newstweek	could	be	characterised	as	an	effort	to	reclaim	the	commons	of	 information,	 as	 it	 is	 a	 device	 capable	 of	manipulating	 the	 news	 read	 by	 people	 using	wireless	 hotspots.	 Adopting	 the	 form	 of	 a	 simple	wall	 plug,	 the	 device	 allows	writers	 to	remotely	 edit	 news	 read	 on	 devices	 connected	 to	wireless	 networks	without	 their	 users																																																									339	The	 project’s	 website:	 ‘Newstweek’	 (Newstweek.com,	 2011)	 <http://www.newstweek.com>	accessed	25	March	2016.		
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being	 aware	 of	 this	 intervention.	 In	 this	 way,	Newstweek	 exposes	 the	 vulnerability	 of	 a	“strictly	 media-defined	 reality”	 –	 an	 omnipresent	 reality	 separated	 from	 any	 form	 of	physicality.	 Most	 importantly,	 the	 work	 humorously	 reverses	 the	 top-to-bottom	 news	distribution	model,	which	may	generate	misinformation	or	–	even	–	propaganda.	In	order	to	accentuate	the	subversion	of	this	function,	the	project’s	website	even	features	a	special	section	dedicated	to	teaching	Web	users	how	to	build	their	own	Newstweek	devices,	using	simple,	low-cost	hardware.340		Liam	 Young’s	 Electronic	 Countermeasures	 (2011)	 also	 focused	 on	 the	 free	distribution	of	information	through	the	“re-appropriation”	of	technology.	The	project	was	realized	 in	 collaboration	with	 Eleanor	 Saitta,	 Oliviu	 Lugojan-Ghenciu	 and	 Superflux,	 and	used	a	flock	of	GPS-enabled	drones	that	formed	their	own	Wi-Fi	network.	By	connecting	to			
	Figure	36:	Liam	Young,	Electronic	Countermeasures	(2011)																																																									340	Notably,	one	of	Paolo	Cirio’s	most	recent	projects	titled	Daily	Paywall	(2014)	also	deals	with	the	idea	of	information	as	part	of	the	commons.	For	this	project,	Cirio	hacked	the	paywalls	of	the	most	influential	financial	publications	(Wall	Street	Journal,	Financial	Times,	and	The	Economist)	making	freely	available	60,000	pay-per-view	items	that	have	been	published	over	the	course	of	2014.	Daily	
Paywall	 functions	 as	 an	 edited	 online	 newspaper	 that	 brings	 together	 the	 hacked	 articles	 in	different	issues,	with	each	one	focusing	on	the	different	economic	injustices	and	contradictions	of	our	time.	One	of	the	main	novelties	of	Cirio’s	online	paper	is	that	 instead	of	asking	the	readers	to	pay,	it	actually	pays	the	readers	$1	if	they	are	able	to	answer	a	simple	questionnaire	that	relates	to	the	 featured	articles.	For	more	 information,	see:	Paolo	Cirio,	 ‘Daily	Paywall’	 (Paolocirio.net,	2014)	<https://www.paolocirio.net/work/daily-paywall/>	accessed	31	March	2016.	As	of	January	2015,	the	website	http://DailyPaywall.com	was	not	operational	anymore.		
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it	through	their	laptops,	tablets	or	smartphones,	users	were	able	to	freely	exchange	files	on	a	local	level.	As	a	constantly	flying,	pirate	file-sharing	infrastructure,	the	drones	could	avoid	detection,	 establish	 peer-to-peer	 networks	 and,	 then,	 disperse,	 following	 an	 original	 and	rather	 provocative	 “informational	 guerilla”	 strategy.	 Electronic	 Countermeasures,	 thus,	adopted	the	character	of	a	site-specific	tactical	media	intervention,	in	which	any	member	of	the	public	could	participate	with	a	view	to	defying	the	monetization	of	information	and	its	hierarchical	models	of	dissemination.		Finally,	 an	 even	 more	 direct	 engagement	 with	 the	 commons	 is	 demonstrated	 in	
Uncommon	Land	 (2011)	 by	Eilis	Murphy,	which	used	 a	 variety	 of	 urban	 interventions	 in	order	 to	reveal	what	he	calls	 the	rise	of	 “pseudo-public	space”	within	our	cities.341	In	 the	context	 of	 neoliberal	 capitalism,	 ownership	 and	 control	 of	 urban	 spaces	 is	 increasingly	being	 transferred	 to	 private	 companies	 and	 other	 entities	 that	 lack	 democratic	legitimization.	 Very	 often,	 this	 is	 not	 visible,	 with	 streets	 and	 plazas	 appearing	 to	 be	“public”,	whereas	–	in	fact	–	they	are	governed	by	rules	set	by	private	bodies.	Activities	like	busking,	begging,	skateboarding,	or	photography	are	restricted	or	even	prohibited	in	such	spaces,	with	 private	 security	 ensuring	 that	 the	 use	 of	 space	 remains	 privately	 regulated	(e.g.	 Paternoster	 Square,	 in	London).	 	 For	Uncommon	Land,	Murphy	 invited	 the	public	 to	help	him	 “hack”	 and	 reveal	 those	 invisible	borders,	 by	participating	 in	 flash	mob	events,	photo-shoots,	mapping	and	video	documentation	sessions,	the	results	of	which	were,	then,	uploaded	on	the	project’s	website.	Often	moving	on	the	verge	of	 legality,	Murphy	asks	us	through	 his	 work	 to	 imaginatively	 activate	 public	 space	 through	 the	 subversive	 use	 of	already	 existing	 technological	 tools.	 Most	 importantly,	 however,	 the	 artist	 asks	 us	 to	“deactivate”	 public	 space’s	 current	 status	 as	 defined	 by	 a	 state-supported	 regulatory	framework	 of	 monetisation,	 exploitation	 and	 exclusion	 –	 three	 principles	 that	 lie	 at	 the	core	of	Data	Capitalism’s	invisible	modus	operandi.		
																																																								341 	The	 project’s	 website:	 ‘Uncommon	 Land’	 (Uncommonland.wordpress.com)	<http://uncommonland.wordpress.com/>	accessed	25	March	2016.		
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Chapter	4	
	
The	Rise	of	Radical	Institutions:	Towards	Alternative	
Modes	of	Socioeconomic	Being			
From	Public	Space	to	Hackerspace		In	 spite	 of	 the	 subversive	 political	 dispositions	 of	 many	 of	 the	 initiatives	 that	 we	 have	analysed	 so	 far,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 their	 often-ephemeral	 character.	 As	 exhibitions,	performances	or	public	interventions,	their	duration	could	only	span	from	a	few	hours	to	a	few	 months,	 thus	 often	 approximating	 Benjamin’s	 concept	 of	 the	 “jetztzeit”	 –	 an	 action	occurring	“here-and-now”.		In	addition,	regardless	of	the	fact	that	they	had	an	online	basis,	or	a	strong	online	component	that	allowed	them	to	–	at	least	partly	–	“survive”	beyond	the	duration	of	 the	exhibitions,	 institutional	engagement	with	 the	social	context	catalysed	by	new	 media	 and	 the	 crisis	 became	 problematic	 once	 an	 exhibition,	 or	 intervention	 had	finished.	In	other	words,	in	such	cases,	it	felt	like	artists	and	cultural	institutions	were	only	addressing	the	crisis	in	an	isolated	context:	they	were	raising	questions	around	the	origins	and/or	 the	 consequences	 of	 the	 crisis	 without,	 however,	 offering	 a	 framework	 within	which	 potential	 answers	 could	 be	 systematically	 explored.	 Nevertheless,	 as	 the	 crisis	persisted,	 artists,	 museums,	 independent	 art	 spaces,	 collectives	 and	 socially	 engaged	cultural	agencies	gradually	realised	that	there	should	be	a	set	of	more	strategic	and	long-term	responses	to	those	conditions.	The	fourth	chapter	of	this	thesis	is	going	to	investigate	and	 map	 those	 responses.	 The	 first	 section	 of	 the	 chapter	 will	 examine	 the	 rise	 of	alternative	 institutions	 such	 as	 hackerspaces,	 which	 have	 been	 proposed	 by	 cultural	producers	as	new	modes	for	the	production	of	common	wealth.	This	investigation	will	be	followed	 in	 the	 second	 section	 by	 an	 analysis	 of	 alternative	 economies	 and	 currencies,	which	have	either	been	created	by	artists,	or	have	been	adopted	by	them	in	their	projects.	Finally,	 the	 chapter	 will	 conclude	 its	 mapping	 exercise	 with	 a	 section	 focusing	 on	 the	efforts	of	artists	and	cultural	institutions	to	radically	reimagine	community	and	the	state	as	the	dominant	modes	of	societal	constitution	and	civic	governance.		First	of	all,	 the	power	of	 this	 revamped	understanding	of	 the	political	 role	of	new	media	art	becomes	evident	when	we	trace	the	appeal	of	creating	new	radical	 institutions	
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within	 the	 activities	 of	 traditional	 art	 institutions.	 Notably,	 the	 latter	 have	 responded	 to	this	 need	 and	 the	 new	 social,	 political	 and	 cultural	 landscape	 produced	 by	 the	 crisis	through	 three	 distinct	 trajectories:	 first	 of	 all,	 many	 cultural	 organisations	 decided	 to	create	 new	 programmes	 or	 sections	within	 their	 existing	 structures;	 others	 to	 reinforce	initiatives	that	they	had	already	established;	and,	finally,	a	third	option	has	been	to	directly	support	 independent	 schemes,	 which	 would	 be	 able	 to	 undertake	 on	 a	 more	 long-term	basis	 the	 role	 that	 temporary	 new	 media	 exhibitions	 and	 projects	 have	 been	 fulfilling.	Those	approaches	have	been	particularly	evident	in	countries	that	have	been	the	epicentre	of	 the	global	 financial	meltdown,	 like	Spain.	More	specifically,	 in	Barcelona,	 the	Centre	of	Contemporary	Culture	 (CCCB)	 established	 in	2010	CCCB	LAB,342	in	order	 to	 explore	new	forms	of	public	exhibition	that	use	the	Internet,	Data	Journalism	and	science.	At	the	same	time,	the	Centre	aimed	at	integrating	techno-cultural	advances	with	philosophy,	literature	and	art,	through	a	variety	of	events,	in	an	attempt	to	underline	the	richness	and	diversity	of	technology’s	impact	on	art	theory	and	intellectual	production	at	large.	In	addition,	many	of	the	 LAB’s	 activities	 have	 had	 a	 strong	 educational	 orientation	 through	 various	 “open	education”	 activities,	 an	 element	 that	 could	 also	 be	 found	 in	 another	 Barcelona-based	organization,	Platoniq.343	Supported	by	the	Department	of	Culture	and	Media	of	Catalonia,	and	the	National	Council	for	Culture	and	the	Arts,	Platoniq	has	largely	based	its	new,	post-crisis	 identity	 on	 its	 2006	 project	 Bank	of	Common	Knowledge	 (BCK),	 which	 researched	“new	ways	of	enhancing	the	distribution	channels	for	practical	and	informal	knowledge,	as	well	as	how	to	share	it”.344	Remaining	within	this	context	of	practice,	Platoniq	has	created	a	variety	of	collaborative	outputs	that	apply	the	working	methods	of	the	Internet	and	P2P	to	education,	economics	and	social	innovation.	In	Madrid,	Medialab-Prado	opened	in	2013	its	new	headquarters	in	order	to	fulfil	more	successfully	its	role	as	a	citizen	laboratory	for	the	production,	research	and	dissemination	of	collaborative	cultural	projects.	Their	main	focus	has	 been	 placed	 on	 practices	 such	 as	 data	 visualization	 and	 new	 social	 and	 artistic	strategies	 like	 the	 trans-disciplinary	 development	 of	 the	 commons. 345 	Finally,	
																																																								342	‘CCCB	Department	Dedicated	to	Research	and	Innovation	in	the	Cultural	Sphere’	(Blogs.cccb.org)	<http://blogs.cccb.org/lab/en>		343	‘Platoniq	 CoLaboratory’	 (Youcoop.org)	 <http://www.youcoop.org/en/>	 accessed	 26	 March	2016.		344 	‘Platoniq:	 The	 Bank	 of	 Common	 Knowledge’	 (Bancocomun.org)	<http://www.bancocomun.org/Wiki/queEsBcc/>	accessed	26	March	2016.	345 	The	 project’s	 website:	 ‘Medialab-Prado	 Madrid’	 (Medialab-prado.es)	 <http://medialab-prado.es/>	accessed	26	March	2016.	
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ColaBoraBora	constitutes	a	prominent	case	from	a	slightly	smaller	Spanish	city,	Bilbao.346	With	 the	 support	 of	 the	 local	 government,	 ColaBoraBora	 has	 established	 itself	 as	 an	experimental	 platform	 fostering	 both	 online	 and	 offline	 discussions	 that	 involve	 a	 large	number	of	 local	agents	 through	regular	meetings.	Following	the	outbreak	of	 the	 financial	crisis,	 the	 aim	 of	 such	 interactions	 and	 exchanges	 has	 been	 specifically	 to	 propose	 new	models	 of	 social	 organisation	 based	 on	 the	 commons,	 activism,	 open	 modes	 of	 cultural	production	and	the	mediation	of	new	technologies.		
	Figure	37:	Centre	of	Contemporary	Culture	(CCCB)	LAB			 Despite	the	fact	that	many	of	the	aforementioned	cultural	entities	and	their	projects	lack	 the	 aggressive	 character	 that	 would	 produce	 a	 “revolutionary”	 milieu	 of	 direct	confrontation	 with	 the	 agents	 of	 Data	 Capitalism,	 we	 should	 not	 fail	 to	 recognise	 their	impact	 on	 reimagining	 the	 dominant	modes	 of	 social	 being	 that	 had	been	 current	 in	 the	pre-crisis	period.	 In	 this	context,	 their	most	 important	contribution	should	not	be	 looked	for	 in	 the	 content	 of	 their	 activities,	 but	 mainly	 in	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 all	 established	 a	permanent	physical	presence	within	the	city,	in	parallel	to	their	permanent	online	presence.	In	other	words,	 they	have	not	been	ephemeral	exhibition	projects	hosted	within	a	 larger																																																									346	The	 project’s	 website:	 ‘ColaBoraBora’	 (Colaborabora.org)	 <http://www.colaborabora.org/>	accessed	26	March	2016.	
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institution,	 but,	 rather,	 independent	 entities	 with	 their	 own	 “headquarters”	 or	 “basis”.	Those	 conditions	 are	 part	 and	 parcel	 of	 the	 role	 of	 the	 new	 legitimacy	 was	 given	 to	hackerspaces	as	a	result	of	the	crisis	and	the	need	of	the	creative	communities	of	several	crisis-hit	 countries	 to	 find	 new	 tools	 of	 communication	 and	 common	 expression.347	However,	the	transition	from	the	performative	character	of	tactical	media	to	hackerspaces	should	not	be	seen	as	a	“confinement”	from	the	public	(although	this	danger	always	exists	with	 any	 kind	 of	 studio,	 or	 workspace	 structure);	 rather,	 this	 development	 should	 be	conceived	as	an	effort	to	give	a	more	permanent	and	concrete	form	to	the	alternatives	that	have	 been	 proposed	 as	 antidotes	 to	 the	 global	 crisis	 of	Data	 Capitalism:	 a	 production	 of	commons	on	a	regular	and	sustainable	basis.		This	aim	of	sustainability	lies	at	the	core	of	several	hackerspaces’	ethos,	especially	in	the	countries	 in	which	public	 funding	for	cultural	 initiatives	has	decreased	radically	after	2008.	 A	 characteristic	 example	 of	 this	 ethos	 can	 be	 found	 at	 the	 activities	 of	 [HSGR]	(hackerspace.gr)	 in	 Athens,	 which	 was	 founded	 in	 2011	 and	 has	 since	 then	 been	 in	operation,	supported	almost	exclusively	by	the	contributions	of	its	own	members.	Inspired	by	 the	 spirit	 of	 technological	 “do-ocracy”,348	the	participants	 are	 fully	 free	 to	 initiate	 any	personal	project	that	they	might	feel	is	worth	pursuing,	whilst	reaching	decisions	about	the	overall	function	of	the	space	as	a	community,	through	open	monthly	meetings.	All	activities	are	 publicised	 and	 fully	 documented	 on	 the	 space’s	 website,	 where	 the	 public	 can	 also	access	the	detailed	balance	sheets	of	the	organisation,	which	present	its	sources	of	income	and	the	different	types	of	expenditure.349	Alongside	the	fact	that	most	of	the	hackerspace’s	projects	are	related	to	activities	like	hardware	hacking,	alternative	social	networks	and	3D	printing	 (amongst	 others),	 there	 is	 also	 a	 considerable	 interest	 in	 sustainable	modes	 of	urban	living.	This	is	expressed	in	projects	that	promote	environmentally	friendly	forms	of	transport	 such	 as	 cycling	 and	 carpooling,	 as	 well	 as	 in	 projects	 that	 develop	 innovative																																																									347	On	a	basic	conceptual	level,	we	could,	argue	that	the	roots	of	hackerspaces	may	be	traced	to	the	early	 period	 of	 post-revolutionary	 Russia	 and	 the	 studios	 of	 the	 Constructivists.	 In	 Rodchenko’s	famous	laboratory,	for	instance,	artists,	designers	and	architects	were	able	to	work	in	conditions	of	extensive	experimentation	and	interdisciplinary	collaboration,	often	combined	with	a	strong	sense	of	 social	 and	 political	 mission,	 in	 order	 to	 produce	 a	 variety	 of	 speculative	 projects.	 See:	 Maria	Gough,	The	Artist	as	Producer:	Russian	Constructivism	in	Revolution	(University	 of	 California	 Press,	Berkeley	2005);	Victor	Margolin,	The	Struggle	for	Utopia:	Rodchenko,	Lissitzky,	Moholy-Nagy ;	1917	-	
1946	(University	 Of	 Chicago	 Press,	 Chicago	 1997);	 and	 B	 Fer,	 ‘Metaphor	 and	Modernity:	 Russian	Constructivism’	(1989)	Oxford	Art	Journal	vol.	12,	no.	1,	pp.	14–30.	348	Do-ocracy	 is	an	organizational	structure	 that	encourages	 individuals	 to	choose	roles	and	 tasks	for	themselves	and	execute	them,	without	the	need	for	any	institutional	legitimisation	or	support	of	the	action.		349	The	 space’s	 budget	 for	 2013	 can	 be	 found	 here:	 Hackerspace,	 ‘The	 Cost	 of	 Hacking:	 Balance	2013’	(Budget.hackerspace.gr)	<http://budget.hackerspace.gr/2013/>	accessed	26	March	2016.	
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ways	of	growing	edible	plants	at	home,	like	aeroponics.350	Nevertheless,	even	in	countries	in	which	 the	 impact	of	 the	crisis	has	been	 felt	 to	a	smaller	extent	 than	 in	Greece,	 similar	principles	have	characterised	the	function	of	most	hackerspaces	and	their	initiatives.			 	London-based	art	space	Furtherfield	has	been	in	the	forefront	of	the	new	media	art	scene	 in	 the	 UK	 since	 its	 foundation	 by	 artists	 Ruth	 Catlow	 and	 Marc	 Garrett	 in	 1997.	Furtherfield	has	produced	over	 the	years	a	 range	of	participatory	exhibitions	and	events	that	encourage	the	members	of	 the	public	 to	“become	active	co-creators	of	 their	cultures	and	societies”.351	Amid	the	economic	crisis	and	the	rise	of	inequalities	that	it	has	brought,	Furtherfield	 developed	 a	 series	 of	 workshops	 titled	 Zero	 Dollar	 Laptop,	 which	 were	accompanied	by	a	programme	of	public	debates	and	exhibitions,	 all	 inspired	by	 the	Zero	
Dollar	Laptop	Manifesto	 (2007).	Published	by	artist,	 educator	and	 free	 software	advocate	James	Wallbank,	the	manifesto	begins	with	the	striking	declaration	“The	zero	dollar	laptop	is	here!”352	Following	this	first	sentence,	the	writer	goes	on	to	describe	the	technical	details	of	the	“already	distributed”	laptop	(“You	weren’t	told	about	it	at	the	time	of	distribution”),	highlighting	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 a	device	 that	 is	 constantly	being	upgraded	and	 that	 it	uses	free,	 open	 software.	 The	 zero	 dollar	 laptop	 is	 not	 intended	 primarily	 for	 multimedia	entertainment;	rather,	its	role	is	to	educate	and	become	a	tool	of	production	for	individual	users,	 NGOs,	 organizations	 and	 small	 businesses,	 whilst	 having	 a	 zero	 carbon	 footprint.	Accordingly,	 the	major	question	 emerges:	 “where	 is	 the	 zero	dollar	 laptop?”	The	 answer	provided	by	Wallbank	is	unexpectedly	simple:	it	is	probably	sitting	on	one	of	our	selves,		unused,	as	we	have	already	upgraded	to	a	new,	more	powerful	machine.	Accordingly,	the	manifesto	becomes	an	open	call	to	install	free,	open	source	operating	systems,	like	Linux,	on	 our	 unused	 computers	 and	 familiarize	 ourselves	 with	 the	 communication	 capacities	offered	 by	 open	 source	 software	 and	 its	 communities.	 For	 Wallbank,	 the	 localized,	decentralized	 and	 do-it-yourself	 character	 of	 the	 technological	 applications	 that	 are	encouraged	by	open	software	can	become	a	catalyst	in	order	to	develop	new	skills,	which																																																									350	“Aeroponics	 is	 the	process	of	growing	plants	 in	an	air	or	mist	environment	without	 the	use	of	soil	or	an	aggregate	medium	(known	as	geoponics).	The	basic	principle	of	aeroponic	growing	is	to	grow	 plants	 suspended	 in	 a	 closed	 or	 semi-closed	 environment	 by	 spraying	 the	 plant's	 dangling	roots	and	lower	stem	with	an	atomized,	nutrient-rich	water	solution.	The	leaves	and	crown,	often	called	 the	 "canopy",	 extend	 above.”	 From:	 Hackerspace,	 ‘Aeroponics’	 (Hackerspace.gr)	<https://www.hackerspace.gr/wiki/Aeroponics>	accessed	26	March	2016.		351	‘About’	(Furtherfield.org)	<http://furtherfield.org/content/about>	accessed	26	March	2016.		352 	James	 Wallbank,	 ‘James	 Wallbank	 Says:	 The	 Zero	 Dollar	 Laptop	 Manifesto’	(Robvankranenburgs.wordpress.com,	 11	 October	 2007)	<http://robvankranenburgs.wordpress.com/2007/10/11/james-wallbank-says-the-zero-dollar-laptop-manifesto/>	accessed	26	March	2016.	
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are	 capable	of	 transforming	our	 social	 reality.	This	potentiality	 is	 vividly	 reflected	 in	 the	final	recommendation	made	in	the	manifesto:	to	freely	distribute	our	zero	dollar	laptops	to	people	 living	 nearby.	 In	 this	way,	 the	 zero	 dollar	 laptop	 shall	 become	 “a	 key	 computing	platform	 for	 empowering	 individuals,	 stimulating	 creativity,	 overcoming	 poverty	 and	enriching	our	shared	culture	[…]	without	any	additional	research,	design,	or	manufacture”.	The	Zero	Dollar	Laptop	workshops	have	been,	 in	many	ways,	the	materialization	of	Wallbank’s	 manifesto.	 The	 project	 was	 launched	 by	 Furtherfield	 in	 January	 2010	 in	collaboration	with	St	Mungo’s	charity	for	the	homeless	and	Access	Space,	the	UK’s	longest	running	 free,	 open	 access	 digital	 media	 lab.353	The	 workshops	 used	 recycled	 laptops	donated	 by	 different	 communities	 in	 order	 to	 teach	 homeless	 people,	 who	 had	 been	excluded	from	formal	education,	core	skills	in	computing.	All	zero	dollar	laptops	have	been	running	 Free	Open	 Source	 Software	 (FOSS)	 to	 create	music,	 graphics	 and	 videos,	with	 a	special	 focus	 on	 distribution	 over	 the	 Internet.	 Once	 they	 completed	 their	 studies,	 the	homeless	participants	left	the	programme	with	basic	technical	skills	as	well	as	one	of	the	wireless-enabled	 laptops	 that	 they	had	often	 themselves	modified	during	 the	workshops,	in	collaboration	with	their	tutors.	Notably,	the	attendance	rates	on	the	Zero	Dollar	Laptop	course	were	 high	 and	 very	 close	 to	 the	 actual	 completion	 rate.354	This	 positive	 response	could	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	 development	 of	 an	 innovative	 and	 supportive	 learning	environment,	 which	 combined	 the	 tuition	 of	 technical	 skills	 with	 the	 creative	experimentation	 offered	 by	 working	 with	 media	 applications.	 Finally,	 it	 is	 important	 to	note	that	the	programme	promoted	a	sustainable	model	of	technology-based	education,	in		accordance	with	 Furtherfield’s	 ambition	 to	 develop	 “a	 critical	 view	of	 growth	 economics	and	patterns	of	consumption”.355			
																																																								353 	The	 website	 of	 St	 Mungo’s	 charity:	 ‘St	 Mungo’s’	 (Mungosbroadway.org.uk)	<http://www.mungosbroadway.org.uk/>	 accessed	 26	March	 2016.	The	 website	 of	 Access	 Space:	‘Access	Space’	(Access-space.org)	<http://access-space.org/>	accessed	26	March	2016.		354 	‘Zero	 Dollar	 Laptop	 Workshops’	 (Furtherfield.org,	 2010)	<http://www.furtherfield.org/outreach/zero-dollar-laptop-workshops>	accessed	26	March	2016.	355 	‘Furtherfield	 Media	 Art	 Ecologies	 2009-12’	 (Furtherfield.org)	<http://www.furtherfield.org/projects/furtherfield-media-art-ecologies-2009-12#deets>	accessed	26	March	2016.	
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	Figure	38:	Furtherfield,	Zero	Dollar	Laptop	workshop	(2010)		 The	cases	that	we	have	examined	in	this	section	collectively	indicate	that	one	of	the	most	distinct	aspects	of	the	rise	of	hackerspaces	–	both	as	physical	entities	and	as	a	cultural	paradigm	–	has	been	their	strong	commitment	to	 fighting	the	commercialized	and	profit-driven	exploitation	of	scientific	progress.	This	privatisation	of	knowledge	is	often	the	result	of	 the	 privileged	 access	 and	 exclusive	 ownership	 of	 technological	 innovations	 by	 large	corporations.	Consequently,	the	efforts	to	re-appropriate	science	and	technology	bear	very	strong	 political	 characteristics,	 as	 they	 aim	 to	 democratise	 some	 of	 the	 most	 important	means	of	production	and	exploitation	that	are	fuelling	Data	Capitalism.			
The	Currency	of	Capitalism	and	the	Death	of	Currencies		In	 the	 55th	 Venice	 Biennial	 of	 2013,	 Greece	 was	 represented	 by	 video	 artist	 Stefanos	Tsivopoulos,	 who	 exhibited	 a	 new	 video	 installation	 titled	History	Zero	 in	 the	 country’s	national	pavilion.356	The	work	was	a	film	in	three	parts,	presented	in	three	different	rooms,	which	brought	 together	 the	 individual	 stories	of	 three	people	 in	present-day	Athens	and	their	unique	relationships	with	money:	an	elderly	and	wealthy	art	collector	suffering	from	dementia;	a	young	 immigrant	 from	Africa	collecting	scrap	metal	 from	the	streets;	and	an																																																									356	The	exhibition	catalogue	of	the	Greek	participation	in	the	55th	Venice	Biennial:	Syrago	Tsiara	and	Stefanos	 Tsivopoulos	 (eds),	 ‘Stefanos	 Tsivopoulos:	 History	 Zero,	 La	 Biennale	 Di	 Venezia	 55	 the	International	 Art	 Exhibition,	 Greek	 Pavilion’	 (Greeceatvenice.culture.gr,	 2013)	<http://greeceatvenice.culture.gr/images/stories/55/140123_History_Zero_Stefanos_Tsivopoulos.pdf>	accessed	26	March	2016.	
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artist	 wandering	 around	 the	 centre	 of	 the	 crisis-hit	 city	 seeking	 inspiration	 for	 a	 new	artwork.	 However,	 the	most	 revealing	 part	 of	 the	 installation	was	 its	 fourth	 and	 central	room.	 The	 room	 featured	 an	 extensive	 historical	 archive	 of	 texts	 and	 images	 presenting	alternative	 economic	 systems,	which	 have	 functioned,	 or	 have	 been	 functioning,	without	using	 an	 exclusive-single	 currency.	 The	 displayed	 examples	 varied	 from	 contemporary	models	of	local	exchange	systems	(LETS)	to	the	use	of	“Mobile	Money”	in	parts	of	Africa	(a	system	of	cash	transfer	based	on	pre-paid	mobile	phone	minutes);	and	from	different	types	of	gift	economies	to	Emissions	Reductions	Currency	Systems.	Those	cases	of	non-monetary	economies	 illustrated	 how	 societies	 can	 find	 imaginative,	 yet	 practical	 ways	 in	 order	 to	escape	 the	 restrictions	 imposed	by	 the	political	 regulatory	 framework	accompanying	 the	single	 currency.	 By	 introducing	 systems	 that	 are	 based	 on	 the	 exchange	 of	 goods	 and	services,	those	economies	managed	to	propose	not	only	a	different	system	of	transactions,	but	–	most	importantly	–	a	different	perspective	on	the	notion	of	value.		
	Figure	39:	Stefanos	Tsivopoulos,	History	Zero	central	room	(2013)	Tsivopoulos’s	 poignant	 choice	 of	 placing	 the	 archive	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 Greek	pavilion	should	not	be	 interpreted	merely	as	 the	reaction	of	an	artist	whose	country	has	been	severely	hit	by	the	global	economic	crisis;	rather,	it	would	have	been	more	accurate	to	claim	that	his	choice	has	been	a	reaction	against	the	very	core	of	Data	Capitalism,	which	is	exemplified	by	currency	fluctuations	and	their	extreme	manipulation	by	financial	markets;	namely	a	condition	that	has	been	clearly	demonstrated	by	the	global	crisis	of	2008.	Most	importantly,	 however,	 the	 manipulable	 character	 of	 currencies	 has	 brought	 into	 public	
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debate,	as	well	as	into	politically	engaged	art,	the	question	of	money’s	real	nature	and	its	inherent	capacity	to	falsify	value.	Arguably,	this	realisation	is	not	something	that	could	be	considered	as	a	 complete	 surprise,	or	as	 some	kind	of	 revelation.	Rather,	 it	 constitutes	a	response	 that	 is	 characteristic	 during	 periods	 of	 intense	 socioeconomic	 turmoil.	 This	applies	equally	to	the	reaction	of	artists	and	the	reaction	of	the	rest	of	society;	and,	in	some	cases,	 to	both	at	once.	 For	 instance,	during	 the	US	depression	of	 the	1930s,	unemployed	itinerant	men	widely	 known	 as	 “hobos”	were	 elaborately	 carving	 the	 faces	 and	 backs	 of	nickel	coins	in	order	to	increase	their	value	above	their	five-cent	denomination,	by	adding	to	them	a	supplementary	artistic	element.	Such	“hobo	nickels”	functioned	as	an	alternative	currency	 that	oscillated	between	money	and	art,	multiplying	 the	available	 resources	of	a	disadvantaged	social	group.357		Therefore,	we	could	claim	that	the	global	economic	crisis	has	functioned	merely	as	a	catalyst	for	the	re-emergence	of	questions	that	can	be	traced	well	into	the	past.	It	is	worth	noting	 that	 in	 his	 work	 On	 the	 Jewish	Question	 (1843),	 Marx	 makes	 a	 direct	 connection	between	the	nature	of	money	and	the	human	condition,	asserting:	“Money	is	the	universal,	self-constituted	value	of	all	things.	Hence	it	has	robbed	the	whole	world,	the	human	world	as	well	as	nature,	of	 its	proper	value.	Money	is	the	alienated	essence	of	man’s	labour	and	life,	and	this	alien	essence	dominates	him	as	he	worships	it”.358	Quite	interestingly,	Marx’s	theorisation	of	money	and	several	of	the	questions	that	he	raises	about	its	function	could	be	discovered	in	even	earlier	writings	–	in	fact,	in	some	of	the	earliest	works	in	the	field	of	philosophy	 and	 critical	 theory.	 In	 this	 context,	 Aristotle’s	 investigation	 of	 money	 in	
Nicomachean	Ethics	 is	 of	 distinct	 relevance	 to	 our	 understanding	 of	 money’s	 birth	 and	evolution.	 More	 specifically,	 in	 his	 most	 important	 work	 on	 ethics,	 Aristotle	 describes	money	as	the	measure	of	value	that	produces	the	associations	between	all	things,	before	he	goes	 on	 to	 identify	 the	 “elementary”	 condition	 of	 falsification	 that	 is	 a	 prerequisite	 for	money’s	very	existence:		 It	 is	 therefore	 necessary	 that	 all	 commodities	 shall	 be	 measured	 by	 some	 one	standard,	as	was	said	before.	And	this	standard	is	in	reality	demand,	which	is	what	holds	everything	together,	since	if	men	cease	to	have	wants	or	if	their	wants	alter,																																																									357	For	 more	 information,	 see:	 Joyce	 Ann	 Romines,	Hobo	 Carvings:	 An	 Exclusive	Upgrade	 of	Hobo	
Nickel	 Artistry	(DLRC	 Press	 1996);	 Stephen	 P	 Alpert,	Hobo	Nickel	 Guidebook	(The	 Original	 Hobo	Nickel	Society	2001);	and	Delma	K	Romines,	Hobo	Nickels	(Lonesome	John	Publishing	Co,	Newberry	Park,	CA	1982).		358	Karl	Marx,	‘On	the	Jewish	Question’	in	David	McLellan	(ed),	Karl	Marx:	Selected	Writings	(Oxford	University	Press,	1977)	p.	60.	
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exchange	will	go	on	no	longer,	or	will	be	on	different	lines.	But	demand	has	come	to	be	 conventionally	 represented	 by	 money;	 this	 is	 why	 money	 is	 called	 nomisma,	customary	currency,	because	it	does	not	exist	by	nature	but	by	custom	(nomos),	and	can	be	altered	and	rendered	useless	at	will.359		Aristotle’s	 etymological	 analysis	 of	 the	 word	 “nomisma”	 (“currency”	 and	 “coin”)	 is	particularly	 revealing,	as	 it	underlines	 the	 fact	 that	when	 it	 comes	 to	currencies,	value	 is	decided	 by	 the	 lawmakers	 of	 a	 certain	 political	 elite	 or	 establishment	 (“nomos”	 is	translated	as	“law”	in	both	ancient	and	modern	Greek).	Yet,	what	is	even	more	interesting	in	the	case	of	“nomisma”	is	that	 it	originates	from	the	verb	“nomizo”	(νομίζω),	which	is	a	synonym	 of	 “think”,	 “suppose”,	 “infer”,	 “deduce”	 and	 –	 last	 but	 not	 least	 –	 “speculate”.	Arguably,	 in	 the	 last	 three	 decades,	 Data	 Capitalism	 gradually	 pushed	 this	 context	 of	speculation	 to	 its	 extremes.	 Economic	 “bubbles”	 have	 been	 the	 result	 of	 the	 practices	adopted	by	speculators,	which	often	involve	the	manipulation	of	financial	markets	through	the	spreading	of	information	that	may	cause	price	fluctuations.360	Notably,	according	to	the	
Volcker	Rule,	which	was	signed	as	a	US	federal	law	by	President	Barack	Obama	in	July	2010,	speculative	investments	and	practices	played	a	crucial	role	in	the	financial	crisis.361		
	
“Liberating”	speculation		In	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 crisis,	 several	 artists	 from	 around	 the	world	 have	 employed	 the	Internet	 in	 order	 to	 reverse	 the	 speculative	 character	 of	 neoliberal	 capital,	 adopting																																																									359	H	 Rackham	 (tr),	Book	 V-Chapter	 5-Section	 10	 &	 11	 [Arist.	 Eth.	 Nic.	 1113a.20]	 –	 Nicomachean	
Ethics	(or	Ethica	Nicomachea)	Aristotle	in	23	Volumes,	vol.	19	(Harvard	University	Press,	Cambridge,	MA;	William	Heinemann	Ltd,	London,	1934).	360	The	volatility	caused	by	speculators	can	generate	fluctuations	in	the	prices	of	the	tradable	goods	of	 different	 markets,	 such	 as	 bonds,	 stocks,	 derivatives,	 currencies,	 real	 estate,	 and,	 of	 course,	antiques	and	fine	art.	As	Keynes	notes,	“Speculators	may	do	no	harm	as	bubbles	on	a	steady	stream	of	 enterprise.	 But	 the	 position	 is	 serious	when	 enterprise	 becomes	 the	 bubble	 on	 a	whirlpool	 of	speculation.”	 See:	 John	 Maynard	 Keynes,	The	 General	 Theory	 of	 Employment,	 Interest,	 and	
Money	(Harcourt,	Brace,	Orlando	1991)	p.	159.	361	The	Volcker	Rule	is	included	in	§	619	(12	U.S.C.	§	1851)	of	the	Dodd–Frank	Wall	Street	Reform	and	 Consumer	 Protection	 Act,	 which	 was	 proposed	 by	 American	 economist	 and	 former	 United	States	Federal	Reserve	Chairman	Paul	Volcker.	Its	purpose	has	been	“[…]	to	promote	the	financial	stability	of	the	United	States	by	improving	accountability	and	transparency	in	the	financial	system,	to	end	 ‘too	big	to	 fail’,	 to	protect	the	American	taxpayer	by	ending	bailouts,	 to	protect	consumers	from	abusive	financial	services	practices,	and	for	other	purposes.”	See:	‘Study	&	Recommendations	on	Prohibitions	on	Proprietary	Trading	&	Certain	Relationships	with	Hedge	Funds	&	Private	Equity	Funds’	 (Treasury.gov,	 2011)	<https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/Volcker%20sec%20%20619%20study%20final%201%2018%2011%20rg.pdf>	accessed	26	March	2016.	
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themselves	the	role	of	the	“speculators”.	In	order	to	materialise	this	role,	artists	embarked	on	creating	works	that	propose	alternative	currencies	and	new	forms	of	exchanging	value	that	move	 beyond	 the	 normative	 (and	 delimiting)	 concepts	 of	monetisation.	 In	 a	 rather	illuminating	historical	recurrence,	contemporary	artists	have	often	adopted	the	role	of	the	amateur	“hobo”	artists	of	the	Great	Depression,	pursuing	the	exact	same	goal:	to	produce	a	new	 currency	 by	 altering,	 or	 “hybridising”	 an	 already	 existing	 one.362	This	 “circle	 of	history”	is	evident	is	Christian	Nold’s	Bijlmer	Euro,	which	was	launched	in	January	2010	in	the	Bijlmer	area	of	South	East	Amsterdam,	and	lasted	for	three	months.363	For	the	British	artist,	 his	 currency	 has	 been	 a	 “parasitical”	 entity	 that	 produced	 “economic	 benefits	 for	local	 people,	 inspires	 social	 connections	 and	 builds	 a	 complex	 network	 identity”.364	Residents	 of	 the	Bijlmer	 area	were	 given	 the	 opportunity	 to	 create	 their	 own	 “breed”	 of	Euros	by	simply	sticking	on	them	a	special	recycled	Radio-Frequency	Identification	(RFID)	sticker,	 which	 had	 a	 unique	 electronic	 tag.	 Stickers	 could	 be	 obtained	 for	 free	 from	 a	“Mobile	Bicycle	Bank”	 that	 toured	 the	whole	area,	with	a	schedule	of	dates	and	 locations	that	 could	be	 found	on	 the	project’s	website.	 Shops	 that	participated	 in	 the	Bijlmer	Euro	scheme	scanned	 the	hybrid	notes	and	offered	small	discounts	 for	using	 the	Bijlmer	Euro	instead	of	standard	currency.	Furthermore,	thanks	to	the	notes’	RFID	component,	money	flows	could	be	traced	through	a	real-time	data	visualisation	that	was	accessible	to	anyone,	on	a	dedicated	website.365		Notably,	the	visualisation	of	flows	could	not	be	equated	with	the	
																																																								362	Those	 practices	 have	 strong	 connections	 with	 the	 tradition	 created	 by	 Conceptual	 Art.	 For	instance,	 in	his	 Insertions	into	Ideological	Circuits	2:	Banknote	Project	 (1970),	Brazilian	artist	Cildo	Meireles	 rubber-stamped	 subversive	 messages	 on	 both	 sides	 of	 banknotes.	 Those	 messages	included	 slogans	 such	 as	 “Yankees	 Go	 Home”	 and	 “Straight	 Elections.”	 The	 messages	 engaged	directly	with	the	political	situation	in	the	artist’s	home	country,	which	was	governed	at	the	time	by	a	highly	oppressive	military	regime.	In	another	example,	American	artist	Lynn	Hershman	used	her	artistic	 alter	 ego,	 Roberta	 Breitmore,	 between	 1974	 and	 1978	 in	 order	 to	 make	 financial	transactions.	In	her	famous	work	Check	(1974)	she	does	exactly	that:	she	signs	a	Bank	of	America	issued	check	as	Breitmore.	In	this	way,	Hershman	was	able	to	create	a	hybrid	public	 identity	that	did	not	affect	merely	her	artistic	 life,	but	also	her	“real	 life.”	The	disruption	of	 the	 limits	between	those	 two	 supposedly	 distinct	 realities	 inevitably	 raises	 questions	 around	 the	 meaning	 of	accountability	within	the	capitalist	mode	of	production.	363	The	project’s	website:	‘Bijlmer	Euro’	(Bijlmereuro.net)	<http://www.bijlmereuro.net/>	accessed	26	March	2016.		364 	‘The	 Bijlmer	 Euro’	 (Bijlmereuro.net)	 <http://www.bijlmereuro.net/?page_id=25&lang=en>	accessed	26	March	2016.		365	‘Bijlmer	Euro	Visualisation’	(Bijlmereuro.net)	<http://www.graph.bijlmereuro.net>	accessed	26	March	2016.		
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	Figure	40:	Christian	Nold,	Bijlmer	Euro	(2010)		tracing	of	a	specific	banknote,	given	that	the	stickers	could	be	easily	removed	from	a	note	and	attached	 to	 another	without	destroying	 the	original.	 Yet,	what	 the	data	visualisation	provided	was	a	more	transparent	image	about	the	way	in	which	the	local	economy	worked	and,	 especially,	 about	 the	 importance	of	 small	businesses.	 In	deprived	areas	 like	Bijlmer,	such	 businesses	may	 function	 as	 effective	 agents	 against	 gentrification	 –	 a	 phenomenon	that	is	capable	of	changing	radically	a	community’s	socioeconomic	character.	The	outcome	of	 the	Nold’s	project	was	 a	 total	 of	 647	purchases	with	Bijlmer	Euros,	which	meant	 that	€4852.5	that	might	have	left	the	local	area	were	kept	in	the	local	economy.	Therefore,	apart	from	its	economic	function,	the	Bijlmer	Euro	also	performed	a	social	function,	by	enhancing	the	sense	of	economic	and	social	interdependence	within	a	particular	geographic	area.		Yet,	 the	 project’s	 most	 important	 contribution	might	 have	 had	 a	more	 concealed	ideological	 character.	 More	 specifically,	 this	 contribution	 can	 be	 traced	 to	 the	 fact	 that	Bijlmer	Euro	effectively	broke	the	capitalist	“taboo”	that	currencies	are	exclusively	top-to-bottom	structures	of	circumscribing	value	and	controlling	an	economy.	 Instead,	what	
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	Figure	41:	Christian	Nold,	Bijlmer	Euro	transaction	flows	(2010)		Nold’s	 work	 suggested	 is	 that	 money,	 as	 a	 public	 form	 of	 exchanging	 value,	 should	 be	directly	 monitored	 by	 the	 people	 and	 serve	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 people.	 This	 is,	 in	 fact,	 a	common	 feature	 of	 most	 alternative	 and	 complementary	 currencies	 that	 have	 appeared	throughout	 human	 history.	 Quite	 predictably,	 perhaps,	 the	 conditions	 generated	 by	 the	financial	crisis	of	2008	intensified	this	trend,	with	several	new	complementary	currencies	appearing	around	the	world.	For	 instance,	 in	the	UK	we	could	highlight	cases	such	as	the	Lewes	Pound	(2008),366	the	Brixton	Pound	(2009),367	or	the	Bristol	Pound	(2012),368	all	of	which	 are	 currently	 in	 use	 and	 growing369	–	 at	 least	 partly	 –	 thanks	 to	 their	 embrace	 of																																																									366	‘The	Lewes	Pound’	(Thelewespound.org)	<http://www.thelewespound.org/>	accessed	26	March	2016.	367	‘The	Brixton	Pound’	(Brixtonpound.org)	<http://brixtonpound.org/>	accessed	26	March	2016.		368	‘Bristol	 Pound’	 (Bristolpound.org)	 <http://bristolpound.org/>	 accessed	 26	 March	 2016.	The	Bristol	mayor	is	paid	exclusively	in	Bristol	pounds	at	the	moment.	based	on	the	structure	of	a	local	credit	union	369	Data	as	of	early	April	2016.	
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digital	 technologies	 and	 online	 media.370	Nevertheless,	 Bijlmer	 Euro	 has	 also	 displayed	three	major	advantages	in	comparison	with	other	complementary	currencies.	First	of	all,	it	created	 a	 much	 stronger	 commitment	 from	 local	 users	 by	 making	 the	 flows	 of	 the	transactions	visible	and,	 thus,	 the	benefits	 for	the	 local	economy	and	the	community	as	a	whole.	 Secondly,	on	a	more	practical	 level,	Bijlmer	Euro’s	 innovative	RFID	sticker	design	did	not	require	that	buyers	and	merchants	keep	two	different	types	of	currencies	in	their	wallets	and	tills.	This	second	characteristic	 is	closely	connected	with	the	currency’s	 third	main	 advantage:	 namely,	 its	 long-term	potential	 as	 “a	prototype	 for	 a	 global,	 community	run	 diaspora	 banking	 system	 based	 on	 the	 strength	 of	 social	 relationships	 between	communities	across	the	whole	globe”.371	In	other	words,	the	fact	that	the	RFID	sticker	can	be	easily	reattached	opens	up	the	opportunity	to	complement	not	merely	the	Euro,	but	also	other	 currencies.	 In	 contradistinction	 to	 a	 homogenising	 globalisation,	 this	 mode	 of	enriched	internationalisation	may,	thus,	produce	a	context	for	fair	trade	around	the	world,	whilst	 respecting	 local	 communities	 and	ecological	 sustainability.	Therefore,	 this	 form	of	localisation	“does	not	mean	everything	being	produced	locally,	nor	does	it	mean	an	end	to	trade.	 It	 simply	 means	 creating	 a	 better	 balance	 between	 local,	 regional,	 national	 and	international	markets.	It	also	means	that	large	corporations	should	have	less	control,	and	communities	more”.372		 Paolo	 Cirio’s	 P2P	 Gift	 Credit	 Card	 (2010)	 pushes	 this	 model	 of	 bottom-to-top	monetary	control	a	step	further,	by	giving	to	the	public	the	ability	to	produce	money	(and	value)	 completely	 independently,	 through	 a	 monetary	 system	 based	 on	 free	 universal	credit	 without	 any	 interest.373	The	 project	 uses	 counterfeit	 virtual	 money	 that	 is	 made	available	 through	 illicit	 VISA	 credit	 cards,	 each	 bearing	 a	 unique	 number	 generated	through	 the	 Luhn	 algorithm.374	That	 number	 has	 been	 assigned	 in	 accordance	 with	 the																																																									370	In	 the	 case	 of	 some	 complementary	 currencies	 people	 can	 use	 smartphone	 apps	 or	 text	 their	transactions	 through	 their	 mobiles	 by	 using	 special	 codes	 (e.g.	 Brixtoncoin).	 Also,	 other	applications	 of	 new	 technologies	 are	 currently	 being	 explored,	 such	 as	 tap	 &	 pay	 transactions	through	 dedicated	 terminals.	 Furthermore,	 on	 their	websites,	 several	 complementary	 currencies	provide	 information	 about	 their	 reserves,	which	 are	usually	 kept	 in	 small	 local	 banks,	which	 are	based	on	the	model	of	local	credit	unions.	371	‘Conceptual	Background’	(Bijlmereuro.net)	<http://www.bijlmereuro.net/?page_id=9&lang=en>	accessed	26	March	2016.		372	Ed	 Mayo	 and	 Helena	 Norberg-Hodge,	 ‘Forword’	 in	 Richard	 Douthwaite	 (ed),	Short	 circuit:	
Strengthening	local	economies	for	security	in	an	unstable	world	(Green	Books,	Totnes	1996)	p.	ix.	373 	The	 project’s	 website:	 ‘P2P	 Gift	 Credit	 Card’	 (p2pgiftcredit.com,	 2010)	<http://www.p2pgiftcredit.com/>	accessed	26	March	2016.		374	The	 Luhn	 algorithm	 is	 a	 checksum	 formula	 used	 to	 validate	 identification	 numbers,	 such	 as	credit	card	numbers.	It	was	created	by	the	IBM	scientist	Hans	Peter	Luhn	and	it	is	described	in	U.S.	Patent	No.	2,950,048	(filed	on	6th	January	1954	and	granted	on	23rd	August	1960).	
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specification	ISO/IEC	7812,	which	is	standard	for	the	bankcard	numbering	process,	and,	in	addition,	 it	 is	 technologically	 capable	 of	 satisfying	 the	 international	 credit	 card	 circuit	checks	for	transactions.	Any	Web	user	with	an	e-mail	account	or	a	mobile	phone	number	can	 generate	 a	 P2P	 Gift	 Credit	 Card	 by	 visiting	 the	 project’s	 website	 and,	 accordingly,	anyone	 can	 send	 a	 card	 to	 another	 individual	 through	 the	 Web.	 Notably,	 all	 peers	participating	 in	 this	 alternative	 financial	model	 are	 given	 the	 same	 “Global	Basic	Credit”,	which	 amounts	 to	 £100.	 In	 this	 way,	 Cirio	 consciously	 highlights	 the	 concept	 of	 a	guaranteed,	 universal	 minimum	 income,	 which	 has	 emphatically	 re-emerged	 as	 a	 social	demand	in	the	aftermath	of	the	global	economic	crisis.375	This	comes	in	contradistinction	to	the	exploitation	of	debt	and	credit	by	the	 financial	system,	which	affects	both	 individuals	and	 countries.	 In	 other	 words,	 through	 P2P	 Gift	 Credit	 Card,	 Cirio	 “reinterprets”	 the	principles	 of	 gift	 economy	 in	 order	 to	 replace	 it	 the	 even	 more	 radical	 context	 of	 “Gift	Finance”.	 At	a	time	when	banks	have	been	considered	as	“too	big	to	fail”	and	governments			
	Figure	42:	Paolo	Cirio,	P2P	Gift	Credit	Card	(2010)																																																										375	See:	 Matthew	 C	 Murray	 and	 Carole	 Pateman	 (eds),	Basic	 Income	 Worldwide:	 Horizons	 of	
Reform	(Palgrave	 Macmillan	 2012);	 and	 Anne-Louise	 Haagh	 and	 Michael	 Howard	 (eds),	 ‘Basic	Income	 Studies’	 (Degruyter.com)	 <http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bis>	 accessed	 26	 March	2016.	
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print	 money	 in	 order	 to	 save	 them,	 Cirio’s	 project	 aims	 to	 democratise	 the	 decision	 of	whether	 or	 not	 to	 generate	money.	 In	 the	 case	 of	P2P	Gift	Credit	Card,	 the	 conditions	 of	speculative	lending	that	led	to	the	latest	crisis	through	a	deregulated	creation	of	credit	are	completely	reversed:	the	members	of	the	public	are	given	the	opportunity	to	appropriate	at	least	 some	 of	 the	 powers	 of	 the	 speculators.	 Finally,	 when	 the	 members	 of	 this	 P2P	community	reach	a	critical	mass,	 the	money	issued	by	the	project’s	Basic	Credit	Network	would	be	theoretically	able	to	replace	the	money	issued	by	the	banks,	thus	subverting	the	pyramidal	scheme	of	the	current	financial	model.			
	Figure	43:	Paolo	Cirio,	P2P	Gift	Credit	Card	basic	credit	diagram	(2010)		
Bitcoin	and	its	legacies		However,	 the	most	 immediate	 and	 popular	Web-based	 response	 against	 the	 established	monetary	 systems	 has	 been	 the	 advent	 of	 digital	 currencies.	 The	 first	 and	 by	 far	 most	
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famous	digital	currency	has	been	bitcoin,	which	was	created	in	2009	and	still	remains	the	biggest	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 total	 market	 value.376	As	 a	 cryptocurrency,	 bitcoin	 uses	 complex	cryptographic	algorithms	in	order	to	create	its	new	units	and	to	secure	all	transactions.377	The	coins	are	managed	by	open	source	software	and	they	are	transferred	from	one	user	to	another	through	a	peer-to-peer	network	that	does	not	have	a	central	hub.	The	creation	of	bitcoin	 was	 followed	 by	 the	 introduction	 of	 various	 other	 digital	 currencies,	 such	 as	Namecoin	 (2011),	 Litecoin	 (2011),	 Peercoin	 (2012),	 Mastercoin	 (2013)	 and	 Primecoin	(2013),	amongst	others.	Some	of	 those	cryptocurrencies	have	been	directly	connected	 to	bitcoin	or	work	complementary	to	it.	This	is	because	of	the	fact	that	bitcoin	has	established	a	variety	of	advantages,	which	clearly	overcome	the	benefits	of	using	traditional	electronic	money	transfer	systems,	like	for	instance	PayPal.	More	specifically,	transactions	in	bitcoin	can	be	practically	anonymous,	with	no	banking	or	processing	fees	being	applied	to	them	in	the	majority	of	cases.	No	state	or	 financial	 institution	has	any	direct	regulatory	authority	over	them	and,	therefore,	bitcoin	accounts	can	be	more	difficult	to	be	seized	or	frozen.378	Furthermore,	the	lack	of	state	control	means	that	bitcoin	is	independent	and	its	value	is	not	pegged	 to	 any	 other	 currency.	 Finally,	 bitcoin	 can	 also	 adopt	 a	 physical	 form,	 with	 the	private	 keys	 of	 the	 tokens	 being	 printed	 on	 paper,	 wood,	 plastic	 or	 metal.	 In	 this	 way,	bitcoins	can	become	parts	of	hardware	wallets	that	cannot	be	hacked,	although	they	can	be	vulnerable	to	physical	theft	or	loss.	Artists	saw	from	early	on	the	potential	of	using	bitcoin	in	order	to	introduce	a	new	context	 for	selling	and	buying	art,	which	could	overcome	 the	constraints	 imposed	by	 the	supply	chain	of	the	traditional	art	market.	For	those	artists,	this	transition	has	been	seen	as	a	 means	 to	 change	 the	 kinds	 of	 relationships	 that	 can	 be	 developed	 between	 artists,	collectors	and	the	general	public;	or,	even,	as	a	means	to	attract	a	new	public	altogether,	which	would	acquire	art	by	using	novel,	more	democratic	and	open	system	of	exchanging	
																																																								376	Javier	 Espinoza,	 ‘Is	 It	 Time	 to	 Invest	 in	 Bitcoin?’	The	Wall	Street	Journal	(22	 September	 2014)	<http://online.wsj.com/articles/how-to-decipher-cryptocurrencies-1411333011>	 accessed	 28	March	2016.	377	The	bitcoin	website:	‘Bitcoin’	(Bitcoin.org)	<https://bitcoin.org/en/>	accessed	26	March	2016.		378	The	 same	 level	 of	 difficulty	 does	 not	 apply	 to	material	 and	 immaterial	 assets	 that	 have	 been	bought	 in	bitcoins.	 In	 that	 case,	 state	 authorities	 can	 easily	 confiscate	or	 freeze	 them,	 should	 the	activities	 that	 are	 associated	 with	 the	 assets	 are	 judged	 to	 be	 illegal	 in	 a	 particular	 country	 or	region.	 The	 most	 prominent	 case	 of	 direct	 bitcoin	 seizure	 has	 been	 that	 of	 the	 online	 drugs	marketplace	Silk	Road	and	the	50,000	bitcoins	belonging	to	 the	website’s	operator	Ross	Ulbricht,	which	were	seized	by	the	F.B.I.	in	2013.	The	American	government	auctioned	Ulbricht’s	bitcoins	in	2015.	See:	Matthew	Sparkes,	 ‘US	auctions	50,000	Bitcoins	seized	from	Silk	Road’	The	Telegraph	(5	March	 2015)	 <	 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/11451379/US-auctions-50000-Bitcoins-seized-from-Silk-Road.html>	accessed	2	November	2016.	
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value.	Notably,	one	of	the	ideas	that	have	emerged	around	this	new	context	of	ownership	has	been	its	materialisation	through	a	unique	cryptocurrency	that	would	apply	exclusively	to	art.	Exemplifying	this	direction,	Banksycoin	was	launched	in	the	summer	of	2014	as	“the	world’s	 first	 art	 backed	 cryptocurrency”,379	with	 its	 name	 referencing	 the	 famous	 graffiti	artist	Banksy.	Inspired	by	Banksy’s	ability	to	operate	at	the	margins	of	the	art	world,	while	producing	poignant	political	and	social	commentary	through	his	works,	Banksycoin’s	aim	has	been	to	radically	modify	the	process	of	collecting	art	by	allowing	online	users	to	buy	artworks	directly	from	artists	or	other	collectors,	without	charging	them	any	kind	of	fees.	An	even	more	radical	approach	to	the	concept	of	selling	and	owning	art	in	the	Internet	Age	has	been	put	forward	by	theironman’s	nxtdrop	(2014),	“the	world’s	first	decentralised	oil	painting”.380	The	 ownership	 of	 the	 painting	 was	 divided	 into	 100,000	 shares	 on	 the	 nxt	blockchain,	a	second-generation	cryptocurrency	that	was	launched	in	late	autumn	of	2013.		Ntx	 is	 independent	 of	 bitcoin’s	 source	 code	 and	 does	 not	 require	 a	 large	 computational	power	 in	 order	 to	 “mine”	 new	 coins	 –	 it	 can	 even	 run	 on	 smartphones	 or	 other	 small	devices.	The	previously	described	democratic	nature	of	the	cryptocurrency	is	reflected	in	the	 equally	 democratic	 ownership	 of	 the	 physical	 painting,	 which	 could	 be	 changed	fractionally	by	dealing	the	ntx-based	shares.	Despite	the	fact	that	the	painting	itself	cannot	claim	much	artistic	merit,	its	shared	ownership	by	a	dynamic	online	community	constitutes	an	overt	disruption	of	the	art	market’s	traditional	structures.			 All	those	examples	indicate	that	in	the	aftermath	of	the	global	economic	crisis	artists	have	 employed	 cryptocurrencies	 in	 order	 to	 formulate	 a	 critique	 against	 normative	currencies	and	their	established	nature.	This	nature,	as	anthropologist	and	political	activist	David	 Graeber	 suggests,	 “has	 always	 been	 and	 presumably	 always	 will	 be	 a	 matter	 of	political	contention”.381	Yet,	in	addition,	certain	artists	have	been	aiming	at	questioning	the	very	 concept	 of	money	 and	 ownership,	 both	 in	 their	 physical	and	 digital	 form.	With	 his	work,	British-born,	Vancouver-based	artist	Rob	Myers	addresses	the	context	within	which	digital	 currencies	 function,	 by	 intervening	 in	 the	 proof	 of	work	 blockchain	 of	 bitcoin.	 In	order	 to	 execute	 a	 transaction	 in	 the	 bitcoin	 network,	 all	 computers	 have	 to	 perform	 a	time-consuming	 calculation	 that	produces	 a	 chain	of	 data	 in	 the	 form	of	 a	 cryptographic	algorithm.	 The	 latter	 needs	 to	 be	 verified	 by	 the	 network	 so	 that	 the	 transaction	 is																																																									379	‘Banksy	 Coin’	 (Startjoin.com)	 <https://www.startjoin.com/banksycoin>	 accessed	 26	 March	2016.		380 	The	 project’s	 website:	 ‘NXTdrop’	 (Nxtdrop.blogspot.co.uk)	 <http://nxtdrop.blogspot.co.uk>	accessed	26	March	2016.	381	David	Graeber,	Debt:	The	First	5000	Years	(Melville	House	Publishing,	New	York	2011)	p.	372.	
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authorised.	 This	 is	 a	 random	process	with	 low	probability,	 so	 that	 it	 becomes	 expensive	both	 in	 computational	 and	 monetary	 terms	 to	 record	 a	 transaction,	 unless	 the	 user	 is	actually	carrying	one	out.	“Proof	of	work”	is	the	output	of	this	calculation:	an	identity	string	for	the	transaction	data,	which	functions	as	a	testament	to	the	user’s	willingness	to	expend	some	resources	in	order	complete	the	work	(in	this	case,	the	transaction).	Myers	uses	his	interventions	 in	 the	 proof	 of	work	 blockchain	 in	 order	 to	 investigate	 in	more	 depth	 the	concept	 of	 ownership,	 especially	 in	 relation	 to	 art.	 In	Art	Market	 (2014),	Myers	 uses	 the	Ethereum	smart	contract	system382	in	order	to	register	the	ownership	of	a	digital	artwork	contained	within	 a	 specific	 file.383	The	 digital	 files	 themselves	 are	 infinitely	 reproducible	and	 capable	 of	 being	 “sold”	 for	 cryptocurrency.	 As	 a	 result,	 this	 allographic	 digital	 art	produces	a	new	form	of	art	market,	which	–	by	being	completely	public	and	transparent	in	its	reproducibility	–	stands	in	contradistinction	to	the	traditional	art	market	structures	and	their	context	of	exclusivity.	Is	Art	of	2014	is	an	Ethereum	contract	that	can	assert	that	it	is	art.384	In	an	overt	effort	to	democratise	the	definition	of	artworks,	any	user	can	change	the	contract’s	claim	of	being	or	not	being	art	by	paying	a	small	cryptocurrency	fee	and	a	click	of	a	mouse.	 Furthermore,	Art	Is	 (2014)	 expands	 on	 this	 idea	 by	 combining	 art	 theory	 and	behavioural	 economics.385	The	 work	 offers	 to	 anyone	 the	 opportunity	 to	 produce	 a	particular	 definition	of	 art,	 through	 a	 contract	 that	 allows	 individuals	 to	 pay	 as	much	 as	they	like	in	order	to	create	their	personal	interpretation.	However,	the	more	changes	they	wish	to	apply	to	the	existing	set	of	statements,	the	higher	the	price	they	would	need	to	pay.	Adopting	a	rather	 ironic	point	of	view,	Myers	appropriates	the	market	 logic	of	bidding	in	order	to	price	and	allocate	the	“truth”.		Finally,	 American	 artist	 Caleb	 Larsen	produces	 a	 very	 literal	 and,	 hence,	 poignant	take	on	some	of	the	questions	that	Myers	raises	about	the	function	of	ownership	within	an	economic	environment	defined	by	immaterial	flows	of	capital.	Larsen’s	installation	A	tool	to	
deceive	and	slaughter	(2009,	ongoing)	is	a	black	cube	that	contains	a	computer,	which	has	to	be	connected	to	the	Internet	in	order	for	it	to	comply	with	its	conditions	of	ownership.386	Once	 the	 computer	 goes	 online,	 it	 immediately	 offers	 itself	 for	 sale	 on	 the	 eBay	 auction																																																									382	Ethereum	is	a	cryptocurrency	and	blockchain	platform,	using	an	open-source	license.		383 	Rob	 Myers,	 ‘Ethereum	 –	 Art	 Market’	 (Robmyers.org,	 24	 July	 2014)	<http://robmyers.org/2014/07/24/ethereum-art-market/>	accessed	26	March	2016.	384 	Rob	 Myers,	 ‘Ethereum	 –	 This	 Contract	 Is	 Art’	 (Robmyers.org,	 22	 July	 2014)	<http://robmyers.org/2014/07/22/ethereum-this-contract-is-art/>	accessed	26	March	2016.	385 	Rob	 Myers,	 ‘Ethereum	 –	 Art	 Is…’	 (Robmyers.org,	 23	 July	 2014)	<http://robmyers.org/2014/07/23/ethereum-art-is/>	accessed	26	March	2016.	386	Caleb	 Larsen,	 ‘A	 Tool	 to	 Deceive	 and	 Slaughter’	 (Caleblarsen.com,	 18	 September	 2009)	<http://caleblarsen.com/a-tool-to-deceive-and-slaughter/>	accessed	26	March	2016.	
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website,	 thus	 instantly	 refuting	 its	 state	 of	 ownership.	 If	 a	 bidder	 buys	 it	 on	 eBay,	 the	current	owner	is	required	to	send	it	to	the	new	owner.	Accordingly,	the	new	owner	must	connect	it	to	the	Internet,	at	which	point	the	cycle	starts	repeating	itself.387	A	tool	to	deceive	
and	 slaughter	 could	 be	 perceived	 as	 a	 critique	 of	 Data	 Capitalism’s	 schizophrenic	transactional	 flux,	 as	 transactions	 are	 happening	 in	 fractions	 of	 a	 second	 and	 financial	models	 “decide”	 when	 assets	 are	 being	 purchased	 and	 sold.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	 work	constitutes	a	complete	subversion	of	the	ideas	of	financial	exchange	and	ownership:	it	can	belong	to	anyone	and	no	one	at	once.	At	the	same	time,	however,	 the	work	could	also	be	interpreted	 as	 a	 critique	 oriented	 towards	 the	 catalytic	 role	 of	 technology	 in	 the	aforementioned	economic	processes.	As	media	and	communication	theorist	David	M.	Berry	underlines,	 the	 financialization	 of	 the	 society	 bears	 strong	 connections	 with	 its	 opaque	softwarization	–	a	condition	evidenced	by	the	uncritical	acceptance	of	technological	“black	boxes”	both	in	our	everyday	lives	and	in	the	architecture	of	financial	markets.	Accordingly,	in	 order	 to	 confront	 this	 context,	 we	 must	 “seek	 to	 open	 up	 the	 black	 box	 of	 digital	technologies”388	in	parallel	 to	 “the	opening	of	 the	black	boxes	of	market	 exchanges”.389	It	would	seem	that	Larsen	shares	Berry’s	point	of	view.			
	Figure	44:	Caleb	Larsen,	A	tool	to	deceive	and	slaughter	eBay	auction	page	(2009,	ongoing)																																																									387	The	 eBay	 auction	 of	A	tool	to	deceive	and	slaughter:	 ‘A	Tool	 to	Deceive	 and	 Slaughter	 (2009)	 -	Caleb	 Larsen’	 (Ebay.com,	 15	 July	 2014)	 <http://www.ebay.com/itm/A-Tool-to-Deceive-and-Slaughter-2009-Caleb-Larsen-/291185893491?>	accessed	26	March	2016.	388	David	M	Berry,	Critical	Theory	And	The	Digital	(Bloomsbury	Publishing	2014)	p.	26.	389	ibid.,	p.	82.		
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Exchange	beyond	money		The	 immateriality	 of	 flows	 that	 characterises	 Data	 Capitalism	 has	 inevitably	 raised	questions	 about	 the	ways	 in	which	 value	 can	be	 estimated	with	precision	 in	 the	 current	historical	 conjuncture.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 neoliberal	 ideology	 that	 dominates	 the	globalised	economy	demands	quantifiable	 results	 for	any	commercial	or	non-commercial	endeavour;	 and,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 “quantity”	 can	 be	 rather	 nebulous	 in	 its	conceptualisation	within	an	increasingly	immaterial	economic	environment.	Reflecting	on	this	dichotomy,	artists	have	often	attempted	to	think	of	new	ways	to	capture	and	articulate	value.	Amongst	 them,	 several	have	been	 focusing	on	 time	as	 a	 form	of	 capital	 and,	more	specifically,	 as	 capital	 that	 should	 be	 re-appropriated.	 As	 it	 has	 already	 been	 suggested	through	the	analysis	of	affective	labour,	the	context	of	the	networked	globalised	economy	has	made	the	appropriation	of	the	worker’s	time	easier,	albeit	 in	a	much	more	concealed	way	than	ever	before.	The	challenge	that	is	produced	by	this	context	is	how	could	time	be	transformed	from	a	unit	of	economic	exchange	–	as	it	is	culturally	portrayed	at	the	moment	–	into	a	unit	of	social	exchange.	A	very	prominent	response	that	is	able	to	materialise	the	aforementioned	ideological	approach-question	can	be	found	in	the	form	of	time	banks.	In	general,	 time	 banking	 covers	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 practices	 through	 which	 people	 can	exchange	time	and	skills,	instead	of	acquiring	goods	and	services	with	money	or	any	other	kind	of	state-backed	system	of	exchanging	value.	Not	surprisingly,	the	right	conditions	for	creation	 of	 time	banks	 first	 emerged	 after	 the	 Industrial	 Revolution	 and	 the	widespread	implementation	of	capitalist	modes	of	production.	As	a	reaction	to	those	and	to	the	(over-)	exploitation	of	workers,	utopian	 theorists	and	practitioners	 such	as	Robert	Owen	 (1771-1858)	 and	 Josiah	 Warren	 (1798-1874)	 created	 “time	 currencies”	 through	 which	 time	became	the	principal	measure	of	different	goods	or	activities	(labour).	Notably,	 following	the	rise	of	such	ideas,	Marx	himself	proposed	in	1875	a	system	of	certification	that	would	take	into	account	the	hours	spent	by	workers	in	order	to	reward	their	labour	through	the	use	of	the	community’s	common	funds.390		
																																																								390	Marx	claimed	that	“the	social	working	day	consists	of	the	sum	of	the	individual	hours	of	work;	the	 individual	 labour	 time	 of	 the	 individual	 producer	 is	 the	 part	 of	 the	 social	 working	 day	contributed	by	him,	his	share	in	it.	He	receives	a	certificate	from	society	that	he	has	furnished	such	and	 such	 an	 amount	 of	 labour	 (after	 deducting	 his	 labour	 for	 the	 common	 funds),	 and	with	 this	certificate	he	draws	from	the	social	stock	of	means	of	consumption	as	much	as	the	same	amount	of	labour	cost.	The	same	amount	of	labour	which	he	has	given	to	society	in	one	form	he	receives	back	in	 another.”	 See:	Karl	Marx,	 ‘Critique	 of	 the	Gotha	Programme’	 in	 John	 F	 Sitton	 (ed),	Marx	today:	
Selected	works	and	recent	debates	(Palgrave	Macmillan,	New	York	2010)	p.	154.	
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	 This	spirit	of	communality	has	been	a	consistent	characteristic	of	 time	banks	ever	since	the	time	of	the	Industrial	Revolution.	The	global	economic	crisis	revitalised	this	ethos,	with	many	initiatives	employing	the	tools	offered	by	the	Web	in	order	to	find	more	creative	and	enriching	means	of	exchange	based	on	the	asset	of	time.	In	2010,	the	interdisciplinary	artistic	 and	 curatorial	 collective	 e-flux	 launched	Time/Bank,	 an	 online	 platform	 that	 has	been	inspired	by	already	existing,	successful	models	of	time	banks.391	The	project’s	website	features	 an	 extensive	 list	 of	 time	 banking	 advertisements	 that	 cover	 several	 countries.	Online	users	can	search	on	the	basis	of	different	categories	and	skillsets,	and	by	registering	on	the	website	they	can	post	advertisements	of	their	own.	Categories	include	art	(the	most	extensive	category),	communication,	education,	shelter	and	transportation;	and	skills	vary	from	drawing	 to	 graphic	design,	 and	 from	 translation	 in	different	 languages	 to	 yoga	 and	dance	classes.	 Furthermore,	Time/Bank	has	established	a	network	of	temporary	and	long-	term	 local	 branches	 in	 several	 cities	 around	 the	world.392	Those	 “offsprings”	 function	 as	physical	spaces	where	time-banking	exchanges	can	take	place,	with	a	view	to	building		
	Figure	45:	e-flux,	Time/Bank	listings	page	(2010,	ongoing)																																																									391 	The	 project’s	 website:	 ‘Time/Bank’	 (E-flux.com/timebank)	 <http://e-flux.com/timebank/>	accessed	26	March	2016.		392	As	of	November	2014,	those	cities	were:	Berlin,	Bristol,	Den	Haag,	Frankfurt,	Leuven,	Ljubljana,	Moscow,	New	York,	Sherbrooke,	Sydney	and	Warsaw.		
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connections	 between	 people	 and	 strengthening	 social	 cohesion	 in	 local	 communities	thanks	 to	 the	 introduction	 of	 an	 alternative	 economic	model.393	In	 accordance	 with	 this	extrovert,	internationalist	approach,	the	credit	hours	earned	by	performing	a	certain	time	banking	activity	can	be	used	at	any	location	around	the	world	and	for	any	service.	This	is	possible	thanks	to	the	common	framework	of	“Hour	Notes”,	which	are	issued	in	half-hour,	one	hour,	six,	twelve	and	twenty-four	hour	denominations.394	Arguably,	this	opportunity	is	of	 particular	 importance	 to	 culture	 at	 a	 time	 of	 extreme	 economic	 pressure.	 As	 e-flux’s	Julieta	 Aranda	 and	 Anton	 Vidokle	 emphasise,	 Time/Bank	 creates	 “a	 sense	 of	 worth	 for	many	of	the	exchanges	that	already	take	place	within	our	field	–	particularly	those	that	do	not	produce	commodities	and	often	escape	the	structures	that	validate	only	certain	forms	of	exchange	as	significant	or	profitable”.395	Therefore,	Time/Bank	does	not	simply	enhance	the	 links	 of	 artists	 with	 their	 local	 communities;	 rather,	 it	 creates	 a	 new	 context	 of	collaboration	and	mutual	support	within	the	artistic	community	itself,	which	is	“liberated”	from	the	conceptual	and	practical	restraints	produced	by	the	use	of	normative	currencies.		The	 connections	 between	 time	 banks	 and	 artistic	 production	 have	 also	 been	explored	in	the	last	few	years	through	the	format	of	artists’	residencies.	A	good	example	of	such	amalgamation	is	the	Neighbourhood	Time	Exchange	residency,	which	was	initiated	in	autumn	2014	in	West	Philadelphia,	USA.396	Hosted	in	one	of	Philadelphia’s	most	deprived	areas,	the	Lancaster	Avenue	neighbourhood,	the	scheme	provides	its	resident	artists	with	a	free	studio	space,	a	fee	and	some	basic	tools.	In	exchange,	and	for	every	hour	of	working	in	the	studio,	the	artists	are	required	to	provide	an	hour	of	service	to	the	local	community,	by	working	 on	 projects	 that	 have	 been	 proposed	 by	 the	 residents	 themselves	 and	 various	community-based	 organisations.	 For	 the	 realisation	 of	 those	 projects,	 artists	 are	encouraged	to	make	use	of	the	often-invisible	resources	of	the	neighbourhood	–	namely,																																																										393	For	a	thorough	evaluation	of	 the	benefits	of	 time	banks	to	 local	communities,	see:	Anna	Coote,	Josh	 Ryan-Collins	 and	 Lucie	 Stephens,	The	 New	Wealth	 of	 Time:	 How	 Timebanking	 Helps	 People	
Build	 Better	 Public	 Services	(New	 Economics	 Foundation,	 London	 2008);	 Ed	 Collom,	 Corinne	Kyriacou	and	 Judith	N	Lasker,	Equal	Time,	Equal	Value:	Community	Currencies	and	Time	Banking	in	
the	 US	(Ashgate	 Publishing,	 Burlington	 2012);	 and	 Abby	 S	 Letcher	 and	 Kathy	 M	 Perlow,	‘Community-Based	Participatory	Research	Shows	How	a	Community	Initiative	Creates	Networks	to	Improve	Well-Being’	(2009)	American	Journal	of	Preventive	Medicine	vol.	37	S292.	394	In	2009,	e-flux	asked	a	group	of	artists,	architects,	writers,	activists	and	designers	to	propose	a	design	 for	 a	 symbolic	 currency	 representing	 the	 exchange	 of	 time.	 The	 full	 list	 can	 be	 found	 on	
Time/Bank’s	 website:	 ‘Project	 0:	 TIME	 CURRENCY,	 CURRENT	 TIMES’	 (E-flux.com/timebank)	<http://e-flux.com/timebank/project/currency>	accessed	26	March	2016.	395	‘About	Time	Banking’	 (E-flux.com/timebank)	<http://e-flux.com/timebank/about>	accessed	28	March	2016.		396 	The	 project’s	 website:	 ‘Neighborhood	 Time	 Exchange’	 (Neighborhoodtime.exchange)	<http://www.neighborhoodtime.exchange>	accessed	28	March	2016.		
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Lancaster	 Avenue’s	 common	 wealth,	 in	 the	 form	 of	 public	 spaces,	 materials,	 objects,	histories,	 knowledge,	 skills,	 languages,	 etc.	 In	 this	 way,	 Neighbourhood	 Time	 Exchange	“offers	 an	 opportunity	 to	 explore	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 forms	 of	 value	 and	 exchange	 are	identified	 and	 distributed,	 and	 the	 boundaries	 between	 public	 and	 private	 might	 be	blurred”.397	Like	 Christian	 Nold’s	 Bijlmer	 Euro	 that	 aimed	 at	 changing	 the	 culture	 of	transactions	 in	 a	 particular	 area,	 Time/Bank	 and	 the	 Neighbourhood	 Time	 Exchange	residency	programme	reinterpret	the	construction	of	micro-economies	(both	material	and	immaterial)	 through	artistic	 initiatives.	Moving	beyond	monetary	value,	and	 in	 their	own	distinct	 ways,	 they	 integrate	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 transaction	 with	 that	 of	 social	 change,	starting	 from	 the	 level	 of	 the	 community.	The	 latter	 appears	 to	 emerge	 “naturally”,	 once	more,	 as	 the	 birthplace	 of	 any	 transformative,	 or	 –	 even	 –	 revolutionary	 action	 both	 in	politics	and	in	art.		
	Figure	46:	Neighbourhood	Time	Exchange	(2014,	ongoing)		 	
																																																								397 	‘Neighborhood	 Time	 Exchange:	 West	 Philadelphia	 Artist	 Residency’	 (Muralarts)	<http://www.muralarts.org/sites/default/files/TimeExchange_FinalRFQ.pdf>	 accessed	 3	 April	2016.	
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	Figure	47:	Neighbourhood	Time	Exchange	gallery	event	(2015)		
Between	the	“Community”	and	the	“Commune”:	Reimagining	the	State		In	a	letter	sent	to	German	politician	August	Bebel	in	1875,	Engels	(who	was	also	speaking	on	behalf	of	Marx)	delineates	the	character	of	“community”	in	a	political	system	based	on	the	principles	of	socialism.	Discussing	the	political	platform	that	was	adopted	at	the	town	of	Gotha	by	the	then	nascent	German	Social	Democratic	Party	(SPD),	Engels	notes	that	the	established	 notion	 of	 a	 “free	 state”	 is	 directly,	 and	 before	 anything	 else,	 linked	with	 the	power	that	 the	state	can	exercise	upon	 its	citizens	–	a	 fact	 that	renders	 it	 into	a	despotic	entity.	 Accordingly,	 Engels	 suggests	 that	 true	 freedom	 and	 democracy	would	 have	 to	 be	looked	for	elsewhere:		 The	 whole	 talk	 about	 the	 state	 should	 be	 dropped	 [from	 the	 Gotha	 Program],	especially	 since	 the	 [Paris]	 Commune,	which	was	 no	 longer	 a	 state	 in	 the	 proper	sense	of	the	word	[…]	As	soon	as	it	becomes	possible	to	speak	of	freedom,	the	state	as	 such	 ceases	 to	 exist.	 We	 would	 therefore	 propose	 to	 replace	 the	 word	 ‘state’	
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everywhere	by	the	word	Geimenwesen	(community)	a	good	old	German	word,	which	can	very	well	represent	the	French	word	‘commune’.398		Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 American	 translator	 of	 the	 quoted	 edition	 chose	 to	 translate	“Geimenwesen”	as	“community”,	it	is	important	to	note	that	this	is	not	the	only	possibility.	In	some	cases,	 translators	have	opted	 for	different	words	 including	“commonality”,	while	“Geimenwesen”	 can	 also	 be	 translated	 as	 “commonwealth”	 or	 “polity”.	 Those	 differences	could	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 “Geimenwesen”	 connotes	 the	 integrated	 political	function	that	the	community	performs,	which	inevitably	poses	an	additional	challenge	for	translators.399	According	to	Marx	and	Engels,	the	state	separates	the	civil	and	the	political	life	of	 its	citizens,	and	that	 is	exactly	what	 the	communist	version	of	 the	community	(the	commune)	aims	to	dissolve.	Democracy	cannot	be	realised	merely	through	politics:	what	is	needed	 is	 the	connection	and	 integration	of	 the	society	with	politics.400	At	 the	same	time,	and	in	order	to	understand	this	definition,	it	is	important	to	take	into	account	the	fact	that	“communism	is	[…]	not	a	stable	state	which	is	to	be	established,	an	 ideal	 to	which	reality	will	have	to	adjust	itself.	We	call	communism	the	real	movement	that	abolishes	the	present	state	 of	 things”.401	Thus,	 communism	 should	 be	 perceived	 as	 stateless	 both	 in	 the	 sense	that	 the	 state	 as	 a	 political	 and	 organisational	 entity	 has	 been	 replaced,	 but	 also	 in	 the	sense	that	this	is	a	transformative	process	in	constant	development	and	evolution.			 This	 aspiration	 to	 redefine	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 state	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 socialist	principles,	 or	 even	 abolish	 it	 altogether	 as	 an	 organisational	 system,	 is	 –	 possibly	 –	 the	most	 radical	 proposition	 that	 politically	 engaged	 artists	 could	 have	 put	 forward	 for	 the	post-crisis	era.	Notably,	even	before	the	financial	cataclysm	of	2007-2008	that	exposed	the	incapacity	 of	 states	 to	 control	 and	 regulate	 the	 markets,	 New	 Media	 Art	 had	 already	developed	a	significant	tradition	in	this	field,	both	on	the	level	of	artworks	as	well	as	on	the	level	 of	 critical	 theory.	 A	 work	 that	 embodies	 both	 aspects	 of	 this	 tradition,	 and	 which	reached	 its	completion	stage	during	the	crisis	 is	Natalie	Bookchin’s	agoraXchange	 (2004-
																																																								398	Karl	 Marx,	Critique	 of	 the	 Gotha	 Programme	(CP	 Dutt	 ed,	 International	 Publishers,	 New	 York	1938)	p.	31.	399	For	a	more	thorough	investigation	of	the	concept	of	“community”	in	Marx,	see:	Kenneth	A	Megill,	‘The	Community	 in	Marx’s	 Philosophy’	 (1970)	Philosophy	and	Phenomenological	Research	 vol.	 30,	no.	3	(March)	pp.	382-393.	400	ibid.,	p.	391.	401	Karl	Marx,	 Friedrich	Engels,	The	German	Ideology	 [Die	Deutsche	Ideologie.	English.	Pascal]	 (Roy	Pascal	ed,	International	Publishers	1947)	p.	26.	
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2008).	402	The	project	adopted	the	form	of	online	design	forum	focusing	on	the	prospective	production	a	massive	multiplayer	“global	politics	game”,	and	it	was	developed	by	Bookchin	in	collaboration	with	political	theorist	Jacqueline	Stevens.	Bookchin	chose	the	format	of	a	game	inspired	by	the	fact	that	today’s	video	games	have	“the	potential	to	be	to	the	twenty-first	century	what	cinema	was	to	the	twentieth”:403	namely,	a	medium	capable	of	reaching	millions	of	people	around	the	world,	who	come	from	a	wide	range	of	social	backgrounds.	Originally	a	commission	for	Tate	Modern’s	online	programme,	agoraXchange	went	 live	 in	March	2004.	The	first	phase	of	the	game’s	development	had	a	rather	speculative	character,	since	it	invited	Web	users	to	answer	a	series	of	general	questions	that	could	inform	its	final	design.	 For	 instance,	 the	 visitors	 of	 the	 project’s	 website	 were	 asked,	 amongst	 other	questions,	 “what	 should	 be	 the	 object	 of	 the	 game?”	 and	 “should	 there	 be	 points?”	Thousands	 of	 responses	 were	 gathered	 and	 were,	 then,	 collated	 into	 multiple-choice	questionnaires.			
	Figure	48:	Natalie	Bookchin,	agoraXchange	(2004-2008)		 In	the	project’s	second	phase,	participants	were	able	to	answer	those	questionnaires	and	explore	different	models	of	social	organization	as	alternatives	to	the	present	political	order.	 Those	 options	 were	 based	 on	 the	 principles	 delineated	 in	 the	 project’s	 key																																																									402 	The	 project’s	 website:	 ‘agoraXchange	 Enters	 Phase	 II	 BETA’	 (Agoraxchange.net)	<http://www.agoraxchange.net>	accessed	28	March	2016.	403	‘FAQ’	(Agoraxchange.net)	<http://www.agoraxchange.net/faq>	accessed	28	March	2016.	
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theoretical	 text,	 the	Recreate	the	State!	Manifesto.	 In	the	manifesto,	Bookchin	and	Stevens	attack	 state-supported	 institutions,	 and	 in	 particular	 the	 family,	 portraying	 them	 as	 the	roots	of	 inequality	around	the	world.	The	manifesto	goes	on	 to	declare	 that	 “our	present	political	 institutions	are	not	natural	or	 inevitable,	but	an	experiment	gone	awry,	a	utopia	for	 the	 paranoid”.404	Accordingly,	 the	 authors	 encourage	 people	 to	 reclaim	 utopianism	through	 a	 wide	 collaboration	 of	 artists,	 thinkers,	 activists,	 political	 leaders	 as	 well	 as	citizens.	agoraXchange	is	a	platform	that	aimed	to	contribute	towards	this	goal	by	fostering	an	online	environment	of	creativity,	empathy	and	freedom.	For	the	manifesto’s	authors,	it	is	now	imperative	to	move	beyond	the	hierarchical	relationships	of	power	that	have	long	been	in	place	without	any	real	consent	from	the	people.	Thus,	the	manifesto	concludes	with	the	assertion	 that	 the	character	of	political	communities	depends	on	 the	character	of	 the	laws	that	govern	them;	and	those	laws	can	change	over	time.	For	Bookchin	and	Stevens	our	current	 legal	 framework	 creates	 xenophobic,	 selfish	 and	 materialistic	 communities.	therefore,	 real	 justice	 should	 urgently	 replace	 such	 attitudes	 and	 a	 new	 context	 of	creativity	should	be	fostered	through	the	tools	provided	by	new	media	technologies.	During	 the	 second	 phase	 of	 the	 project,	 the	 manifesto’s	 overarching	 ethos	 was	consolidated	 into	 four	 distinct	 decrees.	 Those	 composed	 the	 fundamental	 political	doctrines	 for	 a	 new	 prospective	world	 system,	 the	 establishment	 of	which	 has	 been	 the	ultimate	 aspiration	 of	 agoraXchange.	 The	 first	 decree	 refers	 to	 the	 introduction	 of	 a	citizenship	 system	 that	 would	 not	 be	 defined	 by	 birth,	 but	 rather	 by	 choice,	 and	 which	would	 be	 accompanied	 by	 a	 completely	 free	movement	 of	 people	 and	 goods	 around	 the	world.	The	second	decree	rejects	inheritance	and	calls	for	the	posthumous	redistribution	of	an	 individual’s	 wealth	 for	 common	 causes	 like	 education	 and	 healthcare.	 The	 third	repudiates	marriage	and	any	rule	of	kinship	that	is	established	or	controlled	by	the	state.	And,	 finally,	 the	 fourth	 decree	 rejects	 private	 land	 rights.405	Bookchin’s	 ideological	orientation	in	this	project	becomes	even	more	explicit	when	we	associate	her	four	decrees	with	 the	 ten	 principles	 of	 the	 communist	 state	 that	 Marx	 and	 Engels	 describe	 in	 The	
Communist	Manifesto.	Notably,	Those	principles	 include	the	“abolition	of	property	 in	 land	and	 application	 of	 all	 rents	 of	 land	 to	 public	 purposes”,	 the	 “abolition	 of	 all	 rights	 of	inheritance”,	the	“confiscation	of	the	property	of	all	emigrants	and	rebels”,	and	the	pledge	
																																																								404	‘The	 Manifesto’	 (Agoraxchange.net)	 <http://www.agoraxchange.net/manifesto>	 accessed	 28	March	2016.		405	‘Decrees’	 (Agoraxchange.net)	 <http://www.agoraxchange.net/decrees>	 accessed	 28	 March	2016.		
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for	 providing	 “free	 education	 for	 all	 children	 in	 public	 schools”.406	Finally,	 one	 cannot	ignore	the	fact	that	the	second	and	final	phase	of	agoraXchange’s	development	was	realized	after	the	subprime	mortgage	crisis	in	the	US,	with	the	publication	of	the	four	decrees	taking	place	 in	mid	 2008.	Most	 importantly,	 the	 capacity	and	 the	 responsibility	 to	 react	 to	 this	socio-political	 environment	 was	 given	 by	 Bookchin	 directly	 to	 the	 people,	 in	contradistinction	 to	 the	 state	 mechanisms	 that	 failed	 to	 protect	 their	 citizens	 from	 the	crisis	and	its	consequences.			 	
From	the	Web	to	the	ground	(and	back)		Not	 surprisingly,	 however,	 the	 exploration	 of	 new	 media	 activists	 and	 artists	 into	 the	formation	 of	 the	 commune	 has	 predominantly	 materialised	 through	 the	 involvement	 of	communities	 that	 live	 in	poor	countries,	or	 in	places	where	social	support	by	the	state	 is	either	 completely	 absent	 or	 very	 limited.	 Since	 2011,	 Mexican	 artist,	 writer	 and	programmer	 Eugenio	 Tisselli	 has	 initiated	 a	 number	 of	 projects	 that	 make	 use	 of	networked	technologies	in	order	to	foster	new	forms	of	communality	in	deprived	parts	of	the	world.	Sauti	ya	wakulima	(“The	voice	of	the	farmers”,	2011,	ongoing)	was	the	first	one	to	be	launched,	in	the	Chambezi	region	of	Tanzania.407	As	the	title	of	the	work	suggests,	its	main	goal	has	been	to	make	the	voices	of	the	local	farmers	heard,	by	equipping	them	with	smartphones	with	 a	 special	 application	 through	which	 they	 could	 capture	photos,	 sound	recordings	 and	 videos	 and	 directly	 upload	 them	 on	 the	 project’s	website.	 Thanks	 to	 the	uploaded	 media,	 the	 participants	 were	 able	 to	 collaboratively	 produce	 an	 online	“communal	 memory”,	 which	 documented	 the	 challenges	 and	 hardships	 that	 farmers	increasingly	face	because	of	global	warming.	Despite	the	fact	that	the	original	focus	of	Sauti	
ya	 wakulima	 has	 been	 global	 warming,	 gradually	 the	 farmers	 started	 using	 the	smartphones	 beyond	 that	 scope.	 They	 started	 interviewing	 other	 farmers	 from	 the	community,	asking	them	questions	that	did	not	refer	merely	to	the	agricultural	techniques	that	 they	use	or	the	problems	that	they	face	with	pests	and	the	 lack	of	water,	but	also	to	wider	 views	 and	 opinions	 about	 their	 ongoing	 situation.	 Furthermore,	 the	 participants	passed	the	available	smartphones	to	other	members	of	the	local	community,	transforming	the	phones	into	shared	tools	for	communication.	As	one	of	the	farmers	noted,	“The	project	helped	me	learn	that	phones	can	be	used	for	other	things	besides	calling	people,	and	that																																																									406	Marx	and	Engels,	The	Communist	Manifesto,	op.	cit.,	pp.	64-65.	407 	The	 project’s	 website:	 ‘Sauti	 Ya	 Wakulima’	 (Sautiyawakulima.net)	<http://sautiyawakulima.net/bagamoyo/about.php?l=1>	accessed	28	March	2016.		
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computers	can	also	be	used	to	solve	problems:	they	are	not	just	a	fancy	thing	for	the	rich	people	 in	 towns”.408	Thus,	 Sauti	 ya	 wakulima	 expanded	 social	 relationships	 within	 a	community	suffering	 from	 insufficient	 infrastructure	and	poverty.	Thanks	 to	a	process	of	mutual	 learning	 catalysed	 by	 networked	 technologies	 participants	managed	 to	 –	 at	 least	partly	–	overcome	the	constraints	imposed	by	the	state.			
	Figure	49:	Eugenio	Tisselli,	Sauti	ya	wakulima	(2011,	ongoing)		 A	year	after	Sauti	ya	wakulima,	Tisselli	launched	a	similar	project	under	the	title	Los	
ojos	de	la	milpa	 (“The	eyes	of	 the	milpa”409)	 in	his	home	country,	Mexico.410	Tisselli	chose	
																																																								408	Ken	 Banks,	 ‘From	 Smart	 Phones	 to	 Smart	 Farming:	 Indigenous	 Knowledge	 Sharing	 in	Tanzania’	National	 Geographic	(30	 November	 2011)	<http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2011/11/30/smart-phones-meet-smart-farming-indigenous-knowledge-sharing-in-tanzania/>	accessed	28	March	2016.	409	“Milpa”	 is	a	crop-growing	system	formed	mainly	by	maize,	beans,	 chilli	and	squash.	Maize	 is	a	Central	American	cereal	plant	that	yields	large	grains	(corn	or	sweetcorn)	set	in	rows	on	a	cob.	The	many	varieties	include	some	used	for	stockfeed	and	corn	oil.	
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the	area	of	Santa	Maria	Tlahuitoltepec	in	Oaxaca	as	the	project’s	 location,	 inspired	by	the	local	 community’s	 difficulties	 in	 resolving	 the	 tension	between	 the	 capitalist	 demand	 for	increased	 productivity	 and	 profit,	 and	 the	 desire	 to	 preserve	 traditional	 agricultural	techniques	 and	 products.	 Just	 like	with	 the	 Sauti	ya	wakulima	project,	 the	 farmers	were	given	smartphones	in	order	to	document	whatever	happened	in	their	milpas	and	post	them	online.	By	doing	this,	they	were	given	the	opportunity	to	share	their	knowledge,	thoughts	and	concerns,	 gradually	acquiring	a	more	holistic	 image	 regarding	 the	 common	origin	of	their	 problems.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 through	 the	 artist’s	 collaboration	with	 the	 Colegio	 de	Posgraduados	 en	 Agronomía	 (Postgraduate	 College	 of	 Agronomy),	 farmers	were	 able	 to	develop	a	dialogue	with	scientific	researchers	and	get	advice	about	how	to	maintain	their	traditional	 cultivations.	 This	 approach	 lies	 in	 overt	 opposition	 to	 the	 centralised	development	of	policies,	which	do	not	take	into	account	the	local	context	and	the	needs	and	desires	of	the	people.411	The	increasing	unsustainability	of	industrialised	agriculture,	which	has	dire	consequences	for	our	ecosystems,	constitutes	a	prominent	symptom	of	the	blind,	deterministic	 belief	 in	 the	 model	 of	 constant	 economic	 expansion.	 Los	 ojos	 de	 la	milpa	reverses	 this	 idea	 and	 stresses	 the	 need	 to	 develop	 a	 bottom-to-top	 understanding	 of	decision-making,	not	only	in	order	to	be	effective,	but	also	in	order	to	be	truly	democratic.		
	Figure	50:	Eugenio	Tisselli	,Los	ojos	de	la	milpa	(2012)																																																																																																																																																																																			410 	The	 project’s	 website:	 ‘Los	 Ojos	 de	 La	 Milpa’	 (Sautiyawakulima.net)	<http://sautiyawakulima.net/oaxaca/about.php?l=2>	accessed	28	March	2016.	411	The	project	also	tried	to	respect	the	language	of	the	local	people	and	integrate	it	in	all	outputs,	as	great	 efforts	were	made	 to	 translate	 all	words	 in	Mixe,	which	 is	 the	 dialect	 spoken	 in	 the	 Santa	Maria	Tlahuitoltepec	area.	
			 159	
It	is	significant	to	note	that	all	software	used	in	both	Los	ojos	de	la	milpa	and	Sauti	ya	
wakulima,	has	been	open-source.	As	a	 result,	 users	 from	around	 the	world	were	granted	the	 right	 to	 copy	 the	 code	 and	processes	 implemented	 in	 the	projects’	 applications.	This	context	 of	 universal	 access,	 unrestricted	 modification	 and	 free	 distribution	 has	 been	integral	 to	 the	 communal	 character	 of	 open	 source.	 The	 latter	 negates	 the	 dominant	proprietary	models	 of	 production,	which	 are	 defined	 by	 the	 transfer	 of	 knowledge	 from	labour	to	machinery	through	the	exclusivity	of	the	code.	This	has	been	a	consistent	aim	of	the	 capitalist	 model	 of	 knowledge	 appropriation,	 which	 transforms	 the	 products	 of	technological	 progress	 into	 mere	 “black	 boxes”	 by	 concealing	 their	 code.	 As	 political	economist	Steven	Weber	notes,	the	result	of	this	approach	is	reflected	in	the	fact	that	the	labourer-user	is	left	with	a	thoroughly	passive	and,	inevitably,	apolitical	role	to	fulfil:		 The	source	code	is	basically	the	recipe	for	the	binaries;	and	if	you	have	the	source	code,	you	can	understand	what	the	author	was	trying	to	accomplish	when	she	wrote	the	 program	 –	which	means	 you	 can	modify	 it.	 If	 you	 have	 just	 the	 binaries,	 you	typically	cannot	either	understand	or	modify	them.	Therefore,	shipping	binary	code	is	a	very	effective	way	for	proprietary	software	companies	to	control	what	you	can	do	with	the	software	you	buy.412		Gradually,	 those	 barriers	 can	 lead	 from	 what	 American	 political	 economist	 Harry	Braverman	 terms	 as	 “labour	 deskilling”	 to	 what	 Polish	 sociologist	 and	 philosopher	Zygmunt	 Bauman	 calls	 “social	 deskilling;”413	namely,	 from	 the	 incapacity	 to	 maintain	 a	direct	 contact	 with	 technological	 innovation	 to	 the	 erosion	 of	 the	 skills	 through	 which	people	are	able	to	expand	their	social	relationships	and	networks.	If	we	take	into	account	the	 essential	 role	 that	 social	media	 and	 technology-catalysed	 communication	 play	 in	 the	formation	of	those	relationships,	then	it	becomes	evident	that	open	source	can	profoundly	disrupt	 both	 the	 capitalist	methods	 of	 production	 as	well	 as	 its	 channels	 of	 propaganda.	This	tension	between	open	source	and	exclusivity	can	be	seen	as	a	blueprint	for	any	form	of	 governance	 in	 the	 Digital	 Age,	 including	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 citizen	 and	 the	state.	Artists	and	cultural	workers	have	been	in	the	forefront	of	this	antagonism	as	 it	has	
																																																								412	Steven	Weber,	The	Success	of	Open	Source	(Harvard	University	Press,	Cambridge,	MA	2004)	p.	4.	413	See:	 Harry	 Braverman,	Labor	and	Monopoly	Capital:	The	Degradation	of	Work	 in	 the	Twentieth	
Century	(25th	 edn,	 Monthly	 Review	 Press	 1998)[1974];	 and	 Zygmunt	 Bauman,	Consuming	
Life	(Polity	Press	2007).		
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already	been	suggested	by	the	various	open	source	projects	that	have	been	analysed	in	this	chapter.		 The	next	and,	perhaps,	final	step	to	be	taken	in	the	search	for	an	alternative	system	of	governance	would	have	to	be	a	move	beyond	the	micro-level	of	local	communities.	The	ambition	 to	 replace	 the	 neoliberal	 state	 with	 another	 type	 of	 organizational	 entity	necessitates	 a	model	 that	 could	 sustain	 the	 implementation	of	 new	principles	 of	 societal	progress	on	a	large	scale:	it	is	only	through	a	critical	mass	of	people	that	one	would	expect	to	catalyze	some	form	of	revolutionary	action.	If	we	were	to	think	of	such	an	endeavour	in	the	 context	 of	 the	 previously	 described	 role	 of	 open	 source,	 then,	 the	 question	 that	inevitably	emerges	is	whether	there	is	a	limit	to	the	change	that	we	can	produce	through	the	establishment	of	an	open	software	culture.	In	other	words,	would	it	be	possible	to	not	only	use	open	software	technology,	but	also	adopt	its	core	principles	of	openness,	freedom	and	 universality	 in	 all	 aspects	 of	 public	 governance?	 Could	 cultural	 producers,	 actually,	catalyse	 not	 simply	 the	 creation	 of	 open	 source	 communities,	 but	 –	 ultimately	 –	 the	establishment	of	an	open	source	society?	This	challenge,	which	may	well	seem	of	utopian	proportions,	inspired	r0g_,	the	Berlin-based	non-profit	agency	for	open	culture	and	critical	transformation.414	Founded	by	 cultural	 researcher	 Stephen	Kovats	 and	 architect	 Susanne	Bellinghausen	in	2012,	the	organization’s	aim	has	been	“to	support	sustainable	and	hybrid	forms	 of	 cultural	 innovation	 and	 social	 enterprise	 in	 regions	 undergoing	 rapid	 and	fundamental	transformation”.415	In	order	to	achieve	its	mission,	r0g_	employs	a	variety	of	tools	 ranging	 from	 open	 source	 hardware	 and	 software	 systems	 to	 open	 education	 and	skills	 training;	 and	 from	 open	 governance	 and	 open	 urbanism	 to	 cultural	 hacktivism.	Nevertheless,	 the	 simultaneous	 implementation	 all	 those	 unconventional	 or	 non-conformist	 strategies	 within	 a	 society	 that	 already	 relies	 on	 an	 existing	 model	 of	governance	may	generate	strong	resistance.	That	is	why	the	initiatives	undertaken	by	r0g_	focus	predominantly	on	crisis-hit	and	post-conflict	regions	of	the	world,	where	the	need	to	make	a	radically	“new	start”	is	felt	more	strongly	by	the	local	populations.			 One	 of	 those	 cases	 is	 South	 Sudan,	 which	 in	 2011	 became	 the	 world’s	 newest	country,	having	gained	independence	from	Sudan	after	more	than	four	decades	of	bloody	conflict.	Just	like	with	any	society	emerging	from	a	state	of	severe	crisis,	South	Sudan	had	to	 urgently	 construct	 a	 civic	 system	 that	would	 be	 capable	 of	 dealing	 not	 only	with	 the																																																									414	The	 organization’s	 website:	 ‘R0g_agency	 for	 Open	 Culture	 and	 Critical	 Transformation’	 (r0g-
media.org)	<http://r0g-media.org>	accessed	28	March	2016.	415 	From	 the	 organization’s	 mission	 statement:	 ‘r0g_mission’	 (r0g-media.org)	 <http://r0g-media.org/mission/>	accessed	28	March	2016.		
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problems	of	the	past,	but	also	with	the	challenges	of	the	future.	At	this	particular	historical	conjecture,	r0g_	saw	the	opportunity	of	using	the	principles	of	open	source	culture	on	the	ground,	 in	order	 to	collectively	address	 the	numerous	questions	 that	have	emerged	 from	the	birth	of	the	new	nation:	the	formation	of	a	political	identity,	the	priorities	of	the	state,	its	production	model,	the	participation	of	citizens,	the	inclusivity	of	the	system	and	the	new	country’s	relations	with	the	 international	community,	amongst	others.416	The	project	#OS	
SOUTH	SUDAN	(2012)	was	envisioned	by	r0g_	as	the	answer	to	those	questions.	Its	purpose	has	 been	 the	 application	 of	 Open	 Systems	 methodologies	 across	 all	 of	 the	 country’s	structures	of	governance,	 in	order	 to	benefit	 from	the	 fuse	of	diverse	social,	political	and	cultural	 traditions.	 The	 first	 step	 towards	 the	 realization	 of	 this	 new	 model	 has	 been	
#OSJUBA	 (2012),	 which	 applied	 the	 open	 source	 principles	 on	 the	 governance	 of	 Juba,	South	Sudan’s	capital	city.	Juba	was	chosen	for	practical	reasons,	given	that	it	has	served	as	an	administrative	centre	for	many	decades,	as	well	as	for	its	symbolic	value,	given	that	by	being	 the	 country’s	 capital	 it	 constitutes	 the	 location	 that	 physically	 manifests	 the	aspirations	 of	 the	 new	 nation.	 r0g_	 has	 been	working	with	 Juba’s	 universities,	 students,	elected	officials,	local	NGOs,	as	well	as	with	international	organizations	such	as	UNESCO,	in	order	 to	 introduce	Open	Systems	governance	 solutions.	 In	addition,	 the	organization	has	engaged	 the	 city’s	 artists,	 either	 individually	 or	 through	 its	 collaboration	 with	 art	collectives,	 like	the	Kapital	Movie	Industry	Corporation.	Notably,	 this	particular	collective	has	 strong	 links	with	 new	media	 technologies,	 as	 it	 is	 comprised	 of	 filmmakers	 and	 ICT	professionals,	“who	are	interested	in	sharing	and	nurturing	a	vibrant	civil	society	through	the	power	of	open	media”.417		The	most	important,	perhaps	component	of	open	source	governance	that	has	been	outlined	for	South	Sudan	is	#OSBACK,	the	country’s	Open	Server	Backbone.	Envisioned	as	a	network	of	data	tools,	#OSBACK	will	provide	South	Sudan	with	the	capacity	to	fully	own	the	data	 that	 it	 produces,	 whilst	 making	 them	 available	 through	 the	 use	 of	 public	 domain	licenses	 and	 sharable,	 freely	 distributable	 software	 and	 hardware.	 The	 project	 will	 be	delivered	in	its	complete	format	through	decentralized	servers,	with	at	least	one	server																																																									416	Some	 of	 the	 questions	 that	 have	 been	 posed:	 “Where	 no	 uniform	 political	 entity	 or	 national	infrastructure	has	existed	in	the	past,	what	are	the	priorities	in	establishing	a	state?	Who	charts	the	paths	and	gives	the	people	a	voice	in	their	collective	destiny?	How	will	a	new,	post-conflict	identity,	based	on	the	hopes	and	aspirations	of	former	lifelong	combatants	emerge?	How	will	the	new	state’s	cultural	contours	form,	and	how	will	these	be	perceived	by	its	neighbors	and	by	the	world	at	large?”	See:	 ‘#OSJUBA’	 (r0g-media.org,	 27	 October	 2012)	 <http://r0g-media.org/initiatives-2/os-south-sudan/osjuba/#more-61>	accessed	28	March	2016.	417	‘Kapital	 Corporation’	 (Kapitalmovie.net)	 <http://www.kapitalmovie.net>	 accessed	 28	 March	2016.	
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	Figure	51:	r0g_,	#OSJUBA	(2012)		 	node	being	 located	 in	 each	of	 the	 country’s	 constituent	 states.	By	distributing	data	 to	 all	South	 Sudanese	 citizens	 through	 free	 public	 Internet	 access	 across	 all	 of	 the	 country’s	federal	 states,	 the	project	 aspires	 to	 establish	 transparency	models	 for	 participation	 and	interaction	with	 the	government.	As	policy	makers	and	citizens	will	have	equal	access	 to	information,	 accountability	 may	 become	 a	 truly	 meaningful	 element	 of	 public	 service.	Furthermore,	 thanks	 to	 the	 concurrent	establishment	of	media	 literacy	programmes	 that	enable	 OER	 methodologies	 (Open	 Educational	 Resources)	 and	 peer-to-peer	 education,	active	citizenship	can	adopt	several	expressions	–	 for	 instance,	people	are	encouraged	 to	engage	 in	 new	 forms	 of	 citizen-based,	 community	 or	 device	 journalism	using	 SMS,	 radio	and	 data	 streaming.	 Accordingly,	 local	 knowledge	 can	 assume	 a	 protagonist	 role	 in	economic	 development	 by	 linking	 traditional	 and	 contemporary	 histories	 and	 skills.	 The	fuse	 of	 information,	 reports	 and	 other	 forms	 of	 data	 into	 accessible	 knowledge	 banks	 is	particularly	useful	 in	 this	 context,	 as	 it	 can	build	 the	basis	 for	 a	 sustainable,	 transparent	and	cost	effective	management	of	the	country’s	key	natural	resources	(land,	water,	forests,	extractives,	etc.),	which	have	been	of	great	significance	for	the	economy	of	South	Sudan	for	generations.	 In	 contradistinction	 to	 the	 neoliberal	 model	 of	 the	 exclusivity,	 in	 which	knowledge	 is	 controlled	 either	 by	 the	 state	 or	 –	 predominantly	 –	 by	 large	 corporations,	
#OSBACK	will	open	the	possibility	for	a	more	democratic	mode	of	production	Unfortunately,	 however,	 r0g_’s	 mission	 in	 South	 Sudan	 has	 become	 increasingly	unsustainable	since	December	2013,	as	the	newly	born	country	has	been	suffering	from	the	
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devastating	 consequences	 of	 ethnic	 civil	 conflict.418	Despite	 the	 constraints	 produced	 by	that	 development,	 the	 initiatives	 of	#OS	SOUTH	SUDAN	 have	 managed	 to	 systematically	explore	 –	 even	within	 a	 limited	 period	 of	 time	 –	 the	 potential	 for	 the	 development	 of	 a	radically	 new	 approach	 to	 building	 a	 country’s	 political	 system,	 through	 the	 agency	 of	technology.	The	latter	allows	the	principles	of	open	source	governance	to	“develop	a	model	of	an	object	that	can	be	employed	both	to	articulate	the	open	source	cultural	object,	as	well	as	make	visible	the	structural	relations	 inherent	 in	an	object	manifesting	a	(digital)	post-medium	condition”.419	Accordingly,	if	we	replace	the	adjective	“cultural”	with	the	adjective	“political”,	it	becomes	evident	that	we	are	referring	to	a	new	organizational	entity	that	may	incorporate	the	critique	of	its	own	effectiveness	by	providing	unrestricted	visibility	of	the	structural	relations	that	comprise	it	and	of	their	interactions.	Yet,	this	is	not	materialized	as	an	 attempt	 of	 normalization,	 but	 rather	 as	 a	 process	 of	 continuous	 transformation	 –	visibility	combined	with	the	possibility	of	modification	and	improvement.	In	other	words,	the	ultimate	aim	is	not	the	establishment	of	a	deeper	democratic	 function	for	the	current	political	order	as	exemplified	by	the	(neoliberal)	state,	but	rather	the	nurturing	of	what	we	could	 term	as	 a	 “post-state”	 political	 condition.	 The	 ability	 to	 raise	people	 from	 the	pre-revolutionary	 stage	 of	 the	 community	 to	 the	 revolutionary	 stage	 of	 the	 commune	 is,	 in	Marxist	 terms,	 analogous	 to	 that	 condition.	Notably,	 in	 their	 analysis	of	 the	 legacy	of	 the	Parisian	 Commune,	 Marx	 and	 Engels	 argue	 in	 the	 1872	 introduction	 to	 The	Communist	
Manifesto:	“one	thing	especially	was	proved	by	the	Commune,	viz.,	that	‘the	working	class	cannot	 simply	 lay	 hold	 of	 the	 ready-made	 state	 machinery,	 and	 wield	 it	 for	 its	 own	purposes’”.420	In	 today’s	 historical	 conjuncture,	 networked	 technology	 is	 that	machinery.	Its	 transformative	 potentialities	 do	 not	 depend	 merely	 on	 its	 practical	 capacities,	 but	predominantly	on	the	ways	that	people	–	the	new	proletariat	–	can	conceptualize	it,	change	it,	use	it	and	reuse	it.		The	urgent	 character	of	 this	 realization	 in	 the	aftermath	of	 the	 crisis	has	 inspired	one	 of	 Paolo	 Cirio’s	 most	 recent	 projects,	 titled	 Global	 Direct,	 which	 was	 launched	 in	
																																																								418	The	political	 divisions	within	 South	 Sudan's	 ruling	 SPLM	party	 and	 tribal	 factionalism	are	 the	main	 factors	 that	 have	 led	 to	 the	 civil	 war,	 which	 has	 had	 a	 particularly	 devastating	 impact	 for	Jonglei,	the	largest	and	most	populous	state	of	the	country.	419	Boris	Cuckovic,	 ‘The	Open	Source	Cultural	Object’	 in	Lanfranco	Aceti	and	others	(eds),	Red	Art:	
New	Utopias	in	Data	Capitalism,	Leonardo	Electronic	Almanac,	 vol.	 20,	 no.	 1	 (Leonardo/ISAST,	 San	Francisco	2014)	p.	27.	420	From	the	1872	 introduction	 to	 the	German	edition	of	The	Communist	Manifesto.	See:	Marx	and	Engels,	The	Communist	Manifesto,	op.	cit.,	p.	86.	
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December	 2014.421	The	 work	 is	 an	 online	 platform	 bringing	 together	 Cirio’s	 extensive	research	 into	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 modern	 state	 and	 the	 alternative	 systems	 that	 we	 can	pursue	 thanks	 to	 the	 tools	 offered	 by	 distributed	 network	 technologies.	 The	 artist	synopsizes	 this	 research	 through	 a	 series	 of	 sixteen	 diagrams,	 which	 can	 be	 freely	downloaded	 and	 printed	 by	 Internet	 users.	 The	 diagrams	 employ	 the	 paradigm	 of	 the	network	 structure	 in	 order	 to	 display	 legislative,	 judicial	 and	 executive	 decision-making	flows,	which	interconnect	distinct	sectors	of	government.	By	exploring	the	project’s		
	
	Figure	52:	Paolo	Cirio,	Global	Direct	personal	decision	diagram	(2014)																																																									421	The	project’s	website:	 ‘Global	Direct’	 (Globaldirect.today)	 <http://globaldirect.today>	 accessed	28	March	2016.	
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alternative	 frameworks	 of	 power,	 people	 are	 invited	 to	 reimagine	 the	 organograms	 of	parliaments,	 courts	 and	 other	 public	 bodies	 of	 governance	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 three	 main	principles:	participatory	decision-making,	 transparent	accountability	and	civil	awareness.	Accordingly,	the	different	systems	that	are	proposed	can	be	combined	in	order	to	generate	a	new	form	of	autonomous	global	democracy,	for	they	are	flexible	enough	to	accommodate	local	needs,	whilst	nurturing	global	 interactions	and	exchanges	through	 independent			
	Figure	53:	Paolo	Cirio,	Global	Direct	participatory	legislative	diagram	(2014)	
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digital	 social	 network	 platforms.	 The	 most	 important,	 perhaps,	 attribute	 of	 those	alternative	 systems	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 through	 them	 “policies	 can	 be	 created,	 revoked	 and	enforced	democratically	by	the	collective	voice	and	will	of	everyone	without	governmental	or	 corporate	 interference”.422	In	 other	words,	 the	 distributed	 network	 structure	 that	 the	system	adopts	safeguards	that	the	will	of	the	people	will	be	heard,	regardless	of	the	layers	of	 government	 that	might	 comprise	 the	 system.	 All	 sections	 are	 accountable	 and	 cannot	function	independent	of	continuous	civic	engagement	and	empowerment.	In	addition	to	the	diagrams	and	the	critical	texts	that	Global	Direct	presents,	there	is	a	 special	 section	 on	 the	 project’s	 website	 that	 features	 video	 interviews	with	 politically	engaged	artists,	writers,	academics	and	journalists,	as	well	as	political	activists.423	Adopting	the	form	of	short	manifestos,	the	two-minute	videos	propose	specific	policies	and	provide	different	 examples	 of	 alternative	 models	 of	 political	 organization.	 For	 instance,	 David	Moore	 from	 the	 Participatory	 Politics	 Foundation	 in	 the	 US	 puts	 forward	 the	 model	 of	deliberative	democracy,	and	writer	and	journalist	Douglas	Rushkoff	highlights	the	example	of	 the	 online	 decision-making	 platform	 Loomio.424	The	 latter	 is	 based	 on	 the	 general	assembly	methodology	established	by	 the	Occupy	movement,	 in	which	 there	 is	 real-time	deliberation	 in	order	 to	 reach	any	kind	of	 resolution.	Occupy	 is	 also	 referenced	by	artist	Oliver	Ressler,	while	the	co-founder	of	the	Icelandic	Digital	Freedom	Society	Smári	McCarth	underlines	 the	 importance	of	 cutting	 the	 “middle-men”	 from	decision-making	 though	 the	agency	of	new	media	technologies.	Finally,	the	Director	of	the	Center	for	Civic	Media	of	the	MIT	 Ethan	 Zuckerman	 advocates	 that	 we	 should	 use	 participatory	 media	 in	 order	 to	monitor	the	ways	in	which	our	representatives	use	(or	misuse)	power.	As	the	title	of	Cirio’s	work	 suggests,	 the	 ultimate	 goal	 of	 all	 those	 models	 is	 to	 produce	 a	 system	 of	 direct	democracy	 capable	 of	 dealing	 with	 global	 issues.	 The	 latter	 may	 include	 economic	inequalities,	 the	 management	 of	 natural	 resources	 and	 the	 commons	 at	 large,	 global	warming	and	climate	change	and,	 last	but	not	 least,	 the	protection	of	universal	 freedoms	and	rights.		Cirio’s	Global	Direct	exemplifies	the	shift	from	tactics	to	strategy	that	we	identified	in	 the	 second	 chapter	 as	 the	 tendency	 that	 has	 largely	 defined	 the	 views	 of	 politically	engaged	new	media	 theorists	and	cultural	producers	after	 the	rise	of	Web	2.0.	Following																																																									422	‘About’	(Globaldirect.today)	<http://globaldirect.today/about/>	accessed	28	March	2016.		423	‘Statements’	 (Globaldirect.today)	 <http://globaldirect.today/statements/>	 accessed	 28	 March	2016.		424	‘Collaborative	 Decision-Making’	 (Loomio.org)	 <https://www.loomio.org/>	 accessed	 28	 March	2016.		
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the	global	financial	crisis	of	2008,	this	approach	has	often	transformed	into	a	multifaceted	defence	of	political	utopianism,	as	we	have	seen	in	the	mapping	that	has	taken	place	in	the	last	 two	 chapters.	 For	 the	 artists,	 the	 collectives	 and	 the	 institutions	 that	 have	 created	those	projects,	the	advent	of	new	networked	technologies	has	facilitated	the	exploration	of	what	 German	 philosopher	 Ernst	 Bloch	 has	 called	 “concrete	 utopias”	 to	 a	 greater	 extent	than	ever	in	recent	times.	In	his	work,	Bloch	differentiates	between	“abstract	utopias”	and	“concrete	utopias”,	associating	 the	 latter	with	 the	possibility	of	generating	real	change	 in	the	 present.	 Such	 “concrete	 utopias”	 can	 be	 perceived	 as	 intellectual	 devices	 that	 bridge	our	 aspirations	with	 reality,	 in	 order	 to	 render	 them	 directly	 productive.	 For	 Bloch,	 the	actions	 associated	with	 the	 realization	 of	 “concrete	 utopias”	 are	 parts	 of	 an	 “unfinished	forward	dream”;	or,	in	other	words,	constituents	of	an	unfinished	reality.425	Notably,	in	the	post-crisis	world,	the	possibility	of	completing	this	“unfinished	reality”	has	emerged	before	anywhere	else	in	the	countries	that	have	been	more	heavily	hit	by	the	crisis,	as	the	origin	of	the	 artists	 and/or	 the	 projects	 that	 we	 have	 examined	 has	 indicated	 (e.g.	 Greece,	 Italy,	Spain	 and	 Ireland).	 In	 addition,	 the	 same	 fertile	 ground	 has	 often	 been	 identified	 by	cultural	 producers	 in	 traditionally	 poor,	 or	 troubled	 parts	 of	 the	 world	 (e.g.	 Mexico,	Tanzania	and	South	Soudan).	Accordingly,	 in	 order	 to	 promote	 political	 change	 across	 the	 globe	 through	networked	 technologies,	 artists	 and	 institutions	 developed	 a	 variety	 of	 approaches	 that	have	 aimed	 at	 connecting	 the	 harsh	 realities	 of	 Data	 Capitalism	 and	 its	 crisis	 with	 the	potential	for	pursuing	alternative	modes	of	socioeconomic	being	inspired	by	the	legacies	of	communist	 thought.	 More	 specifically,	 artists	 have	 attempted	 to	 raise	 consciousness	around	 the	 systemic	 characteristics	 of	 Data	 Capitalism,	 including	 its	mode	 of	 labour,	 its	class	 structures	 and	 the	 new	 forms	 of	 proletarianization	 that	 they	 may	 engender.	Furthermore,	prompted	by	 the	public	expressions	of	 the	people’s	disenchantment	during	the	 crisis,	 several	 projects	 have	 promoted	 the	 reclaiming	 of	 the	 commons	 and	 the	activation	 of	 public	 spaces,	 while	 others	 have	 focused	 on	 how	 common	 wealth	 can	 be	produced	 on	 a	 regular	 basis	 through	 the	 fostering	 of	 collaboration	 within	 new	 radical	institutions	like	hackerspaces.	As	a	result,	a	context	for	the	introduction	of	more	ambitious	alternative	 economic	 practices	 emerged.	 The	 latter	 has	 been	 further	 exemplified	 by	 the	adoption	 of	 digital	 currencies	 as	well	 as	 by	 the	Web-catalysed	development	 of	 exchange	systems	 that	operate	beyond	money.	Finally,	 cultural	producers	have	 formulated	 in	 their																																																									425	Ernst	Bloch,	The	Principle	of	Hope,	(tr.	N.	Plaice,	S.	Plaice	and	Paul	Knight,	Basil	Blackwell	1986)	p.	157.		
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practices	proposals	for	the	use	of	networked	technologies	as	the	basis	on	which	we	could	build	new	types	of	communities,	which	would	follow	more	open	and	democratic	modes	of	civic	 governance.	 This	 battle	 for	 a	 different	 kind	 of	 democracy,	which	 lies	 at	 the	 core	 of	many	of	the	projects	featured	in	this	chapter,	is	according	to	Marx	and	Engels	“the	first	step	in	 the	 revolution”,	 as	winning	 it	would	 raise	 the	 proletariat	 to	 the	 position	 of	 the	 ruling	class. 426 	In	 that	 sense,	 what	 artists	 like	 Cirio	 and	 Bookchin,	 and	 collectives	 like	Hackitectura,	 e-flux	 and	 Furtherfield	 have	 produced	 during	 the	 crisis	 are	 maps	 of	 the	battlefront,	which	delineate	the	different	paths	that	could	be	potentially	followed	in	order	to	 break	 the	 enemy	 lines.	 The	 next	 chapter	 of	 this	 thesis	will	 analyse	 some	 of	 the	main	barricades,	traps	and	ambushes	that	the	opponents	of	Data	Capitalism	might	encounter	in	their	effort	to	win	this	complex	war	through	new	media	(and)	art.				 	
																																																								426	Marx	and	Engels,	The	Communist	Manifesto,	op.	cit.,	p.	63.	
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Chapter	5		
Between	Myth	and	Reality:	The	Limits	of	the	Political	
Web			
“It’s	the	Economy,	Stupid”427		Any	new	art	 form	 is	 prone	 to	 generate	 several	 debates	 around	 its	 aesthetic	 value,	 social	relevance	 and	 ideological	 orientation,	 until	 it	 becomes	 capable	 of	 finding	 a	 certain	 place	within	 its	 contemporary	 art	 scene.	 This	 status	 of	 “approval”	 may	 become	 even	 more	difficult	to	attain	when	artistic	expression	is	combined	with	technological	innovation,	as	in	those	 cases,	 artists	 have	 to	 additionally	 address	 –	 directly	 or	 indirectly	 –	 the	 questions	associated	with	the	new	instruments	of	communication	that	they	have	chosen	to	employ	in	their	 practices.	 Accordingly,	 a	 variety	 of	 conceptions	 and	 misconceptions,	 facts	 and	speculations	may	arise	around	 this	process	of	hybridisation	between	art	and	 technology.	For	instance,	it	took	video	a	few	decades	before	it	managed	to	overcome	its	depiction	as	a	technological	 innovation	 that	only	 functioned	 “parallel”	 to	 film	and	 television.	As	 curator	Sylvia	Martin	notes,			 when	video	established	itself	in	the	art	context	at	the	end	of	the	1960s,	cinema	had	meant	 that	 viewers’	 perceptions	 had	 already	 become	 accustomed	 to	 moving	pictures	for	more	than	half	a	century.	Public	and	private	television	stations	had	been	making	their	programmes	available	throughout	Europe	and	the	USA	since	the	1940	and	 the	 1950s.	 Moving	 pictures	 and	 their	 electronic	 transfer	 were	 a	 well-tried	media	construct.428			As	a	result,	even	major	museums	around	the	world	did	not	start	collecting	video	art	until	the	mid	1990s	–	a	decade	during	which	a	more	systematic	engagement	with	the	exhibition																																																									427	The	phrase	“It’s	the	economy,	stupid”	was	coined	by	James	Carville,	a	campaign	strategist	of	Bill	Clinton’s	successful	US	presidential	campaign	in	1992.	In	the	years	that	have	followed,	the	phrase	became	a	reference	to	the	power	of	economic	issues	and	factors	to	define	not	only	the	outcome	of	elections,	but	also	socio-political	developments	at	large.			428	Sylvia	Martin,	Video	Art	(Taschen,	London	2006),	p.	6.		
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and	preservation	of	video	started	 to.	This	challenging	set	of	 circumstances	has	also	been	pertinent	 to	 the	 adoption	of	 the	 Internet	 as	 a	 distinct	 platform	 for	 the	development	 and	dissemination	 of	 new	 artworks	 and	 art	 practices.	 Notably,	 less	 than	 a	 decade	 after	 the	introduction	of	Mosaic	(1993),	the	first	visual	browser	for	the	World	Wide	Web,	new	media	scholar	 and	 curator	 Jon	 Ippolito	 published	 an	 article	 tilted	 “Ten	 Myths	 of	 Internet	 Art”	(2002).429	In	 his	 article,	 Ippolito	 attempts	 to	 deconstruct	 the	 common	 misconceptions	associated	 with	 Internet	 Art	 and	 its	 capacities.	 In	 order	 to	 address	 those	 fallacies,	 the	author	 organises	 his	 arguments	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 list,	 which	 covers	 different	 aspects	 of	Internet	 Art	 with	 a	 view	 to	 thoroughly	 explaining	 “the	 difficulties	 museums	 and	 others	have	understanding	what	it	means	to	make	art	for	the	Internet”.430	Despite	the	fact	that	the	list	touches	upon	various	attributes	of	Internet	Art,	four	out	of	 the	 ten	 myths	 that	 Ippolito	 identifies	 display	 an	 explicitly	 economic	 character.	 More	specifically,	they	refer	to	the	cost	of	making	Internet	art	(myths	number	3	and	4	–	“To	make	Internet	 art	 requires	 expensive	 equipment	 and	 special	 training”	 and	 “Internet	 art	contributes	to	the	‘digital	divide’”	respectively);	the	capacity	to	collect	art	that	exists	online	(myth	 number	 8	 –	 “Internet	 art	 is	 impossible	 to	 collect”);	 and	 the	 saleability	 of	 artist-created	websites	(myth	number	9	–	“Internet	art	will	never	be	important	because	you	can’t	sell	a	Web	site”).	In	addition,	even	within	the	rest	of	the	myths,	we	can	recognise	economic	factors,	 agents	 and	 processes.	 For	 instance,	 in	 the	 discussion	 of	 the	 first	 myth,	 Ippolito	attempts	 to	 refute	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 Internet	 is	 merely	 a	 distribution	 tool	 for	 other	 art	forms.	And,	in	myths	number	2	(“Internet	art	is	appreciated	only	by	an	arcane	subculture”)	and	number	10	(“Looking	at	 Internet	art	 is	a	solitary	experience”),	his	 focus	 is	placed	on	the	potentiality	of	online	art	to	attract	mass	audiences,	which	could	surpass	the	number	of	people	who	visit	galleries	and	auction	houses.	 In	view	of	 those	 facts,	we	could	claim	that	Ippolito’s	list	proves	less	exhaustive	than	what	it	first	appears	to	be.	However,	we	should	not	 forget	 that	myths	 always	 have	 some	 basis	 in	 reality.	 In	 other	words,	 the	myths	 that	Ippolito	is	aiming	to	refute	in	his	analysis	are	grounded	on	real	obstacles,	or	–	at	least	–	on	sets	 of	 factors	 that	 may	 have	 a	 negative	 impact	 on	 Internet	 Art’s	 autonomy	 and,	accordingly,	 on	 its	 cultural	 and	 social	 role.	 Regardless	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 Internet’s	applications	 are	 today	 considerably	 different	 from	 those	 of	 2002,	 the	 economic	 agents,	factors	and	processes	that	Ippolito	highlights	still	play	a	very	significant	part	in	defining	the	context	within	which	contemporary	artists	can	employ	networked	media.	And	although	in																																																									429	Jon	Ippolito,	‘Ten	Myths	of	Internet	Art’	(2002)	Leonardo	vol.	35,	no.	5	pp.	485	–	487.	430	ibid.,	p.	485.	
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Ippolito’s	 paper	 Internet	 Art’s	 potential	 relationship	 with	 economic	 instruments	 is	presented	 largely	 as	 an	 “enabler”	 for	 its	 expansion,	 today	 –	 in	 the	 context	 of	 Data	Capitalism	–	the	same	relationship	could	be	regarded	as	the	main	source	of	the	obstacles	that	confront	political	Web-based	art.		The	 fifth	 chapter	 of	 this	 thesis	 will	 attempt	 to	 locate	 those	 obstacles,	 which	may	hinder	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 art	 projects	 that	 were	 analysed	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter	 to	materialise	 their	 social	 and	 political	 ambitions.	 In	 particular,	 the	 chapter	 considers	 the	multiple	ways	in	which	some	of	the	main	economic,	political	and	cultural	agents	related	to	Data	Capitalism	have	been	able	to	delimit	or	neutralise	the	utopian	impulse	that	was	born	online	following	the	global	financial	crisis	of	2008.	Some	of	those	tools	and	strategies	refer	specifically	 to	 cultural	 production,	 while	 others	 play	 a	 much	 wider	 role,	 which	 also	encompasses	the	production	and/or	communication	of	art.	More	specifically,	those	agents	include	 the	 various	 institutions	 and	 instruments	 associated	 with	 the	 contemporary	 art	market,	 such	 as	 commercial	 galleries,	 auction	 houses,	 art	 fairs,	 biennials,	 collectors	 and	museums,	and	their	expanding	relationship	with	the	Web;	social	media	platforms	and	their	corporate	networks;	online	mega-corporations,	such	as	Web	portals,	search	engines,	cloud	computing	 companies	 and	 electronic	 retailers;	 financial	 institutions	 and	 fiscal	 policy	bodies,	 including	 commercial	 banks	 and	 Central	 Banks;	 and,	 finally,	 governments	 and	transnational	 institutions	 with	 regulatory	 powers	 over	 the	 Internet.	 Through	 this	investigation	the	thesis	will	be	able	to	highlight	the	interests	of	Data	Capitalists	in	cultural	production	 and	 the	 kinds	 of	 restrictions	 and	 measures	 that	 they	 adopt	 in	 order	 to	safeguard	 them.	Accordingly,	 the	 chapter	will	 examine	 the	methodologies	 through	which	the	aforementioned	agents	have	been	able	 to	exert	strong	practical	as	well	as	 ideological	pressure	 on	 the	 Internet,	 by	 appropriating	 and/or	 manipulating	 the	 very	 tools	 that	 are	employed	by	politically	engaged	artists	and	cultural	producers.	This	capacity	will	be	traced	in	phenomena	such	as	the	commercialisation	of	the	Web	and	online	art;	the	rise	of	online	corporate	 monopolies;	 the	 development	 of	 modes	 of	 online	 disinformation	 and/or	censorship;	and	the	fierce	institutional	control	of	the	Internet’s	architecture	on	a	national	as	well	as	on	a	transnational	level.	All	of	those	barriers	are	in	a	position	to	radically	delimit	the	 effectiveness	 of	 online	 anti-capitalist	 initiatives,	 including	 the	 effectiveness	 of	politically	engaged	Web-based	art	across	its	various	methodologies	and	concepts	as	set	out	in	the	last	two	chapters.	The	collective	“goal”	of	the	obstacles	has	been	simple:	to	transform	the	subversive	potentialities	of	post-crisis	art	into	mere	myths.	
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Post-Internet	Art	and	the	Fable	of	the	Apolitical	Web		In	recent	articles,	books,	panel	discussions	and	exhibitions	“post-internet	art”	has	been	put	forward	 as	 the	 “ism”	 label	 that	 could,	 possibly,	 best	 describe	 the	 current	 dispositions	 of	contemporary	 art. 431 	The	 category	 predominantly	 encompasses	 artworks	 that	 are	influenced	 by,	 mimic,	 or	 fully	 adopt	 visual	 elements	 of	 the	 Internet,	 in	 order	 to,	 then,	remediate	 them	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 gallery’s	 “white	 cube”.	 Those	 elements	 are	 often	assembled	 together	 in	mixed-media	 installations,	which	 are	 based	 either	 on	 images	 and	sounds	 directly	 drawn	 from	 the	 World	 Wide	 Web,	 or	 on	 the	 aesthetics	 of	 the	 image	manipulation	 and	 presentation	 techniques	 that	 abound	 in	 online	 media	 and	 in	 popular	pieces	 of	 software	 (e.g.	 copying	 and	 pasting,	 layering,	 cutting,	 hypertext	 links,	 etc.).	 For	instance,	 this	 is	 particularly	 evident	 in	 the	 practices	 of	 artists	 like	 Oliver	 Laric,	 Artie	Vierkant,	Katja	Novitskova,	and	Seth	Price,	and	their	colourful	multi-layered	installations,	which	largely	attempt	to	synopsise	“the	image	of	the	Anthropocene”	–	an	epoch	defined	by			
	Figure	54:	Artie	Vierkant,	Image	Object	Thursday	4	June	2015	12:53PM	(2015)																																																									431	The	 term	 “post-internet	 art”	 is	 attributed	 to	 artist	 Marisa	 Olson.	 See:	 Gene	 McHugh,	Post	
Internet	(LINK	Editions,	Brescia	2011)	p.	5.	
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	Figure	55:	Katja	Novitskova,	Mars	Potential	(Cat)	(2015)		the	global	impact	of	human	civilisation	(and,	in	particular,	networks)	on	Earth’s	image	and	ecology.432	Furthermore,	 even	 when	 post-internet	 artists	 use	 the	 Web	 as	 a	 creative	platform	 (like,	 for	 instance,	 in	 the	 cases	of	Petra	Cortright	 and	 Jon	Rafman),	 their	works	often	 follow	 a	 rather	 “self-referential”	 trajectory,	 as	 they	 are	 still	mainly	 inspired	 by	 the	aesthetics	 of	 the	 Internet	 and	 the	 tools	 used	 for	 digital	 imaging.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 such																																																									432	Kirsty	Bell,	‘Silicon	Wafer	Weapons	and	Mars	Missions’	Frieze	no.	166	(2014)	pp.	232-233.	
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practices,	 it	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 apart	 from	 their	 online	 artworks,	 many	 of	 the	 artists	additionally	 produce	 physical	 objects	 that	 evidence	 the	 previously	 described	 aesthetic.	Moreover,	 the	 practices	 of	 “post-internet	 art”	 may	 also	 incorporate	 the	 communication	devices	 used	 for	 networked	 communication	 (e.g.	 smartphones,	 tablets,	 High-Definition	screens,	etc.),	which	are	used	as	exclusive	or	partial	display	formats	for	their	works	(e.g.	Ed	Fornieles).	Finally,	post-internet	art	has	also	been	associated	with	painting	and	the	work	of	artists	like	Alex	Ruthner,	Joe	Bradley	and	Mary	Ramsden,	who	adopt	the	visual	language	of	Web	browsers	and	software	in	the	context	of	the	most	traditional	artistic	medium.			
	Figure	56:	Alex	Ruthner,	(B)	RUSH	(2015)		However,	post-internet	art	is	not	predominantly	a	movement	that	has	been	born	as	an	art	historical	proposition	from	“bottom-to-top”,	as	it	has	been	often	suggested;433	rather,	the	proliferation	of	post-internet	artworks	has	been	a	proposition	made	by	a	certain	group																																																									433	See:	Morgan	Quaintance,	‘Right	Shift’	Art	Monthly	vol.	387		(June	2015)	pp.	5-8.	
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of	art	 critics	and	curators,	who	have	been	promoting	 it	 through	 their	books,	 articles	and	exhibitions.434	More	specifically,	 in	his	book	Post	Internet	(2011)	art	writer	Gene	McHugh	describes	 the	 environment	 within	 which	 post-internet	 art	 operates,	 suggesting	 that	regardless	of	an	artist’s	intentions,	all	artworks	now	find	a	space	on	the	World	Wide	Web	and,	as	a	result,	“[…]	contemporary	art,	as	a	category,	was/is	forced,	against	its	will,	to	deal	with	this	new	distribution	context	or	at	 least	acknowledge	it”.435	Accordingly,	 the	“lack	of	will”	that	McHugh	identifies	would	appear,	at	first,	like	a	strong	oppositional	force	directed	against	the	mainstream	art	world,	which	has	rarely	acknowledged	the	Internet	as	a	distinct	artistic	 platform.436	However,	 further	 down	 in	 the	 same	 page	 in	 which	 McHugh	 writes	about	the	potentially	“disruptive”	effect	of	the	Internet	on	contemporary	art,	he	goes	on	to	characterize	contemporary	art’s	engagement	with	networked	media	as	a	constituent	part	of	the	much	larger	“game”	that	is	played	by	commercial	galleries,	biennials,	museums	and	auction	houses.	This	assertion	is	confirmed	–	to	some	extent,	at	least	–	by	the	fact	that	all	of	the	 artists	 that	 we	 have	 referenced	 so	 far	 in	 this	 section	 are	 represented	 by	 significant	commercial	galleries,	and	they	exhibit	and	sell	 their	works	regularly	 in	some	of	 the	most	prominent	international	art	fairs.	Accordingly,	there	are	inevitable	contradictions	and	challenges	in	the	role	that	post-internet	art	 is	 called	 to	 fulfil	as	a	movement	and/or	as	a	status	of	 cultural	production.437	Firstly,	there	is	an	easily	identifiable	“anxiety”	to	categorise	and	historicize	a	phenomenon	that	 is	very	much	 in	progress:	 the	 Internet	 is	 changing	so	 rapidly,	 that	 if	we	 think	of	 the	online	 landscape	 ten	 years	 ago,	 this	 would	 be	 radically	 different	 from	 our	 present	experience	of	it.	Furthermore,	the	post-internet	theorization	of	contemporary	art	runs	the	
																																																								434	Post-internet	art	has	often	been	associated	with	the	blog	“The	New	Aesthetic”	of	British	artist,	writer	 and	 technologist	 James	Bridle.	 Although	 his	 blog	 has	 featured	 post-internet	 artists,	 Bridle	himself	has	rejected	that	his	heterogeneous	collection	of	artists	and	designers	should	be	considered	as	 a	 movement.	 As	 he	 notes,	 “the	 New	 Aesthetic	 may	 be	 considered	 a	 work,	 a	 conversation,	 a	performance,	 an	 experiment,	 and	 a	 number	 of	 other	 things	 (although,	 please,	 not	 a	movement)”.	See:	 'The	 New	 Aesthetic	 And	 Its	 Politics	 |	 Booktwo.Org'	 (Booktwo.org,	 2016)	<http://booktwo.org/notebook/new-aesthetic-politics/>	accessed	10	April	2016.		435	McHugh,	op.	cit.,	p.	6.	436	For	 instance,	 as	art	writer	and	critic	 Julian	Stallabrass	notes,	 in	one	of	 the	most	 important	art	encyclopaedias	 published	 in	 the	 last	 decade,	 Art	 Since	 1900:	 Modernism,	 Antimodernism,	
Postmodernism	(2005),	net	art	is	completely	absent.	See:	Julian	Stallabrass,	‘Can	Art	History	Digest	Net	Art?’	in	Dieter	Daniels	and	Gunther	Reisinger	(eds),	Net	Pioneers	1.0:	Contextualizing	Early	Net-
Based	Art	(Sternberg	Press,	Berlin	2010)	pp.	165	–	179.	 Stallabrass	 refers	 to	 the	book	Hal	Foster	and	others,	Art	since	1900:	Modernism,	Antimodernism,	Postmodernism	(Thames	&	Hudson,	London	2005).	437	See	 also:	 Bill	 Balaskas,	 ‘Changing	 the	 Game:	 Towards	 an	 “Internet	 of	 Praxis”	 (Editorial	Statement)’	 in	Lanfranco	Aceti	and	others	(eds),	Red	Art:	New	Utopias	in	Data	Capitalism,	Leonardo	
Electronic	Almanac,	vol.	20,	no.	1	(Leonardo/ISAST,	San	Francisco	2014)	pp.	13	–	15.	
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danger	 of	 aestheticizing	 (or	 over-aestheticizing)	 a	 context	 that	 goes	 well	 beyond	 the	borders	of	art:	 in	 the	same	way	that	we	could	 talk	about	post-internet	art,	we	could	also	talk	about	post-internet	commerce,	post-internet	dating,	post-internet	travel,	post-internet	journalism,	 etc.	 Thus,	 the	 role	 and	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 post-internet	 artist	 are	 not	independent	of	a	much	wider	set	of	social	conditions.	This	flawed	notion	of	“autonomy”	is	quite	easy	to	recognize	if	we	think,	for	instance,	the	potential	content	of	neologisms	such	as	“post-radio	 art”	 or	 “post-television	 art”	 or	 –	 even	 –	 “post-videogames	 art”,	 and	 their	inherent	 structural	 and	 conceptual	 limitations.	 In	 this	 context,	 it	 is	 particularly	 useful	 to	consider	 that	 if	 post-internet	 art	 arrives	 after	 (“post”)	 a	 movement,	 then,	 the	 direct	historical	 link	 that	 should	 be	 established	would	 have	 to	 be	with	 net	 art.438	Nevertheless,	such	a	decision	would	assign	net	art	 to	a	 status	of	 “legitimization”,	 towards	which	major	museums,	 curators	 and	 art	 fairs	 have	 shown	 a	 rather	 consistent	 hostility.	 The	 latter	 is	rather	easy	to	explain	if	we	take	into	account	the	fundamentally	different	economic	models	that	mainstream	art	and	the	new	media	scene	propose:	on	the	one	hand,	“the	production	of	rare	 or	 unique,	 expensively	made	objects,	 protected	by	 copyright	 and	 curatorial	 scruple,	appearing	 in	 exclusive	 and	 controlled	 environments,	 and	 purchased	 by	 the	 mega-rich;”	and,	on	the	other	hand,	“the	dissemination	of	digital	works,	of	which	no	one	copy	is	better	than	any	other,	which	may	appear	in	many	places	at	once,	which	may	run	out	of	the	control	of	 artists	 and	 curators,	 and	 which	 are	 given	 as	 gifts”.439	However,	 it	 is	 not	 merely	 the	economic	 nature	 of	 net	 art	 that	 places	 it	 outside	 the	 mainstream	 art	 world;	 more	 than	anything	else,	it	is	its	content.	Apart	from	the	already	referenced	historical	examples	of	net	art	 projects	 that	 have	 attacked	 capitalism,	many	 net	 artists	 have	 addressed	 a	 variety	 of	other	 political	 issues,	 ranging	 from	 the	 freedom	 of	 expression	 and	 censorship	 to	surveillance,	 and	 from	 the	 oppression	 of	 ethnic	 and	 racial	minorities	 to	 gender	 equality.	Thus,	 in	the	case	of	connecting	post-internet	art	with	net	art,	 the	 investigation	of	History	becomes	a	foe,	for	it	would	refute	a	“neutral”	ideological	relationship	of	the	Internet	with	art.440	
																																																								438	Christiane	 Paul	 and	Malcolm	 Levy,	 ‘Genealogies	 of	 the	 New	 Aesthetic’	 in	 David	M.	 Berry	 and	Michael	 Dieter	 (eds),	 Postdigital	 Aesthetics:	 Art,	 Computation	 And	 Design	 (Palgrave	 Macmillan,	2015)	p.	33.		439	Julian	Stallabrass,	Net	Pioneers	1.0:	Contextualizing	Early	Net-Based	Art,	op.	cit.,	172.	440	Notably,	 in	 the	 2016	 exhibition	 Electronic	 Superhighway,	 hosted	 by	 Whitechapel	 Gallery,	 in	London,	this	political	aspect	of	net	art	is	almost	entirely	absent.	In	particular,	the	section	dedicated	specifically	 to	 net	 art	 (“The	 Performative	 Archive	 of	 Net	 Art”)	 presented	 a	 “media	 archaeology”,	which	 aimed	 to	 highlight	 “how	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 work	 itself	 is	 altered	 through	 the	 evolution	 of	browser-based	 different	 hardware	 and	 software”.	 Once	 again,	 we	 can	 identify	 an	 interest	 in	 the	
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Most	importantly,	however,	any	kind	of	aestheticization	may	readily	become	a	very	effective	 tool	of	de-politicization.	The	 idea	of	distributing	 images,	 sounds	and	words	 that	merely	form	part	of	a	pre-existing	system	of	power	(as	McHugh	appears	to	suggest	when	he	 theorises	 the	 context	 of	 post-internet	 art),	 inescapably	 eradicates	 the	 political	significance	of	distribution.	The	subversive	potentiality	inherent	in	the	characterisation	of	a	network	as	“distributed”	was	gradually	undermined	during	the	1990s	and	the	2000s,	due	to	the	ideological	pervasiveness	of	neoliberal	capitalism	over	the	same	period.	Distribution	–	not	to	mention,	equal	distribution	–	could	have	enjoyed	a	much	more	prominent	role	as	an	 integral	 element	 of	 the	 Web	 and,	 accordingly,	 as	 a	 contributing	 factor	 to	 any	investigation	of	digital	art.	In	this	context,	one	cannot	ignore	the	crucial	fact	that	apolitical,	“beautiful”	 art	 is	 much	 easier	 to	 enter	 the	 art	 market	 and	 play	 the	 “game”	 of	institutionalization	(and	vice	versa),	as	Stallabrass	has	suggested	 in	his	analysis	of	digital	art’s	strong	non-commercial	dispositions.	In	addition,	the	fact	that	the	term	“post-internet	art”	was	born	and	grew	parallel	to	the	Great	Recession	of	2009	and	the	global	crisis	of	Data	Capitalism	is	particularly	revealing.	The	latter	seems	to	be	embraced	as	a	“natural”	state	of	things	 by	 the	majority	 of	 post-internet	 artworks,	 which	 often	 appear	 to	 communicate	 a	fascination	with	 the	aesthetic	qualities	of	our	big	data	 culture,	where	data	might	 include	images,	 sounds,	 texts,	 videos,	 etc.	 Thus,	 they	 seem	 to	 ignore	 their	 function	 as	 products	(economic	aspect),	or	elements	of	 ideology	(socio-political	aspect).	Accordingly,	we	could	claim	that	the	emergence	of	the	new	movement	within	the	previously	described	contexts	have	collectively	operated	as	a	kind	of	“ideological	barrier”	for	the	Web-based	art	that	has	been	produced	 since	2008	 as	 a	 response	 to	 the	 crisis	 and	 its	 origins.	 Finally,	 it	 is	worth	noting	 that	 none	 of	 the	 artworks	 that	 have	 been	 analysed	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter	 have	been	included	in	any	of	 the	recent	major	exhibitions	that	have	aimed	at	 investigating	the	relationship	between	the	Internet	and	art.441	Nevertheless,	 the	 “suppression”	of	 those	 initiatives’	voices	and	 the	–	 conscious,	or	unintended	–	concealment	of	their	connections	with	the	political	tradition	of	net	art	have	not	grown	in	a	complete	void.	Rather,	the	ideological	neutrality	with	which	the	Internet	is	often	portrayed	by	post-internet	art	has	much	deeper	roots,	which	can	be	traced	in	more	established	 theorisations	of	contemporary	culture.	A	prominent	example	can	be	 found	 in																																																																																																																																																																																			aesthetic	aspect	of	 the	 Internet	as	a	creative	platform,	rather	than	 in	 its	 ideological	potentialities.	See:	Omar	Kholeif	(ed),	Electronic	Superhighway	(Whitechapel	Gallery,	London	2016)	p.	32.		441	In	 this	 context,	 some	 of	 the	 most	 high-profile	 exhibitions	 in	 recent	 years	 include:	 Electronic	
Superhighway	 (Whitechapel	 Gallery,	 London,	 2016);	 Art	 Post-Internet	 (Ullens	 Center	 for	Contemporary	 Art,	 Beijing,	 2014);	 and	 Raster	 Raster	 (Aran	 Cravey	 Gallery,	 Los	 Angeles,	 2014),	which	was	curated	by	Marisa	Olson.	
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Relational	 Aesthetics	 (1998),	 in	 which	 Nicolas	 Bourriaud	 argues	 that,	 “it	 seems	 more	pressing	 to	 invent	 possible	 relations	with	 our	 neighbours	 in	 the	 present	 than	 to	 bet	 on	happier	 tomorrows.442	Notably,	Bourriaud	associates	his	proposal	with	 the	establishment	of	“microtopias”	–	temporary	transformations	in	the	social	relations	of	a	community,	which	are	 enacted	 or	 precipitated	 by	 artworks	 or	 artistic	 interventions.443	Quite	 evidently,	 this	approach	 stands	 far	 from	 the	 universalism	 that	 Bourriaud	 advocates	 in	 his	Altermodern	
Manifesto	 (2009)	 as	 a	 direct	 result	 of	 new	 technologies,	 networked	 media	 and	globalization.444	As	 it	 has	 already	 been	 suggested	 in	 the	 first	 chapter	 of	 this	 thesis,	Bourriaud	 has	 been	 very	 much	 aware	 of	 new	 media’s	 revolutionary	 communicational	potentialities.	 Yet,	 by	 connecting	new	 technologies	 to	his	 assertion	 that	 grand	narratives	(and	mainly	Marxism)	have	effectively	died,	he	minimized	any	real	political	role	that	new	media	might	be	able	to	undertake.445	At	a	time	when	capitalism	was	entering	its	worst	ever	crisis,	Bourriaud	ended	up	 largely	 ignoring	 this	 context	and,	as	a	 result,	he	based	 the	4th	Tate	Triennial	exhibition	of	2009	(“Altermodern”)	on	a	concept	that	is	rather	apolitical	and	counter-utopian.	 Post-internet	 art	 appears	 to	 follow	 a	 comparably	 dangerous	 trajectory,	which	 undermines	 the	 role	 of	 the	 Internet	 as	 a	 platform	 for	 the	 production	 and	dissemination	of	political	art,	thus	negating	its	socially	transformative	potentialities.	In	 conclusion,	 we	 could	 claim	 that	 the	 case	 of	 post-internet	 art	 exemplifies	 to	 a	considerable	extent	the	twofold	direction	in	which	the	obstacles	for	political	Web-based	art	may	 operate.	 First	 of	 all,	 post-internet	 art	 constitutes	 a	 conceptual	 and/or	 ideological	obstacle	engendered	by	those	agents	of	the	art	world	(mainly	curators,	gallery	owners	and	collectors)	who	are	over-theorising	and	promoting	a	predominantly	aesthetic	phenomenon	as	 the	 sole	 meaningful	 connection	 between	 contemporary	 artistic	 production	 and	 the	Internet.	 In	 consequence,	 they	 overlook	 the	 rich	 historical	 relationship	 between	 the	Internet	and	art,	which	(as	we	have	already	suggested)	is	characterised	by	explicit	political	characteristics,	which	are	antithetical	to	corporate	culture.	And,	secondly,	post-internet	art	constitutes	 an	 economic	 obstacle,	 for	 it	 produces	 a	 new	 “genre”/product,	 which	 is	contributing	to	the	commodification	of	art,	the	expansion	of	art	market	practices,	and	the	accumulation	processes	of	Data	Capitalism	at	large.	In	spite,	however,	of	this	multifaceted																																																									442	Nicolas	Bourriaud,	Relational	Aesthetics	(Simon	Pleasance,	Fronza	Woods	and	Mathieu	Copeland	trs,	Les	Presses	du	réel,	Dijon	2002)	p.	45.	443	ibid.,	p.	13.	444	For	 the	 full	 manifesto	 text	 visit:	 Nicolas	 Bourriaud,	 ‘Altermodern	 Explained:	 Manifesto’	(Tate.org.uk)	 <http://www.tate.org.uk/whats-on/tate-britain/exhibition/altermodern/explain-altermodern/altermodern-explained-manifesto>	accessed	28	March	2016.	445	See:	Bourriaud	(ed),	Altermodern:	Tate	Triennial	2009,	loc.	cit.	
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impact,	 in	 strict	 financial	 terms,	 post-internet	 art	 only	 comprises	 a	 small	 part	 within	 a	much	 larger	 operation.	 As	 it	 will	 be	 indicated	 in	 the	 next	 section	 of	 this	 chapter,	 this	operation	consists	 in	 the	gradual	 transformation	of	cyberspace	 into	a	marketplace	 for	all	types	of	cultural	products	indiscriminately.			
Expanding	Online:	The	Web	as	a	Marketplace			In	 the	 sixth	 chapter	 of	 her	 book	 Big	 Bucks:	 The	 Explosion	 of	 the	 Art	 Market	 in	 the	 21st	
Century	(2014),	art	market	specialist	Georgina	Adam	investigates	the	relationship	between	the	Internet	and	selling	art.	Adam	concludes	her	analysis	with	the	prediction	that	clicking	away	on	a	 computer	will	 never	be	able	 to	 replicate	 “the	pleasure	of	being	wooed	by	 the	auction-house	 specialists,	 the	 fun	 of	 the	 fairs,	 rubbing	 shoulders	with	 other	 high-octane	players	 in	the	art	world	and	the	testosterone-fuelled	excitement	of	 the	actual	auction”.446	Nevertheless,	 the	fact	that	a	renowned	journalist,	with	almost	four	decades	of	experience	as	 an	 art	 market	 correspondent,	 chose	 to	 dedicate	 a	 whole	 chapter	 of	 her	 book	 to	 the	Internet	 is	by	itself	rather	revealing.	As	I	will	attempt	to	demonstrate	 in	this	section,	 it	 is	indicative	of	 the	 fact	 that	 the	art	market	has	been	 increasingly	employing	 the	Web	as	an	important	 tool	 for	 conducting	business	with	a	view	 to	generating	 larger	profits.	This	has	been	particularly	true	in	the	aftermath	of	the	global	economic	crisis,	which	has	produced	the	 need	 to	 expand	 in	 new	 markets	 in	 order	 to	 secure	 the	 financial	 viability	 of	 many	galleries	and	other	companies	related	to	art	trading.	In	this	context,	Adam	synopsises	some	of	the	main	advantages	that	the	Internet	is	offering	to	art	dealers,	by	highlighting	the	speed	with	which	they	can	reach	potential	buyers,	the	unprecedented	geographical	reach	that	the	Web	provides,	the	easiness	of	buying	or	bidding	for	a	work	online,	as	well	as	the	fact	that	through	the	 Internet	commercial	galleries	can	approach	non-traditional	audiences,	which	would	normally	hesitate	to	enter	an	art	space.447	The	documentation	techniques	that	have	been	 developed	 through	 new	 media	 technologies,	 like	 high	 definition	 photography	 and	video,	can	provide	a	good	sense	of	artworks	even	when	potential	collectors	are	not	familiar	with	them.	In	addition,	researching	for	an	artist	online	becomes	even	more	convenient,	and	the	same	applies	to	comparing	auction	and	art	fair	prices,	collections,	curatorial	trends	and	market	developments	at	large.	Finally,	it	is	worth	mentioning	that	maintaining	an	website	
																																																								446	Georgina	Adam,	Big	Bucks:	The	Explosion	of	the	Art	Market	in	the	21st	Century	(Lund	Humphries	Publishers,	Farnham	2014)	pp.	127-128.	447	ibid.,	pp.	121-122.	
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costs	much	 less	 than	maintaining	an	actual	gallery	space,	especially	 in	 the	major	hubs	of	the	global	art	market,	like	London,	New	York,	Los	Angeles,	Paris,	Berlin	and	Hong	Kong.			 Those	 advantages	 have	 prompted	 the	 emergence	 of	 numerous	 platforms	 that	 are	dedicated	 to	 selling	 art	 on	 the	Web,	 as	well	 as	monitoring	 the	 art	market	 and	providing	information	 to	 art	professionals	 and	 collectors	 alike.	The	most	 successful	 case	 to	date	of	such	a	platform	is	Artsy,	whose	stated	mission	is	“to	make	all	the	world’s	art	accessible	to	anyone	 with	 an	 Internet	 connection”.448	However,	 and	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 website	does	 feature	 200,000	 images	 of	 art,	 architecture,	 and	 design	 by	 25,000	 artists,	 Artsy	 is	actually	 a	 profit-driven	 business	 that	 charges	 between	 $400	 and	 $1400	 as	 a	 monthly	subscription	 fee.	 The	website’s	 launch	 in	 June	 of	 2011,	 in	 Basel,	 secured	 the	 backing	 of	prominent	 international	 investors	 who	 operate	 in	 the	 fields	 of	 technology	 and	contemporary	art.449	Since	then,	Artsy	has	been	both	a	huge	database,	as	well	as	an	online	gallery	offering	for	sale	more	than	135,000	works,	with	their	prices	ranging	from	$100	to	$1,000,000.450	Those	works	often	originate	from	some	of	the	leading	commercial	galleries	from	around	the	world,	while	the	platform	also	collaborates	 in	some	of	 its	activities	with	major	museums	such	as	Guggenheim	and	the	British	Museum.	Furthermore,	the	platform	provides	specialist	advice	to	collectors	and	keeps	them	up-to-date	with	all	developments	in	the	 art	market	 by	 sending	 electronic	 alerts	 regarding	 new	works	 and	 shows.	One	 of	 the	most	 interesting	 features	 of	 Artsy	 is	 its	 “Art	 Genome	 Project”,	 which	 is	 a	 classification	system	using	more	than	a	thousand	individual	characteristics	(“artists’	genoming”).	Those	characteristics	are	assigned	to	each	artwork	and	are,	 then,	processed	 in	order	to	connect	works	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 subject,	 style,	 movement,	 period,	 influences,	 etc.	 Accordingly,	 the	website	uses	the	data	produced	by	its	users	 in	order	to	predict	consumer	behaviour	and,	thus,	increase	profit	by	advertising	specific	works	to	the	right	kind	of	collectors.	Being	fully	integrated	in	the	operational	framework	of	Data	Capitalism,	the	processing	of	data	by	Artsy	becomes	of	crucial	importance	to	its	success:	the	monitoring	of	the	flows	of	money	not	only	produces	 forecasts	 about	 the	 future	 of	 individual	 artists,	 or	 –	 even	 –	 entire	markets;	 in	addition,	 it	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 create	 those	 conditions	 of	 exclusivity	 of	 knowledge	 that	would	allow	the	manipulation	of	the	market.	Notably,	by	March	2016,	Artsy	had	developed	
																																																								448	‘About’	(Artsy.net)	<https://artsy.net/about>	accessed	28	March	2016.	449	The	 investors	 included	Twitter	 founder	 Jack	Dorsey,	 Google	 executive	 chairman	Eric	 Schmidt,	and	the	founder	of	 the	Garage	Center	 for	Contemporary	Culture	and	art	collector	Dasha	Zhukova.	Also,	gallerists	Larry	Gagosian	(Gagosian	Gallery)	and	Marc	Glimcher	(Pace	Gallery)	have	served	as	advisors	to	the	website.		450	‘Artsy’	(Artsy.net)	<https://www.artsy.net/>	accessed	28	March	2016.		
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partnerships	 with	 57	 international	 art	 fairs	 as	 a	 provider	 of	 exclusive	 information	 and	sales.451		
	Figure	57:	Artsy		Other	 prominent	 examples	 of	websites	 offering	 similar	 services	 include	Artnet,452	Artspace453 	and	 Paddle8,	 a	 secondary-market	 online	 auction	 house	 hosting	 virtual	showrooms	 for	 its	 auctions.454	As	 Paddle8’s	 co-founder	 Aditya	 Julka	 points	 out,	 bringing	the	 business	 of	 selling	 art	 on	 the	 Web	 has	 proved	 successful,	 because	 people	 feel	increasingly	 confident	 about	 online	 transactions.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 rise	 of	 “global	collectors”	has	created	the	need	to	seek	new	opportunities	for	investing	on	art	around	the	world.	In	times	of	volatility	for	globalised	capitalism,	such	a	move	insulates	the	collectors’	portfolios,	 and	 the	 art	 market	 as	 a	 whole,	 and	 makes	 it	 more	 adaptable	 to	 change.455	Notably,	in	November	2015,	Paddle8	announced	that	it	would	invest	34	million	US	dollars	
																																																								451	‘Preview	60+	Top	Art	Fairs	on	Artsy’	(Artsy.net)	<https://www.artsy.net/art-fairs>	accessed	28	March	2016.	452	‘Artnet’	(Artnet.com)	<http://www.artnet.com/>	accessed	28	March	2016.	453	‘Artspace’	(Artspace.com)	<http://www.artspace.com/>	accessed	28	March	2016.		454	‘Paddle8’	(Paddle8.com)	<https://paddle8.com/>	accessed	28	March	2016.		455	Rob	 Sharp,	 ‘The	 Online	 Art	 Revolution	 Gathers	 Steam	 —	 but	 What	 Does	 It	 Mean?’	BLOUIN	
ARTINFO	(1	 July	 2013)	 <http://www.blouinartinfo.com/news/story/923231/the-online-art-revolution-gathers-steam-but-what-does-it-mean>	accessed	28	March	2016.		
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in	developing	its	services.456	The	Auctionata	platform	takes	the	format	of	the	online	auction	a	step	further	by	offering	live	streaming	from	its	Berlin	studio	alongside	a	variety	of	other	services,457	while	 The	 Auction	 Room	 features	 different	 departments	 whose	 specialisms	range	from	Middle	Eastern	contemporary	art	to	jewellery,	and	from	watches	to	tribal	and	Japanese	art.458	Newbloodart	offers	a	different	area	of	specialism	by	selling	original	works	of	early	career	artists	for	relatively	low	prices,459	and	Eyestorm	focuses	on	limited	edition	works	by	both	emerging	and	established	artists.460	However,	not	all	business	models	that	have	been	transferred	from	physical	space	to	the	Web	have	proved	equally	successful.	The	most	prominent	case	of	failure	has	been	that	of	the	VIP	Art	Fair,	which	was	launched	online	in	2011	by	art	dealers	James	and	Jane	Cohan	and	investors	Jonas	and	Alessandra	Almgren.	The	fair	adopted	the	same	format	with	actual	art	fairs,	through	having	a	VIP	opening	with	limited	 access	 and	 allowing	 direct	 communication	 between	 collectors	 and	 art	 dealers.	Although	 it	 attracted	 most	 of	 the	 internationally	 leading	 commercial	 galleries,	 it	 faced	important	technical	problems	in	2011,	and	in	2012	sales	were	not	large	enough	in	order	to	secure	a	third	edition.	As	a	result,	Artspace	acquired	the	platform	of	the	virtual	art	fair	in	2013.461		 Quite	predictably	for	such	a	dynamic	industry,	the	business	of	selling	art	on	the	Web	has	not	catalysed	merely	 the	appearance	of	new	businesses	 in	 the	art	market;	 it	has	also	mobilised	 and	 attracted	 already	 existing	 businesses,	 originating	 from	 both	 online	commerce	and	the	traditional	art	world.	In	the	former	field,	Ebay	features	in	its	catalogue	a	separate	category	for	collectibles	and	art,	increasingly	trying	to	target	the	higher	end	of	the	contemporary	art	market	by	introducing	more	successful	artists	and,	thus,	attracting	more	serious	collectors.462	 At	the	same	time,	Amazon	has	added	a	similar	category	to	its	own		
																																																								456	Mostafa	 Heddaya,	 ‘High	 Tech	 Cash,	 Low	 Art	 Model?	 A	 Closer	 Look	 at	 paddle8’	BLOUIN	
ARTINFO	(5	 November	 2015)	 <http://blogs.artinfo.com/artintheair/2015/11/05/high-tech-cash-low-art-model-a-closer-look-at-paddle8/>	accessed	28	March	2016.	457	‘Auctionata’	 (Auctionata.com)	 <http://auctionata.com/>	 accessed	 28	 March	 2016.	In	 October	2015,	Auctionata	announced	 the	buy	of	 the	London-based	valuation	company,	ValueMyStuff.	 See:	Marion	 Maneker,	 ‘Auctionata	 Buys	 ValueMyStuff’	Art	 Market	 Monitor	(28	 October	 2015)	<http://www.artmarketmonitor.com/2015/10/28/auctionata-buys-valuemystuff/>	 accessed	 28	March	2016.	458	‘The	 Auction	 Room’	 (Theauctionroom.com)	 <http://theauctionroom.com/>	 accessed	 3	 April	2016.	459	‘NewBloodArt’	(Newbloodart.com)	<http://newbloodart.com/>	accessed	28	March	2016.	460	‘Eyestorm’	(Eyestorm.com)	<http://www.eyestorm.com/>	accessed	28	March	2016.	461 	Andrew	 Russeth,	 'Artspace	 Acquires	 VIP	 Art'	 (Observer,	 2013)	<http://observer.com/2013/04/artspace-acquires-vip-art/>	accessed	6	April	2016.	462	‘Collectibles	&	Art’	(Ebay.com)	<http://www.ebay.com/rpp/collectibles-art>	accessed	28	March	2016.		
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catalogue	(2013).463	Despite	the	fact	that	the	website	has	not	been	collaborating	so	far	with	any	 of	 the	 big	 gallery	 names,	 its	 huge	 customer	 basis	 (250	 million	 registered	 users)	alongside	 its	 established	 name	 and	 reliability	make	 its	 turn	 to	 contemporary	 art	 a	 very	important	development.464	Amazon	had	already	developed	a	vivid	interest	in	entering	the	art	 market	 by	 the	 late	 1990s,	 when	 it	 announced	 a	 joint	 venture	 with	 Sotheby’s.	 The	collaboration	 did	 not	 progress	 much	 and,	 finally,	 ended	 in	 October	 2000;465	however,	 it	emphatically	 proved	 the	mutual	 interest	 of	 online	 retailers	 and	major	 auction	 houses	 in	expanding	their	services	and	building	new	online	markets.	Christie’s	has	been	particularly	active	in	this	field,	with	a	special	part	of	 its	website	being	dedicated	exclusively	to	online	auctions.466	The	 works	 offered	 for	 bidding	 vary	 from	 photographs	 to	 prints	 and	 from	memorabilia	 to	 ceramics,	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 mainly	 attract	 a	 younger	 clientele	 who	 are	investigating	the	prospect	of	becoming	more	serious	collectors.	Furthermore,	in	one	of	its	most	prominent	moves,	Christie’s	joined	forces	with	the	Andy	Warhol	Foundation	in	2012,	offering	on	sale	20,000	 items	 from	the	artist’s	estate.467	Although	some	of	 the	 items	have	been	merely	discarded	materials	from	the	artist’s	studio,	Christie’s	initiative	forms	part	of	its	 strategy	 to	 transform	 the	Web	 into	 a	high-end	market	 for	modern	and	 contemporary	art.	 Finally,	 we	 should	 not	 ignore	 the	 fact	 that	 several	 big	 galleries	 themselves,	 like	Gagosian,468	Hauser	 and	 Wirth,469	or	 the	 White	 Cube470		 (amongst	 others),	 have	 been	offering	 more	 and	 more	 limited	 edition	 items	 produced	 by	 the	 artists	 that	 they	 are	representing	through	their	online	shops.	This	model	has	proved	particularly	successful	in		
																																																								463 	‘Art’	 (Amazon.com)	<http://www.amazon.com/Art/b/ref=nav_shopall_fine_art?ie=UTF8&node=6685269011>	accessed	28	March	2016.	464	Julia	 Halperin,	 ‘Amazon	 to	 Launch	 Virtual	 Art	 Gallery’	The	 Art	 Newspaper	(27	 June	 2013)	<http://old.theartnewspaper.com/articles/-Amazon-to-launch-virtual-art-gallery/29989>	accessed	5	April	2016.	465 	‘Amazon,	 Sotheby’s	 Closing	 Jointly	 Operated	 Auction	 Site’	CNET	(2	 January	 2002)	<http://news.cnet.com/Amazon,-Sothebys-closing-jointly-operated-auction-site/2100-1017_3-246863.html>	accessed	28	March	2016.	466 	‘Online	 Auctions	 of	 Luxury	 Watches,	 Handbags	 &	 Art’	 (Christies.com)	<http://www.christies.com/onlineonly>	accessed	29	March	2016.	467	‘Andy	Warhol	 at	 Christie’s’	 (Christies.com)	 <http://warhol.christies.com/>	 accessed	 29	 March	2016.	468	‘Gagosian	Shop’	(Gagosian.com)	<http://www.gagosian.com/shop/>	accessed	29	March	2016.		469	‘Shop’	(Hauserwirth.com)	<http://www.hauserwirth.com/shop/>	accessed	29	March	2016.		470	‘Limited	 Edition	 Prints	 and	 Publications’	 (Whitecube.com)	 <http://whitecube.com/shop/>	accessed	29	March	2016.		
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certain	 cases,	 with	 the	 director	 of	 Saatchi	 Gallery	 Rebecca	 Wilson	 claiming	 that	 the	institution	sells	more	online	within	a	month	than	most	real	galleries	sell	in	a	year.471			
	Figure	58:	The	Andy	Warhol	Foundation	at	Christie’s			 However,	when	it	comes	to	the	exploitation	of	the	Web	by	the	art	market,	the	most	significant	developments	should	be	looked	for	within	the	Internet’s	most	closely	related	art	forms:	digital	and	online	art.	In	the	last	few	years,	several	websites	have	emerged	as	online	exhibition	platforms	that	present	new	projects	by	artists	who	use	the	Internet	as	a	primary	tool	 in	 their	 practice.	 Several	 of	 those	 platforms,	 including	 Bubblebyte,472	Barmecidal	Projects473	and	 STATE,474	operate	 outside	 the	 commercial	 art	 circuit,	 presenting	 curated	solo	and	group	exhibitions	throughout	the	year,	in	a	similar	manner	to	the	one	traditionally	adopted	by	publicly	funded	galleries	or	museums.	The	success	of	those	websites	prompted	the	exploration	of	the	possibility	to	employ	the	same	model	in	order	to	establish	an	“actual”	commercial	gallery	online.	A	prominent	example	of	such	an	endeavour	is	Fach	&	Asendorf	Gallery,	which	was	launched	in	2010	by	architect	and	artist	Ole	Fach	and	media	artist	Kim	
																																																								471 	Alex	 Hudson,	 ‘Art	 “Sold	 More	 Online	 than	 in	 Galleries”’	BBC	 News	(27	 June	 2013)	<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-23054641>	accessed	29	March	2016.	472	‘Bubblebyte’	(Bubblebyte.org)	<http://bubblebyte.org>	accessed	29	March	2016.	473	‘Barmecidal	 Projects’	 (Barmecidalprojects.com)	 <http://barmecidalprojects.com>	 accessed	 29	March	2016.	474	‘State’	(Thestate.tumblr.com)	<http://thestate.tumblr.com>	accessed	29	March	2016.		
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Asendorf.475	The	 gallery’s	 GIF	Market	 project	 is	 one	 of	 the	 strategies	 its	 founders	 have	employed	in	order	to	sell	digital	files	to	collectors	and	make	net	art	a	commercially	viable	product.476	The	 project	 features	 1,024	 minimalist	 animated	 GIFs,	 with	 a	 price	 inscribed	below	each	one	of	them.	In	addition,	in	the	case	that	the	GIF	has	already	been	bought,	the	name	of	the	buyer	is	also	displayed	under	the	image.	An	algorithm	determines	the	asking	prices,	which	rise	every	time	that	another	GIF	is	purchased,	so	that	the	final	one	would	end	up	costing	$23,350.	Yet,	this	form	of	patronage	is	not	the	only	one	that	can	be	employed	in		
	Figure	59:	Fach	&	Asendorf	Gallery’s	GIF	Market		order	 to	monetize	 online	 art.	 Artist	 Rafael	 Rozendaal	 creates	 unique	 animated	websites,	each	 one	 of	 which	 is	 offered	 for	 patronage	 through	 a	 particular	 system	 that	 the	 artist	describes	 in	 his	 Art	 Website	 Sales	 Contract.477	According	 to	 the	 contract,	 the	 buyer	 has	his/her	name	added	to	the	website	and	acquires	certain	rights	to	the	work,	while	the	site																																																									475	‘F&AG’	(Fa-g.org)	<http://fa-g.org>	accessed	29	March	2016.	476	‘GIF	Market’	(Gifmarket.net)	<http://gifmarket.net>	accessed	29	March	2016.		477 	Rafaël	 Rozendaal	 ‘Art	 Website	 Sales	 Contract’	 (Artwebsitesalescontract.com)	<http://www.artwebsitesalescontract.com>	accessed	29	March	2016.	
			 186	
itself	 remains	 publicly	 accessible.	 The	 collector	 receives	 all	 of	 the	 website’s	 offline	exhibition	files,	as	well	as	the	source	code	and	stewardship	of	the	website's	domain	name.	Also,	collectors	are	given	the	right	to	exhibit	and	sell	the	work	on	the	basis	of	Rozendaal’s	conditions,	which	are	also	binding	for	future	owners.	Under	these	conditions,	Rozendaal’s	work	was	sold	in	the	most	commercial	context	within	which	the	contemporary	art	market	operates	–	an	art	fair	(Rhizome’s	booth	at	the	2011	Armory	Show).	Finally,	one	of	the	most	recent	initiatives	in	this	field	has	been	Daata	Editions,	a	platform	that	was	launched	in	May	2015.478	Daata	Editions	commission	new	artists’	video,	sound	and	online	artworks,	which	are	available	for	sale	in	limited	editions.		
	Figure	60:	Daata	Editions			 Another	 form	 of	 “mass	 patronage”,	 is	 that	 of	 artist-created	 apps	 that	 can	 be	downloaded	on	smartphones	for	a	certain	price.	In	this	case,	the	artist	has	to	collaborate	–	directly	 or	 indirectly	 –	 with	 large	 corporations	 in	 order	 to	 make	 the	 work	 accessible	through	an	app	 store,	 like	 for	 example	 the	Apple	 store.	 Inevitably,	 then,	 the	work	would	become	part	of	the	store	only	if	it	fully	complied	with	the	store’s	content	and	distribution	policies	 –	 a	 fact	 that	 raises	 questions	 about	 the	 amount	 of	 freedom	 that	 an	 artist	would	have,	 especially	 as	 regards	promoting	politically	 engaged	practices.	However,	 it	 is	worth	noting	 that	 any	 form	 of	 patronage,	 or	mass	 sale	 through	 apps	 can	merely	 provide	 some	access	to	the	art	market,	and	even	less	so	to	the	market’s	high	end.	As	it	has	already	been																																																									478	‘Daata	Editions’	(Daata-editions.com)	<https://daata-editions.com>	accessed	29	March	2016.		
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suggested	 in	 the	 case	 of	 post-internet	 art,	 one	 of	 the	 most	 successful	 and	 increasingly	popular	ways	to	monetize	online	art	is	to	overcome	its	immateriality	by	turning	the	works	into	 physical	 objects,	 like	 for	 instance,	 prints	 or	 sculptures/installations.	 This	 strategy	creates	 easily	monitored	 scarcity,	 a	 characteristic	 that	 is	 absolutely	 essential	 for	 the	 art	market	 to	maximize	 its	 profits,	 as	 decreased	 supply	 leads	 to	 an	 increased	 demand.	 The	ultimate	model	of	fabricating	scarcity	is	by	taking	a	work	offline,	so	that	the	collector	can	have	 it	 locally.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	work	would	only	 exist	 in	 the	 collector’s	own	drive	 space	and,	 as	 a	 result,	 the	 lack	of	 any	kind	of	presence	 in	 the	public	domain	would	 clearly	put	under	question	its	very	nature	as	a	work	of	net	art.		Finally,	we	should	not	ignore	the	fact	that	the	commercialization	of	the	Web	by	the	art	market	 also	 has	 other	 dark	 sides.	More	 specifically,	 it	 can	 create	 an	 even	more	 non-transparent	market,	given	that	sales	take	place	privately.	As	a	result,	 there	 is	much	more	limited	access	to	price	information	in	comparison	with	other	forms	of	sales,	like	auctions.	At	the	same	time,	there	are	many	grey	areas	regarding	taxation,	as	some	auction	websites	charge	sales	tax,	whereas	some	others	do	not.	And,	even	in	the	case	that	a	website	charges	tax,	 there	 is	 still	 the	question	of	what	 location	 the	work	 is	delivered	 to	and,	 accordingly,	what	kind	of	tax	rate	applies	to	that	specific	country	or	region.479	Therefore,	the	possibility	of	taxation	loopholes	used	by	a	particular	market	and	by	a	particular	elite	comes	into	view.	As	 Georgina	 Adam	 notes	 in	 her	 book,	 the	 art	 market	 is	 an	 opaque	 and	 unregulated	business,	with	money	laundering	and	tax	evasion	being	two	of	its	most	prominent	traits.	It	would	 seem	 that	 parts	 of	 the	 art	market	 see	 the	 Internet	 as	 a	 tool	 to	 “safeguard”	 those	profitable	characteristics,	and	–	if	possible	–	expand	them.	All	those	developments	testify	to	the	 effort	 of	 the	 art	 market	 to	 integrate	 digital	 art	 and,	 in	 particular,	 net	 art	 into	 the	commercial	 circuit.	 Inevitably,	 the	 commodification	 of	 online	 artistic	 expression	 does	function	as	an	ideological	barrier	“blocking”	the	renewed	spirit	of	political	activism	that	has	emerged	 thanks	 to	 new	 media	 technologies.	 The	 capacity	 of	 Web-based	 art	 to	 express	social	demands	might	still	remain	open;	however,	in	the	current	historical	conjuncture,	the	previously	 described	 strategies	 impair	 its	 potential	 to	 raise	 a	 distinct	 voice	 against	 a	socioeconomic	system	for	whose	perpetuation	the	mainstream	(i.e.	commercial)	art	world	has	long	been	a	strong	proponent.																																																											479	For	example,	Paddle8	charges	sale	tax,	while	Christie’s	charges	online	sales	tax	or	VAT	“based	on	the	 location	 of	 the	 property	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 sale	 and	 subsequent	 final	 delivery	 address”.	 See:	Adam,	op.	cit.,	p.	126.	
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Art	as	Data	as	Profit		The	previously	analysed	examples	of	how	art	(including	online	art)	is	being	commoditised,	sold	and	bought	online	constitute	only	one	part	of	the	strategies	through	which	the	agents	of	Data	Capitalism	are	 in	a	position	 to	exploit	 cultural	production.	The	other	part	of	 this	economic	 field	can	be	 identified	 if	we	expand	our	 investigation	 into	wider	expressions	of	cultural	engagement,	which	are	not	directly,	or	–	even	–	not	at	all	associated	with	the	art	market.	Accordingly,	in	order	to	locate	the	most	prominent	case	within	this	second	part,	we	will	have	to	look	at	the	relationship	with	art	and	culture	of	the	largest	Internet	company	in	the	world	–	Google.480	Google’s	multifaceted	“embracement”	of	cultural	production	started,	in	effect,	in	2004,	when	its	Google	Books	project	was	officially	launched	(the	project’s	initial	name	was	“Google	Print”).481	Since	then,	the	company	has	digitised	millions	of	books,	with	the	 purpose	 of	 entering	 a	 market	 with	 huge	 worldwide	 demand.	 Google’s	 free	dissemination	of	 content	 through	Google	Books	 constitutes	 today	a	 fierce	 competitor	 for	Amazon,	which	has	long	been	the	leader	in	the	market	of	online	bookstores.482	Focusing	on	the	 ownership	 and	 processing	 of	 data	 and	 advertising,	 rather	 than	 on	 profiting	 directly	from	sales,	Google	has	succeeded	so	 far	 in	sidestepping	all	 legal	concerns	 that	have	been	raised	 over	 the	 years	 around	 its	 breaches	 of	 copyright.	 It	 has	 managed	 to	 win	 its	 legal	battles	 with	 both	 the	 Association	 of	 American	 Publishers,	 in	 2012	 (the	 Association	requested	a	settlement),	and	the	Authors’	Guild,	 in	2103,	by	successfully	claiming	that	 its	book-scanning	project	falls	into	the	category	of	“fair	use”	under	the	American	legislation.483	Yet,	 this	 has	 only	 been	 for	 Google	 a	 win	 in	 a	 battle	 that	 now	 encompasses	 all	 forms	 of	cultural	production,	not	just	books.		The	main	“weapon”	that	Google	has	developed	in	order	to	win	the	war	of	exploiting	cultural	data	is	Google	Cultural	Institute	(GCI),	which	was	officially	unveiled	in	2011.484	Its																																																										480	Google	 is	 the	 company	 that	 has	 by	 far	 the	 largest	market	 capitalization	 in	 the	world	when	 it	comes	to	Internet	corporations.	As	of	15th	March	2016	its	capitalization	was	510	billion	US	dollars.	See:	 ‘Alphabet	 Inc:	 NASDAQ:	 GOOG’	 (Google.com,	 2016)	<https://www.google.com/finance?cid=304466804484872>	accessed	29	March	2016.	481	‘Google	Books	History’	(Books.google.com)		<https://books.google.com/intl/en/googlebooks/about/history.html>	accessed	29	March	2016.	482	As	 of	 15th	March	2016,	Amazon’s	 capitalization	was	 273	billion	US	dollars.	 See:	 ‘Amazon.com,	Inc.:	 NASDAQ:	 AMZN’	 (Google.com,	 2016)	 <https://www.google.com/finance?cid=660463>	accessed	29	March	2016.	483	Thomas	 Claburn,	 ‘Google	 Wins	 Book	 Scanning	 Case’	Information	 Week	(14	 November	 2013)	<http://www.informationweek.com/applications/google-wins-book-scanning-case/d/d-id/1112240?>	accessed	29	March	2016.	484 	‘Google	 Cultural	 Institute’	 (Google.com)	 <https://www.google.com/culturalinstitute/home>	accessed	29	March	2016.		
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purpose	 has	 been	 to	 “make	 important	 cultural	 material	 available	 and	 accessible	 to	everyone	 and	 to	 digitally	 preserve	 it	 to	 educate	 and	 inspire	 future	 generations”,485	a	mission	 statement	 surprisingly	 similar	 to	 the	one	of	 the	online	art	dealer	platform	Artsy	(“to	 make	 all	 the	 world’s	 art	 accessible	 to	 anyone	 with	 an	 Internet	 connection”).	Interestingly,	the	first	announcement	of	Google’s	intention	to	digitise	all	great	artefacts	of	human	culture	had	taken	place	two	years	before	the	official	launch	of	CCI,	in	the	aftermath	of	a	real	war.	In	November	2009,	Google	Executive	Chairman	Eric	Schmidt	announced	from	the	National	Museum	of	Iraq,	in	Baghdad,	that	Google	intended	to	use	its	resources	in	order	to	 digitise	 the	 museum’s	 treasures	 and	 make	 them	 available	 online. 486 	Schmidt’s	announcement	took	place	in	the	presence	of	then-US	Ambassador	to	Iraq,	Christopher	Hill,	and	it	came	after	a	worldwide	reaction	against	the	American	forces’	failure	to	protect	the	museum	 and	 other	 sites	 of	 cultural	 significance	 from	 looting	 after	 Iraq’s	 invasion.	Therefore,	 from	the	very	beginning,	GCI	was	promoted	by	Google	as	a	 tool	of	protection,	documentation,	 preservation	 and	 global	 access	 to	 humanity’s	 cultural	 heritage.487	In	 the	years	 that	have	 followed	 this	 first	project,	 some	of	 the	most	 important	museums	around	the	world	have	made	their	exhibits,	special	collections	and	archives	available	to	GCI’s	“Art	Project”:	 from	 the	 Metropolitan	 Museum	 of	 Art	 in	 New	 York	 to	 the	 Hermitage	 in	 St	Petersburg,	and	from	the	Uffizi	in	Florence	to	the	National	Gallery	in	London,	Google	has	so	far	digitised	 thousands	of	artefacts.	 In	addition,	GCI’s	 “Historic	Moments”	project	uses	an	even	more	extensive	collection	of	documents,	photographs,	videos	and	personal	accounts	in	an	attempt	to	“restage”	important	moments	of	human	history.	Those	range	from	the	first	Australian	expeditions	to	the	two	World	Wars,	and	from	the	Nelson	Mandela	collection	to	the	rise	of	Korean	Pop	(K-pop)	over	the	last	two	decades.	Finally,	GCI’s	“World	Wonders”	project	uses	Google’s	Street	View	technology	in	order	to	bring	online	ancient	and	modern	world	heritage	sites,	including	Pompeii,	Hiroshima,	Versailles,	and	the	Grand	Canyon.																																																											485		 JungHyun	 Anna	 Park	 and	 Sang-Yeal	 Han,	 ‘Google	 DevArt:	 Following	 the	 Success	 of	 Google’s	Android	 Market	 in	 the	 Visual	 Arts?’,	Arts	and	Technology:	Fourth	 International	Conference,	ArtsIT	
2014,	 Istanbul,	Turkey,	November	10-12,	2014,	Revised	Selected	Papers	(Springer,	 New	 York	 2015)	pp.	13	–	19.	486	Andrew	 LaVallee,	 ‘Google	 CEO:	 A	 New	 Iraq	 Means	 Business	 Opportunities’	The	 Wall	 Street	
Journal	(24	 November	 2009)	 <http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2009/11/24/google-ceo-a-new-iraq-means-business-opportunities>	accessed	29	March	2016.	487	‘War	 and	 Occupation	 in	 Iraq	 -	 Destruction	 of	 Cultural	 Heritage’	 (Globalpolicy.org,	 June	 2007)	<https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/168/37146.html>	 accessed	 29	March	2016.	
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	Figure	61:	Google	Cultural	Institute			 This	 comprehensive	 expansion	 of	 Google	 into	 the	 field	 of	 cultural	 data	 has	 been	facilitated	 by	 two	 important	 conditions:	 one	 (primarily)	 cultural	 and	 one	 (entirely)	financial.	The	cultural	condition	that	we	could	identify	is	associated	with	the	modern	and	postmodern	 fascination	with	 the	methodologies	of	 the	archive.	The	rise	of	 the	archive	 in	the	modern	era	as	the	main	means	through	which	historians,	anthropologists,	theorists	and	cultural	 workers	 collect,	 organise	 and	 communicate	 memory	 has	 been	 followed	 by	 the	adoption	 of	 the	 archive	 by	 contemporary	 artists,	 who	 gradually	 transformed	 it	 into	 a	distinct	genre.488	As	art	historian	Hal	Foster	notes	in	his	2004	essay	The	Archival	Impulse,	“archival	art”	can	be	defined	as	a	genre	whose	artists	“seek	to	make	historical	information,	often	lost	or	displaced,	physically	present.	To	this	end	they	elaborate	on	the	found	image,	object,	 and	 favor	 the	 installation	 format”.489	This	 phenomenon	 has	 been	 particularly	evident	in	the	practice	of	artists	such	as	Glenn	Ligon,	Douglas	Gordon,	Mark	Dion,	Thomas	Ruff,	 Liam	 Gillick,	 Andy	 Warhol,	 Thomas	 Hirschhorn,	 Tacita	 Dean,	 Stan	 Douglas,	 Susan	Hiller,	Renee	Green	and	Philippe	Parreno,	amongst	others.	 In	addition,	 there	has	been	an	equally	 enthusiastic	 embracement	 of	 archives	 by	 the	 curators	 of	 major	 exhibitions,	including	 the	most	 recent	editions	of	 the	Venice	and	Whitney	Biennales	 (2015	and	2014	respectively),	as	well	as	Documenta	13	(2012),	which	often	place	archives	at	the	epicentre	of	 their	 curatorial	 framework.	 Consequently,	 the	 projects	 of	 GCI	 fit	 in	 to	 a	 considerable	extent	with	this	cultural	context	 that	celebrates	 the	archive.	At	 the	same	time,	we	should	not	 fail	 to	note	 that	all	of	 the	artists	mentioned	above,	as	well	as	 the	museums	 that	host	their	 exhibitions,	 have	 contributed	 to	 the	 growth	 of	 a	 genre	 that	 has	 an	 important																																																									488	Charles	Merewether	(ed),	The	Archive	(Whitechapel	Gallery,	London	2006).	489	Hal	Foster,	‘An	Archival	Impulse’	(2004)	October	Fall	no.	110	p.	3.		
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economic	 aspect	 –	 the	 works	 of	 “archival	 artists”	 are	 being	 sold	 today	 in	 the	 most	important	 international	 art	 fairs	 and	 they	 are	 featured	 in	 major	 private	 and	 public	collections.	Yet,	it	is	actually	the	lack	of	lack	of	state	funds	to	support	cultural	institutions	that	 has	 pushed	 Google’s	 expansion	 even	 further.	 As	 information	 and	 communication	historian	Dan	Schiller	notes,	“GCI	would	be	unlikely,	even	unthinkable,	absent	the	chronic	and	politically	induced	starvation	of	publicly	funded	cultural	institutions	even	throughout	the	wealthy	countries.	States’	withdrawal	or	reallocation	of	resources	to	fund	and	operate	the	 apparatus	 of	 cultural	 provision	 is	 its	 essential	 condition	 of	 possibility”.490	The	 global	economic	crisis	has	made	the	financial	situation	of	most	museums	and	cultural	institutions	even	 more	 difficult	 and	 volatile,491	while	 the	 economic	 environment	 for	 other	 sectors,	including	technology,	has	remained	positive	during	the	same	period.	Those	conditions	have	allowed	 private	 companies	 to	 use	 the	 resources	 of	 public	 organisations	 with	 long-term	benefits,	whilst	merely	offering	short-term	financial	support	in	exchange.	For	Google,	those	benefits	do	not	refer	only	to	the	addition	of	new	“cultural	data”	to	GCI’s	portfolio,	but	also	to	the	company’s	wider	strategy	of	“colonising”	the	open	Web.	In	order	 to	 map	 the	 museums	 that	 are	 part	 of	 GCI’s	 “Art	 Project”	 Google	 has	 used	 a	 very	similar	technology	to	the	one	that	it	has	employed	for	Google	Earth	and	Google	Maps:	users	can	tour	the	participating	museum’s	room-by-room	and	floor-by-floor,	zooming	in	and	out	of	 particular	 exhibits.492	Furthermore,	 by	 using	 their	 smartphones	 whilst	 being	 in	 the	museum,	art	lovers	can	add	an	extra	layer	to	their	experience,	as	their	networked	devices	may	function	as	guides	for	the	exhibitions,	events	and	products	offered	by	the	museum,	as	well	 as	 for	 any	 other	 service	 that	 could	 be	 connected	 not	 just	 to	 art,	 but	 also	 to	 the	particular	location	of	the	cultural	institution	that	they	are	visiting.	This	“extra	layer”	may,	actually,	be	one	of	 the	most	profitable	elements	of	Google’s	 “Art	Project”,	given	that	both	the	 creators	 and	 the	visitors	of	museums	and	art	 galleries	predominantly	originate	 from	the	most	privileged	strata	of	society	–	the	middle	and	the	upper	classes.493	 Those	“alluring																																																											490	Dan	Schiller	and	Shinjoung	Yeo,	‘Powered	by	Google:	Widening	Access	and	Tightening	Corporate	Control’	 in	 Lanfranco	 Aceti	 and	 others	 (eds),	Red	Art:	New	Utopias	 in	Data	 Capitalism,	 Leonardo	
Electronic	Almanac,	vol.	20,	no	1	(Leonardo/ISAST,	San	Francisco	2014)	p.	48.	491	For	instance,	in	the	UK,	the	2010	Spending	Review	reduced	the	budget	of	Arts	Council	England	by	almost	30%.	492	A	study	published	 in	September	2015	by	Southern	Methodist	University’s	National	Center	For	Arts	Research	(NCAR)	has	indicated	that	the	overall	digital	engagement	at	Art	Museums	has	been	growing	 fast.	 See:	 ‘NCAR	 Releases	 New	 Edition	 of	 Data’	 (Mcs.smu.edu,	 9	 September	 2015)	<http://mcs.smu.edu/artsresearch2014/articles/blog-white-papers/ncar-releases-new-edition-data>	accessed	29	March	2016.	493	Fiona	McLean,	Marketing	the	Museum	(Routledge,	London	1997)	p.	24.		
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	Figure	62:	Google	Cultural	Institute’s	“Art	Project”		demographics”	render	the	data	produced	by	museumgoers	even	more	important,	as	their	discretionary	 income	 can	 be	 “directed”	 by	 Google	 towards	 a	 variety	 of	 “spending	destinations”	–	namely	advertisers	and	their	promoted	products.	Google	is	in	a	position	to	monitor	 which	 exhibitions	 and	 artworks	 are	 the	 most	 popular	 (both	 online	 and	 in	 real	spaces)	and	 incorporate	this	data	 into	the	user-consumer	profiles	 that	 its	adverting	tools	are	 producing.	 Notably,	 the	 same	 data	 can	 inform	 its	 search	 algorithm	 and	 its	Web	 ad-placement	 programme.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 through	 GCI	 Google	 is	 able	 to	 secure	 that	 its	competitors	won’t	be	able	to	have	equal	access	to	the	datasets	that	Google	 is	able	to	use.	This	 is,	 of	 course,	 a	 slow	 process.	 As	 the	 director	 of	 GCI	 Steve	 Crossan	 has	 emphasized,	“having	good	content	on	the	Web,	 in	open	standards,	 is	good	for	the	Web,	 is	good	for	the	users.	 If	 you	 invest	 in	 what’s	 good	 for	 the	 Web	 and	 the	 users,	 that	 will	 bear	 fruit”.494	Google’s	 size	 grants	 it	 the	 luxury	 of	 time.	 Quite	 ironically,	 perhaps,	 as	 activists	 were	occupying	 cultural	 institutions	 at	 the	 height	 of	 the	 crisis	 in	 order	 to	 protest	 about	 their	elitist	character	and	the	 financialization	of	 their	modus	operandi,495	GCI	has	been	silently	occupying	the	same	institutions	through	its	own	activities.	
																																																								494	Eric	 Pfanner,	 ‘Quietly,	 Google	 Puts	 History	 Online’	The	New	 York	 Times	(20	 November	 2011)	<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/21/technology/quietly-google-puts-history-online.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>	accessed	30	March	2016.	495	Whitney	Kimball,	 ‘Professors,	 Artists,	Workers,	 and	Activists	Rally	 inside	MoMA’	Art	F	City	(16	January	 2012)	 <http://artfcity.com/2012/01/16/professors-artists-workers-and-activists-rally-inside-moma/>	accessed	30	March	2016.	
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In	 the	 end,	 the	 previously	 described	 combination	 of	 defensive	 and	 offensive	elements	 in	GCI’s	strategy	has	been	capable	of	building	a	wider	pool	of	opportunities	 for	extracting	(cultural)	data	and,	accordingly,	raising	advertising	revenue.	As	Schiller	and	Yeo	note,	“This	is	a	full-scale	commodification	drive,	and	it	exhibits	a	modal	form:	the	‘public-private	 partnership.’	 One	 partner	 typically	 possesses	 the	 cultural	 ‘assets’;	 the	 other,	 the	capital	required	to	‘monetize’	them”.496	Of	course,	such	partnerships,	and	arts	patronage	at	large,	are	not	new	to	the	field	of	cultural	production.	It	is	worth	noting	that	recent	sponsors	of	 the	 Victoria	 &	 Albert	 Museum,	 in	 London,	 include	 technology	 giants	 such	 as	 Apple,	Samsung	 and	 Toshiba,	 whilst	 even	 centralised	 state-funded	 entities	 engage	 in	 “public-private	 partnerships”	 in	 order	 to	 support	 their	 operations.	 For	 instance,	 The	 John	 F.	Kennedy	 Library,	which	 is	 part	 of	 the	US	National	 Archives	 and	Records	 Administration	system,	 developed	 a	 partnership	 with	 IBM	 and	 EMC	 Corporation, 497 	and	 the	 US	Government	 Accountability	 Office	 partnered	 with	 Thomson	 West.498	In	 this	 context,	 the	initiation	 of	 new	 partnerships	 by	 Google	with	 the	 purpose	 of	 producing	new	 art	 can	 be	considered	as	one	of	 the	numerous	 implementations	of	 its	monopolist	model	of	 constant	diversification,	 which	 aims	 to	 encapsulate	 the	 full	 range	 of	 outputs	 produced	 by	 the	creative	industries.499	This	specific	field	of	expansion	is	particularly	useful	for	our	analysis,	as	it	brings	to	light	the	multiple	ways	in	which	art	–	both	in	the	form	of	web-based	art	and	of	artworks	merely	presented	online	–	can	be	transformed	into	programmable	data,	whose	ultimate	output	is	financial	profit.		Out	of	all	of	Google’s	projects,	DevArt	 is,	probably,	the	initiative	that	synopsizes	in	the	most	lucid	way	the	previously	described	business	strategy.500	DevArt	was	launched	as	a	partnership	between	Google	and	the	Barbican	Centre	in	London	in	July	2014,	in	the	context	of	the	“Digital	Revolutions”	touring	exhibition.	It	consisted	in	commissioning	“some	of	the	most	 progressive	 interactive	 artists”501	working	 around	 the	world	 today	 to	 produce	new	
																																																								496	Schiller	and	Yeo,	op.	cit.,	p.	51.	497 	‘Digitization	 Partnerships	 -	 Digitization	 at	 the	 National	 Archives’	 (Archives.gov)	<http://www.archives.gov/digitization/partnerships.html>	accessed	30	March	2016.	498	Cory	 Doctorow	 reposting	 of	 Carl	 Malamud,	 ‘Did	 the	 US	 Gov’t	 Sell	 Exclusive	 Access	 to	 Its	Legislative	 History	 to	 Thomson	 West?’	Boing	 Boing	(17	 March	 2008)	<http://boingboing.net/2008/03/17/did-the-us-govt-sell.html>	accessed	30	March	2016.	499	For	 an	 introduction	 to	 the	 influence	 of	 corporations	 on	 the	 arts	 and	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 free-market	 ethos	 by	 cultural	 institutions	 over	 the	 last	 three	 decades,	 see:	 Chin-Tao	 Wu,	Privatising	
Culture:	Corporate	Art	Intervention	since	the	1980s	(Verso	Books,	London	2002).		500 	The	 project’s	 website:	 'Devart.	 Art	 Made	 With	 Code.'	 (Devart.withgoogle.com,	 2016)	<https://devart.withgoogle.com>	accessed	11	April	2016.	501 	‘Digital	 Revolution’	 (Barbican.org.uk,	 2014)	 <http://www.barbican.org.uk/digital-revolution/explore/dev-art/>	accessed	30	March	2016.	
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artworks	made	with	code.	However,	there	was	an	important	condition	in	order	for	artists	to	receive	the	£25,000	commission:	all	of	the	new	artworks	were	required	to	use	at	 least	one	 of	 Google’s	 technologies,	 be	 it	 in	 the	 form	 of	 programming	 languages,	 platforms,	toolkits	or	Application	Programme	Interfaces	(APIs).502	As	a	result,	 in	 the	case	of	DevArt,	the	 structural	 imbalance	of	power	 that	 characterises	 the	 “public-private	partnerships”	 in	the	aftermath	of	 the	global	economic	crisis	becomes	even	more	acute	and,	accordingly,	a	matter	of	basic	freedom	of	expression.	As	artist	Paolo	Pedercini	has	argued,	DevArt	“as	a		
	Figure	63:	Google’s	DevArt		new	 artistic	 movement	 could	 be	 seen	 as	 an	 attempt	 to	 steer	 digital	 art	 away	 from	 its	current	 practitioners	 who	 interrogate	 aspects	 of	 the	 networked	 society,	 and	 towards	 a	form	 where	 it	 is	 intrinsically	 linked	 with	 Google	 itself	 and	 aesthetically	 pleasing	installations”,	given	that	Google	did	not	allow	any	content	 to	appear	online	 that	could	be	
																																																								502	Four	projects	were	commissioned	by	DevArt:	Wishing	Wall	by	Varvara	Guljajeva	and	Mar	Canet,	which	 transforms	 spoken	 words	 into	 butterflies	 projected	 on	 a	 gallery	 wall;	 Co(de)factory	 by	Karsten	Schmidt,	which	employs	a	set	of	custom	developed	in-browser	3D	modeling	tools	in	order	to	 bring	 creators	 together	 and	 allow	 them	 to	 individually	 and	 collaboratively	 design	 (and	 later	fabricate)	 physical	 artifacts;	 Play	 the	world	 by	 Zach	 Lieberman,	 which	 invites	 gallery	 visitors	 to	perform	with	a	keyboard	that	finds	samples	with	the	same	note	in	realtime	from	web	radio	stations	from	around	 the	world;	 and,	 finally,	Les	métamorphoses	de	Mr.	Kalia	 by	Cyril	Diagne	and	Béatrice	Lartigue,	 which	 is	 an	 interactive	 animation	 installation	 and	website	 that	 invites	 the	 audience	 to	participate	in	the	adventures	and	metamorphoses	and	its	main	character,	Mr.	Kalia.	
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deemed	by	the	company	inappropriate,	indecent,	sexual	or	profane.503	Above	anything	else,	however,	DevArt	constitutes	a	new	economic	model	 for	 the	development	of	art,	 in	which	supporting	 specific	 kinds	 of	 art	 projects	 leads	 to	 the	 production	 of	 specific	 kinds	 of	applications,	 which	 in	 turn	 produce	 specific	 kinds	 of	 consumer	 behaviours	 and	 data.	 In	other	words,	with	DevArt	Google	attempts	to	own	all	levels	of	artistic	creation,	by	owning	the	tools,	structures	and	outputs	of	the	artists’	work.	This	form	of	“hard	data	channelling”	–	namely,	 the	process	of	 actively	 circumscribing	 the	economic	 role	of	data	 from	 their	 very	“birth”	–	is,	perhaps,	the	most	aggressive	part	of	Google’s	data	business	strategy.504	As	we	will	see	in	the	next	section	of	this	chapter,	the	direction	and	manipulation	of	data	towards	specific	 destinations-owners	 (“soft	 data	 channelling”)	 constitutes	 the	 larger	 aspect	 of	Google’s	effort	to	build	an	online	informational	monopoly.	 		
From	Globalisation	to	Googlization:	The	Rise	of	New	Monopolies		The	 navigation	 across	 the	 interconnected	 and	 over-layered	 flows	 of	 information	 that	comprise	the	World	Wide	Web	is	one	of	the	challenges	that	we	face	every	day	as	its	users.	Particularly	 during	 the	 last	 two	 decades,	 it	 would	 seem	 that	 “the	 so-called	 information	revolution	has	flipped	into	a	flood	of	disinformation”.505	This	flood	is	the	inevitable	result	of	data	over-production	–	 a	 condition	within	which	 “the	ability	 to	 select	 information	 […]	becomes	more	and	more	important,	to	the	point	where	learning	without	selecting	becomes	virtually	 impossible”.506	In	 other	 words,	 regardless	 of	 whether	 we	 produce	 the	 online	information	flood	actively	(e.g.	by	posting	a	photo	on	a	social	media	platform),	or	passively	(e.g.	by	simply	browsing	the	Web	and	moving	from	website	to	website),	in	order	for	data	to	become	 useable,	 someone	 has	 to	 undertake	 the	 process	 of	 adding	 to	 them	 qualitative	identifiers.	The	latter	would	render	choosing	the	right	amounts	and	the	right	kinds	of	data																																																									503	Georgina	 Voss,	 ‘DevArt:	 Google’s	 Powerful	 New	 Move	 to	 Arts	 Patronage’	The	 Guardian	(28	February	 2014)	 <http://www.theguardian.com/science/political-science/2014/feb/28/devart-googles-powerful-new-move-to-arts-patronage>	accessed	30	March	2016.	504	HyunYoung	Choi	and	Hal	Varian,	 ‘Predicting	the	Present	with	Google	Trends’	(2012)	Economic	
Record	vol.	88	pp.	2-9;	and	Tobias	Preis,	Helen	Susannah	Moat	and	H	Eugene	Stanley,	‘Quantifying	Trading	Behavior	 in	Financial	Markets	Using	Google	Trends’	 (2013)	Scientific	Reports	 vol.	3	1684	<http://www.nature.com/srep/2013/130425/srep01684/full/srep01684.html>	 accessed	 30	March	2016.	505	Geert	Lovink,	 ‘The	Society	of	the	Query	and	the	Googlization	of	Our	Lives	-	A	Tribute	to	Joseph	Weizenbaum’	 [2008]	 Eurozine	 <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2008-09-05-lovink-en.html>	accessed	30	March	2016.	506 	Maria	 Ledzińska	 and	 Sławomir	 Postek,	 ‘The	 Role	 of	 Metacognition	 in	 C-Learning	Curriculum’,	Problems	of	Education	in	the	21st	Century,	vol.	23	pp.	137	–	145.	
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meaningful	to	a	user.	It	is	always	worth	remembering	that	in	reality	“the	signals	inside	the	computer	are	not	 information.	They	are	not	more	 than	signals.	There	 is	only	one	way	 to	turn	 signals	 into	 information,	 through	 interpretation”.507	As	 the	 amount	 of	 data	 and	 its	complexity	 increases,	 this	 task	 has	 to	 be	 carried	 out	 at	 the	 very	 source	 of	 information;	namely,	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	 “flat	 Web”	 –	 a	 Web	 before	 the	 application	 of	 any	 kind	 of	semiological	 hierarchy.	 Search	 engines	 are	 the	 tools	 that	 promise	 to	 carry	 out	 this	challenging	task	–	to	interpret	the	entirety	(if	possible)	of	the	data	that	comprise	the	World	Wide	Web	in	a	non-biased	manner.				 Google	is	the	search	engine	that	has	managed	more	than	any	other	to	integrate	all	those	multifaceted	objectives	not	only	into	its	operation,	but	also	into	its	public	image.	The	information	empire	that	constitutes	Google	is	not	based	simply	on	the	fact	that	more	than	two	 out	 of	 three	 searches	 that	 take	 place	 online	 happen	 through	 its	 famous	 and	 highly	secretive	algorithm;508	it	predominantly	emanates	 from	 the	 company’s	 expansion	 into	all	possible	 applications	 of	 the	 Web,	 an	 indication	 of	 which	 has	 already	 been	 given	 in	 the	examination	of	Google’s	relationship	with	 the	arts	and	cultural	 institutions.	This	complex	phenomenon	has	been	synopsised	in	the	neologism	“Googlization”,509	which	describes	the	totalising	 effect	 of	 Google	 on	 our	 personal	 information,	 habits,	 opinions,	 and	 judgments	because	of	its	dominance	in	the	fields	of	online	advertising,	software,	geographic	services,	e-mail,	 publishing,	 and	 Web	 commerce.510	Google’s	 engine	 offers	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	specialised	 search	 areas,	 which	 are	 automatically	 activated	 by	 entering	 specific	 “trigger	words”.	 Those	 special	 search	 features	 instantly	 provide	 Web	 users	 with	 any	 kind	 of	practical	 information	 that	might	be	useful	 to	 them	 in	 their	 everyday	 lives:	 from	weather	conditions	 to	 stock	 exchange	 prices;	 from	 sport	 scores	 to	 unit	 and	 currency	 conversion;	from	 dictionaries	 to	 film	 screening	 times;	 and	 from	 travel	 data	 to	 package	 tracking.	 In	addition	 those	 search	 functions,	Google	powers	numerous	 software	 applications,	 such	 as	Google	Maps.	 The	 latter	 is	 a	 characteristic	 example	 of	 how	Google	 is	 accumulating	 user-generated	data,	given	that	it	offers	much	more	than	traditional	geographic	information	like	street	 names.	 Rather,	 Google	 Maps	 is	 a	 multifaceted	 navigator	 that	 provides	 real-time																																																									507	Lovink,	loc.	cit.	508	‘comScore	 Releases	 April	 2014	 U.S.	 Search	 Engine	 Rankings’	 (Comscore.com,	 16	 May	 2014)	<http://www.comscore.com/Insights/Market-Rankings/comScore-Releases-April-2014-US-Search-Engine-Rankings>	accessed	30	March	2016.	509	The	 term	 “Googlization”	was	 first	 used	by	Alex	 Salkever	 on	 the	Businessweek	website,	 in	 late	2003.	See:	Kerric	Harvey	(ed),	Encyclopedia	of	Social	Media	and	Politics	vol.	3,	(SAGE,	London	2013)	p.	1105	510	See:	Siva	Vaidhyanathan,	The	Googlization	of	Everything:	(and	Why	We	Should	Worry)	(University	of	California	Press,	Berkeley,	CA	2011).	
			 197	
driving,	 biking	 and	 walking	 directions,	 traffic	 data,	 an	 embedded	 street-view	 mode,	recommendations	regarding	local	businesses,	details	about	cultural	sites	and	natural	parks,	or	even	emergency	information	like	nearby	vaccination	centres,	as	it	happened	during	the	2009	H1N1	pandemic.511		The	 previously	 described	 focus	 on	 collecting,	 combing	 and	 redistributing	 data	 is	further	 evidenced	 by	 Google’s	 investment	 not	 only	 in	 the	 production	 of	 convergent	applications	 like	 Google	 Maps,	 but	 also	 in	 the	 development	 of	 operating	 platforms	 into	which	such	applications	can	be	integrated.	This	objective	has	been	achieved	in	an	emphatic	way	 with	 the	 company’s	 near-absolute	 dominance	 in	 the	 field	 of	 smartphone	 operating	systems.	In	October	2013,	an	impressive	81.3%	of	all	smartphones	around	the	world	were	using	Android,	Google’s	operating	system;512	and	even	in	countries	in	which	Google’s	main	competitor,	Apple,	has	a	strong	presence	(like,	for	example,	in	USA),	Android	still	remains	the	 market	 leader.513	Notably,	 apart	 from	 smartphones	 and	 tablets,	 Google	 has	 also	developed	 specialized	 user	 interfaces	 for	 televisions	 (Android	 TV),	 cars	 (Android	 Auto),	and	 watches	 (Android	Wear).	 One	 of	 the	 most	 important	 characteristics	 that	 has	 made	Android	such	a	successful	operating	system	across	different	platforms	is	the	fact	that	it	has	adopted	a	hybrid	system	regarding	the	access	to	its	source	code:	the	Android	source	code	is	open,	however,	 if	device	manufacturers	wish	 to	use	 the	Android	 trademark,	 then,	 they	can	only	receive	the	license	by	negotiating	an	individual	contract	with	Google.514	Last	but	definitely	not	least,	Google	has	been	particularly	active	in	the	field	of	social	media,	beyond	the	 launch	 of	 its	 own	 social	 networking	 service,	 Google	 Plus,	 in	 June	 2011.515	The	most	prominent	initiative	in	Google’s	social	media	strategy	has	been	the	acquisition	of	YouTube,	
																																																								511	‘Finding	 Flu	 Vaccine	 Information	 in	 One	 Easy	 Place’	 (Googleblog.blogspot.co.uk,	 10	 November	2009)	 <https://googleblog.blogspot.co.uk/2009/11/finding-flu-vaccine-information-in-one.html>	accessed	30	March	2016.	512	‘Android	Tops	81	Percent	of	Smartphone	Market	Share	in	Q3’	(Engadget.com,	31	October	2013)	<http://www.engadget.com/2013/10/31/strategy-analytics-q3-2013-phone-share/>	 accessed	 30	March	2016.	513	In	 April	 2014,	 the	market	 share	 of	 Android	 in	 USA	was	 52.5%.	 See:	 ‘ComScore	 Reports	 April	2014	 U.S.	 Smartphone	 Subscriber	 Market	 Share’	 (Comscore.com,	 3	 June	 2014)	<http://www.comscore.com/Insights/Press-Releases/2014/6/comScore-Reports-April-2014-US-Smartphone-Subscriber-Market-Share>	accessed	30	March	2016.	514 	‘Frequently	 Asked	 Questions’	 (Source.android.com)	<https://source.android.com/source/faqs.html>	accessed	30	March	2016.		515	After	 just	 two	years	 in	operation,	Google	Plus	had	already	passed	 the	500	million	active	users	benchmark.	 The	 service’s	 website:	 ‘Google+’	 (Plus.google.com)	 <https://plus.google.com/>	accessed	30	March	2016.		
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in	 November	 2006,	 for	 1.65	 billion	 US	 dollars.516	With	more	 than	 1	 billion	 unique	 users	each	month,	over	6	billion	hours	of	video	being	watched	in	the	same	period,	and	more	than	100	hours	of	video	uploaded	every	minute,	YouTube	dominates	a	huge	market	not	only	in	terms	 of	 its	 economic	 value,	 but	 also	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 ideological,	 political	 and	 cultural	influence.517	Finally,	 it	 is	 worth	 mentioning	 another	 important	 subsidiary	 of	 Google,	 the	blog-publishing	service	Blogger,518	which	is	currently	ranked	as	the	18th	most	popular	site	on	the	World	Wide	Web.519	The	pervasiveness	of	 this	 impressive	expansion	has	been	vividly	 reflected	even	 in	the	impact	that	Google	has	had	on	the	English	language:	in	June	2006	the	verb	“google”	was	added	 to	 the	 Oxford	 English	 Dictionary,	 and	 in	 July	 2006,	 the	 same	 happened	 with	 the	eleventh	edition	of	 the	Merriam-Webster	Collegiate	Dictionary.	Quite	 remarkably,	during	the	 years	 that	 have	 followed	 those	 first	 additions,	 the	 new	 verb	 rapidly	 increased	 its	popularity,	 ending	up	 to	 signify	 any	online	 search,	 regardless	 of	whether	 the	 searcher	 is	actually	 using	 Google’s	 engine	 or	 not.	 The	 expression	 “Just	 google	 it!”	 has	 become	synonymous	with	the	encouragement	to	use	the	Internet	in	order	to	find	out	something;	or,	more	 precisely,	 it	 has	 become	 an	 invitation	 to	 discover,	 clarify	 or	 confirm	 absolutely	anything	 by	 simply	 typing	 a	 word	 in	 a	 Web	 browser,	 or	 by	 asking	 a	 question	 to	 a	smartphone’s	“intelligent	personal	assistant”	application.	Yet,	the	truly	illuminating	term	in	the	aforementioned	popular	phrase	 is	not	 the	verb	“google”,	but	rather	the	adverb	“just”.	The	particular	 frame	of	mind	 that	 it	 alludes	 to,	 suggests	 that	when	 it	 comes	 to	using	 the	Internet	 in	 order	 to	 find	 and	 interpret	 information	 (typically	 through	 Google’s	 search	engine),	things	are	simple,	quick	and	clear.		There	are	several	 facts,	however,	 that	would	not	 justify	 such	a	 level	of	 confidence	and	 trust	 in	 Google’s	monopoly.	 Rather,	 the	 company’s	 pursuit	 of	 profit	 is	 guided	 by	 an	ideological	 disposition	 of	 absolute	 control,	 which	 is	 much	more	 concealed	 and	 complex	than	 what	 the	 company’s	 mission	 statement	 suggests.	 The	 ten-paragraph	 text,	 which	explains	Google’s	philosophy,	values	and	goals,	 is	 titled	“Ten	things	we	know	to	be	 true”.	According	 to	 its	 second	 paragraph,	 “It’s	 best	 to	 do	 one	 thing	 really,	 really	 well.	 We	 do	
																																																								516	The	 Associated	 Press,	 ‘Google	 Buys	 YouTube	 for	 $1.65	 Billion’	NBC	News	(10	 October	 2006)	<http://www.nbcnews.com/id/15196982/ns/business-us_business/t/google-buys-youtube-billion/#.UbECrBG9KSM>	accessed	30	March	2016.	517	‘Statistics’	(Youtube.com)	<https://www.youtube.com/yt/press/en-GB/statistics.html>	accessed	30	March	2016.		518	The	service	is	hosted	at	the	subdomain	blogspot.com.	519	‘The	 Top	 500	 Sites	 on	 the	 Web‘	 (Alexa.com)	 <http://www.alexa.com/topsites>	 accessed	 30	March	2016.	
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search”.520	Quite	 obviously,	 Google’s	 diverse	 activities	 refute	 this	 statement.	 Rather,	Google’s	 search	 service	has	become	over	 the	years	 a	 growing	veil	 behind	which	a	whole	informational	 empire	 can	be	 found.	 Interestingly,	 in	aesthetic	 terms,	we	could	 claim	 that	Google’s	 obscurity	 begins	 with	 the	 very	 design	 of	 its	 home	 page,	 whose	 practically	exclusive	features	are	the	Google	logo	and	a	simple	search	box	–	namely,	a	truly	minimalist	approach.	Yet,	in	response	to	the	question	“Is	Google	simple?”,	Don	Norman,	the	director	of	The	Design	Lab	of	the	University	of	California,	argues:			 No.	Google	 is	 deceptive.	 It	 hides	 all	 the	 complexity	 by	 simply	 showing	one	 search	box	on	the	main	page.	The	main	difference	 is	 that	 if	you	want	to	do	anything	else,	the	other	search	engines	let	you	do	it	from	their	home	pages,	whereas	Google	makes	you	search	through	other,	much	more	complex	pages.	Why	aren't	many	of	these	just	linked	together?	Why	isn't	Google	a	unified	application?	Why	are	there	so	many	odd,	apparently	freestanding	services?521			In	financial	terms,	the	initial	answer	to	Norman’s	question	is	rather	simple:	diversification.	By	diversifying	its	portfolio	of	products	and	services,	Google	is	capable	of	reducing	the	non-systematic	 risk	 of	 individual	 activities-assets.	 The	wide	 variety	 of	 the	 assets	 that	 Google	possesses	entails	 that	 the	company	can	afford	 to	expand	 in	 fields	 that	might	pose	higher	risks,	or	might	not	be	able	to	offer	immediate	returns.	If	one	sector	fails,	it	is	very	unlikely	that	 the	 company	 as	 a	 whole	 will	 face	 any	 serious	 problem,	 given	 that	 it	 is	 practically	impossible	that	all	different	sectors	will	fail	simultaneously.	The	more	Google	expands,	the	smaller	its	overall	risk	becomes,	and	the	higher	its	revenue	from	its	main	source	of	income,	which	 is	 advertising.522	Therefore,	 the	 real	 question	 that	 should	 be	 posed	 is	why	Google	wants	 to	 conceal	 the	 connections	within	 its	 portfolio.	 In	 this	 case,	 we	 could	 replace	 the	adverb	“apparently”	in	Don	Norman’s	last	question	with	the	adverb	“seemingly”,	and	ask:	“Why	are	there	so	many	odd,	seemingly	freestanding	services?”		The	answer	can	be	found	in	the	very	way	in	which	revenue	is	produced	for	Google	through	online	advertising.		Over	the	years,	Google	has	developed	a	variety	of	tools	in	order																																																									520 	‘Ten	 Things	 We	 Know	 to	 Be	 True’	 (Google.com)	<http://www.google.com/about/company/philosophy/>	accessed	30	March	2016.	521 	Don	 Norman,	 ‘The	 Truth	 about	 Google’s	 so-Called	 “Simplicity”’	 (Jnd.org)	<http://www.jnd.org/dn.mss/the_truth_about_goog.html>	accessed	30	March	2016.	522	Tim	 Peterson,	 ‘Google	 Finally	 Crosses	 $50	 Billion	 Annual	 Revenue	 Mark’	Adweek	(22	 January	2013)	 <http://www.adweek.com/news/technology/google-finally-crosses-50-billion-annual-revenue-mark-146710>	accessed	30	March	2016.	
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to	be	able	to	identify	consumer	behaviour,	associate	it	directly	with	specific	websites	and	specific	pages,	and	–	finally	–	sell	its	services	and	know-how	to	companies.	By	using	Google	AdWords,	advertisers	can	buy	space	amongst	results	of	Google	searches	that	are	relevant	to	 the	 product	 of	 field	 of	 the	 advertised	 company.523	And,	 through	 Google	 AdSense,	companies	 can	 earn	 money	 by	 displaying	 targeted	 ads	 created	 by	 Google	 in	 their	 own	websites.524	Quite	 evidently,	 however,	 and	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 those	 two	 tools	 provide	Google	with	revenue,	they	do	not	generate	the	amount	of	data	needed	in	order	to	be	able	to	recognise	 patterns	 of	 online	 behaviour	 and,	 thus,	 be	 able	 to	 lead	 the	 market	 of	 online	advertising.	 Without	 much	 larger	 and	 diverse	 amounts	 of	 data	 it	 would	 have	 been	impossible	for	services	like	Google’s	Display	Network	to	position	or	direct	the	right	kind	of	ads	to	the	right	kind	of	online	spaces.525	In	this	context,	the	most	important	move	in	terms	of	consolidating	Google’s	advertising	strategy	came	in	2007,	when	the	company	bought	the	Web	 advertising	 network	 DoubleClick	 for	 $3.1	 billion,526	thus	 producing	 “the	 most	sophisticated	and	far-flung	Internet	advertising	infrastructure	in	existence”.527	DoubleClick	is	capable	of	producing	user	profiles	on	the	basis	on	their	online	interactions,	with	its	most	impressive	 characteristic	being	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 service	 is	 operating	 in	 real	 time:	buyers	participate	in	a	continuous	bidding	system	that	enables	them	to	leverage	their	proprietary	data	 and	 algorithms,	 in	 order	 to	 increase	 efficiency	 and	 effectiveness	 when	 targeting	 a	particular	 market.	 DoubleClick	 has	 been	 combined	 with	 Google	 Analytics,528	Google’s	powerful	home-grown	 tool	 for	 tracking	and	reporting	website	 traffic,	which	accounts	 for	more	 than	 80%	 of	 the	 traffic	 analysis’	 market.529	As	 interrelated	 parts	 of	 Google’s	advertising	 platform,	 all	 those	 tools	 are	 capable	 of	 fully	 monitoring	 users’	 actions	 by	tracking	IP	addresses,	cookies,	web	beacons,	clicks,	mouse	hovers,	webpages’	content	and	sever	requests,	amongst	other	elements.	All	those	methodologies	bring	Google	a	step	closer	
																																																								523	‘AdWords’	(Google.co.uk)	<http://www.google.co.uk/adwords/>	accessed	30	March	2016.	524	‘AdSense’	(Google.com)	<http://www.google.com/adsense/start/>	accessed	30	March	2016.		525 	‘Google	 Display	 Network’	 (Google.com)	 <http://www.google.com/ads/displaynetwork/>	accessed	30	March	2016.	526	‘DoubleClick	 by	 Google’	 (Google.com)	 <https://www.google.com/doubleclick/>	 accessed	 30	March	2016.		527	Schiller	and	Yeo,	op.	cit.,	p.	46.	528 	‘Google	 Analytics’	 (Google.com)	 <http://www.google.com/analytics/ce/nrs/>	 accessed	 30	March	2016.		529	82.2%	as	of	11th	June	2015.	See:	‘Usage	Statistics	and	Market	Share	of	Traffic	Analysis	Tools	for	Websites,	 March	 2016’	 (W3techs.com)	<http://w3techs.com/technologies/overview/traffic_analysis/all>	accessed	30	March	2016.	
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to	what	Google’s	chief	economist	Hal	Varian	calls	“nowcasting”	–	predicting	trends	in	real	time.530	Google’s	 orientation	 towards	 strengthening	 its	 tracking	 methods	 has	 been	consistent,	with	a	view	to	continuously	multiplying	the	amount	of	data	that	the	company	is	capable	 of	 extracting.531	Notably,	 this	 pool	 of	 data	 even	 includes	 groups	 such	 as	 children	under	 13	 years	 old,	 as	 it	 was	 unveiled	 in	 December	 2013.	 More	 specifically,	 Google	announced	that	it	 intended	to	create	child-friendly	versions	of	some	its	applications,	thus	targeting	 “an	 age	 group	 hitherto	 considered	 off-limits	 for	 marketing	 purposes	 and	 data	collection”.532	As	Pavni	Diwanji,	Google’s	vice	president	of	engineering,	noted:	“We	expect	this	to	be	controversial,	but	the	simple	truth	is	kids	already	have	the	technology	in	schools	and	at	home.	So	the	better	approach	is	simply	to	see	to	it	that	the	tech	is	used	in	a	better	way”.533	Yet,	this	monopoly	of	access	to	users’	data	has	raised	a	variety	of	concerns	that	go	well	beyond	the	economic	aspect	of	Google’s	power.	In	January	2014,	almost	a	year	before	Google’s	decision	to	target	children,	France’s	data	protection	watchdog	CNIL	(Commission	Nationale	de	l'Informatique	et	des	Libertés),	fined	Google	with	150,000	€,	as	the	company	ignored	a	three-month	ultimatum	to	start	operating	in	line	with	the	country’s	privacy	laws.	In	its	public	statement,	the	independent	body	identified	that		The	company	does	not	sufficiently	inform	its	users	of	the	conditions	in	which	their	personal	 data	 are	 processed,	 nor	 of	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 processing.	 They	 may	therefore	neither	understand	the	purposes	for	which	their	data	are	collected,	which	are	not	specific	as	the	law	requires,	nor	the	ambit	of	the	data	collected	through	the	different	services	concerned.	Consequently,	they	are	not	able	to	exercise	their	rights,	in	 particular	 their	 right	 of	 access,	 objection	 or	 deletion.	 The	 company	 does	 not	comply	with	its	obligation	to	obtain	user	consent	prior	to	the	storage	of	cookies	on	their	 terminals.	 It	 fails	 to	 define	 retention	 periods	 applicable	 to	 the	 data	which	 it																																																									530	Steven	 L	 Scott	 and	Hal	 R	 Varian,	 ‘Bayesian	 Variable	 Selection	 for	 Nowcasting	 Economic	 Time	Series’	 (People.ischool.berkeley.edu,	 2014)	<http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~hal/Papers/2012/fat.pdf>	accessed	30	March	2016.	531	In	another	prominent	move	of	 expansion,	Google	bought	 in	2011	 the	advertising	optimization	platform	 AdMeld,	 for	 $400	 million.	 See:	 Michael	 Arrington,	 ‘Google	 Acquires	 AdMeld	 for	 $400	Million’	TechCrunch	(9	 June	2011)	<http://techcrunch.com/2011/06/09/google-acquires-admeld-for-400-million/>	accessed	30	March	2016.	532	Cahal	 Milmo,	 ‘Fears	 for	 Children	 as	 Google	 Targets	 under-13s’	The	 Independent	(5	 December	2014)	 <http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/fears-for-children-as-google-targets-under13s-9907313.html>	accessed	30	March	2016.	533	Victor	 Luckerson,	 ‘Google	Wants	 to	 Launch	 Kid-Friendly	 Services	 for	 Users	 under	 13’	Time	(3	December	2014)	<http://time.com/3617009/google-products-for-kids/>	accessed	30	March	2016.	
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processes.	Finally,	it	permits	itself	to	combine	all	the	data	it	collects	about	its	users	across	all	of	its	services	without	any	legal	basis.534			The	case	against	Google	was	triggered	by	the	company’s	decision	in	March	2012	to	merge	60	distinct	privacy	policies	into	one,	a	fact	that	has	allowed	it	to	easily	collect	and	combine	data	 originating	 from	 all	 of	 its	 platforms,	 including	 Gmail,	 YouTube,	 Google	 Plus,	 Picasa,	Google	Maps,	Google	Drive,	Google	Docs,	Google	Maps	and	–	last,	but	not	least	–	the	Google	Search	 Engine.	 Notably,	 Google	 offered	 to	 users	 no	means	 of	 opting	 out	 from	 individual	services	or	platforms.535					 However,	 the	 most	 worrying	 fact	 regarding	 the	 way	 in	 which	 Google	 takes	advantage	of	its	monopolist	position	is	the	manipulation	of	the	search	results	produced	by	its	Engine.	In	April	2015,	after	a	five-year	investigation,	the	European	Commission	sent	to	Google	 a	 Statement	 of	 Objections	 with	 the	 allegation	 that	 “the	 company	 has	 abused	 its	dominant	 position	 in	 the	 markets	 for	 general	 internet	 search	 services	 in	 the	 European	Economic	Area	(EEA)	by	systematically	favouring	its	own	comparison	shopping	product	in	its	general	search	results	pages”.536	This	has	been	a	particularly	useful	strategy	for	Google,	especially	as	regards	markets	in	which	its	products	face	strong	competition	from	a	number	of	 alternative	 providers.	 As	 specified	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 Statement,	 Google	 Product	Search	and	Google	Shopping	seem	to	be	systematically	favoured	by	Google’s	Search	Engine,	thus	resulting	in	having	a	negative	impact	on	consumers’	choices	and	innovation.537	At	the	same	 time,	 the	 Commission	 announced	 that	 it	was	 opening	 another	 formal	 investigation	against	 Google	 in	 relation	 to	 its	 Android	 mobile	 operating	 system,	 which	 is	 supposedly	open-source.	However,	in	practice,	most	mobile	and	tablet	manufacturers	use	Android	“in	combination	with	a	range	of	Google's	proprietary	applications	and	services”,538	because	of																																																									534	‘The	CNIL's	Sanctions	Committee	issues	a	150	000	€	monetary	penalty	to	GOOGLE	Inc.’	(Cnil.fr,	8	January	 2014)	 <http://www.cnil.fr/english/news-and-events/news/article/the-cnils-sanctions-committee-issues-a-150-000-EUR-monetary-penalty-to-google-inc/>	accessed	3	April	2014	535 	‘UPDATE	 1-France	 Fines	 Google	 over	 Data	 Privacy’	Reuters	(8	 January	 2014)	<http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/08/france-google-fine-idUSL6N0KI3A320140108>	accessed	30	March	2016.	536	‘Antitrust:	 Commission	 Sends	 Statement	 of	 Objections	 to	 Google	 on	 Comparison	 Shopping	Service;	 Opens	 Separate	 Formal	 Investigation	 on	 Android’	 (Europa.eu,	 15	 April	 2015)	<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4780_en.htm>	accessed	30	March	2016.	537	‘Fact	 Sheet	 -	 Antitrust:	 Commission	 Sends	 Statement	 of	 Objections	 to	 Google	 on	 Comparison	Shopping	 Service’	 (Europa.eu,	 15	 April	 2015)	 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-4781_en.htm>	accessed	30	March	2016.	538	‘Antitrust:	Commission	Opens	Formal	Investigation	against	Google	in	Relation	to	Android	Mobile	Operating	 System’	 (Europa.eu,	 15	 April	 2015)	 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-4782_en.htm>	accessed	30	March	2016.	
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the	contracts	that	they	have	to	sign	with	Google	in	order	to	have	full	access	to	its	services.	Given	 that	 most	 people	 switch	 from	 Web	 browsers	 to	 apps	 when	 using	 their	 mobile	phones,539	the	manipulation	of	the	search	results	has	a	domino	effect	on	the	apps	that	are	linked	up	with	Google.	Google	may	emphasize	that	the	algorithm	that	conducts	its	searches	is	“unbiased,	anchored	in	scientific	computational	methods,	and	uniformly	aimed	at	helping	its	 users.	 A	 bright	 line	 is	 said	 to	 separate	 its	 “organic”	 or	 “natural”	 search	 results	 from	advertiser-purchased	 links.	 All	 this	 is	 difficult	 to	 corroborate,	 however,	 because	 the	algorithm	 is	 a	 closely	 guarded	 secret”.540	Inevitably,	 then,	 it	 becomes	 rather	 difficult	 to	distinguish	 where	 Google’s	 “information	 empire”	 ends	 and	 where	 its	 “disinformation	empire”	begins.	As	a	result,	given	that	the	vast	majority	of	artists	and	audiences	alike	are	using	 –	 directly,	 or	 indirectly	 –	Google’s	 services,	 plausible	 questions	may	 arise:	 to	what	extent	 do	 political	 Web-based	 artworks	 have	 the	 power	 of	 overcoming	 the	 dangers	 of	“disinformation”	 in	order	 to	promote	effectively	 their	own	“information”?	And,	 is	 there	a	way	 to	 avoid	 contributing	 to	 what	 is	 –	 possibly	 –	 the	 most	 impressive	 rise	 of	 a	 global	corporate	monopoly	in	human	history?			
Institutional	Control,	Legal	Constraints	and	the	Limits	of	Online	Freedom		In	spite	of	its	highly	influential	role,	Google	is	only	one	of	the	agents	whose	activities	relate	to	an	 issue	of	pivotal	 importance	 for	the	character	of	 the	Internet	as	a	public	sphere:	net	neutrality.	The	 concept	of	net	neutrality	was	 introduced	 in	2003	by	Columbia	University	media	 law	 Professor	 Tim	 Wu,	 who	 suggested	 that	 there	 should	 be	 no	 quantitative	 or	qualitative	bias	in	the	way	that	Internet	providers	and	governments	treat	data.541	In	other	words,	 Internet	providers	 should	allow	 the	 same	online	access	 to	all	users,	 regardless	of	where	they	live,	what	income	they	have,	what	social	group	they	might	belong	to,	and	what	kind	of	hardware	or	software	they	might	be	using.	Most	importantly,	perhaps,	the	principle	entails	that	Internet	providers	may	not	favour	or	block	particular	products	or	websites	in	order	to	serve	their	own	interests,	or	the	interests	of	third	parties	to	which	they	might	be	related.	For	 instance,	an	 Internet	provider	might	violate	net	neutrality	by	associating	 the	speed	with	which	a	user	can	access	a	webpage,	with	the	amount	that	the	page	has	paid	to																																																									539	Alastair	Macdonald	and	Julia	Fioretti,	‘EU	Accuses	Google	of	Hurting	Consumers,	Competitors	in	Web	 Search	 Case’	Reuters	(15	 April	 2015)	 <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/16/us-google-eu-idUSKBN0N610E20150416>	accessed	30	March	2016.	540	Schiller	and	Yeo,	op.	cit.,	p.	46.	541	Tim	Wu,	 ‘Network	 Neutrality,	 Broadband	 Discrimination’	 (2003)	 Journal	on	Telecom	and	High	
Tech	Law	vol.	2	pp.	141-175.	
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the	provider	in	order	to	be	granted	a	higher	uploading	or	downloading	speed;	or,	the	same	function	 might	 depend	 on	 the	 amount	 that	 the	 user	 himself	 has	 paid	 for	 his	 Internet	service,	 in	 which	 case	 the	 quality	 of	 Internet	 access	 acquires	 explicit	 class-based	characteristics.	 The	 association	 of	 online	 corporations,	 including	 social	media	 platforms,	with	 the	dangers	posed	 against	 net	neutrality	 becomes	more	 evident	when	we	 take	 into	account	the	fact	that	the	activities	of	such	corporations	have	been	increasingly	expanding	beyond	their	role	as	providers	of	particular	online	services.		This	 condition	 was	 exemplified	 with	 the	 launch	 of	 Internet.org,	 a	 highly	controversial	 initiative	that	was	announced	in	2013	by	the	CEO	and	founder	of	Facebook	Mark	 Zuckerberg.	 Internet.org	 constitutes	 a	 partnership	 of	 various	 technology	corporations	led	by	Facebook542	“with	the	goal	of	bringing	Internet	access	and	the	benefits	of	 connectivity	 to	 the	 two-thirds	 of	 the	 world	 that	 doesn‘t	 have	 them”.543	Three	 major	projects	 are	 being	 fostered	 under	 the	 umbrella	 of	 Internet.org:	 Firstly,	 “Free	 Basics	 by	Facebook”,	 which	 provides	 smartphone	 access	 to	 what	 Facebook	 considers	 to	 be	 the	Internet’s	 “basic	 websites”,	 in	 partnership	 with	 specific	 mobile	 phone	 operators,	 which	have	agreed	that	no	data	charges	will	incur	for	accessing	those	particular	websites	(“zero-rating”).	 Secondly,	 “Connectivity	 Lab”	 focuses	 on	 developing	 technologies	 that	 would	ultimately	provide	Internet	access	to	all	communities	around	the	world,	regardless	of	their	geographical	 location,	 by	 using	 devices	 such	 as	 high-altitude	 long-endurance	 planes	(drones),	satellites	and	 lasers,	which	are	developed	by	Facebook.544	And,	 finally,	 “Express	Wi-Fi	 by	 Facebook”	 aims	 to	 offer	 widespread	 Wi-Fi	 connectivity	 in	 partnership	 with	carriers,	ISPs	and	local	entrepreneurs,	through	the	use	of	software	designed	and	provided	by	Facebook.	This	set	of	initiatives	caused	important	reactions	by	Internet	activists	over	its	breaches	of	net	neutrality	principles.545	Accordingly,	those	reactions	led	to	the	decision	of	several	 technology	 companies	 to	 pull	 out	 of	 Internet.org’s	 “Free	 Basics”	 programme	 in	India	in	April	2015,546	 as	well	as	to	a	ruling	of	the	Telecom	Regulatory	Authority	of	India																																																										542	The	initiative	also	involves	Samsung,	Ericsson,	MediaTek,	Opera	Software,	Nokia	and	Qualcomm.	543	‘Our	 Mission’	 (Info.internet.org)	 <https://info.internet.org/en/mission/>	 accessed	 30	 March	2016.		544	Aviva	 Rutkin,	 ‘Facebook	 Unveils	 Drone	 for	 Beaming	 Internet	 Access	 from	 the	 Sky’	New	
Scientist	(5	 August	 2015)	 <https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn28003-facebook-unveils-drone-for-beaming-internet-access-from-the-sky/>	accessed	30	March	2016.	545	See:	 ‘Mark	Zuckerberg	Wants	 to	Control	What	3	Billion	People	Do	Online’	 (Nofakeinternet.org)	<https://nofakeinternet.org/>	accessed	30	March	2016.	546	Matt	Weinberger,	 ‘Indian	Tech	Companies	Are	Pulling	out	of	Facebook’s	Internet.org	Campaign	over	 Net	 Neutrality	 Violations’	Business	 Insider	(16	 April	 2015)	<http://uk.businessinsider.com/indian-tech-companies-are-pulling-out-of-facebooks-internetorg-campaign-over-net-neutrality-violations-2015-4?r=US&IR=T>	accessed	30	March	2016.	
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	Figure	64:	Internet.org		(TRAI)	against	differential	pricing	of	data	services	and	content.	As	a	 result,	 “Free	Basics”	became	inactive	in	India	in	February	2016.547	The	concerns	on	which	those	decisions	were	based	were	caused	by	the	fact	that	Facebook	would	act,	in	effect,	as	a	“gatekeeper”	of	what	kind	 of	 Internet	 access	millions,	 or	 –	 potentially	 –	 billions	 of	 people	would	 have.548	This	privileged	role	of	Facebook	would	occur	on	top	of	the	company’s	capacity	to	determine	the	overall	 Web-based	 services	 that	 would	 be	 provided	 –	 for	 instance,	 Facebook-owned	Whatsapp	 can	 be	 perceived	 as	 the	 “basic”	 instant	messaging	 application	 included	 in	 the	package.549	Furthermore,	Facebook	even	added	important	technological	characteristics	as																																																									547	‘TRAI	Order	Effect:	Facebook	Free	Basics	Shuts	down	for	India’	The	Indian	Express	(11	February	2016)	<http://indianexpress.com/article/technology/tech-news-technology/facebook-free-basics-india-shut-down/>	accessed	30	March	2016.	548	As	 of	 March	 2016,	 “Free	 Basics”	 had	 been	 available	 in	 the	 following	 countries	 (the	 mobile	operators	 are	 included	 in	 the	parentheses):	Angola	 (Movicel),	Benin	 (MTN),	 Cape	Verde	 (Unitel),	Democratic	Republic	of	 the	Congo	 (Airtel,	Tigo),	Gabon	(Airtel),	Ghana	 (Airtel),	Guinea	 (Cellcom),	Guinea-Bissau	 (MTN),	 Kenya	 (Airtel),	 Liberia	 (Cellcom),	 Malawi	 (Airtel	 &	 TNM),	 Mauritania	(Mauritel),	Mozambique	(Mcel),	Niger	(Airtel),	Rwanda	(Airtel),	Senegal	(Tigo),	Seychelles	(Airtel),	South	 Africa	 (Cell	 C),	 Tanzania	 (Tigo),	 Zambia	 (Airtel),	 Bangladesh	 (Grameenphone	 &	 Robi),	Cambodia	 (Smart	 Axiata),	 Indonesia	 (Indosat),	 Iraq	 (Korek),	 Maldives	 (Ooredoo),	 Mongolia	 (G-Mobile,	 Mobicom	 &	 Skytel),	 Pakistan	 (Telenor	 &	 Zong),	 Philippines	 (Globe	 &	 Smart),	 Thailand	(DTAC	&	TrueMove),	Timor-Leste	(Telkomcel),	Vanuatu	(Telecom),	Bolivia	(Viva),	Colombia	(Tigo),	Guatemala	 (Tigo),	 Mexico	 (Virgin),	 Panama	 (Digicel),	 and	 Peru	 (Entel).	 See:	 ‘Where	 We’ve	Launched’	 (Info.internet.org)	 <https://info.internet.org/en/story/where-weve-launched/>	accessed	30	March	2016.	549	Ingrid	Lunden,	‘WhatsApp	Is	Actually	Worth	More	than	$19B,	Says	Facebook’s	Zuckerberg,	and	It	 Was	 Internet.org	 That	 Sealed	 the	 Deal’	 TechCrunch	(24	 February	 2014)	<http://techcrunch.com/2014/02/24/whatsapp-is-actually-worth-more-than-19b-says-facebooks-zuckerberg/>	accessed	30	March	2016.	
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prerequisites	 for	 future	 participation	 of	 websites	 in	 its	 “Free	 Basics”,	 through	 which	 it	excluded	websites	that	would	employ	JavaScript,	video,	large	images	and	Flash.550	Notably,	on	the	basis	of	those	technical	criteria,	none	of	the	artworks	and	artist-led	projects	that	we	examined	in	the	previous	chapter	would	ever	become	accessible	to	the	users	of	Facebook’s	“Free	Basics”.		Unsurprisingly,	perhaps,	Google	has	been	also	active	 in	 the	 field	of	controlling	 the	Internet	 both	 as	 a	 service	 and	 as	 an	 infrastructure.	 More	 specifically,	 in	 June	 2013	 the	company	announced	 the	 launch	of	Project	Loon,	 a	 research	and	development	programme	that	aims	to	provide	Internet	to	remote	areas	around	the	world	through	the	use	of	special	balloons	 flying	 in	 the	 stratosphere.551	As	 it	 is	 stated	 in	 the	 project’s	 website	 –	 and	identically	to	Internet.org’s	proclamation	–	“two-thirds	of	the	world’s	population	does	not	yet	have	Internet	access”	and	this	 is	a	gap	that	Project	Loon’s	balloons	aspire	to	fill.	Quite	evidently,	 such	 a	move	would	 radically	 increase	 the	 potential	market	 for	 Google,	 whilst	securing	its	monopolist	status	in	several	Web-related	products	and	services.	Furthermore,	in	April	2014	Google	acquired	Titan	Aerospace,	 a	drone	manufacturer	 specialising	 in	 the	production	of	high-altitude	solar-powered	drones,	which	are	capable	of	flying	for	years	at	a	time	without	any	need	to	refuel	or	land.	And,	finally,	in	June	2014	Google	paid	500	million	US	dollars	 in	order	 to	buy	Skybox	 Imaging,	a	company	 that	builds	 tiny	satellites	 that	can	shoot	 high-definition	 photographs	 and	 videos	 of	 the	 Earth,	whilst	 recording	 a	 variety	 of	other	 geographical	 analytics.	 However,	 Google	 has	 not	 been	 looking	merely	 towards	 the	skies	 in	 order	 to	 expand	 its	 infrastructure	 network.	 Utility	 poles	 have	 been	 used	 since	March	 2013	 in	 Kansas	 City	 in	 order	 to	 connect	 households	 with	 Google	 Fiber,	 Google’s	ultra-high-speed	broadband	network.552	Kansas	City	was	selected	as	the	first	Google	Fiber	city	in	the	US	out	of	1,100	municipalities	that	applied	for	the	privilege	to	get	Internet	access	more	 than	 100	 times	 faster	 than	 what	 most	 Americans	 currently	 enjoy.553	Google	confirmed	in	February	2014	that	another	34	American	cities	would	potentially	get	Google	
																																																								550 	‘Technical	 Guidelines	 -	 Free	 Basics	 -	 Documentation’	 (Developers.facebook.com)	<https://developers.facebook.com/docs/internet-org/platform-technical-guidelines>	 accessed	 30	March	2016.	551	The	project’s	website:	‘Project	Loon’	(Google.com)	<http://www.google.com/loon/>	accessed	30	March	2016.	552	Google’s	 announcement	 on	 its	 blog:	 ‘Ultra	 High-Speed	 Broadband	 Is	 Coming	 to	 Kansas	 City,	Kansas’	 (Googleblog.blogspot.co.uk,	 30	 March	 2011)	<http://googleblog.blogspot.co.uk/2011/03/ultra-high-speed-broadband-is-coming-to.html>	accessed	30	March	2016.	553	The	 project’s	 website:	 ‘Google	 Fiber’	 (Fiber.google.com)	 <https://fiber.google.com/about/>	accessed	30	March	2016.		
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Fiber	in	the	near	future,	including	Atlanta,	Nashville,	Phoenix,	Portland,	Salt	Lake	City,	San	Antonio	and	San	Jose.554	Of	 course,	 all	 those	developments,	which	 threaten	 the	principles	of	net	neutrality,	could	not	have	occurred	without	the	involvement	of	other	agents:	more	specifically,	the	de	facto	 privatisation	 of	 the	 Internet	 could	 not	 have	 opened	 as	 a	 possibility	 without	 the	consent	 of	 states.	 The	 latter	 are	 in	 the	 unique	 position	 to	 allow	 (or	 prevent)	 the	monopolisation	of	the	Internet	either	in	the	form	of	specific	online	markets,	or	thoroughly,	in	 the	 form	of	 geographical	 access	 across	 the	 areas	 that	 they	 control.	 However,	 this	 is	 a	twofold	 process:	 the	 state	might	 permit	 Internet	 corporations	 to	 expand	 their	 economic	activities,	 or	 –	 even	 –	monopolies,	 yet,	 it	 also	 aims	 at	 ensuring	 the	 continuation	 and	 the	legitimisation	of	its	own	role.	That	is	why	alongside	the	freedoms	that	the	state	provides	to	online	corporations,	it	also	assigns	to	them	the	responsibility	of	serving	some	of	the	“social	values”	 that	 it	 is	 supposedly	 protecting.	 In	 recent	 years,	 this	 process	 of	 negotiation	 has	been	particularly	 salient	 in	 the	 case	 of	 counterterrorism	and	 the	 fight	 against	 the	 online	propaganda	of	the	“Islamic	State”	(ISIL).	In	one	of	the	most	high-profile	initiatives	related	to	 this	 fight,	 the	 White	 House	 called	 in	 January	 2016	 a	 summit	 with	 Silicon	 Valley	executives	in	order	to	discuss	the	participation	of	all	major	technology	firms	in	the	efforts	to	combat	terrorist	propaganda	online.555	This	meeting	was	the	culmination	of	a	series	of	other	initiatives	focusing	on	the	same	issue,	including	the	United	Nations	Leaders’	Summit	on	 Countering	 Violent	 Extremism,	 which	 took	 place	 in	 September	 2015.556	In	 all	 those	forums,	 the	constant	demand	expressed	by	states	has	been	that	 Internet	providers	act	as	censors	on	the	basis	of	 the	policies	 followed	by	the	states.	However,	given	that	“terrorist																																																									554 	Google’s	 announcement	 on	 its	 blog:	 ‘Exploring	 New	 Cities	 for	 Google	 Fiber’	(Googleblog.blogspot.co.uk,	 19	 February	 2014)	<http://googleblog.blogspot.co.uk/2014/02/exploring-new-cities-for-google-fiber.html>	 accessed	30	March	2016.	555	The	 four	 main	 discussion	 areas	 of	 the	 meeting	 were:	 “a.	 How	 can	 we	 make	 it	 harder	 for	terrorists	 to	 leveraging	 the	 internet	 to	 recruit,	 radicalize,	 and	mobilize	 followers	 to	 violence?	 b.	How	 can	we	 help	 others	 to	 create,	 publish,	 and	 amplify	 alternative	 content	 that	would	 undercut	ISIL?	 c.	 In	what	ways	 can	we	 use	 technology	 to	 help	 disrupt	 paths	 to	 radicalization	 to	 violence,	identify	 recruitment	 patterns,	 and	 provide	 metrics	 to	 help	 measure	 our	 efforts	 to	 counter	radicalization	 to	 violence?	 d.	 How	 can	 we	 make	 it	 harder	 for	 terrorists	 to	 use	 the	 internet	 to	mobilize,	 facilitate,	 and	 operationalize	 attacks,	 and	 make	 it	 easier	 for	 law	 enforcement	 and	 the	intelligence	 community	 to	 identify	 terrorist	 operatives	 and	prevent	 attacks?”	 See:	Danny	Yadron,	‘Agenda	 for	 White	 House	 Summit	 with	 Silicon	 Valley’	The	 Guardian	(8	 January	 2016)	<http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jan/07/white-house-summit-silicon-valley-tech-summit-agenda-terrorism>	accessed	30	March	2016.	556	‘Growing	Threat	 of	 Violent	 Extremism	Demands	Unified	Response,	UN	Chief	 Tells	 Summit’	UN	
News	(29	 September	 2015)	<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=52041#.Vu8KOceDAla>	 accessed	 30	 March	2016.	
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activity”	is	a	notion	that	may	cover	a	very	diverse	set	of	conducts	and	materials	in	different	countries	(and	under	different	circumstances),	what	states	have	been	doing,	in	effect,	is	the	promotion	 a	 primarily	 domestic	 agenda	 of	 censorship.557	For	 instance,	 an	 artwork	 that	criticises	surveillance	might	be	considered	as	antithetical	to	the	counterterrorist	policies	of	a	particular	government	and,	accordingly,	censored	by	a	social	networking	website	that	has	been	 assigned	 with	 the	 duty	 of	 safeguarding	 such	 policies.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 supposedly	“universal”	character	of	the	counterterrorist	combat	would	acquire	very	specific	domestic	characteristics.	 This	 gradual	move	 from	 public	 control	 to	 private	 control	 of	 the	 Internet	may	 produce	 serious	 questions	 around	 the	 protection	 of	 net	 neutrality	 across	 all	 of	 its	levels	(services	and	infrastructures)	and	expressions	(public	and	private).		In	all	of	the	cases	that	we	have	referenced,	the	most	important	–	perhaps	–	element	is	 that	 online	 censors	 operate	 under	 conditions	 of	 complete	 anonymity,	 and	 bear	 no	accountability	to	the	users	of	networking	platforms.	Such	practices	of	content	moderation	lie	 in	 contrast	with	 the	principles	 of	 transparency	 that	 are	 supposed	 to	 characterise	 any	democratic	 regulatory	 framework.	 The	 paradoxical	 character	 of	 this	 modus	 operandi	becomes	even	more	evident	when	we	consider	the	gap	between	social	media’s	corporate	motives	and	the	fact	that	their	officially	stated	objectives	are	defined	by	the	effort	“to	give	people	 a	 place	 to	 share	 and	 connect	 freely	 and	 openly,	 in	 a	 safe	 and	 secure	environment”.558	Therefore,	 given	 that	 social	 media	 platforms	 are	 corporations	 before	being	 online	 communities,	 it	 would	 seem	 quite	 reasonable	 that	 all	 of	 their	 employees	(including	 the	 censors)	 are	 accountable	 to	 their	 stakeholders	 above	 any	 other	 form	 of	public	accountability.	Notably,	when	Twitter	published	its	new	Terms	of	Service	in	January	2012,	it	justified	the	decision	to	update	its	censoring	practices	by	referring	not	only	to	the	platform’s	responsibilities	as	an	online	community,	but	also	to	its	need	to	expand	into	new	territories-markets.559	Finally,	 it	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 most	 of	 the	 content	 moderators	working	for	social	media	platforms	are	based	thousands	of	miles	away	from	the	companies’	headquarters.	 By	 outsourcing	 the	 content	moderation	 processes	 to	 newly	 industrialised	countries	(NICs),	like	the	Philippines,	social	networking	websites	are	in	a	position	to	save	
																																																								557	Courtney	C	Radsch,	‘Privatizing	Censorship	in	Fight	against	Extremism	Is	Risk	to	Press	Freedom’	(Cpj.org,	 16	 October	 2015)	 <https://www.cpj.org/blog/2015/10/privatizing-censorship-in-fight-against-extremism-.php>	accessed	30	March	2016.	558 	‘Explaining	 Our	 Community	 Standards	 and	 Approach	 to	 Government	 Requests’	(Newsroom.fb.com,	 15	 March	 2015)	 <https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2015/03/explaining-our-community-standards-and-approach-to-government-requests/>	accessed	30	March	2016.	559	‘Tweets	Still	Must	Flow’	loc.	cit.	
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very	 large	 amounts	 of	money560	–	 a	 fact	 that	 also	 lends	 to	 the	 censors’	work	 an	 evident	class-based	character.		In	most	cases,	however,	the	state	prefers	to	keep	the	role	of	the	ultimate	censor	for	itself.	This	is	particularly	evident	in	the	cases	in	which	governments	come	to	the	conclusion	that	 social	 media	 and	 other	 networking	 platforms	 may	 damage	 their	 political	 interests.	Notably,	 this	 has	 not	 happened	 only	 in	 cases	 of	 countries	 that	 have	 had	 a	 long-standing	negative	 record	 on	 freedom	 of	 speech	 (e.g.	 China,	 Iran,	 Russia	 and	 Turkey),	 or	 in	 the	countries	of	the	Arab	Spring	(e.g.	Egypt,	Tunisia	and	Libya),	but	also	in	countries	that	are	considered	 as	 fully	 functioning	 liberal	 democracies.	 The	 most	 high-profile	 case,	 which	exemplifies	 this	 context,	 has	 been	 the	 censorship	 of	 the	 WikiLeaks	 platform.	 More	specifically,	 following	 the	 mass	 release	 of	 diplomatic	 cables	 by	 the	 website	 on	 28	November	 2010,	 the	 Obama	 administration	 banned	 hundreds	 of	 thousands	 of	 federal	workers	 from	 having	 access	 to	 the	 website,	 starting	 from	 3	 December	 2010.	 Two	 days	later,	the	main	server	of	WikiLeaks	in	France	also	went	offline,	after	the	country’s	Industry	Minister	proclaimed	that	hosting	 the	website	could	damage	France’s	diplomatic	relations	with	the	rest	of	the	world.	Notably,	even	before	the	November	2010	revelations,	countries	had	already	started	taking	steps	against	WikiLeaks	–	for	instance,	Australia	had	banned	the	website	as	early	as	 in	May	2009.561	Interestingly,	 the	Australian	government’s	move	took	place	 less	 than	 two	 months	 after	 WikiLeaks	 had	 published	 what	 appeared	 to	 be	 the	complete	 list	of	 the	2,395	websites	banned	by	the	Australian	Communications	and	Media	Authority	(ACMA).562	Beyond	those	individual	cases	of	censorship,	however,	the	WikiLeaks	disclosures	have	managed	to	highlight	what	 the	senior	counsel	of	 the	Electronic	Frontier	Foundation	David	L	Sobel	has	described	as	 “two	 longstanding	and	 related	problems	 that	hinder	the	public’s	right	to	know	about	governmental	activities	–	the	overclassification	of	information	and	the	failure	of	transparency	laws	to	operate	in	an	effective	manner”.563	As	Sobel	 underlines,	 both	 of	 those	 elements	 “contribute	 to	 an	 environment	 in	 which	unauthorised	disclosures	are	more	like	to	occur”.	As	a	result	of	those	conditions,	we	have																																																									560	Adrian	 Chen,	 ‘The	 Laborers	 Who	 Keep	 Dick	 Pics	 and	 Beheadings	 out	 of	 Your	 Facebook	Feed’	Wired	(23	October	2014)	<http://www.wired.com/2014/10/content-moderation/>	accessed	30	March	2016.	561	For	 a	 comprehensive	 list	 of	 cases,	 see:	 Jo	 Glanville	 (ed),	The	Net	 Effect:	 The	 Limits	 of	 Digital	
Freedom,	Index	on	Censorship	vol.	40		(SAGE	Publications	2011)	pp.	110	–	120.	562 	Oliver	 Luft,	 ‘Wikileaks	 Taken	 Offline	 after	 Publishing	 Australia’s	 Banned	 Websites’	The	
Guardian	(19	 December	 2009)	<http://www.theguardian.com/media/pda/2009/mar/19/wikileaks-banned-australian-websites>	accessed	30	March	2016.	563	David	 L	 Sobel,	 ‘The	 Urge	 to	 Classify’	 in	 Jo	 Glanville	 (ed),	The	Net	 Effect:	 The	 Limits	 of	Digital	
Freedom,	Index	on	Censorship	vol.	40		(SAGE	Publications	2011)	p.	30.	
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been	 “trapped”	 in	 a	 vicious	 circle	 of	 constantly	 increasing	 regulation,	 control	 and	surveillance,	 which	 is	 directed	 against	 some	 of	 the	 most	 basic	 democratic	 principles:	transparency	and	accountability.		Therefore,	 control	 over	 the	 Internet	 has	 not	 been	 simply	 a	 response	 to	“extraordinary”	conditions,	such	as	information	leaks,	but	rather,	the	consistent	aim	of	the	regulatory	frameworks	that	have	been	applied	on	a	national	as	well	as	on	a	transnational	level.	 In	 this	 context,	 Australia’s	 Senate	 passed	 in	 June	 2015	 a	 highly	 controversial	 anti-piracy	website-blocking	law,	whose	lack	of	definitions	and	specificity	in	the	description	of	who	is	to	be	prosecuted	in	cases	of	online	copyright	violations	has	left	room	for	diverse	and	potentially	dangerous	interpretations	for	freedom	of	speech	in	the	country.564	Notably,	the	passing	 of	 the	 law	 came	 after	 several	 years	 of	 pro-filtering	 campaigning	 from	 many	government	 officials,565	although	 such	 initiatives	 have	 rarely	 had	 targeted	 and,	 thus,	successful	 results. 566 	Furthermore,	 since	 2010	 lawmakers	 in	 France	 have	 taken	considerable	 steps	 towards	 increasing	 online	 filtering	 and	 forcing	 ISPs	 to	 filter	 Internet	traffic,	even	making	provisions	for	wiretapping	Internet	networks	and	phone	lines.567	And,	at	 the	 same	 time,	 important	 EU	 officials,	 like	 the	 Germany’s	 Justice	 Minister,	 have	expressed	concerns	over	the	Internet	policies	followed	in	Europe,	which	cultivate	an	online	“blocking	 culture”	 that	 might	 create	 mistrust	 between	 people	 and	 their	 elected	governments.568			However,	the	country	that	continues	to	determine	to	a	large	extent	the	global	trends	on	 Internet	 regulation	 is	 USA.569	In	 one	 of	 the	 most	 controversial	 pieces	 of	 legislation																																																									564	Ben	 Grubb,	 ‘Australian	 Senate	 Passes	 Controversial	 Anti-Piracy,	 Website-Blocking	 Laws’	The	
Sydney	 Morning	 Herald	(22	 June	 2015)	 <http://www.smh.com.au/digital-life/digital-life-news/australian-senate-passes-controversial-antipiracy-websiteblocking-laws-20150622-ghuorh.html>	accessed	30	March	2016.	565	Glanville	(ed),	The	Net	Effect:	The	Limits	of	Digital	Freedom,	op.	cit.,	p.	110.	566	In	 one	 of	 the	most	 infamous	 cases	 in	 recent	 years,	 the	 Australian	 Securities	 and	 Investments	Commission	 (ASIC),	 blocked	 in	 2013	 over	 250,000	 websites	 in	 its	 attempt	 to	 block	 just	 one	fraudulent	 site,	 as	 it	 targeted	 the	server	on	which	 the	website	was	hosted,	 rather	 than	simply	 its	URL.	See:	Ben	Grubb,	 ‘How	ASIC’s	Attempt	to	Block	One	Website	Took	down	250,	000’	The	Sydney	
Morning	Herald	(5	 June	2013)	<http://www.smh.com.au/technology/technology-news/how-asics-attempt-to-block-one-website-took-down-250000-20130605-2np6v.html>	 accessed	 30	 March	2016.	567	Glanville	(ed),	The	Net	Effect:	The	Limits	of	Digital	Freedom,	op.	cit.,	p.	114.	568	ibid.	569	One	of	the	first	attempts	to	control	the	Internet	in	the	US	came	with	the	1996	Communications	Decency	Act	(CDA),	whose	aim	was	to	impose	standards	of	online	decency	and	to	make	punishable	the	circulation	of	material	that	could	be	deemed	as	“offensive”.	In	June	1998,	the	US	Supreme	Court	declared	 the	 Act	 unconstitutional.	 Just	 a	 few	 years	 later,	 the	 US	 Patriot	 Act	 of	 2001	 and	 The	Homeland	Security	Act	of	2002,	which	were	drafted	as	a	response	to	the	terrorist	attacks	of	9/11,	even	contained	 the	suggestion	 that	 ISPs	should	read	 their	customers’	emails.	See:	Chris	Atton,	An	
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proposed	in	recent	history,	the	US	House	of	Representatives	and	Senate	considered	passing	in	2012	the	Stop	Online	Piracy	Act	(SOPA)	and	its	sister	bill,	the	PROTECT	IP	Act	(PIPA).570	The	two	pieces	of	 legislation	would	have	given	the	right	to	the	U.S.	Department	of	Justice	and	copyright	holders	to	request	from	Internet	service	providers	(ISPs)	the	full	blocking	of	websites	 that	 facilitated,	 in	 some	 form,	 piracy.	 This	 power	 would	 apply	 to	 websites	originating	 both	 from	 the	 U.S.	 and	 abroad,	 and	 it	would	 –	 at	 least	 partly	 –	 privatize	 the	enforcement	of	copyright	legislation.	In	addition,	the	two	laws	would	radically	expand	the	definition	 of	 what	 constitutes	 copyright	 infringement	 and	 they	 would	 allow	 the	 full	blocking	of	websites	even	when	piracy	took	place	without	them	being	directly	responsible.	Therefore,	 a	 strong	 context	 of	 user	 surveillance	 and	 self-censorship	 would	 become	necessary	 for	 any	 website	 to	 avoid	 the	 danger	 of	 being	 blocked.	 On	 18	 January	 2012,	thousands	of	websites	including	Wikipedia,	coordinated	a	full	service	blackout	in	order	to	highlight	the	dangers	posed	by	SOPA	and	PIPA	to	free	speech,	or	even	the	very	stability	of	the	Internet	as	a	structure,	through	DNS	(Domain	Name	System)	filtering.571	As	a	result,	the	proposed	legislation	was	withdrawn	two	days	later	by	the	House	Judiciary	Committee	(20	January	2012).	However,	 the	pressure	 towards	 adopting	 the	direction	of	 SOPA	and	PIPA	still	remains	strong:	notably,	 in	2014,	the	powers	of	the	International	Trade	Commission		were	 extended,	 so	 that	 the	 quasi-judicial	 agency	 is	 permitted	 to	 rule	 not	 only	 on	 the	importation	of	physical	products,	but	also	data.572		Finally,	 this	 orientation	 towards	merging	 the	 legal	 status	 of	 products	 and	 data	 is	exemplified	by	a	decision	taken	by	the	US	Commodity	Futures	Trading	Commission	(CFTC)	in	 September	2015.	More	 specifically,	 following	a	 legal	battle	 against	 a	bitcoin	exchange,	CFTC	managed	 to	 rule	 that	bitcoin	and	all	digital	 currencies	 constitute	 commodities	and,	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Alternative	Internet:	Radical	Media,	Politics	and	Creativity	(Edinburgh	 University	 Press,	 Edinburgh	2004)	p.	16.	570	Jenna	Wortham,	 ‘Public	Outcry	over	Antipiracy	Bills	Began	as	Grass-Roots	Grumbling’	The	New	
York	Times	(19	 January	2012)	<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/20/technology/public-outcry-over-antipiracy-bills-began-as-grass-roots-grumbling.html?pagewanted=1&ref=technology>	accessed	5	April	2016.	571	‘Dear	 Congress,	 It’s	 No	 Longer	 OK	 to	 Not	 Know	 How	 the	 Internet	 Works’	Motherboard	(16	December	 2011)	 <http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/dear-congress-it-s-no-longer-ok-to-not-know-how-the-internet-works>	accessed	30	March	2016.	572	Russell	 Brandom,	 ‘The	MPAA	Has	 a	New	Plan	 to	 Stop	 Copyright	 Violations	 at	 the	 Border’	The	
Verge	(2	 January	 2015)	 <http://www.theverge.com/2015/1/2/7481409/the-mpaa-has-a-new-plan-to-stop-copyright-violations-at-the-border>	accessed	30	March	2016.	
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thus,	 fall	 under	 its	 own	 jurisdiction.573	The	 legitimacy	 of	 this	 decision	 was	 based	 on	 an	actual	 problematic	 characteristic	 of	 bitcoin,	 which	 is	 its	 hybrid	 nature	 as	 a	 commodity-currency.	 However,	 what	 the	 decision	 of	 CFTC	 entails	 is	 that	 cryptocurrencies	 are	 fully	deprived	 of	 their	 role	 as	 currencies	 and	 have	 to	 be	 treated	 exclusively	 as	 non-financial	entities,	 just	 like	 crude	 oil	 or	 wheat.574	Although	 the	 full	 consequences	 of	 this	 set	 of	conditions	 on	 the	 prospects	 of	 cryptocurrencies	 cannot	 be	 fully	 evaluated	 yet,	 the	 CFTC	decision	 constitutes	 an	 important	 element	 of	 pressure	 on	 the	 potentialities	 that	 many	activists	 and	 politically	 engaged	 cultural	 producers	 diagnosed	 in	 the	 proliferation	 of	cryptocurrencies.		As	we	have	already	noted,	Marx	and	Engels	underline	 in	The	Communist	Manifesto	that	as	a	response	to	any	economic	crisis	the	instruments	of	capitalist	production	attempt	to	 either	 expand	 into	 new	 markets,	 or	 exploit	 further	 the	 already	 existing	 ones.	 In	 the	context	of	Data	Capitalism	and	its	relationship	with	intellectual	and	cultural	production,	it	becomes	 evident	 that	 the	 main	 vehicle	 in	 order	 to	 materialise	 these	 goals	 is	 an	 all-encompassing	 process	 of	 datatization,	 which	 is	 realised	 through	 a	 variety	 of	 corporate	tools.	In	the	case	of	search	engines	and	online	platforms,	this	function	might	be	rather	easy	to	 identify,	 as	 artists	 are	 confronted	with	 processes	 that	 are	 implemented	 on	 the	World	Wide	 Web	 as	 a	 whole	 (e.g.	 Googlization	 and	 online	 censoring	 policies).	 This	 modus	operandi	 applies	 even	when	 the	 strategy	 of	 online	 corporations	 has	 to	 be	 “modified”	 in	order	to	capture	the	data	of	all	cultural	products	as	subsections	of	a	rapidly	expanding	Web	(e.g.	Google	Cultural	 Institute).	However,	 in	 the	 case	of	 intellectual	 devices	 such	 as	post-internet	art,	the	previously	described	process	is	considerably	more	complex,	given	that	an	artwork	has	to	be	successfully	“depoliticised”	before	it	becomes	datatized	and	quantified	as	a	product	of	 the	art	market.	This	particular	area	of	expansion	 is,	perhaps,	one	of	 the	 few	fields	within	which	Data	Capitalism	can	still	seek	a	“new”	material	and	immaterial	market	to	 capture.	 Nevertheless,	 even	 within	 the	 relatively	 underexploited	 field	 of	 new	 media	cultural	 production,	 it	 would	 seem	 that	 the	 polyvalent	 control	 of	 the	 Internet	 by	corporations,	 with	 the	 blessing	 of	 sovereign	 states	 and	 (trans-)national	 regulatory	institutions,	has	largely	set	the	limits	within	which	socially	and	politically	engaged	artists																																																									573	‘CFTC	Orders	Bitcoin	Options	Trading	Platform	Operator	and	Its	CEO	to	Cease	Illegally	Offering	Bitcoin	 Options	 and	 to	 Cease	 Operating	 a	 Facility	 for	 Trading	 or	 Processing	 of	 Swaps	 without	Registering’	 (Cftc.gov,	 17	 September	 2015)	<http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7231-15>	accessed	30	March	2016.	574	Luke	 Kawa,	 ‘Bitcoin	 Is	 Officially	 a	 Commodity,	 according	 to	 U.S.	 Regulator’	Bloomberg	(17	September	 2015)	 <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-17/bitcoin-is-officially-a-commodity-according-to-u-s-regulator>	accessed	30	March	2016.	
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can	operate	as	agents	of	change.	This	context	is	particularly	pertinent	to	tools	with	(at	least	some)	 subversive	 in	 systemic	 terms	 potentiality.	 For	 instance,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 digital	currencies,	 the	main	agents	of	Data	Capitalism	have	managed	to	either	appropriate	 them	(e.g.	Amazon	and	other	online	mega-corporations	have	created	their	own	digital	currencies	and/or	have	adopted	already	existing	ones);	or,	when	this	has	not	been	possible,	they	have	taken	advantage	of	the	structural	shortcomings	of	crytpocurrencies	in	order	to	thoroughly	delimit	 their	 function	 (e.g.	 through	 the	 decisions	 and	 operational	 frameworks	 set	 by	regulatory	bodies).		As	 a	 result	 of	 this	 multifaceted	 paradigm	 of	 “economic	 institutionalisation”,	 the	already	established	modes	of	wealth	accumulation	are	kept	secure	and	our	dematerialised	cultural	milieu	maintains	an	undisrupted	connection	with	the	context	of	quantification	that	defines	our	current	economic	model.	Therefore,	 the	obstacles	 that	have	been	analysed	 in	this	chapter	have	collectively	 indicated	 that	Data	Capitalism	does	not	constitute	simply	a	mode	of	production	whose	main	raw	material	and	output	is	information,	as	we	claimed	in	the	 first	 chapter	 of	 this	 thesis;	 rather,	 Data	 Capitalism	 constitutes	 an	 economic	 system	whose	 main	 raw	 material	 and	 output	 is	 corporate-owned	 information.	 This	 entails	 that	those	 politically	 engaged	 artists	 who	 base	 their	 practices	 on	 networked	 media	 have	 to	acknowledge	 the	 fact	 that	 their	 works	 may	 begin	 their	 online	 lives	 from	 a	 rather	unprivileged	 ideological	 and	 –	 often	 –	 practical	 position.	 Even	 if	 we	 consider	 that	 such	works	are	still	in	a	position	to	materialise	at	least	some	of	the	aspirations	of	their	creators,	the	 challenges	 that	 they	 have	 to	 face	 in	 order	 to	 fully	 develop	 their	 capacities	 are	significant.	The	next	chapter	of	 this	 thesis	will	attempt	to	define	with	more	precision	the	scale	of	those	capacities,	by	 locating	them	within	the	ideological	spectrum	of	Marxist	and	post-Marxist	 thought.	 Through	 this	 process,	 the	 thesis	 will	 propose	 a	 methodology	 that	could	 support	 and	 strengthen	 the	 role	 of	 political	 Web-based	 practices	 in	 the	 current	historical	conjuncture	and,	possibly,	in	the	future.			 	
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Chapter	6	
	
Changing	a	Changing	World:	Art	Within	Endless	Crisis				
The	Manifesto	Criterion		In	their	seminal	manifesto,	Marx	and	Engels	make	no	reference	to	the	future	of	art	 in	the	context	 of	 communism.	 Nevertheless,	 they	 clearly	 position	 culture	 as	 an	 element	 that	 is	largely	 defined	 by	 the	 dominant	 mode	 of	 production,	 thus	 portraying	 it	 as	 a	 tool	 that	supports	the	perpetuation	of	the	economic	system	from	which	it	was	born.	With	regard	to	bourgeois	 culture,	 the	manifesto’s	 authors	 accentuate	 its	 highly	 uncritical	 and	 enslaving	character,	making	the	assertion	that,	“just	as,	to	the	bourgeois,	the	disappearance	of	class	property	is	the	disappearance	of	production	itself,	so	the	disappearance	of	class	culture	is	to	him	identical	with	the	disappearance	of	all	culture.	That	culture	[…]	is	a	mere	training	to	act	 as	 a	machine”.575	To	 a	 certain	 extent,	 the	 role	 of	 art	 in	 a	 future	 communist	 society	 is	investigated	in	some	of	the	two	authors’	other	writings,	like	–	for	instance	–	in	The	German	
Ideology,	 in	which	 the	 totally	open,	democratic	and	 “distributed”	character	of	 communist	cultural	production	is	highlighted.576	However,	all	those	traits	are	supposed	to	materialize	
well	after	the	communist	revolution	has	taken	place.	What	remains	unclear	is	the	role	and	the	character	of	art	in	the	period	leading	to	the	revolution,	and	during	the	revolution	itself.	Unsurprisingly,	 in	 the	case	of	 the	Communist	Manifesto,	 the	 lack	of	a	detailed	description	for	 cultural	 production	 becomes	 almost	 a	 necessity,	 if	we	 take	 into	 account	 the	 succinct	nature	of	 the	manifesto	and	 its	strict	political	 focus.	Yet,	 the	question	of	what	kind	of	art	can	be	considered	as	revolutionary	art	persists.	In	view	of	this	thesis’	scope,	we	could	ask:	could	 the	 art	 that	 has	 been	 analysed	 in	 the	 previous	 chapters	 foster	 a	 socio-political	revolution?	Or,	is	it	–	at	least	–	capable	of	contributing	to	its	formulation	in	the	terms	that	Marx	and	Engels	set	out?	In	the	end,	what	is	the	real	political	potential	of	Web-based	art	in	the	context	of	Data	Capitalism?	Marx	and	Engels	might	not	provide	us	with	any	“instructions”	in	their	manifesto	as	regards	the	character	of	revolutionary	art,	but	they	give	a	much	clearer	description	of	the																																																									575	Marx	and	Engels,	The	Communist	Manifesto,	op.	cit.,	p.	58.	576	Marx	and	Engels,	‘The	German	Ideology’,	op.	cit.,	206.	
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political	 responses	 that	 can	 be	 considered	 as	 truly	 revolutionary	 (i.e.	 communist),	 and	those	 that	 cannot.	 In	 the	 third	 part	 of	 the	 manifesto,	 their	 analysis	 of	 “Communist	 and	Socialist	Literature”	sets	out	this	ideological	context,	as	it	identifies	three	main	categories:	Reactionary	 Socialism,	 Conservative	 or	 Bourgeois	 Socialism	 and,	 finally,	 Critical-Utopian	Socialism	and	Communism.	Within	Reactionary	Socialism,	Marx	and	Engels	first	locate	the	tradition	of	Feudal	Socialism,	which	describes	the	conditions	in	France	and	England	in	the	1830s.	During	 this	period,	 the	Aristocracy	attempted	 to	 rally	 the	working	classes	against	the	rising	bourgeoisie,	“pointing	out	that	their	mode	of	exploitation	was	different	to	that	of	the	 bourgeoisie”.577	Petty-Bourgeois	 Socialism	 is	 the	 second	 tradition	 identified,	 and	 it	encompasses	the	clash	between	the	old	“middle”	classes	and	the	modern	bourgeoisie	(the	new	middle	 class)	 in	 their	 effort	 to	 secure	 a	 better	 socioeconomic	 position.	 Finally,	 the	third	manifestation	of	Reactionary	Socialism	is	German	or	‘True’	Socialism,	which	refers	to	the	incapacity	to	implement	a	set	of	socialist	 ideas	(transferred	from	France	to	Germany)	without,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 reproducing	 the	 existing	 social	 conditions.	 In	 this	 case,	theoretical	investigation	becomes	an	agent	for	the	perpetuation	of	the	status	quo,	as	it	does	not	lead	to	any	action	–	political	change	and	social	transformation	remain	academic	issues	merely	discussed	by	the	intelligentsia	of	a	particular	nation	(Germany	in	the	analysis	of	the	manifesto).		Conservative	 or	 Bourgeois	 Socialism	 is	 the	 second	 main	 category	 of	 Socialist	Literature	 that	Marx	and	Engels	examine.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	members	of	 the	working	class	are	 not	 asked	 to	 become	 allies	 with	 the	 Aristocracy,	 but	 rather	 with	 the	 bourgeoisie	 in	order	 to	 survive	 in	 the	 new	 capitalist	 landscape.	 As	 the	 two	 authors	 note,	 “economists,	philanthropists,	humanitarians,	improvers	of	the	condition	of	the	working	class,	organisers	of	charity,	members	of	 the	societies	 for	 the	prevention	of	cruelty	 to	animals,	 temperance	fanatics,	 hole-and-corner	 reformers	 of	 every	 imaginable	 kind”578,	 altogether	 aim	 at	preserving	 the	 existing	 relations	 between	 capital	 and	 labour.	 Thus,	 they	 generated	 “a	bourgeoisie	without	a	proletariat”579,	as	they	nurtured	a	set	of	social	conditions	from	which	the	 notion	 of	 class	 struggle	 had	 been	 exiled.	 This	 outcome	 was	 secured	 through	 the	implementation	 of	 closely	 controlled	 reforms.	 The	 final	 category	 in	 this	 section	 of	 The	
Communist	Manifesto	 is	 Critical-Utopian	 Socialism	 and	 Communism,	 within	 which	 Marx	and	 Engels	 address	 the	 attempts	 by	 Henri	 de	 Saint-Simon,	 Charles	 Fourier	 and	 Robert	Owen	(amongst	others)	to	establish	utopian	societies,	or	modes	of	social	being.	The	main																																																									577	ibid.,	p.	68.	578	Marx	and	Engels,	The	Communist	Manifesto,	op.	cit.,	p.	76.	579	ibid.,	p.	76.	
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contribution	 of	 those	 efforts	 has	 been	 their	 recognition	 of	 the	 proletariat	 as	 the	 most	suffering	and	unprivileged	class.	 In	addition,	 their	critical	character	 is	exemplified	by	 the	fact	 that	 they	attack	 the	constituent	principles	of	existing	societies	and	 they,	accordingly,	propose	actions	such	as	“the	abolition	of	the	distinction	between	town	and	country,	of	the	family,	 of	 the	 carrying	 on	 of	 industries	 for	 the	 account	 of	 private	 individuals,	 and	 of	 the	wage	 system”.580	However,	 the	 aforementioned	 initiatives	 were	 all	 “doomed	 to	 fail”,	 for	they	 considered	 themselves	 as	 “superior	 to	 all	 class	 antagonisms”.581	In	 other	 words,	instead	 of	 promoting	 revolutionary	 action	 against	 the	 bourgeoisie,	 they	 appealed	 to	 the	whole	 of	 society	 without	 making	 any	 distinction	 of	 class.	 As	 a	 result,	 by	 not	 advancing	specifically	 the	 political	 causes	 of	 the	 working	 classes,	 and	 by	 adopting	 only	 non-confrontational	 means,	 their	 role	 gradually	 became	 identical	 to	 that	 of	 reactionary	 or	conservative	socialists.	Accordingly,	if	we	were	to	position	the	Web-based	artworks	and	interventions	that	we	have	 examined	 in	 this	 thesis	within	 the	 ideological	 framework	 that	Marx	 and	Engels	delineate,	practically	all	of	them	could	face	the	accusation	of	being	“doomed	to	fail”.	Firstly,	by	 not	 being	 able	 to	 foster	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 revolutionary	 proletariat	 during,	 or	 in	 the	aftermath	of	 the	crisis,	 they	have	 failed	 to	produce	 the	most	 important	 “ingredient”	 for	a	communist	 revolution.582	In	 addition,	 what	 this	 failure	 entails	 is	 that	 all	 artworks	 may	ultimately	 promote	 a	 theoretical	 or	 “diagnostic”	 rather	 than	 practical	 approach	 to	 class	struggles,	 which	 is	 falsely	 projected	 as	 the	 sole	 mode	 of	 resistance	 to	 capitalist	expansion.583	As	a	result,	 the	“intoxicating	effects	of	self-deception”584	could	be	diagnosed	within	 the	 social	 body,	 leading	 to	 the	 perpetuation	 of	 the	 political	 and	 economic	enslavement	 of	 its	 majority	 to	 the	 classes	 that	 possess	 and	 control	 the	 instruments	 of	production.	In	certain	types	of	technocultural	 initiatives,	this	reactionary,	or	conservative	position	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 mode	 of	 production	 is	 rather	 eloquent.	 For	 instance,	 the	proliferation	 of	 hackathons	 in	 major	 cities	 around	 the	 world	 can	 be	 considered	 as	 a	phenomenon	with	a	potentially	strong	alienating	dimension.	The	latter	stems	from	the	very	composition	 of	 hackathons,	 as	 events	 that	 regularly	 “merge”	 the	 art	 world	 and	 the	corporate	 world	 by	 bringing	 together	 programmers,	 software	 developers,	 as	 well	 as	designers	and	artists	with	a	vivid	interest	in	networked	technologies.	The	objective	of	such																																																									580	ibid.,	p.	80.	581	ibid.,	p.	79.	582	ibid.,	p.	68.	583	ibid.,	p.	73.	584	ibid.,	p.	71.	
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groups	is	to	collaborate	within	a	limited	period	of	time	(typically	between	a	few	hours	and	a	week),	in	order	to	produce	a	specific	outcome,	which	might	vary	from	a	new	smartphone	application	 for	 city	 navigation	 to	 a	 new	 online	 video	 game,	 or	 a	 downloadable	 digital	artwork.	Most	importantly,	at	the	end	of	the	process,	the	outcomes	of	all	individual	groups	are	presented	in	demonstrations,	during	which	the	participants	may	attract	the	interest	of	investors,	such	as	start-up	businesses	and	venture	capitalists.	Therefore,	despite	adopting	as	 a	 starting	 point	 the	 sharing	 of	 knowledge,	 skills	 and	 creative	 ideas,	 hackathons	 often	employ	those	commons	in	order	to	lead	to	the	production	of	new	corporate-owned	wealth.	Nevertheless,	 it	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 even	 when	 we	 consider	 Web-based	 anti-capitalist	initiatives	with	an	explicitly	aggressive	character	against	the	socioeconomic	and	political	establishment,	it	still	remains	rather	difficult	for	them	to	avoid	being	characterised	as	either	 “reactionary”	or	 “conservative”	modes	of	political	expression.	This	 incapacity	of	fulfilling	 the	 Communist	 Manifesto’s	 rigid	 criteria	 of	 revolutionary	 action	 is	 distinctly	exemplified	 in	 the	 work	 of	 the	 hacktivist	 group	 Anonymous.	 Notably,	 the	 online	interventions	 of	 the	 group	 constitute	 a	 paradigm	 of	 dissent	 that	 has	 influenced	 many	artists	in	the	aftermath	of	the	crisis,	 like	for	example,	the	hacking-based	projects	of	Paolo	Cirio,	 or	 –	 even	 –	 several	 of	 the	 hacking-inspired	 interventions	 of	 artists	 and	 artistic	collectives	in	public	spaces.	The	principal	aim	of	Anonymous	is	not	to	attack	all	aspects	of	the	World	Wide	Web;	rather,	 the	members	of	 the	group	are	 focusing	their	attacks	on	the	online	presence	of	government	agencies,	organizations	and	corporations	that	they	consider	to	be	violating	human	rights,	equality	and	democracy.	Through	their	distributed	denial-of-service	 attacks	 (DDoS),	 Anonymous	 usually	 interrupt	 or	 suspend	 services	 of	 a	 host	connected	 to	 the	 Internet,	 thus	 temporarily	 disrupting	 their	 normal	 operation.	 In	 other	words,	 Anonymous	 do	 not	 pose	 a	 threat	 to	 the	 infrastructure	 of	 the	Web,	 but	 rather	 to	specific	manifestations	of	Internet’s	exploitative	control	by	corporations	and	governments.		This	limited	–	in	Marx’s	revolutionary	terms	–	scope	may	also	be	recognized	in	the	activities	 of	 several	 politically	 engaged	 artists,	 who	 aim	 to	 formulate	 an	 anti-systemic	cultural	paradigm	capable	of	replacing	that	of	Data	Capitalism.	The	artworks	and	initiatives	of	such	artists	attack	the	cultural	products	that	might	be	considered	as	systemic,	however,	they	 rarely	have	an	 impact	on	 the	 function	of	 the	World	Wide	Web	as	 the	 infrastructure	that	 gives	 birth	 to	 those	 products	 and	 sustains	 them.	 This	 particular	 critique	 can	 be	addressed	 against	 the	 artistic	 initiatives	 that	 have	 aimed	 at	 building	 on	 the	 legacy	 of	tactical	media	 during	 the	 crisis,	 like	 –	 for	 instance	 –	 Dmytri	 Kleiner’s	 Telekommunisten	Network.	In	addition	to	this	set	of	criticisms,	however,	the	Network’s	ideological	approach	
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also	 possesses	 another	 trait	 that	 may	 place	 tactical	 media	 artivists	 outside	 the	 Marxist	framework:	their	envisioned	mode	of	political	organization.	As	literary	theorist	and	linguist	Zac	 Zimmer	 notes,	 Kleiner	 “tellingly	 does	 not	 title	 this	 document	 ‘The	 Manifesto	 of	 the	Telekommunist	 Party’,	 after	 Engels	 and	Marx's	 original,	 because	 for	 Kleiner,	 there	 is	 no	party.	 [Rather,	 he	 calls	 it	 ‘The	 Manifesto	 of	 the	 Telekommunisten	 Network’]	 The	 TKM	‘forks’	Marxism	away	 from	 the	Party	 and	 towards	 anarchism,	 and	Kleiner's	manifesto	 is,	ultimately,	an	anarchist	proposal	against	both	state	and	party”.585	Therefore,	it	comes	as	no	surprise	 that	 the	 Telekomunisten	 Network	 ultimately	 prioritizes	 self-organization	 over	revolution,	 in	 an	overt	 deviation	 from	 the	 “orthodox”	political	 course	described	by	Marx	and	Engels.586		
Exploring	the	Shades	of	“Red”		The	 “shortcomings”	 that	 we	 have	 highlighted	 above	 constitute	 rather	 easily	 identifiable	deviations	 from	 the	 rigid	 principles	 that	 Marx	 and	 Engels	 set	 out	 in	 the	 Communist	
Manifesto.	 However,	 a	 more	 dispassionate	 assessment	 of	 the	 artworks	 and	 initiatives	examined	in	this	thesis	would	have	to	take	into	account	the	fact	that	at	no	point	in	history	has	an	artwork	ignited	a	revolution	by	itself.	Quite	simply,	the	expectation	from	an	artist,	or	a	 group	 of	 artists,	 to	 produce	 such	 radical	 socio-political	 change	 merely	 through	 the	cumulative	effect	of	 their	works	and	public	 interventions	would	seem	 like	a	highly	naïve	presumption,	which	 ignores	 the	much	wider	 synergies	of	 social	 and	political	 groups	 that	are	required.	Therefore,	another	kind	of	evaluative	framework	would	have	to	be	found	in	order	to	determine	with	more	precision	the	relationship	between	Marxist	thought	and	the	ideological	 scope	 of	 the	 anti-capitalist	Web-based	 art	 that	 has	 been	 produced	 since	 the	financial	 crisis	 of	 2008.	An	 initial	 answer	 to	 this	 question	 can	be	 given	by	 attempting	 to	locate	the	artistic	practices	that	we	have	analysed	within	the	work	of	post-Marxist	theorists	whose	 main	 focus	 has	 been	 technology’s	 ideological	 nature.	 A	 categorization	 that	 may	facilitate	an	investigation	of	this	nature	can	be	found	in	Nick	Dyer-Witheford’s	book	Cyber-
Marx	(1999),	in	which	three	major	schools	of	post-Marxist	thought	are	identified:	scientific	socialists,	neo-Luddites,	and	post-Fordists.	Since	the	publication	of	Dyer-Witheford’s	book,																																																									585	Zac	 Zimmer,	 ‘Manifesting	 the	 Internet:	 A	 Review	 of	 Dmytri	 Kleiner’s	 the	 Telekommunist	Manifesto’	 (2013)	 Política	 Común	 vol.	 4		<http://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/pc/12322227.0004.014?view=text;rgn=main>	 accessed	 3	 April	2016.	586	Kleiner,	op.	cit.,	p.	27.		
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several	 complimentary	 approaches	 have	 been	 developed,	 which	 will	 also	 be	 taken	 into	account	 in	 order	 to	 delineate	 the	 relevance	 of	Marx’s	 theorizations	 to	 the	 socio-political	impact	of	new	technologies.	As	it	has	already	been	suggested	in	several	parts	of	this	thesis,	this	impact	has	been	largely	 portrayed	 in	 negative,	 neo-Luddite	 terms,	 given	 that	 for	 several	 thinkers,	networked	media	have	only	contributed	to	the	development	of	even	harsher	“versions”	of	Late	 Capitalism.	 In	 this	 context,	 Kevin	 Robins	 and	 Frank	 Webster	 systematically	demythologise	in	their	works	the	notion	of	the	“Information	Revolution”,587	suggesting	that	it	has	been	an	intellectual	device	for	the	concealment	of	Cybernetic	Capitalism.	The	latter	should	be	perceived	as	a	more	effective	phase	of	Late	Capitalism,	“in	which	everyday,	and	apparently	 insignificant,	 activities,	 deportment,	 and	 interchanges	 are	 disciplined	 and	controlled”,	 through	 the	 extensive	 use	 of	 new	 media	 technologies.588	A	 similar	 claim	 is	made	 by	 Manuel	 Castells,	 who	 notes	 that	 Informational	 Capitalism	 is	 the	 product	 of	 a	“capitalist	 perestroika”,589	which	 is	 driven	 by	 a	 relentless	 search	 for	 profit	 through	 the	bringing	 together	 of	 information	 technology	 and	 the	 technology	 of	 information.590	The	Internet	is	the	child	of	this	“marriage”,	and	according	to	Dan	Schiller,	it	“comprises	nothing	less	 than	 the	 central	 production	 and	 control	 apparatus	 of	 an	 increasingly	 supranational	market	 system”. 591 	Schiller	 rejects	 any	 kind	 of	 “messianic”	 perspective	 on	 Digital	Capitalism	–	a	point	of	view	that	is	shared	by	Nick	Dyer-Witheford,	who	vehemently	refutes	the	utopian	promises	of	information	technologies	in	the	context	of	what	he	term	as	“High	Technology	Capitalism”.592	In	overt	contrast	to	any	kind	of	utopian	claims,	Dyer-Witheford	argues	 that	 “there	 is	 now	 widespread	 acceptance	 even	 on	 the	 left	 that	 aspirations	 for	proletarian	autonomy	have	met	a	technological	nemesis	–	that	capital	may	have	succeeded	in	achieving	its	age-old	goal	of	emancipation	from	the	working	class”.593	As	it	has	already	been	 suggested,	 Italian	 philosopher	Maurizio	 Lazzarato	 defines	 immaterial	 labour	 as	 the	
																																																								587	Kevin	Robins	and	Frank	Webster,	Times	of	the	Technoculture:	From	the	Information	Society	to	the	
Virtual	Life	(Routledge,	London	1999).	588	Kevin	 Robins	 and	 Frank	 Webster,	 ‘Cybernetic	 Capitalism:	 Information,	 Technology,	 Everyday	Life’	 in	 Vincent	Mosco	 and	 Janet	Wasko	 (eds),	The	political	economy	of	information	(University	 of	Wisconsin	Press,	Madison	1988)	p.	71.	589	Manuel	 Castells,	The	 Rise	 of	 the	 Network	 Society:	 The	 Information	 Age:	 Economy,	 Society	 and	
Culture	(Blackwell,	Oxford	1996),	p.	18.	590	ibid.,	p.	160.	591	Dan	 Schiller,	Digital	Capitalism:	Networking	 the	Global	Market	 System	(The	 MIT	 Press,	 London	2000)	p.	xiv.		592 	Nick	 Dyer-Witheford,	Cyber-Marx:	 Cycles	 and	 Circuits	 of	 Struggle	 in	 High-Technology	
Capitalism	(University	of	Illinois	Press,	Chicago	1999).	593	ibid.,	p.	79.	
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source	 of	 the	 proletariat’s	 enslavement,594	which	 becomes	 an	 instrument	 of	 intense	depoliticization.	The	latter	is	considered	by	political	theorist	Jodi	Dean	as	main	feature	of	Communicative	 Capitalism	 –	 a	 theorisation	 of	 Late	 Capitalism	 characterised	 by	 the	dominance	 of	 fantasy	 and	 technology	 fetishism,	 which	 together	 exploit	 and	 manipulate	emotion,	through	the	various	modes	of	online	affective	labour.595	Finally,	Bernard	Stiegler	locates	 this	 process	 of	 depoliticization	 in	 the	 context	 of	 what	 he	 term	 as	 “Cognitive	Capitalism”	–	a	socioeconomic	system	defined	by	the	lack	of	knowledge	of	the	prospective	proletariat	that	emanates	from	its	lack	of	memory.	As	Stiegler	explains,	“their	memory	has	passed	 into	the	machine	that	reproduces	gestures	that	 the	proletariat	no	 longer	needs	to	know	 –	 they	 must	 simply	 serve	 the	 reproductive	 machine	 and	 thus,	 once	 again,	 they	become	serfs”.596	On	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	 post-Marxist	 ideological	 spectrum,	 we	 may	 locate	 less	hostile	 approaches	 to	new	media	 technologies.	 Those	have	been	 formulated	by	 theorists	who	have	either	seen	the	rise	of	networks	through	the	 lens	of	 technological	determinism	(scientific	socialists),	or	through	a	post-Fordist	perspective	that	has	attempted	to	negotiate	the	positive	aspects	of	living	with	a	networked	capitalist	milieu.	In	the	former	case,	we	can	find	theorists	who	have	been	largely	influenced	by	the	work	of	Ernest	Mandel,	who	claimed	that	“capitalism	is	incompatible	with	fully	automated	production	in	the	whole	of	industry	and	agriculture”597.	As	Mandel	explained,	due	to	technological	innovation	“in	the	long	run	the	fall	in	the	average	rate	of	profit	is	inevitable”,598	and	this	entails	that	an	economic	crisis	is	much	more	likely	to	occur.	Accordingly,	with	every	new	crisis	(as	Marx	and	Engels	have	argued	 in	 the	Communist	Manifesto),	 the	 capitalist	 system	 of	 accumulation	 comes	 a	 step	closer	 to	 its	 collapse.	 Following	 the	 events	 of	 2008,	 several	 political	 economists	 have	connected	 the	 crisis	with	Marx’s	 law	 of	 the	 tendency	 of	 the	 rate	 of	 profit	 to	 fall	 (TRPF),	which	occurs	due	to	the	advances	in	technology.599	 Despite	the	opposite	view,	which	has		
																																																								594	Maurizio	Lazzarato,	‘Immaterial	Labor’	in	Paolo	Virno	and	Michael	Hardy	(eds),	Radical	Thought	
in	Italy:	A	Potential	Politics	(University	of	Minnesota	Press,	Minneapolis	1996).	595	Jodi	 Dean,	 ‘Communicative	 Capitalism,	 Circulation	 and	 the	 Foreclosure	 of	 Politics’	 in	 Megan	Boler	 (ed),	Digital	 Media	 and	 Democracy:	 Tactics	 in	 Hard	 Times	(The	 MIT	 Press,	 Cambridge	 MA	2008)	pp.	101	–	121.	596	Stiegler,	For	a	New	Critique	of	Political	Economy,	op.	cit.,	p.35.	597	Ernest	Mandel,	Late	Capitalism	(New	Left	Books,	London	1975)	p.	110.	598	Ernest	Mandel,	An	Introduction	to	Marxist	Economic	Theory,	 (Pathfinder	Press,	New	York	2011)	p.	70.	599	Marx	analyses	the	tendency	of	the	rate	of	profit	to	fall	(TRPF)	in	chapter	13	of	Das	Kapital’s	third	volume.	
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been	expressed	even	by	Marxist	economists,600	theorists	 like	Alan	Freeman	(the	principal	economist	for	the	Greater	London	Authority	from	2000	to	2011)	have	largely	managed	to	demonstrate	that	the	rising	rate	of	profit	since	the	economic	crisis	of	the	1970s	has	been	a	myth.	More	specifically,	 in	his	study	of	 the	US	and	 the	UK	economies	 (the	countries	with	two	of	the	most	powerful	financial	centres	in	the	world	–	New	York	and	London),	Freeman	notes	 that	 the	 documented	 rise	 in	 the	 rate	 of	 profit	 over	 this	 period	 is	 the	 result	 of	 a	miscalculation,	 as	 economists	 have	 been	misleadingly	 avoiding	 to	 take	 into	 account	 the	capital	 tied	up	 to	marketable	 financial	 instruments	 (particularly	securitized	 instruments)	
in	addition	to	commercial	and	landed	capital.601	Accordingly,	Freeman	calls	for	a	correction	in	 the	 traditional	measure	 of	 profit	 rate,	which	 –	 once	 applied	 –	 proves	 the	 accuracy	 of	Marx’s	theorization.602	This	confirmation	can	be	directly	associated	with	the	rise	of	the	new	technological	instruments	of	production	over	the	last	three	decades,	as	other	theorists,	like	Andrew	 Kliman,	 have	 argued.603	Therefore,	 within	 this	 deterministic	 context,	 one	 could	readily	 assert	 that	 there	 is	 not	 much	 need	 for	 political	 mobilization,	 given	 that	 our	capitalist	 system	 is	 heading	 towards	 more	 self-generated	 crises,	 which	 shall	 ultimately	bring	it	to	its	collapse.		Finally,	in	contrast	to	the	overtly	antagonistic	neo-Luddite	perspective,	and	far	from	the	determinism	of	scientific	socialists,	post-Fordists	(or,	additionally,	“postmodernists”	in		
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Dyer-Witheford’s	categorisation)	have	argued	for	some	form	of	reconciliation,	within	our	existing	economic	paradigm,	between	networked	technologies	and	 leftist	social	demands.	In	 1997,	 media	 culture	 theorist	 Douglas	 Kellner	 rejected	 both	 technophilic	 and	technophobic	 approaches	 associated	 with	 new	 media	 technologies,	 opting	 instead	 for	 a	more	“open-ended”	theorization.604	As	he	noted,	“computers,	like	broadcasting,	can	be	used	for	 or	 against	 democracy”	 and,	 as	 a	 result,	 the	 rise	 of	 new	 technologies	 requires	 a	 new	generation	of	intellectuals	who	will	define	the	content	of	the	online	public	spheres	that	are	under	 formation.	 Their	 goal	 should	 be	 “to	 increase	 the	 dissemination	 of	 critical	 and	progressive	 ideas”	 in	 order	 to	 counterbalance	 the	 negative	 elements	 of	 the	“ultracommodified	world	 of	 technocapitalism”.	 The	 significance	 of	 this	mission	 becomes	even	more	salient	in	his	1998	essay	“New	technologies,	the	welfare	state,	and	the	prospects	for	 democratization”,	 in	 which	 Kellner	 underlines	 that	 we	 are	 undergoing	 a	 “Great	Transformation”,	and	“as	the	new	technologies	become	ever	more	central	to	every	domain	of	 everyday	 life,	 developing	 a	 progressive	 technopolitics	 in	 the	 new	 public	 spheres	 will	become	 more	 and	 more	 important”.605	This	 interest	 in	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 online	 public	sphere	 has	 been	 shared	 by	media	 theorist	Mark	 Poster,	who	 also	 appears	 to	 leave	wide	open	their	exact	character.	As	he	explains,	“in	the	absence	of	a	coherent	alternative	political	program	the	best	one	can	do	is	to	examine	phenomena	such	as	the	Internet	in	relation	to	new	 forms	 of	 the	 old	 democracy,	 while	 holding	 open	 the	 possibility	 that	 what	 might	emerge	might	be	 something	other	 than	democracy	 in	any	shape	 that	we	may	conceive	 it	given	our	embeddedness	in	the	present”.606	Interestingly,	 the	 distinctions	 between	 the	 post-Marxist	 approaches	 to	 technology	that	 we	 have	 briefly	 analysed	 above	 became	 increasingly	 complex	 during	 the	 global	financial	crisis	and	–	to	an	even	greater	extent	–	in	the	years	that	have	followed	it.	This	is	vividly	reflected	in	the	fact	that	many	of	the	theorists	who	have	been	leading	the	discourses	in	this	field	have	attempted	to	re-evaluate	their	positions	in	view	of	the	crisis	and	the	socio-political	changes	that	 it	has,	or	has	not	produced.	More	specifically,	 in	Aftermath:	the		
																																																								604 	Douglas	 Kellner,	 ‘Intellectuals,	 the	 New	 Public	 Spheres	 and	 Techno-Politics’	(Pages.gseis.ucla.edu)	<https://pages.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/essays/intellectualsnewpublicspheres.pdf>	accessed	3	April	2016.	605	Douglas	Kellner,	‘New	Technologies,	the	Welfare	State,	and	the	Prospects	for	Democratization’	in	Andrew	Calabrese	and	Jean-Claude	Burgelman	(eds),	Communication,	Citizenship,	and	Social	Policy:	
Rethinking	the	Limits	of	the	Welfare	State	(Rowman	&	Littlefield,	Lanham	1999)	p.	253.	606	Mark	 Poster,	 ‘CyberDemocracy:	 Internet	 and	 the	 Public	 Sphere’	 (Humanities.uci.edu,	 1995)	<http://www.humanities.uci.edu/mposter/writings/democ.html>	accessed	3	April	2016.	
			 223	
cultures	of	the	economic	crisis	(2012),	Manuel	Castells	asserts	that	“we	are	entering	a	world	with	very	different	social	and	economic	conditions	from	those	that	characterized	the	rise	of	global,	informational	capitalism	in	the	preceding	three	decades”.607	Castells	recognizes	that	the	 structural	 contradictions	 that	 were	 exposed	 by	 the	 crisis	 have	 produced	 a	 fertile	ground	 for	 the	 blossoming	 of	 alternative	 economic	 practices,	 especially	 in	 the	worst	 hit	countries	 (e.g.	Spain,	Portugal	and	Greece).	This	 is	a	development	 that	has	been	possible	thanks	to	the	use	of	new	communication	and	information	technologies,	such	as	free	Wi-Fi	networks,	free	radio	stations,	HackLabs,	free	software	and	programming	initiatives,	global	peer-to-peer	 networks	 and	 the	 online	 collaboration	 of	 hacktivists.608	Notably,	 Castells	connects	directly	those	blossoming	economic	practices	with	the	rise	of	alternative	cultural	activities,	 which	 have	 been	 gradually	 embraced	 by	 all	 forms	 of	 art	 –	 from	 theatre	 and	filmmaking	to	music,	plastic	arts	and	poetry.609	Furthermore,	Nick	Dyer-Witheford	argues	in	 Cyber-Proletariat	 (2015),	 and	more	 specifically	 in	 the	 chapter	 that	 shares	 the	 title	 of	Castells’	 book	 (“Aftermath”),	 that	 the	 2011	 revolts	 might	 have	 passed,	 however,	 the	system’s	resilience	is	still	highly	questionable.610	Dyer-Witheford	attributes	such	questions	to	“the	explosive	proletarianization	and	re-proletarianization	that	arises	as	huge	tranches	of	 the	 global	 population	 are	 rendered	 surplus	 to	 requirements	 by	 an	 increasingly	automatic	capitalism”.611	This	updated	view	on	the	role	of	the	proletariat	and	the	limits	of	High	Technology	Capitalism	is	evidently	different	from	his	assertions	made	in	Cyber-Marx	(1999)	regarding	the	irreversible	emancipation	of	capital	from	the	working	class.	Instead,	given	 that	 “the	 ‘general	 intellect’	 is	now	 in	 the	process	of	automating	 itself”,612	new	class	tensions	 and,	 thus,	 windows	 for	 socio-political	 changes	 may	 arise.	 As	 the	 author	underlines,	the	“first	step	along	this	brick	road	is	[…]	for	communists	to	acknowledge	the	new	conditions	of	class	composition”.613	When	 applied	 to	 cultural	 production,	 however,	 both	 the	 old	 and	 the	 new	 post-Marxist	 theorizations	 that	 we	 have	 described	 fail	 to	 provide	 us	 with	 a	 holistic	 and	summative	view	on	what	has	been	the	common	ideological	direction	of	political	Web-based		
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Crisis	(Oxford	University	Press	2012)	p.	1.	608	ibid.,	pp.	220-221.	609	ibid.,	p.	221.	610	Nick	Dyer-Witheford,	Cyber-Proletariat:	Global	Labour	in	the	Digital	Vortex	(Pluto	Press,	London	2015)	p.	168.	611	ibid.,	p.	184.	612	ibid.	613	ibid.,	p.	205.	
			 224	
art	of	the	crisis.	Quite	evidently,	we	cannot	claim	that	the	artworks	and	cultural	initiatives	that	we	have	examined	are	inspired	by	the	principles	of	scientific	socialism,	as	they	do	not	adopt	a	deterministic	stance	on	networked	technologies,	whose	prospective	evolution	will	supposedly	 lead	 to	 the	 automatic	 collapse	 of	 capitalism.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 cultural	producers	 have	 consistently	 embraced,	 or	 –	 even	 –	 appropriated	 the	 means	 of	communication	 offered	 by	 new	media,	 with	 a	 view	 to	 actively	 generating	 socio-political	change.	At	the	same	time,	however,	it	is	difficult	to	categorize	their	works	as	distinctly	neo-Luddite,	 or	 post-Fordist.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	most	 of	 them	 attack	 explicitly	what	 could	 be	considered	as	the	main	systemic	characteristics	of	Data	Capitalism;	and,	on	the	other	hand,	artists	regularly	employ	in	their	practices	the	corporate-owned	technological	tools	through	which	the	aforementioned	negative	characteristics	materialize.		Therefore,	 the	 incapacity	 to	 collectively	 classify	 the	Web-based	 art	 that	 has	 been	produced	 since	 2008	 should	 not	 be	 attributed	 merely	 to	 the	 important	 ideological	agitations	 generated	 by	 the	 crisis,	 as	 exemplified	 by	 the	 evolution	 of	 post-Marxists	approaches	 to	 networked	 technologies	 that	 we	 have	 highlighted.	 Rather,	 our	 incapacity	should	 be	 associated	with	 the	 fact	 that	 in	 the	 case	 of	 politically	 engaged	Web-based	 art,	several	contradictory	elements	of	empowerment	often	co-exist	within	 the	same	work.	As	media	artist,	theorist	and	net	activist	Pit	Schultz	notes,		 To	be	productive,	her	[i.e.	the	power	user’s]	contributions,	private	or	public,	critical	or	 affirmative,	 need	 to	 remain	 free	 gifts	 to	 generate	 the	 surplus	 on	 which	 other	advanced	services	and	enclosures	can	be	built	upon.	The	ambiguity	of	this	low	end	info-communism	 in	 the	 eye	 of	 the	 hurricane	 of	world	wide	 integrated	 capitalism,	has	become	one	of	the	major	resources	of	the	neo-liberal	knowledge	economy	and	can	be	described	as	both	revolutionary	and	reactionary.614			The	 ambiguity	 described	 by	 Schultz	 entails	 that	 if	 we	 wish	 to	 be	 more	 accurate	 in	 our	assessment,	we	have	 to	move	beyond	 the	 rather	obvious	overarching	 ideological	 context	that	defines	the	works:	namely,	their	expression	of	an	anti-capitalist	critique,	which	often	attempts	to	find	alternative	modes	of	socioeconomic	being	that	would	successfully	defy																																																												614	Pit	 Schultz,	 ‘The	 Producer	 as	 Power	 User’,	Engineering	 Culture:	 On	 ‘The	 Author	 as	 (Digital)	
Producer’	(Autonomedia	2005)	p.	115.	
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Data	Capitalism.	Accordingly,	 in	order	to	determine	with	precision	the	common	strategic	goals	of	the	artists	included	in	this	thesis,	and	start	forming	a	more	complete	image	about	the	political	role	of	Web-based	art,	we	have	to	adopt	a	paradigm	capable	of	overcoming	the	delimiting	aspects	of	post-Marxist	theorizations	of	new	technologies.	Therefore,	instead	of	moving	 from	 a	 given	 political	 theorization	 (in	 our	 case,	 communist	 utopianism)	 to	 the	evaluation	 of	 networks’	 nature	 and	 their	 use,	 we	 should	 attempt	 to	 follow	 the	 opposite	route:	namely,	we	should	start	 from	 the	artists’	 conceptualization	of	networks	and,	 then,	identify	 the	 overall	 relationship	 that	 they	 seek	 to	 develop	 between	 them	 and	 political	ideology.615		
From	the	Ideology	of	Networks	to	the	Ideology	of	the	Multitude		In	his	book	Networks	and	States	(2010),	 information	political	economist	Milton	L.	Mueller	provides	a	paradigm	that	fulfils	the	previously	delineated	characteristics.616	His	model	puts	forward	 an	 alternative	 conceptualization	 of	 the	 political	 spectrum,	 which	 is	 based	specifically	on	the	ideologies	associated	with	Internet	governance	and	their	implications.	In	order	 to	 illustrate	 his	 premise,	 Mueller	 creates	 a	 diagram	 that	 features	 two	 axes:	 the	horizontal	 axis	 (“nation-state	 axis”)	 refers	 to	 the	 relationship	 between	 communication	governance	and	national	 sovereignty;	 and	 the	vertical	 axis	 (“networking-hierarchy	axis”)	refers	to	the	level	of	hierarchy	on	the	basis	of	which	the	Internet	should	be	governed.			
																																																								615	Notably,	 a	 similar	 position	 is	 expressed	 by	 Walter	 Benjamin	 in	 “The	 Author	 as	 Producer”.	Benjamin	notes	that	“instead	of	asking:	what	is	the	relationship	of	a	work	of	art	to	the	relationships	of	production	of	the	time?	Is	it	in	accord	with	them,	is	it	reactionary	or	does	it	strive	to	overthrow	them,	 is	 it	 revolutionary?	–	 in	place	of	 this	question,	or	 in	any	case	before	asking	 this	question,	 I	would	 like	 to	 propose	 another.	 Before	 I	 ask:	 how	 does	 a	 literary	 work	 stand	 in	 relation	 to	 the	relationships	 of	 production	 of	 a	 period,	 I	 would	 like	 to	 ask:	 how	 does	 it	 stand	 in	 them?	 This	question	 aims	 directly	 at	 the	 function	 that	 the	 work	 has	 within	 the	 literary	 relationships	 of	production	of	a	period.	In	other	words,	it	aims	directly	at	a	work’s	literary	technique”.	Available	at:	‘Walter	 Benjamin:	 The	 Author	 as	 Producer’	 (1970)	 New	 Left	 Review	 I/62		<https://newleftreview.org/I/62/walter-benjamin-the-author-as-producer>	 accessed	 3	 April	2016.	616	Milton	L	Mueller,	Networks	and	States:	The	Global	Politics	of	Internet	Governance	(The	MIT	Press,	Cambridge	MA	2010)	pp.	253-271.	
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	Figure	65:	The	quadrants	of	the	political	spectrum	of	Internet	governance		 On	the	nation-state	axis,	the	right	favours	national	political	institutions,	whereas	the	left	advocates	the	establishment	of	new	transnational	 institutions,	which	engage	with	the	Internet	as	a	geographically	distributed	entity.	And,	on	the	networking-hierarchy	axis,	the	right	 favours	 highly	 hierarchical	 mechanisms	 of	 decision-making,	 whilst	 the	 left	 allows	unilateral	 decisions	 to	 connect	 or	 disconnect,	 which	 would	 lead	 to	 a	 form	 of	 “peer	governance”.	As	a	result	of	those	two	axes,	the	quadrants	that	are	created	can	be	associated	with	four	distinct	types	of	polity:	denationalized	liberalism,	global	governmentality,	cyber-nationalism	 (networked	 nationalism),	 and	 cyber-conservatism	 (cyber-reactionaries).	Accordingly,	if	we	were	to	collectively	connect	the	artworks	and	artist-led	projects	that	we	have	examined	with	this	“revised”	political	spectrum,	we	could	relatively	easily	locate	most	of	 them	 lying	 closer	 to	 the	 upper-left	 quadrant	 of	 denationalized	 liberalism.	 As	 Mueller	notes,	 a	 denationalized	 liberal	 governance	 of	 the	 Internet	 “recognizes	 the	 individual	network	 participant,	 not	 states	 or	 corporations,	 as	 the	 fundamental	 source	 of	 legitimate	global	 Internet	 governance	 and	 proposes	 to	 create	 new	 governance	 institutions	 around	
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them”.617	Correspondingly,	 most	 of	 the	 political	 Web-based	 artworks	 that	 have	 been	produced	 since	 2008	 proclaim	 that	 emergent	 forms	 of	 social,	 political	 and	 economic	control	may	only	emerge	from	globally	networked	communities.618	Nevertheless,	 this	 initial	 categorization	 of	 cyber-libertarianism	 does	 not	 come	without	 considerable	 structural	 problems.	 As	 Mueller	 himself	 recognizes,	 the	 kind	 of	liberalism	that	he	refers	 to	would	not	be	able	 to	contribute	 to	a	redistribution	of	wealth,	given	that	such	an	initiative	“would	require	an	overarching	hierarchical	power	that	would	be	almost	impossible	to	control	democratically”	in	the	context	of	a	completely	open	peer-to-peer	model.619	Most	of	the	cultural	producers	whose	practices	we	have	analysed	in	this	thesis	 do	 implicitly	 or	 explicitly	 acknowledge	 this	 danger	 when	 they	 propose	 potential	structures	of	social,	political	and	economic	organization	(e.g.	in	Paolo	Cirio’s	Global	Direct,	Natalie	Bookchin’s	agoraXchange,	or	e-flux’s	Time/Bank).	In	those	cases,	we	could	identify	elements	 of	 global	 governmentality	 coexisting	 with	 liberalism	 in	 the	 artists’	 ideological	scope.	Therefore,	it	would	be	more	accurate	to	conceptualize	the	position	of	post-crisis	art	on	Mueller’s	diagram	not	as	a	stable	spot	in	the	quadrant	of	denationalized	liberalism,	but	rather	 as	 a	 “pendulum”	 that	 oscillates	 between	 denationalized	 liberalism	 and	 a	 form	 of	global	governmentality	that	is	based	on	the	principles	of	socialism.		The	 previously	 described	 challenge	 emanates	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 online	libertarianism	can	readily	be	either	left-wing,	or	right-wing,	depending	on	the	path	that	our	imaginary	 pendulum	 might	 ultimately	 follow.	 Quite	 predictably,	 perhaps,	 the	 most	influential	element	that	is	capable	of	defining	this	path	is	the	mode	of	public	participation	that	a	particular	networked	polity	cultivates.	As	the	composition	and	the	evolution	of	the	crisis’	 movements	 has	 demonstrated,	 the	 ideological	 axes	 of	 “nation-state”	 and	“networking-hierarchy”	 can	 develop	 a	 rather	 antagonistic	 relationship,	 which	 may	 put	under	question	 the	kind	of	 collectivities	 “Occupy”,	 “Indignados”	or	 “Aganaktismeni”	have	actually	been:	have	they	been	social	movements,	political	movements,	protest	movements,	all	of	those	categories	at	once,	or	none	of	the	above?	In	the	largest	part	of	the	bibliography	that	has	attempted	to	answer	those	questions,	 the	main	point	of	reference	remains	Negri	and	Hardt’s	proposition	of	the	“multitude”.	However,	as	I	will	demonstrate,	the	dependence	on	the	notion	of	the	multitude	creates	even	more	problems	to	the	ideological	direction	of	the	pendulum	of	networked	polity	than	the	ones	that	it	resolves.		
																																																								617	ibid.,	pp.	258-259.		618	ibid.,	p.	269.	619	ibid.,	p.	270.	
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Negri	 and	 Hardt	 (re-)	 define	 the	multitude	 as	 a	 new	 kind	 of	 proletariat,	 which	 –	however	 –	 refutes	 any	 kind	 of	 classification	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 demarcating	 the/a	 “working	class”	in	contradistinction	to	the	other	socioeconomic	classes.620	Rather,	Negri	and	Hardt’s	proletariat	is	one	that	possesses	no	uniform	identity:	“Insofar	as	the	multitude	is	neither	an	identity	 (like	 the	 people)	 nor	 uniform	 (like	 the	 masses),	 the	 internal	 differences	 of	 the	multitude	must	discover	the	common	that	allows	them	to	communicate	and	act	together.	The	common	we	share,	in	fact,	is	not	so	much	discovered	as	it	is	produced”.621	The	question	that	can	be	easily	raised	from	this	definition	is	how	can	the	multitude	create	a	new	political	and	economic	order,	without	the	need	to	nurture	the	consciousness	that	is	implied	by	the	act	of	the	discovery?	In	other	words,	is	(class)	consciousness	a	redundant	prerequisite	for	the	development	of	the	new	proletariat	and,	accordingly,	for	the	initiation	of	revolutionary	action	in	the	current	historical	conjuncture?		In	this	case,	the	multitude	is	presented	by	Negri	and	Hardt	as	a	“given”	–	a	de	facto	formation	 within	 today’s	 networked	 societies,	 rather	 than	 a	 dynamic	 stage	 in	 the	development	 of	 a	 particular	 historical	 phenomenon.	 The	 two	 authors’	 “horizontalist”	interpretation	of	the	multitude	lies	in	harmony	with	the	“horizontal”	character	of	the	Web.	And	it	entails	accepting	multitude’s	condition	of	multiplicity	“as	also	automatically	defining	collective	action,	rather	than	as	the	point	of	departure	for	a	complex	process	of	social	re-composition	 and	 symbolic	 articulation,	 facilitating	 the	 ‘fusion’	 of	 individuals	 into	 a	 new	collective	 agent”.622	However,	 this	 assertion	 comes	 in	 direct	 contrast	 with	 the	 very	condition	within	which	the	multitude	is	called	to	operate	in	the	first	place:	the	Empire.	As	Negri	 and	 Hardt	 explain,	 the	 multitude	 functions	 both	 as	 the	 source	 of	 the	 Empire	 and	against	 it:	 “The	 deterritorializing	 power	 of	 the	 multitude	 is	 the	 productive	 force	 that	sustains	 Empire	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 the	 force	 that	 calls	 for	 and	 makes	 necessary	 its	destruction”.623	Therefore,	 the	 two	 authors	 see	 Empire	 as	 a	 transitional	 state	 towards	 a	new	order	of	 things,	 just	 like	Marx	and	Engels	see	capitalism	as	an	 inescapable	historical	
																																																								620	Negri	 started	 exploring	 an	 expanded	 notion	 of	 the	 proletariat	 in	 the	 1970s,	 and	 in	 1982	 he	formulated	 for	 the	 first	 time	an	analytical	 context	 for	 “a	new	working	 class”	 composed	of	 “social	workers”	whose	role	“now	extended	throughout	the	entire	span	of	production	and	reproduction”.	See:	Antonio	Negri,	‘Archaeology	and	Project:	The	Mass	Worker	and	the	Social	Worker’,	Revolution	
Retrieved:	 Writings	 on	 Marx,	 Keynes,	 Capitalist	 Crisis,	 and	 New	 Social	 Subjects	 (1967–1983)	(Red	Notes,	London	1988).	621	Michael	Hardt	and	Antonio	Negri,	Multitude:	War	and	Democracy	in	the	Age	of	Empire	(Penguin,	New	York	2004)	p.	xv.	622	Paolo	 Gerbaudo,	Tweets	 and	 the	 Streets:	 Social	Media	 and	Contemporary	Activism	(Pluto	 Press,	London	2012)	p.	29.	623	Hardt	and	Negri,	Empire,	op.	cit.,	p.	61.	
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stage	 towards	 the	 realization	 of	 communism.624	At	 the	 same	 time,	 however,	 Negri	 and	Hardt	 theorize	 the	multitude	 as	 a	 contradictory-yet-stable	 entity	within	 the	 body	 of	 the	Empire;	 similar,	 perhaps,	 to	 a	 liquid	 mixture	 that	 is	 incapable	 of	 changing	 its	 form	 by	evaporating	or	solidifying,	regardless	of	what	is	happening	in	its	environment.	Thus,	what	Negri	 and	 Hardt	 seem	 to	 be	 claiming	 is	 that	 the	 Empire	 might	 seize	 to	 exist,	 but	 the	multitude	may	very	well	go	on.	The	question	to	pose	here	is	“as	what?”			 The	main	difficulty	in	contextualizing	the	previously	described	“gap”	in	the	political	character	of	 the	multitude	emanates	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 the	main	element	 that	defines	 its	function	 is	neither	direction,	nor	 focus	–	 it	 is	power.	 In	his	book	 Insurgencies:	Constituent	
Power	and	the	Modern	State	 (1999),	Antonio	Negri	 argues	 that	 “the	 relationship	between	multitude	and	strength	determines	the	meaning	of	history”.625	For	Negri,	the	two	concepts	are	inseparable,	as	the	potentiality	mediated	by	the	multitude	is,	in	fact,	limitless:	“the	clash	between	 revolutionary	 becoming	 and	 political	 constructions	 does	 not	 regard	 only	 a	phenomenology	 of	 the	 historical	 process	 but	 reveals	 the	 incommensurability	 of	 the	expression	of	the	strength	of	the	multitude”.626	Accordingly,	the	multitude	has	the	capacity	to	radically	change	 the	course	of	history	by	merging	“not	only	 the	strength	of	 ‘much’	but	also	 the	 strength	 of	 ‘many,’	 that	 is,	 the	 strength	 of	 singularities	 and	 differences”.627	The	latter	 do	 not	 constitute,	 according	 to	 Negri,	 a	 barrier	 for	 multitude’s	 function	 and	effectiveness,	as	its	strength	is	“both	unstoppable	and	aleatory”.628		The	 foremost	 expression	 of	 this	 incommensurable	 power	 in	 today’s	 networked	milieu	can	be	found	in	multitude’s	“swarm	intelligence”.	Negri	and	Hardt	borrow	the	term	from	 cellular	 robotic	 systems	 and	 artificial	 intelligence	 in	 order	 to	 describe	 the	 complex	way	in	which	multitude’s	collective	behaviour	is	the	result	of	a	decentralized-yet-creative	structure.	Starting	 from	the	original	observation	of	swarm	intelligence	 in	nature,	 the	 two	thinkers	extend	its	relevance	by	noting	that		 when	a	distributed	network	attacks,	it	swarms	its	enemy:	innumerable	independent	forces	 seem	 to	 strike	 from	 all	 directions	 at	 a	 particular	 point	 and	 then	 disappear	back	 into	 the	 environment.	 From	 an	 external	 perspective,	 the	 network	 attack	 is																																																									624	Marx	 and	 Engels,	 The	 Communist	 Manifesto,	 op.	 cit.,	 p.	 51:	 “What	 the	 bourgeoisie	 therefore	produces,	above	all,	are	its	own	grave-diggers.	Its	fall	and	the	victory	of	the	proletariat	are	equally	inevitable”.	625	Antonio	 Negri,	Insurgencies:	 Constituent	 Power	 and	 the	 Modern	 State	(Maurizia	 Boscagli	 tr,	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	Minneapolis	1999)	p.	321.	626	ibid.,	p.	318	627	ibid.,	p.	308	628	ibid.,	p.	305	
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described	as	a	swarm	because	it	appears	formless.	[…]	The	swarm	model	suggested	by	animal	societies	[…]	assumes	that	each	of	the	agents	or	particles	in	the	swarm	is	effectively	 the	 same	 and	 on	 its	 own	 not	 very	 creative.	 The	 swarms	 that	 we	 see	emerging	in	the	new	network	political	organizations,	in	contrast,	are	composed	of	a	multitude	of	different	creative	agents.	This	adds	several	more	layers	of	complexity	to	 the	model.	 The	members	 of	 the	multitude	 do	 not	 have	 to	 become	 the	 same	 or	renounce	 their	creativity	 in	order	 to	communicate	and	cooperate	with	each	other.	They	remain	different	in	terms	of	race,	sex,	sexuality,	and	so	forth.	What	we	need	to	understand,	 then,	 is	 the	 collective	 intelligence	 that	 can	 emerge	 from	 the	communication	and	cooperation	of	such	a	varied	multiplicity.629		Quite	evidently,	Negri	and	Hardt’s	description	of	multitude’s	intelligence	does	not	comply	with	our	traditional	understanding	of	how	(political)	knowledge	can	be	accumulated	and,	most	importantly,	how	political	consciousness	can	be	developed.630	It	would	seem	that	for	the	two	thinkers	communication	alone	is	capable	of	 fulfilling	the	political	“agenda”	of	the	multitude.	In	this	context,	it	is	worth	noting	that	the	two	philosophers	reference	the	French	poet	Arthur	Rimbaud	in	an	attempt	to	explain	in	more	depth	the	nature	of	their	premise:	“Perhaps	when	we	grasp	the	enormous	potential	of	this	swarm	intelligence	we	can	finally	understand	why	the	poet	Arthur	Rimbaud	in	his	beautiful	hymns	to	the	Paris	Commune	in	1871	 continually	 imagined	 the	 revolutionary	 Communards	 as	 insects.	 […]	 This	 is	 a	 new	kind	of	 intelligence,	 a	 collective	 intelligence,	 a	 swarm	 intelligence,	 that	Rimbaud	and	 the	Communards	anticipated”.631		 The	use	of	Rimbaud’s	poetry	as	a	vehicle	to	understand	the	revolutionary	condition	that	is	nurtured	by	multitude’s	networked	intelligence	is	particularly	revealing,	for	it	hinds	at	 what	 Negri	 and	 Hardt	 consider	 as	 the	 actual	 origin	 of	 multitude’s	 power	 –	 love.	Rimbaud’s	 symbolist	and	highly	suggestive	works	gave	us	a	poetry	driven	by	 the	senses.	The	 fact	 that	 his	 poems	 influenced	 significantly	 the	 Surrealist	movement	 is	 indicative	 of	this	radical	approach,	as	Rimbaud	rejected	all	established	formal	conventions	in	favour	of	a	new	 literary	 technique	 that	 conveyed	 a	 fevered	 and	 “unmediated”	 passion	 for	 life.																																																									629	Hardt	and	Negri,	Multitude:	War	and	Democracy	in	the	Age	of	Empire,	op.	cit.,	p.	91.	630	Negri	and	Hardt	were	not	 the	 first	post-Marxist	 thinkers	 to	 theorise	new	social	movements	 in	the	aforementioned	terms.	Notably,	 in	 their	book	Hegemony	and	Socialist	Strategy,	Ernesto	Laclau	and	 Chantal	 Mouffe	 reject	 “the	 confluence	 of	 struggles	 into	 a	 unified	 political	 space”	 (p.	 152),	privileging	 instead	 “the	 plurality	 of	 diverse	 and	 frequently	 contradictory	 position”	 (p.	 84).	 See:	Ernesto	Laclau	and	Chantal	Mouffe,	Hegemony	and	Socialist	Strategy:	Towards	a	Radical	Democratic	
Politics	(Verso	Books,	London	1985).	631	Hardt	and	Negri,	Multitude:	War	and	Democracy	in	the	Age	of	Empire,	op.	cit.,	p.	92.	
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Correspondingly,	Negri	 identifies	the	power	of	the	multitude	with	the	power	of	the	affect	and	 the	 vehemence	 of	 passion	 that	 characterizes	 multitude’s	 public	 expressions.632	In	
Insurgencies:	Constituent	Power	and	the	Modern	State,	Negri	repeatedly	uses	the	Latin	word	“cupitidas”	(desire)	in	order	to	describe	the	basis	on	which	multitude’s	constitutive	power	lies:	 “The	 strength	 of	 the	 multitude,	 the	 different	 degrees	 of	 a	 constitutive	 cupiditas	[desire],	and	the	transformation	of	this	density	and	complexity	of	processes	 in	union	and	love	 are	 thus	 the	 determinations	 that	 constitute	 an	 always	 new	 social	 being”.633	The	constant	 expansion	 of	 this	 desire	 is	 what	 will	 drive	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 new	 political	institutions	of	the	multitude.		However,	Negri	and	Hardt	do	not	merely	anchor	their	own	perspective	to	the	affect-love,	 but	 they	 also	 imbue	 love	with	 a	 strong	messianic	 character,	 by	 claiming	 that	 “both	God’s	 love	 of	 humanity	 and	 humanity’s	 love	 of	 God	 are	 expressed	 and	 incarnated	 in	 the	common	material	political	project	of	 the	multitude”.634	Their	“theological”	rhetoric	 is	also	reflected	in	the	apocalyptic	terms	in	which	they	describe	their	faith	in	“the	point	of	crisis	and	 negativity	 around	which,	 within	 sudden,	 untimely	 events	 and	 radical	 discoveries	 of	different	 temporalities,	 the	 multitude	 comes	 to	 recognize	 its	 own	 strength”.635	This	recognition	will	 finally	 initiate	real	events,	which	will	affirm	the	political	character	of	 the	multitude	as	the	social	force	that	will	attack	Empire.636	However,	in	order	for	the	multitude	to	 realize	 the	 previously	 described	 historical	 role,	 the	 two	 philosophers	 claim	 that	 “we	need	to	recover	today	this	material	and	political	sense	of	love,	a	love	as	strong	as	death”.637	The	notion	of	a	certain	historical	“recovery”	is	crucial	as	the	main	challenge	that	we	face	in	the	 current	 historical	 conjuncture;	 and	 it	 becomes	 particularly	 evident	 when	 Negri	 and	Hardt	theorise	the	social	struggles	that	we	are	facing	in	terms	of	a	“déjà	vu”.	As	they	assert,	“there	 is	 a	 sense	 of	 déjà	 vu	 when	 we	 see	 the	 reappearance	 of	 the	 struggles	 that	 have	continually	been	passed	down	from	those	origins	[the	first	humanist	revolution]”.638		Notably,	 Negri	 and	 Hardt	 underline	 in	 Empire	 that	 the	 most	 important	 survival	strategy	of	capital	is	“changing	the	very	composition	of	the	proletariat”.639	In	a	rather	ironic	turn	 of	 events,	 it	 would	 seem	 that	 their	 interpretation	 of	 the	 multitude	 ends	 up	 doing	exactly	 that.	And,	 as	 it	 has	 already	been	 suggested,	 the	 same	 claim	could	be	made	about																																																									632	Negri,	Insurgencies:	Constituent	Power	and	the	Modern	State,	op.cit.,	p.	304.	633	ibid.,	p.	305.	634	Hardt	and	Negri,	Multitude:	War	and	Democracy	in	the	Age	of	Empire,	op.	cit.,	pp.	351-352.	635	Negri,	Insurgencies:	Constituent	Power	and	the	Modern	State,	op.cit.,	p.	321.	636	Hardt	and	Negri,	Empire,	op.	cit.,	p.	411.		637	Hardt	and	Negri,	Multitude:	War	and	Democracy	in	the	Age	of	Empire,	op.	cit.,	p.	352.	638	Hardt	and	Negri,	Empire,	op.	cit.,	p.	90.	639	ibid.,	p.	268.	
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several	 social	media	 platforms	 and	 networked	 participatory	 initiatives,	 both	 artistic	 and	non-artistic.	 Those	 tools,	 on	 whose	 basis	 a	 variety	 of	 artivist	 practices	 have	 been	developed,	may	–	intentionally	or	unintentionally	–	nurture	a	monosemous	interpretation	of	our	 socioeconomic	environments,	which	 is	 informed	exclusively,	or	predominantly,	by	the	 affect;	 namely,	 a	 largely	 apolitical	 version	 of	 “cupitidas”.	 The	 latter	 might	 be	responsible	for	powerful	expressions	of	public	mobilisation,	yet	“in	the	[complete]	absence	of	a	formal	organizational	structure,	collective	action	is	always	structured	by	the	forms	of	communication	responsible	for	 ‘setting	the	scene’	for	its	display”.640	In	other	words,	what	appears	to	dominate	the	function	of	today’s	multitude	is	the	image	of	its	public	expression.	This	 process	 of	 spectacularization	may	 produce	 a	 schism	 between	 the	 publicness	 of	 the	intellect	(as	expressed	in	swarm	intelligence)	and	the	public	sphere.	As	a	result,	instead	of	the	 creation	 of	 a	 revolutionary	 class,	 what	 we	 could	 identify	 here	 is	 the	 formation	 of	 a	“pseudo-proletariat”	 –	 an	 entity	 that	 bears	 many	 of	 the	 formal	 characteristics	 of	 the	proletariat,	 without,	 however,	 having	 a	 solid	 political	 structure.	 Such	 a	 political	 entity,	which	 lacks	a	solid	organizational	and	 ideological	basis,	 is	much	more	 likely	 to	be	 led	by	ideologies	 of	 cyber-conservatism,	 or	 cyber-nationalism.	 This	 danger	 is	 highlighted	 by	Italian	philosopher	Paolo	Virno,	who	argues	that	“the	public	intellect	which	the	multitude	draws	upon	 is	 the	point	 of	 departure	 for	opposing	 developments”.641	Virno	describes	 the	rupture	 between	 multitude’s	 potentialities	 and	 actual	 outcomes	 as	 a	 “terrifying	 effect”,	explaining	 that	 when	 the	 general	 intellect	 is	 not	 articulated	 within	 a	 political	 space,	 it	“translates	 into	 an	 unchecked	 proliferation	 of	 hierarchies	 as	 groundless	 as	 they	 are	thriving”.642	
	
Procedural	Sublimity	and	the	“Society	of	Non-Spectacle”		As	it	has	already	been	suggested,	in	our	networked	public	lives,	social	media	constitute	one	of	 the	 most	 prominent	 channels	 through	 which	 our	 desires	 and	 anxieties	 are	communicated.	In	addition,	online	platforms	have	been	of	crucial	importance	in	expressing	the	desires	of	the	socio-political	movements	that	were	born	in	the	aftermath	of	the	global	financial	crisis	of	2008.	Those	 two	 facts	are	 inextricably	 interwoven	 in	 light	of	Negri	and	Hardt’s	theorization	of	the	multitude,	because	they	foreground	a	problematic	that	goes	well																																																									640	Gerbaudo,	op.	cit.,	p.	21.	641	Paolo	Virno,	A	Grammar	of	the	Multitude	(Isabella	Bertoletti,	Andrea	Casson	and	James	Cascaito	trs,	Semiotext(e),	Los	Angeles	2004)	p.	40.	642	ibid.,	p.	41.	
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beyond	 the	 rather	 obvious	 connections	 between	 social	 media	 platforms	 and	 the	proliferation	of	Affective	Capitalism.	This	problematic	refers	to	the	deeper	nature	of	social	media	 as	 a	 new	 “public	 sphere”	 that	 is	 not	 primarily	 defined	 by	 content	 anymore,	 but	rather	by	the	processes	that	their	users	experience.	More	specifically,	every	“like”	and	every	comment	on	a	post,643	every	uploaded	item	(photo,	video,	music	piece,	etc.),	every	tweet	or	re-tweet,	and	every	addition	of	a	contact,	follower,	or	friend	generates	new	content	for	the	online	 platforms.	 Yet,	 the	 crucial	 fact	 for	 the	 users	 is	 not	 that	 they	produce	 those	 posts;	rather,	 the	most	 important	element	of	 their	 interaction	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 they	manage	 their	uploaded	“items”	as	well	as	the	“items”	that	other	users	have	uploaded	(e.g.	by	“liking”	or	“sharing”	 them).	 Therefore,	 content	 itself	 has	 a	 predominantly	 ephemeral	 function	 for	social	media	users,	as	the	most	important	aspect	of	maintaining	an	online	presence	is	the	ability	to	repeatedly	interact	with	new	content.644	This	is	the	element	that	generates	desire	(Negri’s	 “cupitidas”).	 Notably,	 new	 content	 becomes	 old	 almost	 immediately,	 as	 the	platforms’	interfaces	have	been	designed	in	such	a	way	so	that	constant	updates	constitute	an	 organic	 part	 of	 their	 modus	 operandi	 (e.g.	 Facebook’s	 Timeline,	 or	 the	 notifications	received	 for	 new	 tweets).	 As	 I	will	 indicate,	 however,	 the	 procedural	 sublimity	 of	 social	media	has	gradually	led	to	the	cultivation	of	a	“gamified”	and,	thus,	highly	uncritical	public	sphere,	which	contradicts	the	nominal	function	of	online	communities	at	large.		The	 concept	 of	 the	 “procedural	 sublime”	 may	 be	 understood	 as	 the	 ability	 of	complex	 computer-based	 systems	 to	 present	 an	 awe-inspiring	 range	 of	 potentialities,	regardless	of	the	aesthetic	forms	through	which	those	possibilities	are	being	manifested.645	Notably,	 this	 phenomenon	 is	 particularly	 relevant	 to	 contemporary	 video	 games,	 which	combine	extraordinary	computational	power	with	a	high	level	of	interactivity	–	a	paradigm	for	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 procedural	 sublime	 functions	 in	 general	 in	 today’s	 networked	media.646	Considerations	 of	 the	 sublime	 in	 video	 games	 have	 orientated	 around	 the	aesthetic,	 as	 they	 have	 often	 focused	 on	 the	 connections	 of	 virtual	 landscapes	 with	
																																																								643 	Dave	 Lee,	 ‘“Dislike”	 Button	 Coming	 to	 Facebook’	BBC	 News	(18	 September	 2015)	<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-34264624>	accessed	3	April	2016.	644	Of	 course,	 as	data,	 the	uploaded	content	has	a	much	more	 long-term	role	 for	 the	 social	media	platforms	 and	 service	 providers,	 who	 can	 use	 them	 for	 marketing	 purposes	 and	 for	 generating	advertising	revenue,	as	we	have	already	seen	in	the	case	of	Google	in	the	previous	chapter.		645	For	 a	 thorough	 investigation	 of	 the	 social	 construction	 of	 technology	 and	 its	 relation	 to	 the	notion	of	the	sublime,	see:	David	E	Nye,	American	Technological	Sublime	(MIT	Press	1994).	646	Alenda	Y.	Chang,	'Playing	Nature:	The	Virtual	Ecology	Of	Virtual	Environments'	(PhD,	University	of	California,	Berkeley	2013)	pp.	82-86.	
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romantic	 painting	 and	 elements	 of	 the	 pastoral	 and	 the	 gothic.647	As	 digitally	 modelled	complexity	appears	 infinite	 in	 its	scale,	so	do	the	 landscapes	that	video	game	players	are	able	 to	navigate	 through,	experience,	or	actively	generate	 through	their	decisions.648	This	notion	of	procedurality	is	associated	with	the	fact	that	gaming	content	is	generated	in	real	time,	 through	 a	 set	 of	 algorithms	 that	 produce	 unique	 iterations	 of	 a	 general	 “concept”.	Lying	closer	to	Kant’s	theorization	of	the	mathematical	sublime,649	this	type	of	procedural	potentiality	is,	thus,	capable	of	fostering	a	new	kind	of	seductive	beauty,	which	is	based	on	randomization.		Inevitably,	 however,	 the	 procedural	 sublime	 cannot	 live	 up	 to	 its	 truly	 expansive	remit.	A	key	irony	of	much	digital	design	–	including	games	–	is	that	its	seemingly	limitless	choice	 and	 potential	 are	 delivered	 through	 an	 extremely	 rule-bound	 and	 systematic	medium,	which	allows	for	little	or	no	breaking	of	its	foundational	logics.	In	this	sense,	the	procedural	 sublime	 may	 operate	 as	 an	 extension	 of	 Debordian	 spectacle:	 the	 ability	 to	exercise	 apparent	 freedoms	 within	 a	 delimited	 and	 controlled	 illusion	 is	 a	 fundamental	form	of	alienation.650	Therefore,	procedurality	should	be	understood	as	a	tool	of	capitalist	sublimation	 that	 is	 achieved	 through	 the	 emotional	 investment	 of	 the	 users	 in	 a	 system	with	 a	 thoroughly	 predetermined	 character.	 This	 context	 reflects	 an	 emerging	technocultural	order,	whose	spectacular-yet-alienating	nature	 is	not	exclusively	based	on	the	 “visual”	 or	 the	 “aesthetic”,	 as	 was	 the	 case	 in	 Debord’s	 original	 theorization.	 For	instance,	 this	 is	 vividly	 reflected	 in	 agriculture-themed	 games	 like	 FarmVille	 (2009),651																																																									647 	See:	 Eugénie	 Shinkle,	 ‘Video	 Games	 and	 the	 Technological	 Sublime’	 (Tate.org.uk)	<http://www.tate.org.uk/art/research-publications/the-sublime/eugenie-shinkle-video-games-and-the-technological-sublime-r1136830>	accessed	3	April	2016;	and	the	recent	exhibition	“Under	the	clouds:	From	paranoia	to	the	digital	sublime”	at	the	Serralves	Museum,	in	Portugal	(2015).	See:	‘Under	 the	 Clouds:	 From	 Paranoia	 to	 the	 Digital	 Sublime’	 (Serralves.pt,	 2015)	<http://www.serralves.pt/en/activities/under-the-clouds-from-paranoia-to-the-digital-sublime/?menu=249>	accessed	3	April	2016.	648	A	good	example	of	such	a	game	is	Minecraft	(2011),	in	which	players	can	build	constructions	by	using	textured	cubes	in	a	3-D	procedurally	generated	world.	Notably,	in	the	game’s	“creative	mode”	players	are	given	unlimited	 resources,	which	means	 that	 there	 is	no	 restriction	 to	 the	 size	of	 the	world	that	they	might	choose	to	produce.	649	See:	Immanuel	Kant,	Critique	of	Judgement	(Nicholas	Walker	ed,	James	Creed	Meredith	tr,	Oxford	University	Press,	New	York	2007).	650 	See:	 Guy	 Debord,	 ‘Society	 of	 the	 Spectacle’	 (Marxists.org)	<https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/debord/society.htm>	 accessed	 3	 April	 2016.	Debord	notes	in	thesis	8:	“Lived	reality	is	materially	invaded	by	the	contemplation	of	the	spectacle	while	 simultaneously	 absorbing	 the	 spectacular	 order,	 giving	 it	 positive	 cohesiveness.	 Objective	reality	is	present	on	both	sides.	Every	notion	fixed	this	way	has	no	other	basis	than	its	passage	into	the	 opposite:	 reality	 rises	 up	 within	 the	 spectacle,	 and	 the	 spectacle	 is	 real.	 This	 reciprocal	alienation	is	the	essence	and	the	support	of	the	existing	society”.	651	FarmVille	 is	 developed	by	 Zynga,	 and	 is	 available	 as	 an	Adobe	Flash	 application	 via	 Facebook	and	Microsoft's	MSN	Games.		
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whose	 graphics	 can	 only	 be	 considered	 as	 basic	 in	 comparison	 with	 the	 exponential	development	of	game	design	capacities	in	recent	years.	In	the	case	of	FarmVille,	the	player	not	only	has	control	over	the	landscape,	but	–	most	importantly	–	he/she	has	to	exert	this	control	in	real	time	in	order	to	succeed.	That	means	that	the	player	has	to	invest	time	while	performing	 regular	 farm	 management	 activities,	 such	 as	 ploughing	 the	 land,	 planting,	watering	 the	 plants,	 collecting	 the	 fruits,	 raising	 livestock	 and	 trading	 with	 other	producers.	 The	 counter-pastoral	 aesthetics	 of	 the	 game	 seem	 to	 be	 “balanced”	 by	 its	capacity	 to	 encapsulate	 a	 certain	 cultural	 nostalgia	 for	 returning	 to	 country	 life,	 whilst	combining	 it	 with	 the	 fundamental	 principles	 of	 capitalist	 production.	 Notably,	 between	2009	and	2011	FarmVille	was	the	most	popular	game	on	Facebook.652			
	Figure	66:	Farmville		 The	power	of	procedural	sublimity	has	been	evident	even	in	cases	in	which	cultural	producers	 have	 attempted	 to	 criticise	 its	 negative	 influence	 on	 our	 engagement	 with	networks.	 A	 prominent	 such	 example	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	 release	 on	 Facebook	 of	 Cow	
																																																								652 	‘Facebook	 Apps	 Leaderboard’	 (Appdata.com)	<http://www.appdata.com/leaderboard/apps?metric_select=mau_estimate&style=classic>	accessed	3	April	2016.	
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Clicker	(2010),	 a	 game	 produced	 by	 video	 game	 artist	 and	 researcher	 Ian	 Bogost.653	The	game	featured	the	image	of	a	“Farmvillesque”	cow,	which	had	to	be	clicked	every	six	hours		so	that	the	player	could	earn	more	future	clicks	as	a	reward.	Furthermore,	the	player	could	add	the	cows	of	his	friends	to	his	pasture	in	order	to	receive	even	more	“clicks”,	and,	finally,	a	 currency	known	as	 "Mooney"	allowed	 the	player	 to	purchase	cows	of	different	designs	and	 skip	 the	 six-hour	 interval	between	his	 clicks.	Cow	Clicker	was	 intended	by	Bogost	 to	function	 as	 a	 parody	 that	 would	 deconstruct	 recent	 gaming	 trends,	 as	 well	 as	 the	application	 of	 game-design	 elements	 and	 principles	 in	 non-game	 environments	 for	economic	reasons	(gamification).	This	process	is	closely	associated	with	affective	labour	–	an	organic	element	in	most	online	platforms,	as	we	have	suggested	in	the	previous	chapter.	Affective	 labour	 functions,	 in	 effect,	 as	 a	 catalyst	 of	 gamification,	 for	 “it	 frustrates	 the	practice	 of	 game	 design	 and	 reduces	 playing	 to	 a	 stimulus-response	 experience”.654	Therefore,	 “gamification	has	 little	 to	do	with	the	design	of	games	(or	an	allegedly	salvific	process),	and	much	more	with	the	exploitation	of	consumers”.655	Despite	those	elements	of	critique	towards	social	media’s	processes	of	alienation,	however,	(and	to	Bogost’s	surprise)	
Cow	Clicker	 became	an	online	hit,	 not	only	 in	 terms	of	publicity,	 but	 also	 in	 terms	of	 the	number	 of	 registered	 players	 who	 regularly	 enjoyed	 experiencing	 its	 satirical	 ludic	labour.656	More	 specifically,	 the	 game	 had	 5,000	 users	 soon	 after	 its	 launch	 in	 late	 July	2010;	20,000	a	few	weeks	later;	50,000	by	early	September	and	56,000	in	October.657																																																									653	Ian	 Bogost,	 ‘Cow	 Clicker’	 (Bogost.com)	 <http://bogost.com/games/cow_clicker/>	 accessed	 3	April	2016.		654	Mathias	 Fuchs	 and	 others,	 Rethinking	 Gamification	 (meson	 press	 by	 Hybrid	 Publishing	 Lab	2014),	p.	10.		655	For	 a	more	 thorough	 investigation	of	 the	 economic	nature	 of	 gamification,	 see:	Karen	Robson	and	 others,	 ‘Is	 It	 All	 a	 Game?	 Understanding	 the	 Principles	 of	 Gamification’	 (2015)	 Business	
Horizons	58	(4)	pp.	411–420;	Juho	Hamari,	‘Transforming	Homo	Economicus	into	Homo	Ludens:	A	Field	Experiment	 on	Gamification	 in	 a	Utilitarian	Peer-to-Peer	Trading	 Service’	 (2013)	Electronic	
Commerce	 Research	 and	 Applications	 12	 (4)	 pp.	 236	 –	 245;	 and	 Byron	 Reeves	 and	 Leighton	 J	Read,	Total	 Engagement:	 How	Games	 and	 Virtual	Worlds	 Are	 Changing	 the	Way	 People	Work	 and	
Businesses	Compete	(Harvard	Business	Review	Press	2009).	656	The	 free	micro-labour	 of	 their	 users	 is,	 perhaps,	 the	most	 important	 element	 that	 defines	 the	relationship	 between	 spectacle	 and	 alienation	 in	 social	 media.	 The	 strength	 of	 this	 aspect	transforms	social	media	platforms	 into	 “factories”	of	 commons-based	peer	production,	which	are	capable	 of	 generating	 the	 exact	 same	 alienating	 effect	 of	 a	 physical	 factory.	 In	 his	 book	 Digital	
Labour	and	Karl	Marx,	Christian	Fuchs	deconstructs	in	depth	this	effect	and	identifies	four	types	of	alienation	 that	 are	 produced	 on	 social	media	 platforms	 through	 the	 exploitation	 of	 users’	 digital	labour.	More	specifically,	users:	 “in	relation	 to	subjectivity	 (a)	are	coerced	by	 isolation	and	social	disadvantage	if	they	leave	monopoly	capital	platforms	(such	as	Facebook),	in	relation	to	the	objects	in	 labour;	 (b)	 their	 human	 experiences	 come	 under	 the	 control	 of	 capital,	 in	 relation	 to	 the	instruments	of	labour;	(c)	the	platforms	are	owned	not	by	users	but	by	private	companies	that	also	
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	Figure	67:	Ian	Bogost,	Cow	Clicker	(2010)		 Bogost’s	experiment	emphatically	reveals	the	deep	ideological	effects	of	what	writer	and	 curator	 Matteo	 Pasquinneli	 calls	 the	 “financialization	 of	 the	 bios”	 –	 namely,	 the	transformation	 of	 all	 aspects	 of	 our	 lives	 into	 mere	 credit	 lines,	 though	 the	 active,	 or																																																																																																																																																																																			commodify	user	data,	and	 in	relation	to	the	product	of	 labour;	(d)	monetary	profit	 is	 individually	controlled	by	the	platform’s	owners”.	See:	Fuchs,	op.	cit.,	p.	260.	657	Jason	Tanz,	‘The	Curse	of	Cow	Clicker:	How	a	Cheeky	Satire	Became	a	Videogame	Hit’	WIRED	(20	December	2011)	<http://www.wired.com/2011/12/ff_cowclicker/all/1>	accessed	4	April	2016.	
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passive	 production	 of	 data.658	Pasquinneli	 notes	 that	 this	 function	 is	 particularly	 strong	within	“the	new	forms	of	business	running	on	digital	networks,	whose	‘strategy	of	over’	is	precisely	to	use	the	rhetoric	of	digital	collectivism	(network	cooperation,	peer	production,	free	culture,	creative	commons,	etc.)	 to	hide	the	accumulation	of	value”.659	Apart	 from	its	hidden	economic	function,	however,	procedural	love	also	impacts	the	very	core	of	political	discourse.	 As	 Virno	 notes,	 “the	 boundaries	 between	 pure	 intellectual	 activity,	 political	action,	 and	 labor	 have	 dissolved.	 […]	 The	 world	 of	 so	 called	 post-Fordist	 labor	 has	absorbed	 into	 itself	 many	 of	 the	 typical	 characteristics	 of	 political	 action;	 and	 […]	 this	fusion	 between	 Politics	 and	 Labor	 constitutes	 a	 decisive	 physiognomic	 trait	 of	 the	contemporary	multitude”.660	Virno	goes	on	to	argue	that	“political	action	now	seems,	 in	a	disastrous	 way,	 like	 some	 superfluous	 duplication	 of	 the	 experience	 of	 labor,	 since	 the	latter	 experience,	 even	 if	 in	 a	 deformed	 and	 despotic	 manner,	 has	 subsumed	 into	 itself	certain	structural	characteristics	of	political	action”.661	In	this	context,	the	assumption	that	“the	 interplay	 of	 commodities	 is	 merely	 a	 distraction	 from	 a	 fundamentally	 aniconic	structure	 [the	 capitalist	 mode	 of	 production]”662	does	 not	 stand	 anymore	 –	 in	 Data	Capitalism	the	image	is	the	structure.	Spectacle	is	so	thoroughly	embedded	in	the	multiple	media	interfaces	that	we	are	using	in	our	everyday	lives,	that	it	is	not	visible	anymore.	As	philosopher	Boris	Groys	 ironically	notes,	 “if	 contemporary	society	 is	 […]	still	 a	 society	of	spectacle,	then	it	seems	to	be	a	spectacle	without	spectators”.663	Nevertheless,	Groys’	 assertion	does	not	 entail	 that	 “traditional”	 forms	of	 spectacle	do	 not	 remain	 important	 components	 of	 Data	 Capitalism.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 politically	engaged	artists	often	identify	spectacle	as	an	overt	obstacle	that	accompanies	technology-based	artworks	and	interventions.	Notably,	in	an	interview	about	his	collaboration	with	the	Tanzanian	farmers	in	Sauti	ya	wakulima	(“The	voice	of	the	farmers”,	2011),	artist	Eugenio	Tisselli	 recognized	 the	 great	 challenges	 raised	 by	 the	 spectacularization	 of	 new	technologies	 and	 their	 inherent	 connections	 with	 consumerist	 culture.	 In	 response	 to	 a	comment	 from	 one	 of	 the	 farmers-participants	 of	 his	 project	 regarding	 the	 impressive																																																									658	Matteo	Pasquinelli,	‘Communism	of	Capital	and	Cannibalism	of	the	Common:	Notes	on	the	Art	of	Over-Identification’	 in	 Lanfranco	 Aceti	 and	 others	 (eds),	Red	Art:	New	Utopias	in	Data	Capitalism,	
Leonardo	Electronic	Almanac,	vol.	20,	no	1	(Leonardo/ISAST,	San	Francisco	2014)	p.	75.	659	ibid.,	p.	76.	660	Virno,	A	Grammar	of	the	Multitude,	op.	cit.,	p.	50.	661	ibid.,	p.	51.	662 	Sven	 Lutticken,	Idols	 of	 the	 Market:	 Modern	 Iconoclasm	 and	 the	 Fundamentalist	
Spectacle	(Sternberg	Press,	Berlin	2009)	p.	125.	663	Boris	 Groys,	 ‘Comrades	 of	 Time’	 [2009]	 e-flux	 <http://www.e-flux.com/journal/comrades-of-time/>	accessed	4	April	2016.	
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capabilities	of	computers	and	the	fact	that	smartphones	“are	not	just	a	fancy	thing	for	the	rich	people	in	towns”,	Tisselli	notes:		in	 the	quote,	 there	 is	 an	explicit	 comparison	between	 the	 (poor)	 farmers	 living	 in	remote	areas	and	‘the	rich	people	in	towns.’	Moreover,	the	fact	that	smartphones	are	explicitly	 considered	 as	 fancy	 devices	 points	 towards	 issues	 which	 need	 to	 be	handled	very	carefully.	In	every	part	of	the	world,	technological	gadgets	are	quickly	becoming	 symbols	 of	 social	 status.	 Currently,	 I	 am	 working	 in	 a	 rural	 zone	 in	southern	Mexico	where	cellphone	coverage	was	nonexistent	only	two	years	ago.	But	as	 soon	 as	 the	 first	 antennas	 were	 installed,	 young	 people	 in	 those	 communities	started	buying	smartphones,	and	now	there	is	an	open	competition	to	see	who	has	the	 fanciest	 one.	 A	 similar	 thing	 happens	 in	 Bagamoyo	 [the	 site	 of	 Sauti	 ya	
wakulima].	So,	of	 course,	 smartphones	can	be	useful	 tools,	but	 they	can	also	bring	more	consumerism	into	poor	communities.	This	is	very	dangerous.664		Although	 Tisselli’s	 aim	 has	 been	 to	 implement	 a	 “bottom-to-top”	 structure	 of	 social	empowerment	 through	 the	 use	 of	 smartphones,	 it	 would	 seem	 that	 the	 process	 of	nurturing	a	networked	version	of	the	commune	might	have	found	a	“natural”	barrier	in	the	form	of	 new	 technologies’	 spectacularized	 character,	which	 encompasses	 both	 hardware	and	software.		Finally,	 it	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 this	 dangerous	 context	 does	 not	 apply	 only	 to	Tisselli’s	project,	but	to	all	types	of	interaction	that	take	place	within	a	community.	In	the	case	 of	 online	 communities,	 this	 context	 is	 also	 present,	 through	 the	 generation	 of	 an	almost	 “nostalgic”	milieu,	which	 catalysed	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 our	 data	 do	 not	 refer	 only	 to	cyberspace,	but	also	to	the	real	spaces	that	we	inhabit	(e.g.	by	“tagging”	people	and	places,	or	 by	 “checking	 in”	 at	 specific	 locations	 through	 social	media	 applications).665	Therefore,	through	 a	meticulously	 constructed	 attachment	 to	 the	 affect,	 online	 platforms	perform	a																																																									664	Marc	 Garrett,	 ‘Community	 Memory	 through	 Appropriated	 Media:	 An	 Interview	 with	 Eugenio	Tisselli’	 (Furtherfield.org,	 30	 November	 2012)	<http://www.furtherfield.org/features/interviews/community-memory-through-appropriated-media-interview-eugenio-tisselli>	accessed	4	April	2016.	665	Paolo	Virno	notes	that	“antiquarian	historiography	applies	its	own	typical	methods	to	actuality:	everything	 that	 happens	 is	 treated	 as	 suggestive	evidence,	while	 it	 is	 still	 happening;	 the	 current	moment	is	consumed	by	nostalgia”.	See:	Paolo	Virno,	‘Déjà	Vu	and	the	End	of	History’	[2015]	e-flux	<http://www.e-flux.com/journal/deja-vu-and-the-end-of-history/>	 accessed	 4	 April	 2016.	 For	 a	more	 extensive	 analysis	 of	 the	 subject	 by	 Virno	 see:	 Paolo	 Virno,	Déjà	 Vu	 and	 the	 End	 of	
History	(David	Broder	tr,	Verso	Books,	London	2015).	
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“colonization”	of	social	entities	such	as	“community”	and	the	“commons”.666	In	the	context	of	Data	Capitalism,	those	elements	become	mere	tools	for	the	accumulation	of	(immaterial)	capital,	which	is	also	being	managed	by	its	producers	until	it	is	ready	to	be	fully	exploited	by	 its	actual	proprietors	–	 the	corporations	 that	own	the	online	platforms	and	 their	data	(both	uploaded	and	generated).	Therefore,	the	return	of	the	“commons”	as	a	component	of	online	 media	 may	 promote	 a	 “pseudo-materialism”,	 which	 remains	 hidden	 behind	 the	density	 of	 the	processes	 through	which	 “communality”	 is	 experienced	by	 the	users.	 This	leads	 to	 what	 Turkish	 curator	 Vasif	 Kortun	 has	 recently	 termed	 as	 “powerless	socialization”667	–	 a	 context	 of	 spectacularized	 isolation,	 which	 cannot	 have	 a	 real	transformative	 effect	 on	 society.	 To	 a	 large	 extent,	 our	 love	 for	 networks	 is	 a	 love	 for	accessibility,	 which	 sees	 exclusion	 as	 its	 only	 enemy.	 However,	 the	 real	 enemy	 is	 not	exclusion	–	it	 is	exploitation.	This	fact	remains	thoroughly	concealed	in	the	context	of	the	“Society	of	Non-Spectacle”,	in	which	spectacle	is	nowhere	and	everywhere	at	once.		
	
From	Abstraction	to	the	“Unstable	Equilibrium	of	Compromise”		In	the	end,	the	fully	integrated	and,	thus,	“abstract”	spectacularization	of	networked	media	through	procedural	sublimity	functions	as	an	“enabler”	of	what	Italian	Marxist	philosopher	Antonio	 Gramsci	 has	 termed	 as	 the	 “unstable	 equilibrium	 of	 compromise”.668	Within	 his																																																									666	In	 a	 recent	 interview,	 philosopher	 Zygmunt	 Bauman	 argues	 that	 “the	 difference	 between	 a	community	and	a	network	 is	 that	you	belong	to	a	community,	but	a	network	belongs	 to	you.	You	feel	in	control.	You	can	add	friends	if	you	wish,	you	can	delete	them	if	you	wish.	You	are	in	control	of	 the	 important	 people	 to	 whom	 you	 relate.	 People	 feel	 a	 little	 better	 as	 a	 result,	 because	loneliness,	abandonment,	is	the	great	fear	in	our	individualist	age.	But	it’s	so	easy	to	add	or	remove	friends	on	the	internet	that	people	fail	to	learn	the	real	social	skills,	which	you	need	when	you	go	to	the	street,	when	you	go	to	your	workplace,	where	you	find	lots	of	people	who	you	need	to	enter	into	sensible	 interaction	 with.	 […]	 Real	 dialogue	 isn’t	 about	 talking	 to	 people	 who	 believe	 the	 same	things	as	you.	Social	media	don’t	teach	us	to	dialogue	because	it	 is	so	easy	to	avoid	controversy…	But	 most	 people	 use	 social	 media	 not	 to	 unite,	 not	 to	 open	 their	 horizons	 wider,	 but	 on	 the	contrary,	to	cut	themselves	a	comfort	zone	where	the	only	sounds	they	hear	are	the	echoes	of	their	own	voice,	where	 the	only	 things	 they	 see	 are	 the	 reflections	of	 their	own	 face.	 Social	media	 are	very	useful,	they	provide	pleasure,	but	they	are	a	trap”.	See:	Ricardo	de	Querol,	‘Zygmunt	Bauman:	“Social	 Media	 Are	 a	 Trap”’	El	 Pais	(25	 January	 2016)	<http://elpais.com/elpais/2016/01/19/inenglish/1453208692_424660.html>	 accessed	 4	 April	2016.	667	Julie	McCalden	 and	Mark	Robinson,	 ‘No	Boundaries	Arts	 Symposium:	Two	Views	 from	Bristol	and	 Manchester’	 (a-n.co.uk,	 2	 October	 2015)	 <https://www.a-n.co.uk/news/no-boundaries-arts-symposium-two-views-from-bristol-and-manchester>	accessed	4	April	2016.	668	See:	 Antonio	 Gramsci,	Selections	 from	 the	 Prison	Notebooks	 of	 Antonio	Gramsci	(Quintin	 Hoare	and	 Geoffrey	 Nowell-Smith	 eds,	 Lawrence	 &	 Wishart,	 London	 1971);	 and	 Antonio	Gramsci,	Selections	 from	 Political	 Writings	 1910-1920	(Quentin	 Hoare	 ed,	 John	 Mathews	 tr,	Lawrence	and	Wishart,	London	1977).	
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analytical	study	of	Gramsci’s	work,	Greek	political	sociologist	Nicos	Poulantzas	attempted	to	 clarify	 the	 ideological	 condition	 encapsulated	 in	 this	 particular	 concept.	 More	specifically,	Poulantzas	focuses	on	theorising	the	“unstable	equilibrium	of	compromise”	as	the	 fundamental	 tool	 for	 the	 prolongation	 of	 the	 capitalist	 system.	 Accordingly,	 he	elucidates	the	scope	of	Gramsci’s	premise	by	defining	in	detail	its	three	constituent	terms	–	an	endeavour	that	reveals	the	relations	of	power	that	the	equilibrium	is	fostering:		 1.	Compromise:	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 this	 power	 corresponds	 to	 a	 hegemonic	 class	domination	and	can	take	into	account	the	economic	interests	of	certain	dominated	classes	even	where	those	could	be	contrary	to	the	short-term	economic	interests	of	the	dominant	classes,	without	this	affecting	the	configuration	of	political	 interests;	2.	Equilibrium:	 in	 the	 sense	 that	while	 these	 economic	 ‘sacrifices’	 are	 real	 and	 so	provide	 the	ground	 for	 an	equilibrium,	 they	do	not	 as	 such	 challenge	 the	political	power	which	 sets	 precise	 limits	 to	 this	 equilibrium;	 and	 3.	Unstable:	 in	 the	 sense	that	these	limits	of	the	equilibrium	are	set	by	the	political	conjuncture.669		Poulantzas’	 conceptualisation	 of	 the	 “unstable	 equilibrium	 of	 compromise”	 refers	 to	 the	role	 of	 the	 state	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 capitalist	 system:	 the	 state	 is	 for	 him	 (as	 it	 was	originally	 for	 Gramsci)	 the	 principal	 institution	 that	 naturalises	 and	 implements	 the	compromise.670	The	 latter	 is	 diachronically	 presented	 by	 the	 elites	 as	 a	 necessary	 and	valuable	concession	–	in	effect,	a	new	form	of	“social	contract”	that	shall	allow	things	to	“go	on”	–	even	more	so,	following	a	crisis	of	some	form	(e.g.	in	the	case	of	the	IMF/EU	bailout	programmes	 in	 the	 Eurozone).	 Yet,	 in	 reality,	 the	 concessions	 made	 through	 the	 new	contract	are	valuable	only	for	one	part	of	the	society.	Interestingly,	it	is	this	benefited	part	that	has	to	be	initially	convinced	about	the	usefulness	of	the	previously	described	strategy,	as	 its	 long-term	 and	 “invisible”	 character	 comes	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 capitalist	 urge	 for	
immediate	accumulation:			
																																																								669	Nicos	Poulantzas,	Political	Power	and	Social	Classes	(Timothy	O’Hagan	tr,	Verso	Books,	New	York	1975)	p.	192.	670	It	is	particularly	easy	to	recognise	this	process,	if	we	apply	it	to	today’s	post-crisis	context.	In	our	case,	 the	 “struggle”	 of	 governments	 and	 administrations	 around	 the	 world	 to	 achieve	 an	increasingly	abstract	 notion	 of	 economic	 balance	 –	 especially	with	 regard	 to	 the	management	 of	public	 finance	 –	 has	 ended	 up	 preserving	 in	 full	 the	 social,	 political	 and,	 of	 course,	 economic	relationships	that	were	established	in	the	pre-crisis	period.	
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The	notion	of	the	general	interest	of	the	‘people’,	an	ideological	notion	covering	an	institutional	operation	of	the	capitalist	state,	expresses	a	real	fact:	namely	that	this	state,	 by	 its	 very	 structure,	 gives	 to	 the	 economic	 interests	 of	 certain	 dominated	classes	 guarantees	 which	 may	 even	 be	 contrary	 to	 the	 short-term	 economic	interests	 of	 the	 dominant	 classes,	 but	 which	 are	 compatible	 with	 their	 political	interests	and	their	hegemonic	domination.671		 This	 seeming	 “anomaly”	 in	 the	 short-term	 function	 of	 the	 state	 is	 explained	 in	
Empire,	 by	 Negri	 and	 Hardt,	 who	 “complement”	 Poulantzas’	 analysis	 by	 identifying	spectacle	as	 the	 “glue	 that	 sticks	 together	 the	diverse	 functions	and	bodies	of	 the	hybrid	constitutions”672.	 In	 today’s	world,	 the	 latter	 are	 not	 predominantly	 defined	 by	 the	 state	anymore,	as	we	move	further	away	from	the	Foucauldian	“author	state”	and	closer	to	the	Deleuzian	 “body-without-organs	 state”.673	Rather,	 today’s	 “hybrid	 constitutions”	 are	 the	agents	that	we	have	identified	in	the	previous	chapter	as	some	of	the	cornerstones	of	Data	Capitalism:	search	engines,	social	media	platforms,	financial	markets	and	their	national	and	transnational	 regulatory	 bodies.	 Collectively,	 those	 agents	 have	 replaced	 the	 role	 of	 the	state,	although	they	almost	always	include	it	as	a	constituent	of	their	activities	(most	often	as	 a	 “façade”	 of	 democratic	 legitimization	whenever	 needed).	 In	 other	 words,	 we	might	have	moved	from	Poulantzas’	monopolist	role	of	the	state	to	the	multi-factor	world	of	the	Empire;	however,	 this	“expansion”	has	been	accompanied	by	an	unprecedented	elevation	of	spectacle	 in	our	networked	public	spheres,	which	“unifies”	and	conceals	the	persistent	reality	that	the	Greek	political	sociologist	was	describing	in	his	writings	four	decades	ago.	As	 Dmytri	 Kleiner	 rightly	 observes	 in	 his	 Telekommunist	 Manifesto,	 the	 Internet	 has	disappeared	behind	the	(spectacular)	Web	2.0,	which	constitutes,	through	its	optimization	for	 user	 input	 and	 social	media,	 a	mechanism	 of	 “private	 capture	 of	 community-created	value”.674	Within	those	conditions,	it	is	not	only	“the	open	terrain	of	political	exchange	and	
																																																								671	Poulantzas	op.	cit.,	p.	191.	672	Hardt	and	Negri,	Empire,	op.	cit.,	p.	321.	Notably,	Guy	Debord	writes	in	the	third	thesis	of	Society	
of	the	Spectacle:	“The	spectacle	appears	at	once	as	society	itself,	as	a	part	of	society	and	as	a	means	of	unification.	As	a	part	of	society,	it	is	that	sector	where	all	attention,	all	consciousness,	converges.	Being	 isolated	 –	 and	 precisely	 for	 that	 reason	 –	 this	 sector	 is	 the	 locus	 of	 illusion	 and	 false	consciousness;	 the	 unity	 it	 imposes	 is	 merely	 the	 official	 language	 of	 generalized	 separation”.	Debord,	loc.	cit.	673	Jerry	 Everard,	Virtual	 States:	 The	 Internet	 and	 the	 Boundaries	 of	 the	 Nation-State	(Routledge,	London	2000)	p.	45.		674	Kleiner,	op.	cit.,	p.	17.	
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participation”675	that	may	completely	evaporate	due	to	spectacle’s	impact;	it	is,	potentially,	
any	political	initiative	and	action,	public	and	private.		Finally,	 it	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 the	 erosive	 power	 of	 “integrated	 spectacle”	 starts	and	 finishes	 with	 the	 same	 agent:	 the	 proletariat.	 Notably,	 although	 Negri	 and	 Hardt	recognize	 the	 counter-revolutionary	 power	 of	 spectacle,	 in	 the	 end,	 they	 seem	 to	underestimate	 its	 impact	 on	 the	 multitude	 as	 their	 proposed	 “reincarnation”	 of	 the	proletariat.	 More	 specifically,	 by	 predominantly	 associating	 spectacle’s	 effects	 with	 “the	impossibility	of	traditional	forms	of	struggle”,	they	are	suggesting	that	the	new	forms	and	means	 provided	 by	 networked	 media	 will	 allow	 the	 multitude	 to	 escape	 from	 it.676	However,	 as	 it	 has	 been	 proven	 during	 the	 crisis	 and	 its	 aftermath,	 accessibility	 and	connectivity	 do	 not	 entail	 the	 automatic	 cultivation	 of	 a	 more	 fertile	 ground	 for	 the	development	 of	 the	 proletariat	 as	 the	 foremost	 revolutionary	 instrument.	 Rather,	 the	opposite:	the	totalitarian	enactment	of	the	accessible	and	interconnected	image	that	fuels	contemporary	spectacle,	within	a	condition	of	endless	crisis	(as	Italian	philosopher	Giorgio	Agamben	 calls	 the	 post-2008	 socio-political	 status),677	has	 been	 functioning	 as	 the	most	important	 refuge	 of	 an	 economic	 model	 that	 is	 under	 threat	 from	 its	 own	 structural	impasses.			
Systemic	Instability	and	the	Rise	of	“Cybertopos”		However,	 the	 spectacularized	 abstraction	 of	 the	 “unstable	 equilibrium	 of	 compromise”	does	not	conceal	only	 its	content,	but	also	 its	very	nature	and	architecture.	 Interestingly,	the	elucidation	of	this	nature	is	provided	by	Poulantzas	himself	in	one	of	his	later	writings.	More	specifically,	in	his	article	titled	“The	Capitalist	State:	A	Reply	To	Miliband	and	Laclau”	(1976),	 which	 was	 published	 just	 a	 few	 months	 after	 Political	Power	and	Social	Classes,	Poulantzas	 argues	 that	 the	 realisation	of	 the	 “unstable	 equilibrium	of	 compromise”	 is,	 in	fact,	an	issue	of	appearance	and	surface	in	more	than	one	ways.	As	he	points	out,	it	is	not	only	 the	socioeconomic	compromise	 that	 it	mediates	 that	 is	 forged,	but	also	 the	absolute	power	of	its	enabler	–	the	mastery	of	the	state:																																																										675	Hardt	and	Negri,	Empire,	op.	cit.,	p.	321.	676	ibid.,	pp.	323-324.	677	‘The	 Endless	 Crisis	 as	 an	 Instrument	 of	 Power:	 In	 Conversation	 with	 Giorgio	 Agamben’	(Versobooks.com,	 4	 June	 2013)	 <http://www.versobooks.com/blogs/1318-the-endless-crisis-as-an-instrument-of-power-in-conversation-with-giorgio-agamben>	accessed	4	April	2016.	
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The	 various	 organs	 and	 branches	 of	 the	 state	 (ministries	 and	 government	 offices,	executive	and	parliament,	central	administration	and	local	and	regional	authorities,	army,	 judiciary,	 etc.)	 reveal	major	 contradictions	among	 themselves,	 each	of	 them	frequently	constituting	the	seat	and	the	representative	–	in	short,	the	crystallization	–	 of	 this	 or	 that	 fraction	 of	 the	 power	 bloc,	 this	 or	 that	 specific	 and	 competing	interest.	In	this	context,	the	process	by	whereby	the	general	political	interest	of	the	power	 bloc	 is	 established,	 and	 whereby	 the	 state	 intervenes	 to	 ensure	 the	reproduction	of	the	overall	system,	may	well,	at	a	certain	level,	appear	chaotic	and	contradictory,	 as	 a	 ‘resultant’	 of	 these	 inter-organ	 and	 inter-branch	contradictions.678		However,	 if	 this	 systemic	 instability	 is	 an	 accurate	depiction	of	 reality,	 the	question	 that	convincingly	 emerges	 is,	 “why	 has	 not	 the	 system	 collapsed	 yet?”	 Quite	 evidently,	 the	answer	to	the	question	is	of	particular	important	for	those	citizens	who	stand	against	the	capitalist	model	adopted	by	 the	system;	namely,	 those	who	 locate	 themselves	at	 the	Left	side	 of	 the	 political	 spectrum,	 including	 the	 cultural	 producers	 whose	 works	 we	 have	explored	in	this	thesis.	As	Milton	Mueller	observes,	their	opposite	political	pole,	the	Right,	“now	consists	 of	 an	 increasingly	 strange	 combination	of	market	 liberalism	 in	 economics,	religious-based	social	conservatism,	and	extreme	nationalism	in	international	and	military	affairs.	 Policy	 toward	 Internet	 governance	 tends	 to	 be	 dominated	 by	 the	 nationalist	element.	The	 Internet	has	 always	posed	a	problem	 for	 the	 right	 and	 its	bundle	of	barely	compatible	 tendencies	 and	 constituencies”.679	Therefore,	 if	 we	 “update”	 Poulantzas’	analysis	in	view	of	the	current	historical	conjuncture,	we	can	ask:	why	Right-wing	policies	have	 not	 been	 defeated	 yet,	 given	 what	 the	 crisis	 of	 2008	 revealed	 so	 many	 of	 Data	Capitalism’s	inter-organ	and	inter-branch	impasses?		If	we	wish	 to	 find	 a	 comprehensive	 response	 to	 those	questions,	 then,	we	 should,	perhaps,	 focus	 not	 only	 on	 the	 remarkable	 power	 of	 the	 tools	 that	 Data	 Capitalism	 is	employing	in	order	to	survive,	like	spectacle,	but,	also,	on	the	modes	of	resistance	that	we	need	 to	develop	 as	 cultural	 producers	 as	well	 as	 citizens	 in	 order	 to	 effectively	 confront	such	 tools.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 the	 post-crisis	 world,	 Matteo	 Pasquinelli	 associates	 those	practices	 of	 resistance	 with	 the	 very	 notion	 that	 lies	 at	 the	 core	 of	 Data	 Capitalism’s																																																									678	Nicos	Poulantzas,	‘The	Capitalist	State:	A	Reply	To	Miliband	and	Laclau’	(1976)	New	Left	Review	95	 pp.	 65-83	 quoted	 in	 Nicos	 Poulantzas,	The	 Poulantzas	 Reader:	 Marxism,	 Law,	 and	 the	
State	(Martin	James	ed,	Verso	Books,	London/	New	York	2008)	p.	285.	679	Mueller,	op.	cit.,	p.	262.	
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architecture:	the	paradox.	As	Pasquinelli	claims,			 exodus	must	be	 established	 in	 an	 intensive	 and	paradoxical	way.	Resistance	must	set	 itself	 inside	 and	 against	 the	 structure	 of	 capitalism,	 as	 Mario	 Tronti	 was	suggesting	already	in	the	‘60s	(and	not	just	inside	and	against	its	ideological	code,	as	a	Lacanian	new-wave	is	back	to	suggest	today).	Post-utopianism	is	to	be	replaced	by	
endo-utopianism.	Where	 to	 find	 an	 intensive	 yet	 practical	 line	 of	 flight	 behind	 the	ideological	 spectacle	 of	 capitalism?	 Far	 from	 psychoanalysis,	 looking	 to	 the	mundane	chronicles	close	to	us,	it	is	in	the	very	financial	crisis	of	2009	that	we	can	find	an	example	of	an	intrinsic	breach	affecting	the	system.	The	political	diagram	of	
endo-utopianism	 should	 be	 found	 along	 that	 “systemic	 risk”	 of	 capitalism	 that	 has	been	only	recently	acknowledged	by	financial	institutions.680		Pasquinelli’s	 “map”	 for	 an	 exodus	 from	Data	 Capitalism	 is,	 thus,	 defined	 by	 three	major	elements:	Firstly,	“paradox”	should	be	viewed	as	a	resistance	strategy,	rather	than	merely	as	a	“weapon”	that	can	be	claimed	exclusively	by	the	dominant	economic	system.	Secondly,	the	practical	use	of	 those	strategies	 should	adopt	an	outward-looking	perspective,	which	would	be	positioned	opposite	 the	 tendency	of	 the	Left	 towards	 ideological	 introspection.	And,	 finally,	 the	 strategy	 should	 accentuate	 the	 systemic	 incapacities	 that	 have	 already	been	 revealed	 and	 acknowledged	 during	 the	 crisis,	 even	 by	 financial	 institutions	themselves.	 Accordingly,	 if	 we	 take	 into	 account	 the	 reliance	 of	 Data	 Capitalism	 on	networks’	immateriality,	then	the	foremost	paradox	that	could	fuel	the	resistance	of	“endo-utopianism”	would	be	its	principal	formulation	not	from	the	point	of	view	of	networks,	but	rather	from	that	of	physical	spaces.	This	suggestion	might	appear	to	come	in	contrast	with	the	famous	assertion	of	Manuel	Castells	that	the	network	society	is	defined	by	the	space	of	flows,	 rather	 than	 the	 space	 of	 places.681	However,	 the	 proposed	 “reversal”	 could	 be	justified	if	we	consider	the	fact	that	the	space	of	flows	has	been	thoroughly	dominated	by	capital	 in	 the	 historical	 context	 of	 Data	 Capitalism.	 As	 a	 result,	 our	 capacity	 to	 exert	sustained	political	pressure	within	 the	network	society,	 still	depends	significantly	on	 the	notion	of	“place”	–	the	other	pole	in	Castells’	binary,682	which	we	seem	to	have	“forgotten”	due	to	the	seductive	spectacularization	of	networks.		
																																																								680	Pasquinelli,	op.	cit.,	p.	74.	681	Castells,	loc.	cit.	682	Fuchs,	op.	cit.,	p.	316.	
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In	order	to	elucidate	further	this	“paradoxical”	proposition,	we	have	to	consider	that	one	the	most	important	objectives	of	the	socio-political	movements	that	were	engendered	by	 the	 financial	 crisis	of	2008	has	been	 the	effort	 to	 “reclaim”	and	 “re-appropriate”.	This	aspiration	 referred	 not	 only	 to	 economic	 resources,	 but	 also	 to	 social	 roles,	 democratic	functions,	human	rights,	and	–	of	course	–	urban	spaces.	Syntagma	Square	in	Greece,	Puerta	del	 Sol	 in	Madrid,	 Zuccotti	 Park	 in	New	York,	 as	well	 as	 some	 of	 the	most	 iconic	 public	locations	 around	 the	 world	 saw	 diverse,	 or	 even	 seemingly	 “irreconcilable”	 in	 their	ideological	 composition	 crowds	 gather	 to	 demand	 change.	 Within	 the	 reality	 of	 Data	Capitalism	 and	 its	multiple	 self-generated	 crises,	 people	 increasingly	 felt	 that	 they	 have	now	been	totally	deprived	of	a	place	–	“topos”	 in	ancient	and	modern	Greek.	This	 feeling	might	 be	 associated	 with	 the	 deprivation	 of	 a	 social	 “topos”,	 due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 equal	opportunities;	 the	 negation	 of	 a	 political	 “topos”,	 because	 of	 the	 lack	 of	 adequate	democratic	representation;	or,	even,	the	denial	of	a	literal	“topos”,	due	to	the	lack	of	access	to	public	space,	as	the	latter	is	being	progressively	privatized,	gentrified	and	commodified	–	 especially	 in	 urban	 areas.	 It	 is	 worth	 remembering	 that	 Thomas	 More,	 the	 coiner	 of	“utopia”,	which	literally	means	“no	place”,	chose	an	island	as	the	location	where	he	placed	his	 ideal	 society.683	Any	 island	 constitutes	 a	 geographic	 formation	 that	 privileges	 the	development	of	highly	individual	traits,	through	a	natural	process	of	“appropriation”.	This	encompasses	 both	 the	 material	 and	 the	 immaterial	 environments,	 as	 expressed	 in	 the	landscape,	the	biology	of	the	different	organisms,	and	–	most	relevant	to	the	subject	of	this	thesis	–	culture.	Without	this	process	of	“appropriation”,	which	transforms	a	“space”	into	a	“topos”,	 space	 would	 have	 remained	 “neutral”,	 or	 –	 more	 accurately	 –	 “empty”.	 For	example,	 in	 simple	 geographic	 terms,	 we	 could	 claim	 that	 through	 the	 process	 of	appropriation,	“a	major	piece	of	land	surrounded	by	water,	west	of	the	country	known	as	‘France’”	 (space),	 becomes	 “Great	 Britain”	 (topos).	 Quite	 evidently,	 when	 referring	 to	“Great	Britain”,	we	 are	not	 evoking	merely	 its	 physicality,	 but	 also	 its	 people,	 languages,	traditions,	habits,	architecture,	religions	and	artistic	production,	amongst	others.	Accordingly,	if	we	were	to	formulate	the	challenge	of	this	process	in	socioeconomic	terms,	 then	we	could	claim	that	an	“empty	space”	should	be	understood,	before	anything	else,	as	an	alienated	“space”	–	a	“space”	whose	nature	is	defined	by	the	elites.	Even	when	the	ruling	classes	do	not	own,	or	are	not	able	 to	directly	profit	 from	a	particular	“space”,	they	are	in	a	position	to	superimpose	a	particular	meaning	on	it	–	a	meaning	that	delimits	
																																																								683	Thomas	More’s	Utopia	was	first	published	in	1516,	in	Belgium.		
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the	ways	in	which	it	can	be	conceptualized	and,	thus,	used	by	the	rest	of	the	social	body.684	Quite	 predictably,	 the	 most	 direct	 way	 of	 using	 art	 in	 order	 to	 re-imbue	 space	 with	subjectivity	 is	by	occupying	 it	with	politically	engaged	artworks	or	cultural	 initiatives,	as	several	of	the	artists	referenced	in	this	thesis	have	demonstrated	(e.g.	Maurice	Benayoun’s	
Occupy	Wall	 Screens	 in	 New	 York,	 or	 the	 multiple	 projects	 that	 “hacked”	 the	 streets	 of	Dublin	 in	 the	 context	 of	 Science	 Gallery’s	 Hack	 the	 City	 exhibition).	 In	 the	 post-crisis	historical	 context,	 such	 an	 attempt	 to	 expose	 capitalism’s	 function	 in	 public	 is	 naturally	akin	 to	 the	 different	 forms	 of	 protest	 that	 have	 been	 employed	 by	 social	 movements	around	the	world.	As	digital	media	theorist	Paolo	Gerbaudo	argues,	“contemporary	popular	movements	are	marked	by	a	stress	on	unity	and	the	adoption	of	practices	of	 ‘centring’685	which	 strongly	 resonate	with	 Laclau’s	 description	 of	 populism”.686	What	 is	 interesting	 to	note	about	the	work	of	Argentine	political	theorist	Ernesto	Laclau	is	the	fact	that	he	focuses	on	defining	populism’s	 significance	not	 in	 terms	of	 its	 content,	 but	 rather	 in	 terms	of	 its	form	 –	 namely,	 through	 the	 division	 that	 it	 draws	 between	 “the	 people”	 and	 “the	institutional	system”,687	or	the	“institutionalized	‘other’”.688	In	the	case	of	the	protests	that	have	come	to	define	the	early	2010s,	the	tactic	of	the	mass	sit-in	in	central	squares	and	on	the	streets	in	front	of	major	financial	institutions	could	be	perceived	as	a	material-physical	version	 of	 a	 “people’s	 consensus”	 directed	 against	 the	 immaterial	 ideological	 consensus	imposed	by	the	financial	and	political	elites	of	Data	Capitalism,	who	caused	the	crisis.	This	antagonistic	 binary	 was	 overtly	 expressed	 in	 the	 main	 slogan	 used	 by	 the	 Occupy	movement,	“We	are	the	99%”.	In	other	words,	the	movement’s	mass	sit-ins	translated	the	opposition	 against	 the	 ideological	 dominance	 of	 neoliberal	 capitalism	 and	 its	 division	 of	wealth	into	a	physical	entity:	the	huge	majority	of	the	“have-nots”	(99%)	finally	occupied	the	space	controlled	by	the	tiny	minority	of	“haves”	(1%).	
																																																								684	In	The	Production	of	Space,	 French	Marxist	 philosopher	 and	 sociologist	Henri	 Lefebvre	 asserts	that	 the	representations	of	space	“are	tied	to	the	relations	of	production	and	to	the	 ‘order’	which	those	relations	impose,	and	hence	to	knowledge,	to	signs,	to	codes,	and	to	‘frontal’	relations”	(p.	33).	For	Lefebvre,	“social	space	is	produced	and	reproduced	in	connection	with	the	forces	of	production	(and	with	the	relations	of	production)”.	These	“forces	[…]	are	not	taking	over	a	pre-existing,	empty	or	neutral	space,	or	a	space	determined	solely	by	geography,	climate,	anthropology…”	(p.	77).	What	the	abstract	space	of	capitalism	is	aiming	to	conceal	is	homogenization,	hierarchization,	and	social	fragmentation.	See:	Henri	Lefebvre,	The	Production	of	Space	(Donald	Nicholson-Smith	tr,	Blackwell	Publishers,	Oxford	1991).		685	In	 architecture,	 “centring”	 signifies	 the	 framing	 used	 to	 support	 an	 arch	 or	 dome	 while	 it	 is	under	construction.	686	Gerbaudo,	op.	cit.,	p.	11.	687	Ernesto	Laclau,	On	Populist	Reason	(Verso	Books	2005)	p.	73.	688	ibid.,	p.	117.	
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Accordingly,	if	we	tried	to	connect	the	spatial	dimension	of	such	political	action	with	the	cultural	paradigm	of	Web-based	art,	we	should	not	focus	merely	on	the	lack	of	physical	space	as	articulated	through	cyberspace;	rather,	as	we	have	already	suggested,	we	should	address	 the	 juxtaposition	 of	 “topos”	with	 a	 potentially	 “empty”	 and	 alienated	 space.	 The	most	 important,	 perhaps,	 gesture	 in	 order	 to	 bridge	 those	 two	 entities	 is	 to	 add	 to	 the	dematerialized	 notion	 of	 space,	 which	 defines	 the	 Internet,	 elements	 of	 identity	 and	direction,	 which	 would	 make	 its	 “ownership”	 not	 only	 possible,	 but	 also	 socially	 and	politically	meaningful.	This	is	the	sole	way	in	which	the	time	that	we	spend	navigating	the	Internet	 would	 be	 in	 a	 position	 to	 counteract	 the	 “empty”	 and	 “homogenous”	 time	 of	“powerless	 socialization”	 that	 largely	 dominates	 our	 relationship	 with	 the	 networked	media	 developed	 in	 the	 context	 of	 Data	 Capitalism.	 Interestingly,	 in	 On	 the	 Concept	 of	
History	 Benjamin	 ascribes	 to	 the	 action	 of	 fighting	 this	 particular	 kind	 of	 time	 a	 truly	revolutionary	 character,	 which	 lies	 at	 the	 very	 core	 of	 History’s	 transformation.	 As	 he	claims,	“History	 is	 the	object	of	a	construction	whose	place	 is	 formed	not	 in	homogenous	and	 empty	 time,	 but	 in	 that	 which	 is	 fulfilled	 by	 the	 here-and-now	 [Jetztzeit]”.	 Notably,	“Jetztzeit”	connects	structurally	the	notions	of	space	and	time.	As	a	result,	the	proposition	made	 by	 Benjamin	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 this	 connection	 entails	 that	 in	 order	 to	 escape	 the	continuum	 of	 homogenous	 and	 empty	 time	 and	 reclaim	 History	 (revolution),689	we	 also	need	to	escape	the	continuum	of	institutionalized	space.	Therefore,	what	 emerges	 as	 an	 important	 prerequisite	 for	 the	 exploitation	 of	 the	potentialities	 opened	 by	 networked	media	 is	 the	 transition	 from	 cyberspace	 to	 another	type	 of	 spatial	 entity	 that	 would	 be	 capable	 of	 functioning	 as	 an	 agent	 of	 ideological	appropriation.	I	will	call	this	entity	“cybertopos”.	In	many	respects,	the	proposition	for	the	creation	of	cybertopos	could	be	regarded	as	a	resolution	to	the	conundrum	of	 the	“ideal”	relationship	 between	 cybernetics	 and	 communism,	 which	 has	 underpinned	 the	 entirety	this	 thesis.	 In	 order	 to	 understand	 this	 “conciliatory”	 role	 of	 cybertopos,	we	 can	 turn	 to	Nick	 Dyer-Witheford’s	 most	 recent	 book	 Cyber-Proletariat	 (2015),	 in	 which	 two	diametrically	 different	 responses	 to	 the	 question	 “how	 much	 cybernetics	 communism	needs”	 are	 identified.690	On	 the	 one	 hand,	 pro-cybernetic	 accelerationism	 expresses	 the	desire	 to	employ	networked	technologies	 to	such	unfathomable,	omnipresent	extent,	and	with	 such	 speed,	 that	 capitalist	 pathologies	 will	 not	 be	 able	 to	 manifest	 themselves	 as																																																									689	As	we	have	noted	 in	the	first	chapter	of	 this	 thesis,	Benjamin	directly	connects	“Jetztzeit”	with	“the	 consciousness	 of	 exploding	 the	 continuum	 of	 history	 [that]	 is	 peculiar	 to	 the	 revolutionary	classes	in	the	moment	of	their	action”.	(Walter	Benjamin,	On	the	Concept	of	History,	Thesis	XV).	690	Dyer-Witheford,	Cyber-Proletariat:	Global	Labour	in	the	Digital	Vortex,	op.	cit.,	p.	197.	
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concrete	 barriers	 produced	 by	 the	 system’s	 governance	 structures.691	And,	 on	 the	 other	hand,	 anti-cybernetic	 localism	 constitutes	 a	 reaction	 to	 the	 pervasiveness	 of	 capitalist	automation	–	a	“halt”	to	capitalism’s	spatio-temporal	expansion	through	the	restriction,	or	rejection	of	technological	expansion.	Dyer-Witheford	connects	the	two	seemingly	opposite	directions	on	the	historical	timeline	by	making	the	suggestion	that,	“the	most	likely	result	of	the	acceleration	of	capital’s	current	technological	tendencies	is	an	involuntary	localism	brought	 about	 by	 social,	 geopolitical	 and	 ecological	 disasters	 that	 disintegrates	 the	subsuming	 processes	 of	 globalization”.692	In	 other	 words,	 Dyer-Witheford	 sees	 this	correlation	as	 the	unwanted	result	of	a	 catastrophe,	or	–	 in	 the	best-case	scenario	–	as	a	traumatic	compromise	generated	by	the	global	economic	crisis.		In	 direct	 contrast,	 the	 formation	of	 cybertopoi	 constitutes	 a	 consciously	 aimed	 for	outcome,	which	 is	 in	a	position	 to	produce	a	much	more	proactive	context	of	 ideological	engagement.	 The	 latter	 could	 be	 associated	 with	 the	 original	 signification	 of	 “crisis”	 in	ancient	 Greek,	 in	 which	 the	 word	 is	 associated	 (amongst	 others)	 with	 the	 ability	 to	distinguish	 (Aristotle),	 decide	 (Aeschylus)	 and	 fight	 (Herodotus).693	In	 other	 words,	cybertopos	expresses	an	intentional-conscious	focus	on	the	locale	catalysed	by	networked	technologies,	 rather	 than	 a	 retreat	 of	 the	 defeated	 into	 some	 kind	 of	 geographical	 and	ideological	 margins.	 It	 should,	 thus,	 be	 conceptualised	 as	 the	 principal	 tool	 of	 a	 third	tendency	to	be	added	to	the	two	identified	by	Dyer-Witheford,	which	we	could	name	“pro-cybernetic	 localism”.	 However,	 in	 contradistinction	 to	 concepts	 like	 Bourriaud’s	microtopias,	 which	 are	 looking	 “inwards”,	 the	 cybertopoi	 of	 pro-cybernetic	 localism	 are	produced	through	the	engagement	with	the	distinctiveness	of	physical	spaces,	in	order	to	then	look	“outwards”.	This	extroversion	becomes	possible	only	thanks	to	the	capacities	of	interconnectivity	offered	by	contemporary	 technological	networks.	Therefore,	 if	we	were																																																									691	In	left-wing	political	theory,	the	most	prominent	text	relevant	to	the	concept	of	accelerationism	published	 in	 recent	years	 is	 the	2013	#ACCELERATE	MANIFESTO	for	an	Accelerationist	Politics,	by	Alex	 Williams	 and	 Nick	 Srnicek.	 The	 main	 argument	 expressed	 by	 the	 two	 authors	 is	 that	“Accelerationism	 pushes	 towards	 a	 future	 that	 is	 more	 modern,	 an	 alternative	 modernity	 that	neoliberalism	 is	 inherently	 unable	 to	 generate”.	 See:	 Alex	 Williams	 and	 Nick	 Srnicek,	‘#ACCELERATE	 MANIFESTO	 for	 an	 Accelerationist	 Politics’	 (Criticallegalthinking.com,	 14	 May	2013)	 <http://criticallegalthinking.com/2013/05/14/accelerate-manifesto-for-an-accelerationist-politics/>	accessed	4	April	2016.	For	a	critique	of	Williams	and	Srnicek’s	proposed	“politics	at	ease	with	 a	 modernity	 of	 abstraction,	 complexity,	 globality	 and	 technology”,	 see:	 Nina	 Power,	‘Decapitalism,	Left	Scarcity,	and	the	State’	 [2015]	Fillip	<http://fillip.ca/content/decapitalism-left-scarcity-and-the-state#notes>	accessed	4	April	2016.	692	Dyer-Witheford,	Cyber-Proletariat:	Global	Labour	in	the	Digital	Vortex,	op.	cit.,	p.	197.	693 	‘Epitome	 of	 the	 Great	 Dictionary	 of	 Ancient	 Greek	 Language’	 (Greek-language.gr)	<http://www.greek-language.gr/Resources/ancient_greek/tools/liddel-scott/search.html?lq=κρίσις%5Bῐ%5D>	accessed	4	April	2016.	
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to	 position	 cybertopos	 within	 Milton	 Mueller’s	 axes,	 then,	 we	 could	 claim	 that	 the	 full	development	 of	 cybertopoi	 constitutes	 a	 prerequisite	 in	 order	 for	 the	 pendulum	 of	denationalised	 liberalism	 and	 global	 governmentality	 to	 reach	 some	 kind	 of	 productive	balance,	which	could,	then,	be	given	a	more	concrete	political	direction.		On	 the	 level	 of	 artistic	 practice,	 several	 of	 the	 projects	 that	we	 have	 examined	 in	chapter	 two	 display	 elements	 of	 pro-cybernetic	 localism.	 This	 is	 the	 case	 –	 to	 different	extents	 –	 in	 the	 interactive	 maps	 of	 Istanbul	 designed	 by	 Burak	 Arikan;	 the	 mapping	platforms	 of	 the	 National	 Museum	 of	 Contemporary	 Art	 in	 Athens;	 the	 circulation	 of	Christian	Nold’s	Bijlmer	Euro	 in	Amsterdam;	or,	 the	various	artist-led	 time	bank	projects	that	 have	 emerged	 in	 neighbourhoods	 around	 the	 world	 thanks	 to	 networked	 media.	Nevertheless,	an	additional	project	 to	which	we	could	turn	 in	order	to	 locate	most	of	 the	previously	 analysed	 characteristics	 of	 cybertopos	 informing	 each	 other	 in	 a	 harmonious	balance	 is	 NAMAland	 (2010)	 by	 the	 Irish	 new	 media	 artist	 and	 academic	 Conor	McGarrigle.694	NAMAland	was	 an	Augmented	Reality	 (AR)	 smartphone	application,	which	used	open	data	in	order	to	visualize	the	Irish	financial	crisis,	following	the	collapse	of	the	country’s	property	market.	More	specifically,	McGarrigle’s	application	over-layered	Dublin	with	 information	 regarding	 the	 properties	 in	 the	 city	 reportedly	 owned	 by	 NAMA,	 the	National	 Asset	 Management	 Agency.	 NAMA	 was	 created	 in	 late	 2009	 by	 the	 Irish	government	 in	order	 to	acquire	property	development	 loans	 from	the	country’s	banks	 in	return	for	government	bonds,	acting	–	in	effect	–	as	a	“bad	bank”695.	However,	NAMA	failed	in	its	original	mission	and	additional	support	was	needed	from	the	EU	and	the	IMF,	which	came	in	the	form	of	a	bailout	in	November	2010.	By	the	end	of	2011,	a	total	of	€74	billion	in	loans	had	been	transferred	to	NAMA.696	Quite	surprisingly,	however,	it	was	not	until	14	April	 2015	 that	 NAMA	 became	 subject	 to	 Ireland’s	 Freedom	 of	 Information	 Act.697	Until	then,	 the	 organization’s	 dealings	 and	 assets	 remained	 semi-published,	 and	 it	 was	 only	thanks	 to	 the	 efforts	 political	 activists	 and	 cultural	 producers	 like	McGarrigle	 that	 some	information	 could	 be	 verified	 in	 the	 years	 that	 preceded	 this	 inclusion.	 More	 than	 120																																																									694	‘NAMAland’	(Walkspace.org)	<http://www.walkspace.org/namaland/>	accessed	4	April	2016.		695	A	“bad	bank”	is	a	corporate	structure	set	up	to	isolate	illiquid	and	high-risk	securities	by	buying	the	bad	loans	of	a	bank’s	nonperforming	assets	at	market	price.	By	transferring	the	bad	assets	of	an	institution	to	the	“bad	bank”,	the	bank	is	able	to	clear	its	balance	sheet	of	toxic	assets,	although	it	is	also	forced	to	take	write	downs.	Shareholders	lose	money	from	this	solution	and	not	the	depositors.	However,	when	the	state	undertakes	this	role	and	bails	out	a	bank,	the	shareholders	are	–	in	effect	–	all	citizens.	696 	‘NAMA:	 Key	 Financial	 Figures’	 (Nama.ie)	 <https://www.nama.ie/financial/key-financial-figures/>	accessed	4	April	2016.		697	‘NAMA:	 Freedom	 of	 Information’	 (Nama.ie)	 <https://www.nama.ie/freedom-of-information/>	accessed	4	April	2016.		
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properties	were	listed	in	McGarrigle’s	application,	and	they	were	revealed	to	the	users	of	the	application	by	a	“Monopoly	Man”	figure,	who	appeared	“over”	the	building	when	users	approached	it.	Notably,	the	application	attracted	more	than	45,000	users,	who	downloaded	the	application	on	their	smartphones	(Apple	or	Android),	and	even	the	poignant	title	of	the	project,	NAMAland,	managed	to	enter	into	general	usage	as	a	signifier	for	the	consequences	of	the	bank	bailouts	and	the	post-crisis	situation	of	Ireland	at	large.		
	Figure	68:	Conor	McGarrigle,	NAMAland	(2010)		In	his	awarded	academic	article	titled	“Augmented	Resistance:	 the	possibilities	 for	AR	and	data	driven	art”,698	McGarrigle	analysed	in	depth	not	only	NAMAland,	but	also	the	wider	 possibilities	 opened	 by	 the	 hybrid	 use	 of	 digital	 and	 physical	 spaces.	 McGarrigle	begins	his	article	by	noting	that	“situated	interventions	offer	powerful	new	methods	for	the	political	 activation	 of	 sites	 which	 enhance	 and	 strengthen	 traditional	 non-virtual	approaches	and	should	be	thought	of	as	complementary	to,	rather	than	replacing,	physical																																																										698	Conor	 McGarrigle,	 ‘Augmented	 Resistance:	 The	 Possibilities	 for	 AR	 and	 Data	 Driven	 Art’	 in	Lanfranco	Aceti	 and	others	 (eds),	Not	Here,	Not	There,	Leonardo	Electronic	Almanac,	 vol.	 19,	 no.	 1	(Leonardo/ISAST	 2013)	 pp.	 106	 –	 115.	 The	 article	 received	 the	 2014	 Leonardo	 Award	 for	Excellence	 by	 Leonardo/The	 International	 Society	 for	 the	 Arts,	 Sciences	 and	 Technology	(Leonardo/ISAST).	
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intervention”.699	This	 is	particularly	 true	 in	 the	case	of	 interventions	with	strong	political	aspirations,	for	the	combination	of	virtual	interventions	with	physical	actions	can	radically	multiply	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 a	 project.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 NAMAland,	 the	 launch	 of	 the	application	 was	 accompanied	 by	 regular	 guided	 walks,	 whose	 routes	 were	 carefully	selected	by	 the	artist,	 in	order	 to	maximize	 their	 impact.	Those	gatherings	 functioned	as	“walking	forums”,	in	which	participants	were	able	to	discuss	the	issues	that	were	raised	by	NAMA’s	role	and	the	composition	of	its	portfolio	of	properties.700	In	combination	with	the			
	Figure	69:	Conor	McGarrigle,	NAMAland	participatory	event/walk	(2010)		artist’s	public	speaking	engagements,	wide	media	coverage	and	individual	interventions	by	users	 of	 the	 application	 (e.g.	 activists),	 the	 project	 raised	 public	 awareness	 of	 NAMA’s	dealings	 and	 opened	 up	 previously	 unavailable	 data.	 As	 a	 result,	NAMAland	managed	 to	connect	 data	 with	 the	 fabric	 of	 the	 city,	 thus	 visualizing	 “a	 complex	 system	 of	 abstract	financial	 dealings	 [and]	 transactions	 which	 have	 become	 disconnected	 from	 everyday	understanding,	but	yet	have	significant	and	very	real	consequences”.701		Finally,	it	is	worth	noting	that,	following	the	project,	Dublin’s	authorities	negotiated	with	NAMA	getting	access	to	 the	vacant	properties	of	 its	portfolio	 in	order	 to	host	cultural	activities.	As	McGarrigle	notes,	“if	augmented	reality	interventions	are	to	be	successful	it’s	important	that	they																																																									699	ibid.,	p.	107.	700	ibid.,	p.	113.	701	ibid.,	p.	113.	
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operate	as	spatial	interventions	first	and	avoid	becoming	overly	technology	focused.	Work	that	is	enacted	in	space	needs	to	be	effective	at	this	level,	with	the	technology	augmenting	the	 primary	 spatial	 experience”.702	Through	 ubiquitous	 network	 access,	 the	 location	awareness	 that	 McGarrigle	 refers	 may	 become	 a	 truly	 powerful	 tool	 in	 the	 hands	 of	politically	engaged	artists.				
Post-net	Participation:	Towards	a	“Value-driven	Demos”?		As	we	have	already	suggested,	the	most	important	lesson	that	new	media	artists	can	learn	from	 the	 crisis’	 modes	 of	 civic	 mobilization	 is	 that,	 in	 order	 to	 be	 effective,	 cyberspace	should	become	part	of	a	strategy	that	combines	physical	and	online	spaces,	whilst	 taking	into	account	the	individual	traits	of	both.	This	has	been	indicated	not	only	by	the	relatively	recent	mobilization	 initiatives	of	Occupy,	but	also	by	other	activist	movements	 that	have	preceded	it.703	Therefore,	the	open	and	broadly	distributed	character	of	networked	media	applications	 should	 be	 employed	 as	 a	 means	 to	 augment	 personal	 social	 and	 political	contexts	–	be	it	activist,	or	artistic.	As	a	result	of	this	process,	personal	identity	narratives	are	offered	the	opportunity	to	“replace	collective	social	scripts	as	the	bases	for	social	order.	These	narratives	become	interpersonal	linkages	as	network	organization	begins	to	displace	hierarchical	 institutions	 as	 primary	 membership	 and	 social	 recognition	 systems	 for	individuals”.704	Personal	 identity	 is,	 thus,	 transformed	into	a	starting	point	 in	the	attempt	to	communicate	issues	that	may	have	a	particular	significance	for	the	initiator-individual,	but	 also	 display	 a	wider	 relevance	 to	 the	 initiator’s	 immediate	 or	 –	 even	 –	wider	 social	milieu.	This	 strategy	of	deconstructing	and,	 then,	 reconstructing	 the	hierarchies	of	 social	signifiers705	has	 to	 be	 carried	 out	 by	 using	 both	 online	 and	 offline	 relationship-building	tools.706	In	 this	 context,	 “relationships”	 constitute	 not	 only	 a	 phenomenon	 developing	
																																																								702	Lanfranco	Aceti	and	Richard	Rinehart,	‘Interview	with	Conor	McGarrigle’	in	Lanfranco	Aceti	and	others	 (eds),	Not	 Here,	 Not	 There,	 Leonardo	 Electronic	 Almanac,	 vol.	 19,	 no.	 1	 (Leonardo/ISAST	2013)	p.	117.	703	See:	 Wim	 van	 de	 Donk	 and	 others	 (eds),	Cyberprotest:	 New	 Media,	 Citizens,	 and	 Social	
Movements	(Routledge,	 New	 York	 2004);	 and	Donatella	 Della	 Porta	 and	Mario	 Diani	 (eds),	Social	
Movements:	An	Introduction	(2nd	edn,	Blackwell	Publishing,	Oxford	2006).	704	Lance	 Bennett,	 ‘Communicating	 Global	 Activism:	 Strengths	 and	 Vulnerabilities	 of	 Networked	Politics’	 in	 Wim	 van	 de	 Donk	 and	 others	 (eds),	 Cyberprotest:	 New	 Media,	 Citizens	 and	 Social	
Movements	(Routledge	2004)	p.	112.	705	Donald	A	Norman,	‘The	Way	I	See	It:	Signifiers,	Not	Affordances’	(2008)	Interactions	vol.	15,	no.	6,	p.	18.		706	Lance	Bennett,	 ‘Social	Movement	Beyond	Borders:	Organization,	 Communication,	 and	Political	Capacity	 in	 Two	 Eras	 of	 Transnational	 Activism’	 in	 Donatella	 Della	 Porta	 and	 Sidney	 G	 Tarrow	
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between	humans,	or	humans	and	places,	but	also	an	expanded	condition	that	incorporates	the	means	of	communication	that	we	employ	–	in	our	case,	networked	media	applications.	The	 integration	 of	 online-digital	 and	 offline-physical	 interaction	 –	 as	 exemplified,	 for	instance,	 by	 McGarrigle’s	 NAMAland	 –	 should	 aim	 at	 forging	 the	 aforementioned	relationships,	with	a	view	to	generating	a	context	of	trust,	credibility	and,	last	but	not	least,	commitment	 to	 a	 common	 cause.	 The	 latter	 is	 fostered	 within	 particular	 channels	 of	communication	and	is	mediated	by	them	at	the	same	time.	In	 technocultural	 terms,	 the	 necessity	 expressed	 through	 this	 combination	constitutes	 –	 at	 least	 partly	 –	 a	 departure	 from	 the	 developing	 discourses	 around	 the	“Internet	 of	Things”	 and	 the	 “Internet	 of	 Places”.707	Alternatively,	 or	additionally,	what	 is	proposed	here	is	the	institution	of	an	“Internet	of	Praxis”,	which	would	embrace	all	types	of	human	 activity,	 including	 artistic	 praxis.	 Notably,	 the	 progression	 from	 the	 Internet	 of	Things	to	the	Internet	of	Places	represents	a	vision	in	which	it	is	not	simply	physical	items	that	become	“smart	objects”	equipped	with	sensors	that	can	be	remotely	controlled;	rather,	within	the	Internet	of	Places	we	can	identify	a	more	holistic	approach	to	the	development	and	utilization	of	the	capacities	offered	by	Web	2.0.	Through	the	introduction	of	a	spatial	dimension	 to	 what	 the	 Internet	 of	 Things	 can	 do,	 the	 Internet	 of	 Places	 expresses	 the	aspiration	to	become	an	omnipresent	technological	and	social	agent.	However,	 if	we	take	into	 account	 the	 economic	 aspect	 of	 such	 capacities	 and	 their	 commercial	 exploitation,	then,	the	political	potentialities	of	the	previously	described	spatial	expansion	can	be	easily	“downgraded”:	 if	 a	 place	 is	 to	 be	 perceived	 merely	 as	 another	 “thing”	 that	 produces	financially	 exploitable	 data,	 then,	 its	 subversive	 potentiality	 is	 inevitably	 lost.	 Therefore,	the	 Internet	 of	 Places	 needs	 to	 adopt	 characteristics	 of	 topology	 that	 go	 beyond	 data	generation	and	transmission.	In	other	words,	the	distributive	character	of	both	the	Internet	of	Things	and	the	Internet	of	Places	(in	terms	of	distributing	data,	which	may	be	exploited	by	 the	 corporations	 that	 dominate	 the	Web)	 has	 to	 become	 distributed	 (in	 terms	 of	 its	openness	to	modification,	personalisation	and,	in	the	end,	ownership).	As	we	have	already																																																																																																																																																																																			(eds),	Transnational	Protest	and	Global	Activism	(Rowman	&	Littlefield	Publishers	2004)	pp.	203	–	226.	707	For	an	account	of	 the	 Internet	of	Things,	 see	Friedemann	Mattern	and	Christian	Floerkemeier,	‘From	the	Internet	of	Computers	to	the	Internet	of	Things’	(2010)	Informatik-Spektrum	33,	no.	2	pp.	107-121;	Friedemann	Mattern	and	Christian	Floerkemeier,	‘From	the	Internet	of	Computers	to	the	Internet	 of	 Things’	 (Vs.inf.ethz.ch,	 2010)	 <http://www.vs.inf.ethz.ch/publ/papers/Internet-of-things.pdf>	accessed	4	April	2016.	For	an	account	of	the	Internet	of	Places,	see:	Giuseppe	Conti	and	others,	‘Enabling	the	“Internet	of	Places”:	A	Virtual	Structure	of	Space-Time-Tasks	to	Find	and	Use	Internet	 Resources’,	 Proceedings	 of	 the	 2nd	 International	 Conference	 on	 Computing	 for	Geospatial	
Research	&	Applications	(ACM,	New	York	2011)	p.	9.	
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suggested	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 the	 political	 potentialities	 of	 the	 Internet	 as	 a	distributed	network	have	been	largely	concealed	by	the	ideological	pervasiveness	of	Data	Capitalism,	which	is	vividly	reflected	in	the	multifaceted	corporate	control	exerted	on	the	World	 Wide	 Web.	 Thus,	 in	 many	 ways,	 the	 proposition	 for	 an	 “Internet	 of	 Praxis”	constitutes	and	invitation	to	re-engage	with	the	idea	of	the	Internet	as	a	distributed	entity.	Such	a	gesture	requires	the	subversion	of	the	Internet	of	Things	and/or	Places	as	top-down	mega-infrastructures	 of	 interconnected	 every-things,	 with	 a	 view	 to	 articulating	 viable	bottom-up	alternatives.708		 The	viability	of	this	proposition	is	closely	connected	with	the	term	“praxis”,	which	points	 towards	 the	 role	 of	 the	 human	 agent.	 We	 should	 not	 forget	 that	 the	 creation	 of	cybertopos	is	impossible	without	the	human	agency	–	namely,	without	the	introduction	of	personal-“unique”	 elements	 to	 the	dialogue	developed	between	 the	online	 space	 and	 the	physical	 space.	 The	 enabler	 of	 this	 amalgamation	 can	 only	 be	 a	 different	 kind	 of	engagement	 with	 both	 of	 them,	 which	 I	 will	 term	 as	 “post-net	 participation”.	 Post-net	participation	consists	in	the	development	of	the	socio-political	participatory	potentialities	of	 the	Web	 in	combination	with	our	perception	of	physical	reality,	which	might	(or	might	not)	 materialize	 in	 a	 set	 of	 concurrent	 actions	 taking	 place	 online	 and	 offline.	 In	 other	words,	 post-net	 participation	 is	 the	 tool	 that	 “bridges”	 our	 online	 initiatives	 with	 the	“reality	 on	 the	 ground”,	 by	 enriching	 them	 with	 the	 “added	 value”	 provided	 by	 the	recognition	 of	 the	 capacities	 and	 the	 limitations	 of	 both.	 This	 process	 of	 recognition,	 or	consciousness-raising,	 should	 not	 be	 equated	 with	 the	 consciousness	 of	 the	 proletariat;	however,	it	can	be	understood	as	a	significant	prerequisite	for	its	formation.		Accordingly,	 if	we	accept	that	the	main	element	that	defines	Data	Capitalism	is	the	“financialization	 of	 bios”,	 then,	 post-net	 participation	may	 be	 conceptualised	 as	 the	 tool	that	will	allow	us	–	at	least	partly	–	to	refute	this	process.	More	specifically,	the	role	of	post-net	participation	 lies	 in	bringing	 “bios”	 and	 “zoē”	next	 to	 each	other,	with	 the	 aim	of	 re-evaluating	them	and	–	ultimately	–	proposing	a	new	kind	of	“bios”.	This	function	becomes	salient	 when	 we	 take	 into	 account	 the	 interpretation	 of	 those	 two	 Greek	 words	 that	 is	provided	by	Giorgio	Agamben	in	the	introduction	of	his	book	Homo	Sacer	(1998).	Agamben	elaborates	on	the	political	signification	of	“bios”	and	“zoē”,	in	order	to	illuminate	their	deep	differences.	As	he	notes,																																																										708 	‘Reprogramming	 the	 Internet	 of	 Things’	 (Transmediale.de,	 5	 February	 2016)	<http://2016.transmediale.de/content/reprogramming-the-internet-of-things>	 accessed	 4	 April	2016.	
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the	Greeks	 had	no	 single	 term	 to	 express	what	we	mean	by	 the	word	 “life”.	 They	used	 two	 terms	 that,	 although	 traceable	 to	 a	 common	 etymological	 root,	 are	semantically	 and	morphologically	distinct:	zoē,	which	expressed	 the	 simple	 fact	 of	living	common	to	all	living	beings	(animals,	men,	or	gods),	and	bios,	which	indicated	the	form	or	way	of	living	proper	to	an	individual	or	a	group.	When	Plato	mentions	three	 kinds	 of	 life	 in	 the	 Philebus,	 and	 when	 Aristotle	 distinguishes	 the	contemplative	life	of	the	philosopher	(bios	theōrētikos)	from	the	life	of	pleasure	(bios	
apolaustikos)	 and	 the	 political	 life	 (bios	 politikos)	 in	 the	 Nichomachean	 Ethics,	neither	philosopher	would	ever	have	used	the	term	zoē.709			The	 transition	 from	 the	 financialized	 “bios”	 to	 “zoē”	 and,	 then,	 back	 to	 a	 new	 “bios”	constitutes	a	“focal	practice”;	namely,	a	practice	that	“re-centres”	us	by	giving	us	a	better	sense	 of	 our	 location	within	 the	world.710	Notably,	 this	 function	 of	 providing	 orientation	and	direction	is	akin	to	the	origin	of	the	term	“cybernetics”	in	Greek	–	the	word	kybernētēs	(κυβερνήτης),	 which	 means	 steersman,	 as	 well	 as	 leader,	 ruler	 and	 governor.	 The	attainment	 of	 socio-political	 “focus”	 and	 “direction”	 constitutes	 the	 ultimate	 goal	 of	 the	development	of	cyber-topoi	–	a	relationship	whose	basis	is	also	highlighted	by	Paolo	Virno	in	 A	 Grammar	 of	 the	 Multitude,	 where	 the	 philosopher	 brings	 to	 our	 attention	 the	derivation	of	the	word	“topic”	from	“topos”.711		However,	the	previously	described	relationship	of	post-net	participation	with	space	and	the	development	of	cybertopos	is	only	one	part	of	its	political	function.	In	addition	to	that,	post-net	participation	should	also	be	identified	as	a	civic	modus	operandi	that	aims	to	nurture	 a	 new	 understanding	 of	 what	 is	 “political	 constitution”	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	networked	 society.	 Over	 the	 last	 two	decades,	 an	 undeniable	 contribution	 of	 new	media	technologies	 to	 the	 transformation	of	 the	public	 sphere	has	been	 the	 fact	 that	 they	have	allowed	 a	 “strong	 expression	 of	 autonomy	 by	 the	 individual	 and	 collective	 productive	subjectivities”712.	 In	 its	political	dimension,	 this	 expression	of	 freedom	can	be	positioned	against	 “the	 strategy	 of	 equilibrated	 and	 regulated	 participation,	 which	 the	 liberal	 and	imperial	mixed	constitutions	have	always	followed”713.	Nevertheless,	as	it	has	already	been																																																									709	Giorgio	Agamben,	Homo	Sacer:	Sovereign	Power	and	Bare	Life	(Daniel	Heller-Roazen	tr,	Stanford	University	Press,	Stanford	1998)	p.	9.	710 	Albert	 Borgmann,	Technology	 and	 the	 Character	 of	 Contemporary	 Life:	 A	 Philosophical	
Inquiry	(University	of	Chicago	Press,	Chicago	1984).	711	Virno,	A	Grammar	of	the	Multitude,	op.	cit.,	p.	35.	712	Hardt	and	Negri,	Empire,	op.	cit.,	p.	321.	713	ibid.	
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suggested	 in	 this	 chapter,	 the	 opportunities	 that	 are	 opened	by	 this	 condition	 cannot	 be	pursued	 through	 self-defeating	 ideological	 constructs,	 like	 Negri	 and	 Hardt’s	 multitude.	For,	 the	 multitude	 might	 seem	 –	 or	 might	 actually	 be	 in	 many	 cases	 –	 unregulated;	however,	 its	 function	 is	 fully	 equilibrated	 due	 to	 the	 unresolved	 interpretation	 and,	accordingly,	 use	 of	 the	 tools	 through	 which	 it	 constitutes	 itself.	 Therefore,	 instead	 of	following	 multitude’s	 largely	 “theological”	 approach,	 our	 focus	 should	 be	 placed	 on	alternative	schemata,	which	could,	perhaps,	be	reminiscent	of	what	Professor	of	Law	J.H.H.	Weiler	 terms	as	 “variable	 geometry”.	Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 “variable	 geometry”	 originally	refers	to	the	prospective	structure	of	the	European	Union	and	the	relationship	that	it	may	produce	as	a	supranational	entity	between	“demos”	and	“polity”,	the	origins	of	civic	action	that	Weiler	 identifies	 in	his	premise	 lie	very	close	to	the	context	within	which	we	should	locate	 post-net	 participation.	Weiler	 asks:	 “Can	we	 not	 define	membership	 of	 a	 polity	 in	civic,	non-organic-cultural	terms?	Can	we	not	separate	ethnos	from	demos?	And	can	we	not	imagine	a	polity	whose	demos	 is	defined,	understood	and	accepted	 in	civic,	non-organic-cultural	 terms,	 and	 would	 have	 legitimate	 rule-making	 democratic	 authority	 on	 that	basis?”714		Notably,	Weiler’s	variable	geometry	has	been	mainly	associated	with	 the	 idea	of	a	“multi-speed	 Europe”,	 in	 which	 different	 countries	 may	 choose	 to	 integrate	 into	 the	European	Union	 to	different	extents	and	at	various	 speeds.	 In	 the	 case	of	 the	networked	political	economy,	however,	we	could	conceptualise	the	variable	geometry	encouraged	by	post-net	participation	as	a	metro	map:	we	are	not	only	traveling	on	distinct	networks	that	intersect	(“lines”	in	the	case	of	the	metro),	but,	also,	different	lines	may	be	part	of	one	or	more	common	fare	zones.	Correspondingly,	if	we	think	of	the	networks-lines	as	courses	of	Web-based	action	that	deal	with	specific	issues	(“stations”)	and	the	fare	zones	in	terms	of	shared	 ideologies	 and	 values,	 then,	 the	 adoption	of	Weiler’s	 paradigm	 starts	 becoming	 a	useful	guide	 for	 the	 formulation	of	a	new	type	of	civic	engagement	with	the	 Internet	and	through	the	Internet.	Thanks	to	online	networks’	wide	geographical	reach	this	process	can	be	 both	 vertical	 (on	 the	 basis	 of	 countries	 and	 regions)	 and	 horizontal	 (on	 the	 basis	 of	political	 ideas,	aesthetic	values,	sexual	orientation,	race,	etc.).	As	a	result,	 such	a	mode	of	engagement	may	allow	the	development	of	what	Weiler	describes	as	a	“contemporaneous	membership	in	a	national	ethno-cultural	demos,	and	in	a	supranational	civic,	value-driven	
																																																								714	Joseph	HH	Weiler,	 ‘The	State	 “Über	Alles”:	Demos,	Telos	 and	 the	German	Maastricht	Decision’	(Jeanmonnetprogram.org,	 1995)	<http://jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/95/9506ind.html>	accessed	4	April	2016.	
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demos”.715	This	 type	 of	 rights-based	 supranationalism	 lies	 at	 the	 core	 of	 post-net	participation’s	view	of	our	globalised	world.		The	variable	geometry	of	the	value-driven	demos	could	be	explored	further	through	the	 lens	of	Bauman’s	concept	of	“multiple	democracies”,716	which	signifies	the	capacity	to	formulate	multiple	 translations	 of	 the	 same	 principle.	 Bauman	 bases	 his	 premise	 on	 the	concept	 of	 the	 agora	 and	 its	 “two-way	 translation	 between	 the	 language	 of	individual/familial	 interests	 and	 the	 language	 of	 public	 interests”.717	Bauman	 sees	 this	translation	 as	 the	 ultimate	 outcome	 that	we	 should	 be	 aiming	 for,	 rather	 than	 as	 a	 fully	predetermined	process.	As	he	notes,			 the	 degree	 of	 democracy	 of	 a	 political	 regime	may	 therefore	 be	measured	 by	 the	success	 and	 failure,	 smoothness	 and	 roughness	 of	 that	 translation:	 to	 wit,	 by	 the	degree	to	which	its	principal	objective	has	been	reached,	rather	than,	as	is	often	the	case,	 by	 staunch	 obedience	 to	 one	 or	 another	 procedure,	 viewed	 wrongly	 as	 the	sufficient	condition	of	democracy,	of	democracy	as	such.718		Notably,	Bauman	connects	this	capacity	with	the	role	of	the	dominant	economic	system,	by	making	a	 short	historical	 analysis	 in	which	he	 identifies	 two	 important	 secessions	 in	 the	development	of	capitalism:	the	first	one	is	the	separation	of	business	from	household	–	an	idea	 that	 he	 “borrows”	 from	 German	 sociologist	 and	 philosopher	 Max	 Weber.719	This	secession	is	related	to	“the	emancipation	of	business	interests	from	all	extant	socio-cultural	institutions	 of	 ethically	 inspired	 supervision	 and	 control”.720	The	 second	 secession	 that	Bauman	 recognises	 is	 the	 emancipation	 from	 the	 nation-state,	 which	 was	 gradually	assigned	the	status	of	the	“household”.721	The	combined	outcome	of	those	two	secessions	has	been	the	“divorce	between	power	and	politics”,	for	–	as	Bauman	notes	–	“we	now	have	
power	free	from	politics,	and	politics	devoid	of	power.	Power	is	already	global;	politics	stays	
																																																								715	Joseph	HH	Weiler,	Ulrich	R	Haltern	and	Franz	C	Mayer,	‘European	Democracy	and	Its	Critique’	in	Jack	Hayward	(ed),	The	Crisis	of	Representation	in	Europe	(Frank	Cass	Publishers	1995)	p.	23.	716	Zygmunt	 Bauman,	Collateral	Damage:	Social	 Inequalities	 in	a	Global	Age	(Polity	 Press	 2011)	 p.	11.		717	ibid.	718	ibid.		719	See:	Max	Weber,	Economy	and	Society:	An	Outline	of	 Interpretive	Sociology	(Guenther	 Roth	 and	Claus	Wittich	eds,	University	of	California	Press	1978).	720	Bauman,	Collateral	Damage:	Social	Inequalities	in	a	Global	Age,	op.	cit.,	p.	21.	721	ibid.,	p.	22.	
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pitifully	 local”.722	The	 proposition	 of	 cybertopos	 is	 that	 before	 trying	 to	 make	 politics	global,	 we	 should	 first	 make	 power	 local;	 yet,	 this	 should	 happen	without	 ignoring	 the	wider	 (i.e.	 global)	 potentialities	 opened	 by	 our	 actions	 (pro-cybernetic	 localism).	 The	“value-driven	demos”	 is	 the	subject	of	 this	 translation,	or	negotiation	between	 the	global	and	the	 local	agora,723	whose	aim	 is	 to	secure	 that	 the	new	forms	of	political	movements	and	social	alliances	can	be	both	flexible	and	resilient.	Therefore,	the	emergence	of	a	culture	of	 post-net	 participation	 is	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 culture	 in	which	 online	media	 transcend	physical	spaces	by	consolidating	them,	instead	of	merely	“augmenting”	them.		 According	to	the	pioneer	theorist	of	tactical	media	David	Garcia,	the	people	who	will	materialise	 the	 previously	 described	 “translation”	 are	 the	 “neo-pragmatists	 of	 the	Web”.	Garcia	 grounds	 his	 “search”	 for	 them	 on	 the	 conclusion	 that	 we	 have	 now	 irrevocably	moved	 “from	 the	 heroic	 pioneering	 days	 of	 the	 net	 when	 only	 radicals	 and	 geeks	participated	to	the	era	of	the	social	web”.724	However,	this	is	not	a	development	that	has	to	be	viewed	from	a	negative	perspective,	given	that	the	most	important	element	that	leads	to	political	mobilisation	 remains	 the	 content	 of	 the	 political	 proposition	 and	 its	 capacity	 to	
implicate	 the	 public	 –	 not	 the	 mobilisation	 around	 specific	 affinity	 groups,	 or	 –	 even	 –	political	 parties.725	In	 this	 context,	 Garcia	 notes	 that	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 forces	 that	 seek	 to	domesticate	the	Web,	new	media	activists	and	cultural	producers	alike			 have	 had	 the	 vision	 to	 step	 out	 of	 the	 established	 conception	 of	 how	 to	 do	democratic	politics	and	into	the	new	hybrid	spaces	that	combine	the	virtual	and	the	street,	 which	 inevitably	 entails	 risk	 and	 contradiction.	 It	 is	 only	 from	 this	 actual	practice	 including	 a	 willingness	 to	 fail	 and	 fail	 again	 that	 the	 vital	 renewal	 of	democratic	politics	immanent	to	the	age	of	networks	will	emerge.726		This	 prospect	 is	 already	 becoming	 evident	 in	 several	 artistic	 projects	 taking	 around	 the	world,	 ranging	 from	 the	 emergence	 of	 artist-led	 hackerspaces	 in	 the	 countries	 that	 have	been	 most	 heavily	 hit	 by	 the	 economic	 crisis,	 to	 the	 increasingly	 important	 role	 of	 the																																																									722	ibid.,	p.	23.		723	Paolo	Gerbaudo	proposes	“an	alternative	understanding	of	the	process	of	mobilisation,	based	on	the	 notion	 of	 ‘assembling’	 or	 ‘gathering’	 rather	 than	 ‘networking’”.	 The	 action	 of	 “assembling”	alludes	not	only	to	democratic	organisational	structures,	like	the	national,	regional	or	other	kinds	of	Assemblies,	 but	 –	 above	 anything	 else	 –	 to	 the	 very	 origins	 of	 democracy	 in	 the	 agora.	 See:	Gerbaudo,	op.	cit.,	p.	21.	724	Garcia,	‘From	Tactical	Media	to	the	Neo-pragmatists	of	the	Web’,	op.	cit.,	p.	133.	725	ibid.,	p.	132.	726	ibid.,	p.	134.	
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“commons”	in	the	works	and	actions	that	socially	and	politically	engaged	artists	pursue.	In	all	such	initiatives,	the	death	of	cyberspace	as	the	“pure”	and	“autonomous”	utopian	entity	of	 the	World	Wide	Web’s	 first	 two	decades	does	not	 entail	 the	death	of	 utopianism	as	 a	technology-catalysed	pool	of	potentialities.	The	death	of	messianic	Web	is	not	the	death	of	revolutionary	Web.	Rather,	 it	 is	 its	 liberation	and	 its	emphatic	connection	with	the	social	and	political	struggles	of	everyday	physical	reality.						 	
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Conclusion			 “The	way	to	heaven	out	of	all	places	is	of	length	and	distance”	Thomas	More,	Utopia,	1516			In	 order	 to	 mark	 the	 quincentenary	 from	 the	 publication	 of	 Thomas	 More’s	 Utopia,	Somerset	House,	in	London,	commissioned	British	conceptual	artist	Jeremy	Deller	and	the	Fraser	Muggeridge	studio	to	design	a	flag	that	would	encapsulate	the	notion	of	“utopia”	and	celebrate	2016	as	a	“Year	of	Imagination	and	Possibility”.727	The	flag	that	the	artist	and	the	studio’s	graphic	designers	came	up	with	featured	a	large	“smiley	face”,	very	similar	to	the	emojis	that	we	use	every	day	when	exchanging	messages	on	our	smartphones,	tablets	and	laptops.	 For	 a	 whole	 year,	 the	 flag	 overlooked	 London’s	 impressive	 skyline,	 which	 is	increasingly	 defined	 by	 the	 presence	 of	 skyscrapers	 that	 (mainly)	 host	 international	financial	 firms	and	banks.	Although	the	flag’s	 face	 is	widely	perceived	as	a	symbol	with	a	positive	 connotation,	 the	most	 important	 question	 to	 be	 asked	 about	 its	meaning	 refers	neither	 to	 its	 emotional	 character,	 nor	 to	 the	 geographical	 direction	 towards	 which	 the	smile	is	oriented	(i.e.	whether	it	is	facing	the	City’s	skyscrapers	in	the	east,	or	the	Houses	of	Parliament	 in	 the	west,	 etc.);	 rather,	 the	most	 pertinent	 question	 is	 associated	with	 the	flag’s	 relation	 to	 time:	 is	 the	 face	 featured	 in	 the	 flag	 smiling	 to	 a	 future	 utopia,	 or	 is	 it	smiling	to	a	past	one?	In	 the	 Communist	Manifesto,	 Marx	 and	 Engels	 break	 emphatically	 with	 the	 long-established	 idea	 that	 utopia	 belongs	 to	 a	 lost	 “Golden	 Age”,	 turning	 –	 instead	 –	 their	attention	 to	 the	 future.	 In	 this	 way,	 they	 refute	 a	 well-known	 “occupational	 disease	 of	historians”,	as	English	broadcaster	and	historian	A.	J.	P.	Taylor	has	called	the	prevalence	of	the	 past	 in	 utopianism’s	 association	 with	 time.728	As	 it	 is	 exemplified	 by	 the	 Communist	
Manifesto,	 this	orientation	 towards	 the	 future	 is	of	particular	 importance	 for	 the	political	character	of	utopianism,	as	 it	 lends	to	 it	elements	of	a	distinct	political	methodology	–	a	blueprint	on	how	to	produce	a	better	world.	In	her	book	Utopia	as	Method:	The	Imaginary																																																									727	‘UTOPIA	2016’	(Utopia2016.com)	<http://utopia2016.com>	accessed	4	April	2016.	728 	A.	 J.	 P.	 Taylor,	 ‘Introduction’,	 in	 Karl	 Marx	 and	 Friedrich	 Engels,	The	 Communist	
Manifesto	(Penguin	Books,	UK	1967)	p.	12.	
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Reconstitution	 of	 Society	 (2013),	 British	 sociologist	 Ruth	 Levitas	 elaborates	 on	 the	character	of	utopia	as	a	methodology,729	by	noting	that	it		 provides	 a	 critical	 tool	 for	 exposing	 the	 limitations	 of	 current	 political	 discourses	about	economic	growth	and	ecological	sustainability.	It	facilitates	genuinely	holistic	thinking	 about	 possible	 futures,	 combined	 with	 reflexivity,	 provisionality,	 and	democratic	 engagement	with	 the	 principles	 and	 practices	 of	 those	 futures.	 And	 it	requires	us	to	think	about	our	conceptions	of	human	needs	and	human	flourishing	in	 those	 possible	 futures.	 The	 core	 of	 utopia	 is	 the	 desire	 for	 being	 otherwise,	individually	 and	 collectively,	 subjectively	 and	 objectively.	 Its	 expressions	 explore	and	bring	to	debate	the	potential	contents	and	contexts	of	human	flourishing.	 It	 is	thus	better	understood	as	a	method	than	a	goal.730		Levitas	 complements	 this	 definition	 by	 identifying	 three	 key	 modes	 for	 the	 “imaginary	reconstitution	of	society”731.	First	of	all,	the	archaeological	mode	of	reconstitution	focuses	on	the	“excavation	of	 fragments	and	shards”	 from	the	past,	which	may	belong	to	utopian	traditions	in	politics,	literature,	or	the	arts.	The	aim	of	the	“excavator”	is	not	only	to	reveal	those	utopian	accounts,	but	also	to	combine	them	into	a	coherent	whole.	Secondly,	there	is	the	ontological	mode,	which	is	concerned	with	the	subjects	and	agents	of	utopia	–	namely,	the	ways	 in	which	utopianism	may	encourage	people	 to	change	 their	social,	political	and	cultural	behaviours.	Finally,	Levitas	identifies	the	architectural	mode,	which	focuses	on	the	organisational	 and/or	 institutional	 structures	 that	 could	 facilitate	 the	 creation	 of	 a	different	and	better	society.		Collectively,	 the	 art	 projects	 that	 we	 have	 examined	 in	 this	 thesis	 fulfil	 all	 three	aspects	of	“utopia	as	a	method”:	they	“rediscover”	and,	then,	combine	political	and	artistic	traditions	of	utopianism;	they	propose	new	forms	of	socioeconomic	and	cultural	being;	and	they	 identify	 potential	 organisational	 structures	 through	 which	 such	 forms	 might	 be	realised.	However,	the	additional	characteristic	that	defines	them	is	their	shared	ambition	to	 bring	 together	 the	 three	 modes	 of	 social	 reconstitution	 by	 regularly	 employing	 the																																																									729	Levitas	largely	builds	her	analysis	on	Fredric	Jameson’s	theorization	of	utopianism,	according	to	which	 “utopias	 have	 something	 to	 do	 with	 failure,	 and	 tell	 us	 more	 about	 our	 own	 limits	 and	weaknesses	than	they	do	about	perfect	societies”.	See:	Fredric	Jameson,	‘Comments’	(1988)	Utopian	
Studies	vol.	9	no.	2,	p.	74.		730	Ruth	 Levitas,	Utopia	 as	 Method:	 The	 Imaginary	 Reconstitution	 of	 Society	(Palgrave	 Macmillan	2013)	p.	xi.		731	ibid.,	p.	xvii.	
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legacies	of	communist	utopianism	as	a	connecting	web.	Therefore,	the	challenge	that	they	are	 called	 to	 address	 is	 how	 to	 render	 the	 role	 of	 Marxist	 thought	 productive	 and	sustainable,	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 achieve	 a	 reconstitution	 of	 society	 that	would	 not	 be	merely	“imaginary”	as	the	title	of	Levitas’	book	suggests.	In	other	words,	if	we	turn	our	attention	back	to	the	geographical	aspect	of	Thomas	More’s	 fictional	world,	 the	question	that	post-crisis	political	art	is	called	to	answer	is:	if	Utopia	were	indeed	an	island,	as	More	suggested	500	 years	 ago,	what	would	 be	 the	 coastline	 of	 a	 socialist	 Utopia?	 To	wit,	 how	 big	 is	 the	ideological	 territory	 that	 communist	 utopian	 thought	 might	 be	 able	 to	 occupy	 in	 the	current	historical	conjuncture?		Quite	 evidently,	 this	 is	 a	 far	 broader	 and	more	 complex	 question	 than	 the	 one	 of	identifying	the	key	characteristics	of	a	group	of	politically	engaged	cultural	practices.	That	is	why	the	objective	of	this	thesis	as	a	mapping	exercise	has	not	been	merely	to	organise	artworks	 and	 projects	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 commonalities,	 but,	 also,	 to	 delineate	 and	analyse	 the	 conditions	 under	 which	 they	 have	 been	 produced,	 disseminated	 and	experienced,	 with	 a	 view	 to	 determining	 their	 transformative	 potential.	 Through	 this	multifaceted	 approach,	 the	 thesis	 has	 been	 able	 to	 cover	 a	 significant	 scholarly	 gap	 that	refers	 to	 the	 reaction	 of	 New	Media	 Art	 and,	 in	 particular,	Web-based	 art	 to	 the	 global	financial	crisis	of	2008.	As	it	has	been	indicated	in	the	introduction	of	the	thesis,	following	the	crisis,	a	wide	range	of	academics,	cultural	theorists,	curators,	activists	and	artists	have	published	works	that	have	aimed	at	determining	the	impact	of	the	global	economic	turmoil	on	 contemporary	 art.	 However,	 in	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 cases,	 the	 exploration	 of	 those	scholars	 has	 not	 encompassed	online	 and	Web-based	practices,	 examining,	 instead,	 anti-capitalist	projects	that	have	been	deployed	through	various	offline	media.	This	choice	has	produced	a	general	overview	of	 the	 connections	between	contemporary	art	 and	political	activism,	 which	 has	 largely	 ignored	 the	 very	 rich	 reservoir	 of	 new	media	 artworks	 and	cultural	initiatives.	As	a	result,	very	few	of	the	artists	whose	projects	have	been	examined	in	this	thesis	are	referenced	in	the	books	that	belong	to	the	previously	described	body	of	research.	 Consequently,	 the	 existing	 scholarship	 has	 generated	 a	 rather	 fragmented	 and	partial	 image	as	regards	 the	political	role	of	Web-based	art	 in	 the	post-crisis	world	–	 the	very	 subject	 of	 this	 thesis.	 In	 addition	 to	 covering	 this	 scholarly	 gap,	 the	 multifaceted	evaluation	of	Web-based	practices	 that	has	 (mainly)	 taken	place	 in	 the	previous	 chapter	has	allowed	the	thesis’	contribution	to	knowledge	to	transcend	the	realm	of	Web-based	art	and	address	online	communication	at	large.	Most	notably,	this	has	been	evidenced	through	the	 introduction,	or	elucidation	of	several	key	terms	and	concepts.	Those	began	from	the	
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field	 of	 economics	 (Data	 Capitalism);	 they	 continued	 with	 contemporary	 art	 produced	and/or	disseminated	through	new	data-based	technologies	(the	distributed	art	object);	and	ended	up	delineating	a	new	kind	of	hybrid	engagement	with	online	 and	physical	 spaces,	which	 brought	 together	 Marxist	 theory	 and	 ICTs	 (cybertopos,	 pro-cybernetic	 localism,	post-net	participation	and	the	Internet	of	Praxis).		 In	order	 to	 support	 and	 systematise	 this	new	 theoretical	 framework,	 the	 answers	provided	to	the	four	research	questions	of	the	thesis	were	used	as	the	key	“building	blocks”	of	 its	structure.	Accordingly,	 the	 first	part	of	 the	thesis	has	addressed	the	question	of	 the	historical	 and	 technocultural	 context	 within	 which	 the	 global	 financial	 crisis	 of	 2008	occurred,	 in	 order	 to	 establish	 the	 relevance	 of	 alternative	 political	 imaginaries	 and,	 in	particular,	 those	 inspired	 by	 communist	 thought.	 As	 indicated	 in	 the	 first	 chapter	 of	 the	thesis,	 the	 most	 important	 element	 of	 the	 crisis’	 milieu	 has	 been	 Data	 Capitalism	 –	 	 a	distinct	and	highly	exploitative	phase	 in	 the	evolution	of	our	globalised	economic	model.	The	main	catalyst	 for	 the	 rise	of	 this	new	phase	has	been	 the	development	of	 the	World	Wide	Web	in	the	early	1990s,	while	its	maturity	began	with	the	widespread	introduction	of	Web	2.0	applications	in	the	mid	2000s,	which	altered	the	balance	in	the	principal	agent	of	economic	expansion	 from	consumption	 to	production	(user-generated	data	and	content).	In	this	context,	Data	Capitalism	can	be	understood	as	an	economic	system	whose	main	raw	material	and	output	is	information,	the	vast	majority	of	which	belongs	to,	or	is	controlled	by	corporations.	However,	the	system’s	overdependence	on	data	as	expressed	through	the	algorithmic	control	of	the	economy	has	been	a	prominent	cause	of	the	global	financial	crisis	(e.g.	 high-frequency	 trading).	 Alongside	 the	 quantification	 of	 everyday	 life	 through	 a	process	of	 constant	datatization,	 they	 constitute	 two	of	 the	main	elements	against	which	Web-based	cultural	producers	reacted	after	2008.		This	reaction	was	built	on	a	rich	cultural	 tradition	of	new	media	artistic	practices,	whose	main	focus	has	been	the	formulation	of	anti-capitalist	social	and	political	demands.	The	 origins	 of	 this	 tradition	 can	 be	 traced	 in	 tactical	 media	 pioneers	 like	 Polish	 artist	Krzysztof	Wodiczko	and	his	public	projections,	as	well	as	in	the	public	interventions	staged	by	 the	 tactical	media	 collective	 Critical	 Art	 Ensemble	 (CAE).	Most	 importantly,	 however,	post-crisis	artists	have	been	able	to	build	on	the	legacies	of	political	net	art	–	namely,	the	practices	of	groups	like	®TMmark,	Etoy	and	Electronic	Disturbance	Theater	(EDT),	and	the	work	of	 individual	artists,	 like	Natalie	Bookchin.	Finally,	 it	 is	worth	noting	the	significant	contribution	 of	 online	 activist	 platforms	 that	 have	 taken	 advantage	 of	 the	 new	potentialities	opened	by	Web	2.0	in	order	to	influence	public	opinion	on	a	truly	global	scale	
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(MoveOn.org,	 Avaaz,	 Change.org,	 SumOfUs.org,	 GetUp,	 38	Degrees,	 Campact,	 350.org	 and	WikiLeaks,	 amongst	 others).	 Thanks	 to	 the	 focused	 “issue-based”	 approach	 of	 the	aforementioned	 artistic	 practices	 and	 alternative	 channels	 of	 public	 advocacy,	 a	 fertile	online	ground	 for	 the	revitalisation	and	promotion	of	anti-capitalist	 ideas	was	already	 in	place	by	2008.	Communist	 thought	and	 its	multiple	 traditions	 functioned	as	a	unifying	agent	 that	brought	 together	 the	 evolutionary	 paths	 of	 the	 economy	 and	 culture	 that	 we	 have	described	 above.	 The	 critical	 framework	 of	 this	 agency	 was	 investigated	 in	 the	 second	chapter	of	this	thesis,	which	identified	the	Internet’s	“organic”	connections	with	communist	utopianism	through	the	examination	of	the	work	and	legacy	of	Walter	Benjamin.	The	study	of	 Immanuel	 Kant	 by	 Benjamin	 has	 been	 able	 to	 reveal	 the	 two	 philosophers	 shared	interest	in	the	notion	of	“justice”,	which	largely	shaped	Benjamin’s	work	in	the	field	of	art	under	the	influence	of	Marx.	The	main	element	that	links	those	two	aspects	of	Benjamin’s	work	is	“possession”	–	a	capacity	that	 is	negated	through	the	mechanical	reproduction	of	the	art	object.	 In	 today’s	context,	digital	and	online	reproduction	defy	 to	an	even	greater	extent	 the	power	of	 aura	and	historicization	 that	mechanical	 reproduction	 first	 attacked.	The	passage	from	the	singular-unique	to	the	distributed	art	object,	and	from	an	“auratic”	to	a	more	democratic	mode	of	cultural	production	can,	thus,	become	a	natural	enabler	in	our	struggle	to	gain	“recognition”	as	equals	(Hegel).	Most	importantly,	perhaps,	the	formulation	of	 new	 revolutionary	 demands	 may	 focus	 on	 the	 power	 of	 “here-and-now”	 (Benjamin’s	“jetztzeit”),	 as	 we	 increasingly	 live	 in	 a	 world	 of	 real-time	 networks.	 Those	 political	potentialities	have	been	truly	inspirational	for	new	media	theorists	and	artists	who	use	the	World	Wide	Web.	As	the	reinterpretations	of	Benjamin’s	work	in	the	context	of	the	Internet	Age	suggest,	 in	the	period	preceding	the	crisis	there	was	a	distinct	shift	of	focus	from	the	potential	of	the	medium	to	transform	the	individual	(Douglas	Davis,	1995)	to	the	potential	of	the	individual	to	transform	the	medium	(Geoff	Cox	and	Joasia	Krysa,	2005).	This	gradual	metamorphosis	 of	 the	 Internet	 into	 a	 much	 more	 personal	 and,	 thus,	 political	 tool	 of	expression	has	been	employed	by	politically	engaged	cultural	producers	as	an	antidote	to	the	anti-utopian	spirit	that	defined	the	two	decades	that	preceded	the	global	financial	crisis	of	 2008.	 As	 a	 result,	 alternative	 political	 imaginaries	 inspired	 by	 communist	 thought	managed	to	survive	the	rise	of	Data	Capitalism	and,	then,	thrived	after	the	crisis,	as	artists	identified	 the	 subversive	 political	 potentialities	 residing	 in	 art’s	 online	 creation	 and	distribution.	
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	 The	practical	 evidence	of	 this	proliferation	 is	provided	 through	 the	answer	 to	 the	second	 research	 question	 of	 this	 thesis,	 which	 refers	 to	 the	 identification	 of	 the	 main	formal	 and	 conceptual	 characteristics	 of	 the	 political	Web-based	 art	 that	 was	 produced	between	2008	and	2015.	By	examining	a	wide	range	of	projects	as	well	as	artists’	practice	statements,	manifestos,	articles,	academic	papers	and	interviews,	the	thesis	has	been	able	to	produce	an	inclusive	“navigation	map”	of	such	practices,	which	have	been	divided	into	two	distinct	categories.	The	first	broad	category	of	works,	which	was	analysed	in	the	third	chapter,	has	included	projects	that	deconstruct	the	modus	operandi	of	Data	Capitalism	and	protest	against	the	social,	economic,	political	and	cultural	conditions	that	it	nurtures.	The	common	goal	of	those	practices	has	been	the	activation	of	citizens’	political	consciousness	and	 the	 development	 of	 a	 new	 understanding	 of	 their	 class	 position	 as	 an	 “online	proletariat”.	In	order	to	achieve	that,	politically	engaged	Web-based	artists	exposed	in	their	works	 the	 complex	 architecture	 of	 Data	 Capitalism	 (a	 system	 of	 invisible	 “flows”);	 its	privileged	 mode	 of	 labour	 (immaterial	 and	 affective	 labour);	 the	 class	 divisions	 that	 it	produces	and/or	accentuates;	and,	finally,	the	impact	of	the	crisis	on	artistic	creation	and	cultural	 institutions	 (devalorisation	 and	 underfunding).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 many	 artists	were	 influenced	 by	 the	 modes	 of	 protest	 and	 civic	 mobilisation	 in	 public	 spaces	 that	appeared	after	the	events	2008.	The	practices	of	such	artists	have	been	characterised	by	a	strong	focus	on	the	notion	of	the	“commons”	and,	more	specifically,	on	their	appropriation	by	Data	Capitalism	and	the	necessity	to	reclaim	them.		In	 spite	 of	 the	 anti-capitalist	 political	 dispositions	 of	 many	 of	 the	 initiatives	belonging	 to	 this	 first	 category,	 however,	 their	 often-ephemeral	 character	 as	 exhibitions,	performances	 or	 public	 interventions	delimited	 their	 ability	 to	 formulate	more	practical,	long-term	 propositions.	 Accordingly,	 the	 second	 broad	 category	 of	 post-2008	works	 has	reflected	the	need	to	find	more	strategic	responses	to	the	new	conditions	produced	by	the	crisis.	In	this	context,	a	significant	number	of	Web-based	artists,	museums,	independent	art	spaces,	 collectives	 and	 cultural	 agencies	 created	 projects	 whose	 goal	 has	 been	 the	establishment	 of	 alternative	 modes	 of	 socioeconomic	 being	 that	 strongly	 reflect	 the	legacies	of	Marxism.	Those	projects,	which	have	been	analysed	in	the	fourth	chapter,	have	systematically	 promoted	 the	 creation	of	 new	 radical	 institutions,	 such	 as	hackerspaces	 –	places	where	new	modes	for	the	production	of	common	wealth	could	be	nurtured.	At	the	same	time,	a	range	of	digital	currencies	were	created	by	artists,	or	adopted	by	them	in	their	projects.	This	group	of	works	has	been	indicative	of	the	effort	of	politically	engaged	artists	to	produce	and/or	support	alternative	economic	models,	which	could	defy	the	main	agents	
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of	 Data	 Capitalism	 on	 a	 permanent	 basis.	 And,	 finally,	 several	 artists	 and	 cultural	institutions	created	projects	that	have	radically	reimagined	community	and	the	state	as	the	dominant	modes	of	societal	constitution	and	governance.	Through	the	use	of	the	Internet,	those	 cultural	producers	have	aimed	at	 replacing	 the	existing	 capitalist	 state	with	a	new	kind	 of	 civic	 entity	 based	 on	 the	 principles	 of	 openness,	 accountability,	 equality	 and	communality.	 Consequently,	 the	 crisis	 functioned	 as	 a	 two-fold	 catalyst	 for	 politically	engaged	Web-based	art.	On	the	one	hand,	it	revitalised	a	strong	utopian	spirit	inspired	by	socialist	ideals,	which	has	materialised	as	a	public	denunciation	and	deconstruction	of	Data	Capitalism	and	its	modes	of	wealth	accumulation.	And,	on	the	other	hand,	many	artists	and	cultural	 workers	 gradually	 adopted	 a	 more	 strategic	 view	 on	 the	 Internet,	 in	 order	 to	propose	novel	and	radical	modes	of	social	being,	with	long-term	ambitions.		However,	as	demonstrated	through	the	answer	to	the	third	research	question	of	the	thesis,	 the	 political	 power	 of	 the	 Internet	 as	 a	 subversive	 technocultural	 tool	 does	 have	important	limitations.	This	reality	is	highlighted	in	the	thesis’	fifth	chapter,	which	explores	the	 question	 of	 the	 interests	 of	 global	 capitalist	 elites	 in	 art	 and	 the	 Internet,	 and	 the	restrictions	 that	 they	have	 imposed	on	the	political	use	of	 the	Web	 in	order	 to	safeguard	them.	The	agents	who	have	undertaken	 this	 safeguarding	 “mission”	 include	 the	different	institutions	 and	 instruments	 associated	 with	 the	 contemporary	 art	 market,	 such	 as	commercial	 galleries,	 auction	 houses,	 art	 fairs,	 biennials,	 collectors	 and	museums;	 social	media	platforms	and	their	expanded	corporate	networks;	online	mega-corporations,	such	as	 Web	 portals,	 search	 engines,	 cloud	 computing	 companies	 and	 electronic	 retailers;	financial	 institutions	 and	 fiscal	 policy	 bodies,	 including	 commercial	 banks	 and	 Central	Banks;	and,	finally,	governments	and	transnational	institutions	with	restrictive	regulatory	powers	 over	 the	 Internet.	 In	 harmony	 with	 the	 Marxist	 theorisation	 of	 capitalism’s	strategic	 reaction	 to	 its	 own	 structural	 weaknesses,	 global	 elites	 have	 seen	 both	 the	Internet	 and	 culture	 as	 emerging	 fields	 of	 economic	 expansion	 and	 deeper	 exploitation.	This	 perspective	 has	 been	 crucial	 for	 minimising	 the	 ramifications	 of	 the	 crisis,	 whilst	providing	new	opportunities	to	generate	profits.		The	main	instrument	that	has	been	used	in	order	to	materialise	the	goals	of	online	economic	 expansion	 and	 exploitation	 is	 datatization	 –	 namely,	 the	 transformation	 of	 all	aspects	 of	 our	 lives	 into	 data.	 This	 function	 is	 accompanied	 by	 totalising	 processes	 of	commodification	 and	 control,	 which	 have	 at	 their	 core	 search	 engines	 and	 social	networking	 platforms.	 Because	 of	 those	 processes,	 Web-based	 creative	 production	 and	dissemination	 is	 confronted	 with	 significant	 obstacles	 that	 are	 applied	 to	 the	Web	 as	 a	
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whole	–	be	 it	 in	 the	 form	of	online	monopolies	 following	 the	Googlization	model	of	dada	centralisation,	or	the	censoring	policies	of	social	media	corporations	that	aim	for	complete	control	 over	 data	 generation.	 Notably,	 this	 mode	 of	 exploitation	 also	 incorporates	 the	“niche”	area	of	cultural	data,	as	arts	and	culture	constitute	today	an	important	subsection	within	 a	 rapidly	 expanding	Web	 (e.g.	 Google	 Cultural	 Institute).	 As	 an	 economic	 system	whose	 main	 raw	 material	 and	 output	 is	 corporate-owned	 information,	 Data	 Capitalism	aims	to	integrate	all	types	of	cultural	information-data	into	its	quantification	practices.	Yet,	this	 is	merely	the	most	visible	aspect	of	 the	obstacles	 imposed	by	Data	Capitalism	on	the	political	Web.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 new	 curatorial	 and	 academic	 trends	 such	 as	 the	 rise	 of	 the	post-internet	 art	 movement,	 the	 previously	 described	 process	 is	 considerably	 more	complex.	 This	 is	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 an	 artwork	 has	 to	 be	 thoroughly	 “depoliticised”	 by	“deleting”	 its	 association	 with	 the	 political	 background	 of	 net	 art,	 before	 it	 can	 become	datatized	and	quantified	as	a	product.	Such	an	approach	is	indicative	of	the	capitalist	need	to	 find	 or	 construct	 new	 markets.	 Most	 importantly,	 all	 those	 limits	 have	 been	 set	 by	appropriating	 and/or	 manipulating,	 in	 some	 form,	 the	 very	 tools	 that	 are	 employed	 by	politically	 engaged	 artists	 and	 cultural	 producers.	 Therefore,	 Data	 Capitalism	 sees	 the	Internet	through	the	prism	of	a	multifaceted	paradigm	of	“economic	institutionalisation”,	in	order	to	perpetuate	the	already	established	modes	of	wealth	accumulation.		Accordingly,	 the	 fourth	 and	 final	 research	 question	 that	 emerges	 from	 the	previously	described	obstacles	and	limitations	is:	how	can	we	consider	them	in	relation	to	the	 subversive	 qualities	 of	 post-crisis	 Web-based	 art,	 in	 order	 to	 reach	 an	 overall	evaluation	 of	 such	 practices	 as	 a	 paradoxical	 combination	 of	 capitalism’s	 products	(networked	 media)	 and	 communism’s	 visions	 (alternative	 and	 anti-capitalist	 modes	 of	political	organisation,	social	being	and	cultural	production)?	As	we	have	seen	in	the	sixth	chapter,	 an	 evaluation	 based	 on	 the	 strict	 principles	 set	 out	 by	Marx	 and	 Engels	 in	The	
Communist	Manifesto	would	readily	position	all	of	the	artworks	and	initiatives	examined	in	chapters	 three	 and	 four	 outside	 the	 ideological	 realm	 of	 communism.	 By	 not	 advancing	
exclusively	the	political	causes	of	the	working	classes,	they	have	not	been	able	to	produce	a	revolutionary	 proletariat;	 and	 by	 adopting	 largely	 non-confrontational	means,	 their	 role	could	be	characterised	as	merely	reactionary,	or	–	even	–	conservative.	This	dual	difficulty	can	be	attributed	 to	 the	systemic	 ideological	barriers	produced	by	Data	Capitalism.	More	specifically,	 due	 to	 the	 procedural	 sublimity	 of	 networked	 media	 (as	 expressed	 –	 for	instance	–	by	our	emotional	and	 intellectual	attachment	to	 the	constant	updates	of	social	media	 timelines),	 we	 have	 become	 incapable	 of	 recognising	 the	 alienating	 dimension	
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embedded	 in	 the	 interfaces	 that	mediate	 our	 communication.	 Instead,	we	 fully	 immerse	ourselves	in	a	seductive	“Society	of	Non-Spectacle”,	whose	ultimate	outcome	is	a	“gamified”	and,	 thus,	 highly	 uncritical	 public	 sphere.	 The	 latter	 is	 increasingly	 determined	 by	 an	abstract	 perspective	 on	 the	 social	 body’s	 political	 function,	 which	 is	 exemplified	 by	attractive,	yet	counter-productive	intellectual	devices	like	Negri	and	Hardt’s	postulation	of	the	multitude.	The	incapacity	of	such	conceptual	approaches	to	provide	a	specific	political	direction	is	indicative	of	the	inability	of	many	post-Marxist	thinkers	to	grasp	the	complex	and	highly	contradictory	ideological	nature	of	new	media.	As	it	has	been	suggested	in	the	final	part	of	the	thesis,	in	order	to	find	an	antidote	to	this	impasse,	we	should	take	a	step	away	from	political	theory	and	follow	the	opposite	path	in	our	analysis:	namely,	we	should	start	from	assessing	the	ideology	of	networks	and	only	
then	examine	the	ideology	of	the	art	that	can	may	be	produced	through	them.	Accordingly,	the	main	proposition	of	 this	 thesis	 has	 been	 the	 evaluation	of	Web-based	 art	 by	 looking	into	 the	 ideological	 space	 between	 networks’	 denationalised	 liberalism	 and	 global	governmentality.	 Interestingly,	 the	 opportunities	 for	 social,	 political	 and	 cultural	 change	engendered	 by	 the	 investigation	 of	 this	 space	 are	 based	 on	 the	 embrace	 of	 one	 of	 Data	Capitalism’s	 major	 characteristics:	 the	 paradox.	 According	 to	 theorists	 like	 Matteo	Pasquinelli,	the	contradictory	nature	of	our	capitalist	system	could	successfully	function	as	a	blueprint	for	articulating	a	reaction	against	its	own	modus	operandi.	In	this	context,	the	paradox	 adopts	 the	 form	 of	 a	 reaction	 grounded	 on	 the	 potentialities	 of	 physical	 space	rather	than	the	potentialities	of	online	space.	More	specifically,	the	thesis	has	called	for	the	cultivation	of	a	new,	more	strategic	understanding	of	the	relationship	between	cyberspace	and	 physical	 space,	 which	 has	 been	 synopsised	 in	 the	 notion	 of	 “cybertopos”.	 The	materialization	 of	 this	 relationship	 requires	 the	 activation	 of	 a	 physical	 space’s	 distinct	traits	through	and	in	parallel	to	the	use	of	networked	media.	Accordingly,	the	development	of	a	 culture	of	 “pro-cybernetic	 localism”	could	 function	as	an	answer	 to	 the	depoliticised	conception	 of	 networked	 media	 that	 characterises	 many	 of	 today’s	 technology-driven	discourses	(e.g.	“Internet	of	Things”	and	“Internet	of	Places”).	Such	approaches	should	be	replaced	by	the	proposition	for	an	“Internet	of	Praxis”,	within	which	the	ethos	of	“post-net	participation”	 that	 first	 appeared	 within	 the	 crisis’	 social	 and	 artivist	 movements	 could	flourish.	The	subject	of	this	new	mode	of	political	participation	is	a	“value-driven	demos”,	whose	 scope	 lies	 beyond	 the	 “theological”	 and	 abstract	 approaches	 to	 proletarianization	that	 still	 dominate	 leftist	 thought.	 By	 allowing	 different	 levels	 and	 types	 of	 civic	engagement,	which	are	–	however	–	both	collectively	and	individually	directed	against	the	
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Web’s	modes	of	powerless	socialisation	(e.g.	social	media),	the	praxes	of	the	new	“demos”	are	in	a	position	to	challenge	Data	Capitalism’s	processes	of	accumulation.		In	spite,	however,	of	the	detailed	answer	provided	to	the	final	research	question	of	this	 thesis,	 the	 premises	 on	 which	 the	 answer	 has	 been	 built	 are	 –	 inevitably	 –	 both	analytical	 and	 speculative.	 In	 other	 words,	 this	 investigation	 might	 have	 been	 able	 to	demonstrate	that	the	political	Web-based	art	produced	between	2008	and	2015	has	been	indeed	 the	 product	 of	 a	 paradoxical	 combination	 of	 capitalism’s	 products	 and	communism’s	 visions.	 Nevertheless,	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 defining	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	forces	of	communist	utopianism,	or	the	forces	of	capital	have	been	the	most	influential	in	shaping	 the	works’	ultimate	effect,	 this	 largely	remains	an	open-ended	question.	 Just	 like	the	 flag	 that	 was	 placed	 on	 the	 top	 of	 Somerset	 House	 to	 mark	 2016	 as	 the	 “Year	 of	Imagination	and	Possibility”,	 the	 “ideological	winds”	of	 contemporaneity	might	make	 the	works’	 impact	 face	 one	 direction	 or	 another,	 for	 longer	 or	 shorter	 periods	 of	 time.	 This	conclusion	 becomes	 even	 more	 pertinent	 if	 we	 take	 into	 account	 some	 of	 the	“unimaginable”	and	“impossible”	political	events	that	have	defined	2016	–	“Brexit”	and	the	election	 of	 Donald	 Trump	 as	 the	 45th	 President	 of	 the	 US.	 The	 growing	 volatility	 of	globalised	politics,	as	exemplified	by	such	developments,	and	the	role	of	networked	media	in	 the	 rise	 of	 a	 “post-truth”	 world,	 render	 the	 work	 of	 politically	 engaged	 artists	 more	complex	than	ever	in	recent	times.732	Within	an	unstable	environment,	the	proliferation	of	alternative	 political	 imaginaries	 in	 Web-based	 art	 does	 not	 automatically	 entail	 their	proliferation	as	attainable	goals	within	the	consciousness	of	our	societies.	Yet,	what	we	can	assert	with	much	more	certainty	is	that	this	is	a	question	that	is	addressed	to	the	future	–	not	a	question	addressed	to	the	past.	As	the	crisis	of	globalised	capital	continues	in	various	forms,	as	the	catastrophic	results	of	its	mode	of	production	become	increasingly	evident	in	the	 planet’s	 ecological	 imbalance,	 and	 as	 technological	 advances	 nurture	 highly	 complex	conditions	 that	 allow	 better	 communication	 and	 wider	 disinformation	 and	 control,	 the	question	 of	 what	 might	 come	 next	 is	 calling	 for	 our	 attention.	 Artists	 have	 often	 been	amongst	the	first	to	respond	to	this	call.	And,	as	this	thesis	has	indicated,	they	appear	eager	to	continue	being	amongst	the	first.				
																																																								732	“Post-truth”	 was	 pronounced	 “word	 of	 the	 year”	 by	 Oxford	 Dictionaries	 in	 November	 2016,	particularly	because	of	its	use	in	the	phrase	“post-truth	politics”.	The	adjective	has	been	defined	as	“relating	to	or	denoting	circumstances	in	which	objective	facts	are	less	influential	in	shaping	public	opinion	 than	 appeals	 to	 emotion	 and	personal	 belief”.	 See:	 'Word	Of	The	Year	2016	 Is...	 |	Oxford	Dictionaries'	 (Oxford	 Dictionaries	 |	 English,	 2016)	 <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/word-of-the-year/word-of-the-year-2016>	accessed	30	December	2016.		
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Glossary	
	
	Affective	labour		 A	 type	 of	 labour	 that	 is	 based	 on	 producing,	 or	 manipulating	affects.	This	is	particularly	relevant	to	Data	Capitalism’s	modes	of	wealth	 accumulation	 as	 exemplified	 by	 users’	 engagement	 with	social	media	platforms	(“prosumption”)	and	online	marketing.			Aura			 The	conceptual	distance	produced	by	the	uniqueness	of	a	cultural	object.	 Aura	 controls	 our	 relationship	 with	 the	 work	 of	 art	 by	imposing	on	it	a	specific	“reading”,	which	is	perpetuated	through	tradition.	 Walter	 Benjamin	 calls	 for	 the	 “liberation”	 of	 the	 art	object	from	aura	through	its	mechanical	reproduction.		Algorithmic	trading		 The	 automated	 creation	 and	 execution	 of	 trading	 orders	 by	computers	using	complex	mathematical	 formulas	and	high-speed	programs,	 which	 take	 specific	 actions	 in	 response	 to	 varying	market	data	(time,	price,	volume,	etc.).		Altermodern		 A	new	cultural	paradigm	that	has	succeeded	postmodernism,	and	is	 characterised	 by	 increased	 communication,	 travel	 and	migration.	 According	 to	 Nicholas	 Bourriaud,	 this	 “new	universalism”	 is	 catalysed	 by	 translation,	 subtitling	 and	generalised	dubbing	that	take	place	in	new	media.		Behavioral	Finance			 A	subfield	of	Behavioral	Economics,	which	analyses	the	influence	of	 psychological,	 social,	 cognitive,	 and	 emotional	 factors	 on	 the	decisions	 of	 financial	 agents	 (individuals	 and	 institutions).	 Its	main	premise	 is	 that	 there	 are	 limits	 to	 the	 rationality	of	 “homo	economicus”	(“economic	man”).			Big	Data			 Extremely	 large	 data	 sets,	 whose	 size	 and	 complexity	 makes	traditional	 data	 processing	 applications	 inadequate	 to	 analyse	them.	Once	analysed	computationally,	 they	can	 reveal	 current	as	well	 as	 predicted	 patterns,	 trends,	 and	 associations,	 especially	relating	to	human	behaviour	and	interactions.		Commons			 The	natural,	cultural	and	technological	resources	accessible	to	all	members	of	a	society,	which	are	held	in	common	and	not	owned	privately.	 Those	 include	 the	 natural	 environment	 and	 its	materials;	 cultural	 products;	 public	 goods,	 in	 the	 form	 of	infrastructures,	education,	healthcare,	and	digital	information	and	communication	resources.		Communist	and	Socialist	Literature		 The	third	chapter	of	Marx	and	Engels’	Manifesto	of	the	Communist	Party	 (1848),	 in	 which	 the	 two	 authors	 critique	 three	 main	strands	 of	 socialist	 and	 communist	 thought:	 Reactionary	Socialism,	 Conservative	 or	 Bourgeois	 Socialism,	 and	 Critical-Utopian	Socialism	and	Communism.	Marx	and	Engels	use	this	part	of	 their	manifesto	 in	 order	 to	 explain	 in	 detail	 the	 failures	 of	 all	
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three	 approaches,	 which	 then	 allows	 them	 to	 draw	 clearer	distinctions	with	their	own	political	propositions.		Cryptocurrency						
A	 digital	 currency	 using	 encryption	 techniques	 in	 order	 to	regulate	the	generation	of	its	units	and	verify	the	transfer	of	funds	through	 secure	 transactions.	 Cryptocurrencies	 use	 decentralized	control	as	opposed	to	centralized	electronic	money,	or	centralized	banking	systems	(e.g.	Central	Banks).		Cybertopos			 The	 hybrid	 conceptualisation	 and	 use	 of	 physical	 and	 online	spaces,	 by	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 unique	 qualities	 (advantages	and	disadvantages)	of	both.	Cybertopos	can	be	understood	as	the	object	of	pro-cybernetic	localism.		Data	Capitalism			 An	 economic	 system	 whose	 main	 raw	 material	 and	 output	 is	programmable,	 corporate-owned	 information	 (data).	 It	constitutes	 a	 particular	 stage	 in	 the	 development	 of	 Late	Capitalism,	catalysed	by	the	launch	of	the	World	Wide	Web	in	the	1990s	 (early	 phase)	 and	 the	 introduction	 of	Web	2.0	 in	 the	mid	2000s	 (maturity).	 Its	 main	 characteristics	 are	 datatization,	 the	algorithmic	 control	 of	 the	 economy	 and	 the	 passage	 from	consumption	 to	 production	 as	 the	 principal	 agent	 of	 economic	expansion	(user-generated	content	and	data).		Datatization		 The	translation	of	all	types	of	information	into	readable,	sharable	and	comparable	data,	which	may,	then,	become	commodities.		Distributed	art	object			
The	 art	 object	 that	 is	 created,	 reproduced	 and	 disseminated	through	the	distributed	network	that	is	the	Internet.		End	of	History		 The	 idea	 that	 following	 the	 end	of	 the	Cold	War	we	 reached	 the	completion	point	of	mankind’s	 ideological	evolution,	 through	 the	universalization	of	Western	liberal	democracy	as	the	final	form	of	human	 government.	 According	 to	 Francis	 Fukuyama	 and	 his	“conclusive”	version	of	human	development,	 the	 free	market	 is	a	key	component	of	this	optimum	form	of	social	organization.		Financialization			 The	 increase	 in	 size	 and	 influence	 of	 financial	 markets	 and	institutions,	 which	 subordinates	 the	 traditional	 processes	 of	production	 (industrial	 economy	 and	 agricultural	 economics)	 to	the	accumulation	of	profits	in	financial	systems.		Gamification			 The	application	of	 game-design	elements	and	game	principles	 to	non-game	 contexts.	 Gamification	 is	 often	 used	 as	 an	 online	marketing	 technique	 in	 order	 to	 encourage	 engagement	 with	products	or	services.		Googlization		 The	totalising	effect	of	Google	on	our	personal	information,	habits,	opinions,	and	judgments	because	of	its	dominance	in	the	fields	of	online	 advertising,	 software,	 geographic	 services,	 e-mail,	
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publishing,	and	Web	commerce.		Grand	narrative		(or	Metanarrative)		 An	overarching	narrative	about	narratives	of	history,	 experience	and	knowledge,	which	provide	a	structure	for	people’s	beliefs,	and	give	 meaning	 to	 their	 experiences	 through	 the	 anticipated	completion	of	a	(as	yet	unrealized)	master	idea.		Hacktivism			 The	subversive	and	unauthorised	use	of	computers	and	computer	networks	in	order	to	further	social	or	political	ends.		Hackerspace		 A	community-operated,	usually	“not-for-profit”	workspace,	where	people	with	a	common	interest	in	computing	and	technology	can	meet	 to	 collaborate	 on	 projects,	 while	 sharing	 ideas,	 equipment	and	knowledge.		High-frequency	trading			
A	 type	of	algorithmic	 trading	 in	which	 large	volumes	of	 financial	products	 (equities,	 futures,	 options,	 currencies,	 etc.)	 are	 bought	and	 sold	 automatically,	 continuously	 and	 at	 very	 high	 speeds,	capturing	with	each	transaction	very	small	amounts	of	money	that	accumulate	quickly.			Homo	Economicus	 The	 figurative	 human	 being	who	 is	 characterized	 by	 the	 infinite	ability	to	make	rational	decisions.		Internet	governance		 The	 development	 and	 application	 of	 shared	 principles,	 norms,	rules,	decision-making	processes	and	programmes	that	shape	the	evolution	and	use	of	the	Internet.	According	to	Milton	L.	Mueller,	there	 are	 four	 distinct	 approaches	 to	 Internet	 governance:	denationalized	 liberalism,	 global	 governmentality,	 cyber-nationalism	 (networked	 nationalism),	 and	 cyber-conservatism	(cyber-reactionaries).		Internet	of	Places			 The	 interconnection	 via	 the	 Internet	 of	 computing	 devices	situated	in	different	 locations,	which	allows	the	exchange	of	data	relating	 to	 local	 conditions	 (e.g.	 weather)	 and	 a	 variety	 of	community	 assets	 and	 services	 (e.g.	 schools,	 libraries,	transportation	 systems,	 hospitals,	 power	 plants,	 water	 supply	networks,	waste	management,	law	enforcement,	etc.).		Internet	of	Praxis			 The	 combination	 of	 the	 distributive	 and	 distributed	 functions	 of	the	 Internet	 in	 order	 to	 fully	 actualise	 its	 transformative	potentialities.	 The	 distributive	 function	 is	 exemplified	 by	 the	Internet	 of	 Things	 and	 the	 Internet	 of	 Places	 (distributing/	exchanging	 data),	 and	 the	 distributed	 function	 refers	 to	 the	Internet’s	 architecture	 as	 a	 distributed	 network	 (openness	 to	modification,	personalisation	and	ownership).		Internet	of	Things				
The	 interconnection	 via	 the	 Internet	 of	 computing	 devices	embedded	 in	 everyday	 physical	 items,	 which	 renders	 them	“smart”	 objects	 capable	 of	 exchanging	 data	 and	 being	 remotely	controlled	in	real	time.	
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	 	Jetztzeit			 The	 notion	 of	 “here-and-now”	 according	 to	 Walter	 Benjamin,	which	 defines	 “the	 consciousness	 of	 exploding	 the	 continuum	of	history	 [that]	 is	 peculiar	 to	 the	 revolutionary	 classes	 in	 the	moment	of	their	action”.		Laissez-faire			 An	economic	paradigm	in	which	governments	totally	abstain	from	interfering	in	the	workings	of	the	free	market	through	any	kind	of	regulations,	privileges,	tariffs	and	subsidies.		Multiple	democracies		 The	 capacity	 to	 formulate	 multiple	 translations	 of	 the	 same	democratic	principle.	According	to	Zygmunt	Bauman,	this	process	is	 expressed	 through	 the	 negotiation	 between	 “the	 language	 of	individual/familial	interests	and	the	language	of	public	interests”,	which	originates	from	the	oikos-agora	binary.		Multitude			 A	new	type	of	collective	subject	within	networked	societies,	which	despite	sharing	some	of	proletariat’s	traits,	refutes	its	uniformity,	a	 common	 identity	 and	 its	 definition	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 class	antagonisms.		Neo-Luddism		 A	 philosophical	 strand	 that	 opposes	 many	 forms	 of	 new	technologies	and	their	applications.	In	the	context	of	post-Marxist	thought	 and	 networked	 media,	 Neo-Luddites	 believe	 that	 the	Internet	 is	 merely	 an	 instrument	 for	 the	 development	 of	 new,	better	 concealed,	 yet	 more	 aggressive	 forms	 of	 Late	 Capitalism.	The	name	of	the	strand	originates	from	the	British	Luddites,	who	were	 active	 as	 an	 anti-technology	movement	 between	 1811	 and	1816.		Net	Art		 Digital	art	that	is	created	for	the	Internet	and	distributed	through	networked	media.		Net	neutrality		 The	absence	of	any	quantitative	or	qualitative	bias	in	the	way	that	Internet	service	providers	and	governments	regulate	access	to	the	Internet	and	treat	online	data.		New	Media	Art			 Artworks	 that	 combine	 traditional	 media-based	 practices	 (e.g.	video,	animation	and	experimental	 film)	with	practices	based	on	new	technologies,	which	do	not	necessarily	have	a	media-related	component	(e.g.	electronic	art,	robotic	art	and	bio	art).		Post-Fordism		 The	dominant	production	model	in	most	industrialized	countries,	which	is	characterised	by	specialisation	in	production	and	labour,	economies	 of	 scope,	 the	 introduction	 of	 new	 Information	 and	Communication	Technologies	(ICTs),	and	the	development	of	 the	services	 sector.	 This	 paradigm	 constitutes	 a	 departure	 from	 the	large-scale	mass-production	methods	pioneered	by	Henry	Ford.		
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Post-Internet	Art			 A	group	of	artworks	that	are	influenced	by,	mimic,	or	fully	adopt	aesthetic	 elements	 of	 the	 Internet,	 in	 order	 to	 remediate	 them,	predominantly	in	the	gallery’s	“white	cube”.		Post-net	participation			
A	 mode	 of	 participatory	 action	 that	 takes	 into	 account	 the	capacities	 and	 limitations	 of	 both	 the	 online	 milieu	 and	 the	physical	 spaces	 that	 relate	 to	 the	action.	This	 joint	 conception	of	online	 and	 offline	 realities	 does	 not	 necessarily	 materialize	 as	activities	taking	place	concurrently	online	and	offline,	but	always	considers	the	traits	of	both.		Post-truth	politics			 A	 political	 culture	 in	which	 objective	 facts	 are	 less	 influential	 in	shaping	 public	 opinion	 than	 appeals	 to	 emotion	 and	 personal	belief.		Powerless	socialization				
The	 context	 of	 spectacularized	 isolation	dominating	 the	 function	of	 social	 media	 platforms,	 which	 cannot	 have	 a	 real	transformative	effect	on	individuals	and	the	society.		Pro-cybernetic	localism			
The	 intentional	 focus	 on	 the	 locale	 through	 networked	 media,	which	aims	at	activating	the	political,	social,	economic	and	cultural	potentialities	of	a	particular	physical	space,	whilst	enabling	 links	with	other	locales	on	cyberspace.			Procedural	sublime			 The	 ability	 of	 complex	 computer-based	 systems	 to	 present	 an	awe-inspiring	 range	 of	 potentialities,	 regardless	 of	 the	 aesthetic	forms	through	which	those	possibilities	are	being	manifested.		Prosumption			 The	 blurring	 and	 merge	 of	 the	 actions	 of	 production	 and	consumption	 through	 the	use	of	new	media	 technologies.	This	 is	particularly	 relevant	 to	 Internet	 users,	 who	 are	 constantly	engaged	 in	 creative	 activities,	 communication,	 building	 online	communities	and	producing	content.			Pure	Gewalt		 A	type	of	transcendent	violence/power	exerted	by	the	proletariat	at	 the	time	of	 its	revolution	against	unjust	possession.	According	to	Walter	Benjamin’s	reinterpretation	of	Kantian	philosophy,	pure	Gewalt	should	be	used	with	prudence	and	as	a	kind	of	“gift”,	for	it	constitutes	 a	 stage	 towards	 the	 realization	 of	 the	 category	 of	justice.			Scientific	Socialism		 The	strand	of	socialist	thought	based	on	scientific	methodology,	in	whose	context	observation	is	essential	to	developing	or	amending	elements	of	political	theory.	Scientific	socialists	believe	that	due	to	technological	innovation	and	increasing	automation	the	fall	in	the	average	 rate	 of	 profit	 is	 inevitable,	 and	 this	 entails	 that	 more	capitalist	crises	are	likely	to	occur	(technological	determinism).		Society	of	Non-Spectacle		 The	 development	 of	 a	 society	 in	 which	 new	 media	 procedural	sublimity	makes	it	impossible	to	distinguish	between	spectacle	as	content	 and	 the	 technological	 interfaces	 through	 which	 it	 is	
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mediated.	This	fully	“integrated”	spectacle	renders	gamification	a	constituent	part	not	only	of	everyday	communication,	but	also	of	political	and	social	constitution.			Struggle	for	recognition		 The	struggle	of	humans	to	be	recognised	by	other	humans	as	the	catalyst	 of	 any	 historical	 process.	 According	 to	 G.W.F.	 Hegel,	we	can	 gain	 self-consciousness	 as	 autonomous	 subjects	 only	 by	interacting	 with	 and	 being	 recognised	 by	 other	 autonomous	subjects.	The	effort	to	do	so	is	our	“struggle	for	recognition”.		Tactical	Media		 A	set	of	activist	media	art	practices,	which	intervene	temporarily	in	 public	 spaces	 in	 order	 to	 express	 a	 critique	 of	 the	 political,	economic	and	cultural	order.		Unstable	Equilibrium	of	Compromise		
The	 calculated,	 short-term	 sacrifices	made	 by	 a	 capitalist	 state’s	ruling	classes,	which	–	however	–	do	not	challenge	in	any	way	the	established	relationships	of	power.	According	to	Nicos	Poulantzas,	the	 “unstable	 equilibrium	 of	 compromise”	 is	 a	 fundamental	 tool	for	the	prolongation	of	the	capitalist	system.		Value-driven	demos			 The	supranational	civic	demos	produced	by	the	implementation	of	a	“variable	geometry”	political	structure.		Utopianism		 The	belief	in,	or	pursuit	of	a	society	in	which	everything	is	perfect,	through	 the	 establishment	 of	 political,	 economic,	 social	 and	cultural	structures	that	are	considered	as	ideal.		Variable	geometry			 A	 polity	 whose	 demos	 is	 defined,	 understood	 and	 accepted	 in	civic,	 non-organic	 cultural	 terms,	which	go	beyond	 the	 construct	of	nation	and	allow	different	levels	and	types	of	civic	engagement.	The	 concept	 originally	 refers	 to	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 European	Union	and,	 according	 to	 J.H.H.	Weiler,	 it	 consists	 in	 the	 idea	 that	different	 countries	 should	 integrate	 at	 different	 levels	 and	 pace	depending	 on	 their	 political,	 economic	 and	 social	 conditions	(“multi-speed	Europe”).			Web-based	Art			 A	subset	of	New	Media	Art	that	includes	artworks	using	the	World	Wide	 Web	 as	 their	 exclusive	 medium	 of	 creation	 and	dissemination	(net	art);	and	artworks	that	might	exist	in	physical	spaces,	 but	 also	 have	 important	 online	 components	 that	 are	necessary	 for	 the	 communication	of	 their	 creators’	 aesthetic	 and	ideological	aims.			 	
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